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ABSTRACT 
This study in constitutional history argues that the American framers created the 
Constitution to address the problem of coercion in American society. The framers’ 
antecedent commitment to a conception of the law that made coercion its sine qua non 
best explains why they sought reconstitution rather than amendment in 1787, and why 
they made certain choices and not others in establishing and administering the first 
federal government in the decade after ratification. The research revolves around two 
central questions.   
First, why did coercion concern the framers? Certainly a number of concrete 
policy-related failures coming to a head in 1787 starkly illuminated both the Continental 
Congress’s want of enforcement powers and the foundering magistracies in the states. 
Part I, however, situates the coercion problem in a deeper historico-intellectual context. 
The American Revolution produced a constitutional discourse that made the consent of 
the governed its essential ingredient and coercion ipso facto illegitimate. At the same 
time, the Revolution unleashed egalitarian social thinking predicated on the belief in an 
absolute equality of mind, ability, and opportunity among individuals. Part I shows that 
	  	   vi	  
these principles had real legal consequences in the decade after Independence that 
scholars have overlooked. The principle of consent produced a revolution against 
independent judicial power. The principle of equality produced a revolution against 
professional lawyers and the common law. Both insurgencies posed special threats to 
legal professionalism as such and both advanced upon a single shared legal ideal: law 
without force. Fearing anarchy and seeking to secure their own place within the 
constitutional order, American lawyers calling themselves Federalists waged a 
counterrevolution against this conception of law in 1787.   
But how? Part II recovers an originally understood constitutional structure of 
coercion that included military, magisterial, and judicial sanctions, to operate in 
accordance with a priority scheme that partially accommodated the inherited aversion to 
standing armies. It further shows that the Federalists brought this structure of coercion to 
bear on individuals and states within the union in every area that concerned the framers, 
and nothing in the Jeffersonian ascendancy significantly compromised the Federalists’ 
achievements in this regard.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study in constitutional history takes a problem-centered approach to the 
American founding. The framers faced certain constitutional problems in 1787 and meant 
for the Constitution and the first federal government created thereunder to respond to 
those problems. The primary problem they faced, and the one that subsumed and 
animated virtually every other issue that attracted attention in 1787, concerned the 
Continental Congress’s constitutional inability to enforce its policies by coercive 
sanctions.  
The evidence in support of this proposition is unassailable. Benjamin Rush listed 
four “defects in the confederation” in his oft-cited “Address to the American People” 
published in January 1787. At the top of Rush’s list: “the deficiency of coercive power.”1 
All the confederation’s “vices” enumerated by James Madison prior to the Federal 
Convention revolved around the coercion problem and one in particular put the matter in 
no uncertain terms: “A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of 
Government,” Madison wrote. “The federal system being destitute of both, wants the 
great vital principles of a Political Cons[ti]tution.”2 During the Federal Convention, 
Hamilton reiterated these points, describing coercion as the “great & essential principle[] 
necessary for the support of Government.”3  At the opening of the Connecticut ratifying 
convention, Oliver Ellsworth told attendees that a single foundational flaw in the 
confederation necessitated the new Constitution: “The present [system] is merely 
                                                
1 Rush, “Address to the American People,” Jan. 1787, in DHRC, 13:46.  
2 Madison, Writings, 2:363. For all the vices described by Madison (eleven in total), see “Vices of the 
Political System of the U. States,” [Apr. 1787], in ibid., 2:361-69.      
3 Farrand, Records, 1:284 (June 18, 1787).  
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advisory. It has no coercive power.”4 The Massachusetts Senate pledged its support for 
the new frame of government with reference to one overriding principle: “the power of 
coercion is indispensibly requisite to the very  name of Government.”5 The list goes on. 
Over and again, proponents of the new system diagnosed the constitutional crisis in 1787 
in the same essential terms.   
Two questions naturally arise: First, why did the Continental Congress’s want of 
coercive power concern the Federalists? Second, how did they address the problem? If 
the want of coercion ranked high or, for some influential individuals, highest on the 
Federalists’ list of objections to the Confederation, and pervaded all others, then these 
questions arguably warrant serious study. Indeed, I shall contend here that they provide 
the essential key to properly understanding just what happened in and after 1787 as a 
constitutional matter. And yet, notwithstanding the enormous corpus of constitutional 
history and historically-oriented constitutional scholarship produced in the last century, 
not a single work in the overcrowded field has pursued these questions in a disciplined 
way.  
Why? The liberalism-republicanism debate in the constitutional historiography 
deserves some of the blame, for none of the positions within this debate can reconcile the 
American system of constitutional government with coercion. Republics predicated on 
political virtue in either its classical or early modern expressions stood opposed to 
coercion.6 To assert, on the other hand, that liberal individualism better describes the 
                                                
4 Ellsworth Convention Speech, Jan. 7, 1788, in DHRC, 15:272. 
5 Mass. Senate’s Answer to Governor Hancock’s Speech, Mar. 4, 1788, in ibid., 16:226. 
6 In most of its ancient and modern articulations, republican virtue meant, first and foremost, “obedience to 
law” predicated on active participation in the lawmaking process and, in representative governments, 
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ascendant framework for American government at the founding excludes adequate 
consideration of the coercion question by shifting the framework of analysis from power 
to rights and, accordingly, from enabling the federal government to restraining it.7  
Indeed, a libertarian bias with connections to the liberalism side of the 
republicanism-liberalism debate has slanted most of the major interpretations of the 
American constitutional founding since the Progressive Era.8 By “libertarian bias,” I 
mean simply an undue emphasis on originally understood restraints on federal power 
under the Constitution, together with a correlative focus on the protection of negative 
rights within the constitutional order.9 Gordon Wood, Jack Rakove, Lance Banning, and 
others have partaken in and perpetuated the libertarian bias in varying degrees.10 The 
                                                                                                                                            
deference to officials fairly elected as representatives. “[T]his submission [to the law] had to be a 
conscious, voluntary act, because sound republics were assumed to be incapable of rigorous, continuing 
coercion.” Banning, “Some Second Thoughts on Virtue,” 200. As Gordon Wood observes, “In a republic . . 
. there could be no sustained coercion from above. The state, like no other, rested on the consent of the 
government freely given not compelled. In a free government the laws, as the American people never tired 
of repeating, had to be obeyed by the people for conscience’s sake, not for wrath’s.” Wood, Creation of the 
American Republic, 66. Within the republican tradition, virtue stood opposed to “corruption” inside and 
outside of government, and particularly to professional standing armies. See Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, 506-34.     
7 See, e.g., Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 608, 547, 559. For works discussing the liberalism-
republicanism debates in the constitutional historiography, see Appleby, “Republicanism in Old and New 
Contexts”; Horwitz, “Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought”; Kloppenberg, 
“Virtues of Liberalism”; Rodgers, “Republicanism: The Career of a Concept”; Shalhope, “Republicanism 
and Early American Historiography”; Shalhope, “Toward a Republican Synthesis.” 
8 For mid-century variances, see Jensen, The Articles of Confederation; Jensen, The New Nation; Crosskey, 
Politics and the Constitution. 
9 For a recent article demonstrating the considerable extent to which libertarian constitutionalism has 
become “mainstreamed” in recent years, see Bernstein and Somin, “Mainstreaming of Libertarian 
Constitutionalism.” In questioning this libertarian bias in the literature, my own interpretation herein 
harmonizes with three recent works: Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government; Johnson, Righteous 
Anger at the Wicked States; and Raphael, Constitutional Myths. For two other recent works that complicate 
libertarian historiographical orientations, see Holton, Unruly Americans and Bouton, Taming Democracy. 
10 Gordon Wood, for example, argues that for the Federalists the separation of governmental power 
“became the best defense of liberty,” now conceived as “personal or private, the protection of individual 
rights against all governmental encroachments.” Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 608; see also, 
ibid., 532, 547, 559, discussing the Federalists’ commitments to popular accountability, checks and 
balances, and bicameralism, as restraints on federal power. Jack Rakove suggests that the Antifederalist 
view of representation—conceived as a “mirror” and a positive restraint on government—prevailed at 
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tendency among constitutional historians to anchor analysis of the Federal Convention in 
either the “Great Compromise” on representation, or in the shift from a government of 
general powers (as reflected in the Virginia Plan) to limited powers has surely 
contributed to the libertarian bias. The disproportionate significance accorded three (of 
eight-five) essays in The Federalist series—Nos. 10, 51, and 78—has also skewed 
historical interpretations of the founding along libertarian lines, since all three emphasize 
restraints on federal power.11 Yet probably no factor has contributed more to the 
libertarian bias than the tendency to make James Madison, particularly post-ratification, 
the mouthpiece for the Federalist persuasion. This move has permitted constitutional 
                                                                                                                                            
ratification and otherwise emphasizes the framers’ commitment to protecting individual rights. See Rakove, 
Original Meanings, 232-33, 238, 243, 288-338. Lance Banning contends that James Madison’s consistent 
aim throughout his career laying in protecting “liberty,” conceived both as “inherent rights of individuals” 
and “popular control” over the federal government. Banning, Sacred Fire of Liberty, 10. Banning 
elsewhere asserts that Madison championed “virtue” as the people’s “continuing participation in a politics 
that trusted only limited responsibilities to national officials” who should “be continuously watched [by the 
people] for any signs of an appearance of a separate set of interests.” Banning, “Some Second Thoughts on 
Virtue,” 207. Even historians empathetic to the Hamiltonian perspective have not gone untouched by the 
libertarian bias. Forrest McDonald, for example, maintains that protecting “the lives, liberty, and property 
of the citizens” was “inherent in [] [the framers’] purpose, that the framers emphasized limitations on 
congressional power, and that the Constitution was designed to “thwart” expression of the general will. 
McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 3, 268. The post-Progressive claim that the framers sought not to wage a 
counterrevolution but rather to consummate the Revolution, has nourished the libertarian bias in the 
historiography. See, e.g., Rossiter, The Grand Convention, 261. See also Chapter 5, Introduction. 
11 Leading constitutional historians recognize that these three essays have attained “high canonical status” 
in the literature. Rakove, Original Meanings, 160. The Federalist Nos. 10 and 51 deeply shape Gordon 
Wood’s influential interpretation of the national founding. Wood, Creation, 499-518, 547-61; see also 
Kramer, “Madison’s Audience,” 672. Garry Wills structures an entire book around these two essays and the 
interpretations that surround them in the literature. Wills, Explaining America. Finally, it goes without 
saying that The Federalist No. 78 has dominated historical understandings of judicial review and judicial 
independence at the founding. As to No. 10, critics have persuasively challenged the “[false] conviction 
that its insights were widely shared” during the founding. Kramer, “Madison’s Audience,” 672. Recent 
scholarly attempts to steer attention away from these three canonical essays on governmental restraint, 
however, question only the intended means of restraint, not the historical centrality and importance of 
restraining the federal government in the first instance. See Kramer, The People Themselves, 81-92. 
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historians to advance the claim that the Federalists made it their primary objective to limit 
government and protect rights.12  
Does this contention have a concrete historical basis in the facts facing the 
framers in 1787? The strongest basis concerned creditor rights under siege in the 
popularly controlled state legislatures. This did deeply concern Madison and many other 
Federalists in 1787. To most Americans, however, the Federalists’ commitment to 
upholding these rights hardly qualified as libertarian. After all, the creditors that mattered 
most to the Federalists hailed from Britain, the enemy, and claimed their rights under a 
treaty that the people had not approved and with whose terms Britain had not complied. 
Because the states legislatures had enacted the contract impediments in question, 
moreover, enforcing these contract rights would, in effect, stifle the most fundamental 
republican right of all: the right to self-government. The constitutional problem raised by 
creditor rights in 1787 concerned the coercion of American debtors and state legislatures, 
not the protection of American liberties.  
The problem of control eclipsed the question of right in 1787. Control in turn 
required coercion or the credible threat thereof. The task of enforcing contract rights 
formed only one part of the problem. The Continental Congress’s inability to raise a 
revenue sufficient to make required payments on the sizable national war debt probably 
held greatest significance in this regard. Less appreciated is Congress’s disastrous 
attempts to assert appellate jurisdiction over the state courts in the limited sphere of prize 
                                                
12 See Rakove, Original Meanings, xvi; Wood, Creation, 499-518, 532, 547-61; Banning, Sacred Fire, 10; 
Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, passim. Max Edling correctly observes that “[t]he mainstream 
interpretation of the Federalist argument presents it as a call for limited government and protection of 
minority rights.” Edling, Revolution in Favor of Government, 219.   
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cases. In notable prize appeals involving Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire, 
the states refused to recognize the federal court’s jurisdiction and ignored its decrees. 
Finally, in 1786 Congress proved itself completely unable to respond to the Shaysites in 
Massachusetts, unable protect its own arsenal at Springfield, and unable to prosecute the 
rebels who had attacked it. “[H]ere is felt,” wrote congressman Edward Carrington, “the 
imbecility, the futility, the nothingness of the federal powers.”13  
The Federalists themselves, however, did not contrast coercion with rights. They 
contrasted coercion with the older discourse of popular consent—the paradigm around 
which all the state constitutions had converged. Herein lay one of the dissertation’s 
central claims of historical change. At the nation’s founding constitutional moment in 
1787 a conceptual transformation occurred within American legal culture that explains 
the constitutional changes of the period in ways that historians and scholars have 
overlooked: Coercion supplanted consent as government’s perceived sine qua non. 
Advocates for reform no longer made it their primary aim to create a government 
predicated on the consent of the governed as the state constitution makers had. Instead, 
they sought to establish a system of coercive federal power minimally consistent with 
what they called “republican principles.” This overlooked discursive shift on the eve of 
reform gave the terms of constitutional debate a whole new center of gravity that would 
shape not only the drafting of the Constitution, but the ratification debates and the 
establishment of the first federal government.    
                                                
13 Edward Carrington to the Governor of Virginia, Dec. 8, 1786, in Burnett, Letters, 8:518. 
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This discursive shift and the reconstitution of the nation that followed, moreover, 
marked a truly counterrevolutionary moment in American history. A century ago, Charles 
Beard first depicted the framers as counterrevolutionaries, arguing that their economic 
interests motivated them to pursue a new constitutional framework.14 Gordon Wood has 
alternatively suggested that a counterrevolutionary sociology underlay the movement for 
constitutional reform in 1787.15 The analysis herein contends that neither economic 
interests nor sociological anxiety gave rise to the Constitution of the United States. A 
counterrevolutionary jurisprudence did. This jurisprudence grew out of a particular 
conception of law embraced by the Federalists: “It is essential to the idea of a law that it 
be attended with a sanction.”16 The framers’ antecedent commitment to this principle, 
above all others, best explains why they sought reconstitution rather than amendment in 
1787 and why they made certain choices and not others in establishing and administering 
the first federal government in the decade after ratification.  
Yet to characterize this jurisprudence as counterrevolutionary, we must identify 
what qualifies as “revolutionary” in the first instance. This, in turn, shall require some 
investigation of the American Revolution’s immediate legal and constitutional 
consequences. The inherited historical wisdom characterizes the Revolution as a legally 
conservative event. 17  Legal historians suggest that, standing alone, the Revolution 
                                                
14 See Beard, An Economic Interpretation.  
15 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 485. 
16 The Federalist No. 15, 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added); see also Madison, Writings, 2:363; 
Zenas [James Sullivan], Independent Chronicle (Boston), Apr. 27, 1786, 1.  
17 See Morris, “Legalism Versus Revolutionary Doctrine”; Pole, “Reflections on American Law and the 
American Revolution”; Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, vols. 1-4; Hulsebosch, 
Constituting Empire. For asserted continuities in laws and legal culture surrounding work and slavery, see 
Tomlins, Freedom Bound, 65, 398-99, 504-06. 
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produced very little change at all in American legal institutions and doctrines.18 The 
dissertation challenges the continuity thesis by shifting the frame of reference from 
institutions and doctrines to legal culture. By legal culture, I mean publically expressed 
values and attitudes toward law, lawyers, judicial officers, courts, juries, and/or the legal 
process within American society. Prevailing historical interpretations of legal culture in 
the age of the American Revolution converge around a shared historical proposition: the 
Revolution produced a legalistic ideology in American life that made the law “king” and 
which gave primacy to the rule of law over other modes of governance.19  Part I offers an 
interpretation that challenges the law-exalting suppositions in the literature. Focusing on 
Massachusetts in the period from 1774 to 1786, the research demonstrates that the 
American Revolution in fact spawned a constellation of attitudes deeply hostile to 
independent judicial power, the inherited legal process, the English common law,  and to 
the legal profession as such.  
Part I’s examination of the popular resistance to the judicial courts in 
Massachusetts during the American Revolution uncovers significant cultural conflicts 
over whether a government predicated on the consent of the governed could assimilate an 
independent judicial power on the English model. For well-known historical reasons, 
                                                
18 See, e.g., Mann, “Legal Reform and the Revolution.” While otherwise downplaying the extent of the 
Revolution’s legal impact, Professor Mann does note that the states’ efforts to limit the number of capital 
crimes and restrict corporal punishment reflected the “influence of revolutionary ideology.” Ibid., 440; see 
also Mann, “The Evolutionary Revolution in American Law.” Mann has elsewhere argued that legal 
changes which other scholars have linked to the Revolution in fact began to occur well before the 
Revolution in Connecticut. Mann, Neighbors and Strangers. For the alternative view, see Nelson, 
Americanization, and Horwitz, Transformation of American Law. 
19 See Wilf, Law’s Imagined Republic, 56; Edwards, People and Their Peace, 66; Ferguson, Law and 
Letters, 11, 16; Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology, 21; Reid, In a Defiant Stance. According to John Philip 
Reid, “It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the legal aspects of the American Revolution could be told 
under the title In Defense of the Rule of Law.” Reid, “The Rule of Law,” 632. In his widely read Common 
Sense (1776), Thomas Paine asserted that “in America the law is king.” Paine, Complete Writings, 1:29.  
 9 
most Americans during this period could easily embrace some measure of judicial 
independence from the executive branch. Controversy revolved around whether and to 
what extent the judges should possess independence from the people themselves. The 
eastern lawyers angled toward greater such independence. The populists sought in the 
first instance to abolish the state courts and localize the administration of justice in the 
towns; and, to the extent any state courts remained, to remake them as representative 
institutions directly accountable to the people. Although most of the early state 
constitutions established a formal tripartite separation of powers, all also included 
considerable concessions to the populists in this regard. Even the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, which otherwise seemed to embrace the English model in its 
judicial article and which, as a result, the populists refused to credit with full legitimacy, 
took pains to describe the judges, like all other representatives and officials, as the 
people’s “substitutes and agents, and [] at all times accountable to them.”20  
At the cultural level, however, the early state constitutions resolved nothing. A 
litigation explosion in the 1780s inflamed the preexisting divisions in Massachusetts, as 
did the growing wealth, power, and asserted independence of the professional lawyers 
prosecuting these cases. By mid-decade, post-Revolutionary populist anxiety over 
judicial independence had converged with the anti-aristocratic ideology cultivated in the 
attack on the Society of the Cincinnati, to ignite a self-conscious revolution against 
inherited legal institutions unlike anything Americans had seen before. The revolt 
reached culmination in a series of influential newspaper articles published in 
                                                
20 Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1 (Dec. of Rights), art. V.  
 10 
Massachusetts during the spring of 1786 wherein upstart publicist Benjamin Austin, Jr. 
advanced the audacious claim that neither lawyers nor the common law had any rightful 
place in a republican society.  
The dissertation’s historically grounded interpretation of the antilawyer 
controversies in Massachusetts demonstrates, first, that an egalitarian sociology born out 
of the American Revolution, rather than economic pressures (let alone Christian religion), 
lay behind the antilawyerism that convulsed Massachusetts and a number of the other 
states in the 1780s. Second, the dissertation shows that post-Revolutionary antilawyerism 
had a profound impact on the legal profession and, ultimately, the American legal mind 
that helps explain the creation of the Constitution in 1787. The episode in fact marked an 
important moment in the rise of lawyers within American society. The antilawyer 
challenge intensified rather than moderated the lawyers’ sense of their own constitutional 
indispensability. In responding to the attacks on their existence and legitimacy, moreover, 
the lawyers acquired a sense of professional solidarity they had never before possessed 
and that extended well beyond Massachusetts.21 Thereafter American lawyers dominated 
the process of framing the Constitution, the ratification debates, and federal statecraft in 
the 1790s. The Antifederalists keenly perceived this—and feared it. “Beware of the 
lawyers,” declared one New York Antifederalist editor. “Of the men who framed the 
monarchial, tyrannical, diabolical system of slavery, the New Constitution, one half were 
                                                
21 McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 182. 
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lawyers . . . to whose wicked arts we may chiefly attribute the adoption of the abominable 
system.”22 
In addition to “annihilating” the legal profession, the Austinites would have 
completely abolished the common law and replaced it with “fundamental principles of 
law,” by which they meant a configuration of common sense universally possessed and 
established local customs. In lieu of lawyers, judges, and the judicial process, they 
championed personal representation and a mode of referring disputes to local “referees” 
mutually agreed upon by the parties and personally familiar with applicable local 
customs. The referees’ decision would have a final and binding effect with no further 
appeals except when “new evidence” arose, in which case the parties would become 
entitled to a second hearing before the same referees. The logic of the reference rendered 
coercive enforcement in the manner of common law execution writs unnecessary and, in 
fact, obnoxious. Herein, the dissertation contends, lay the American Revolution’s central 
legal ideal—the same ideal toward which backcountry populists hostile to independent 
judicial power had advanced in the 1770s: law without force. Fearing the destruction of 
contracts and seeking to secure their own place within the constitutional order, 
Massachusetts lawyers fired the opening shots in a counterrevolution against this 
conception of law in 1786. A year later, American lawyers calling themselves Federalists 
consummated it.  
 
 
                                                
22 A True Antifederalist and No Lawyer, Daily Advertiser (N.Y.), Mar. 4, 1789, 2. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
LAW IN THE CRUCIBLE OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
* * * 
Introduction: Adams and the Horse Jockey 
In late August 1775, with Boston under siege and the American Revolution in 
swing, John Adams returned from the Continental Congress to Massachusetts where he 
had an experience that stayed with him until the day he died. Riding through 
Washington’s camp one day, Adams met a former client, an individual who Adams 
recalled “was always in the law . . . sued in many actions at almost every court”—and yet 
“sometimes in the right” for Adams recollected that he had “commonly been successful.”  
Upon seeing Adams, this man, a “common horse-jockey,” immediately approached his 
former lawyer: “Oh, Mr. Adams, what great things have you and your colleagues done 
for us! We can never be grateful enough to you. There are no Courts of Justice now in 
this province, and I hope there will never be another.” The horse jockey’s statements put 
Adams into a “profound reverie, if not a fit of melancholy” and, at that moment, he began 
to perceive a “great danger” that people actuated by “these principles” would assume 
power in America. Adams vowed to “guard against this spirit” apparently unleashed by 
the American Revolution.1   
                                                
1 Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 3:326-27.  
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Adams conveyed this anecdote in 1802, almost thirty years after the event, at 
which point he could observe “the Tryumph of Principles too nearly resembling those of 
my client.”2 Having just lost his bid for a second presidential term against Thomas 
Jefferson in easily the most acrimonious national political election the world had ever yet 
seen, Adams perhaps had personal motives to depict the horse jockey in an unfavorable 
light—as a proto-Jeffersonian “wretch” the likes of whom threatened to destroy requisite 
socio-constitutional balance and rend the nation asunder—and maybe even to conjure 
him out of thin air. Yet the record provides ample evidence that wretches like the jockey 
did exist in Massachusetts during the American Revolution. The jockey, moreover, 
correctly described an anomalous scene in Massachusetts in 1775 with respect to the 
judiciary. The established Massachusetts provincial courts of law at all levels had ceased 
doing business on the eve of the American Revolution and many courts remained closed 
until 1780.  
Why had the courts closed? Equally important, why did the courts stay closed for 
so long in Massachusetts notwithstanding the Declaration of Independence, the 
provisional state government’s efforts to reappoint judges and reopen the courts, and the 
transition of the war to the southern theatre? In every instance, crowds of people without 
formal political power prevented appointed provincial judges from hearing cases during 
the Revolution. Yet this only begs the questions of how and why the people themselves, 
and specifically which people, came to determine that the courts should cease doing 
business.  
                                                
2 Ibid., 3:327. 
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These questions boast historical significance for a number of reasons. To be sure, 
closure of the courts by grassroots resistance had some episodic precedent in the North 
Carolina backcountry during the imperial struggle, though under considerably different 
circumstances relating to immigration rather than the Revolution itself.3 In Massachusetts 
in particular, however, at the moment John Adams encountered the immortal horse 
jockey, forced court closures represented something quite new and, while the royal courts 
experienced resistance elsewhere on the eve of Independence, no other state saw a 
movement against the courts during the 1770s to quite the same extent or with the same 
intensity as the Bay State. Popular resistance to the judiciary in Massachusetts, moreover, 
rose and fell on basically the same temporal trajectory as the Revolution itself.  
All these things suggest a close connection between the Revolution’s very 
meaning in Massachusetts and attitudes toward judicial institutions that historians and 
scholars have not adequately explored. If nothing else, the controversy surrounding the 
courts in Massachusetts during the Revolution provides a portal into a lost world 
inhabited by revolutionary court resisters whose signature method, if not madness, 
essentially disappeared by 1800 and arguably no longer presents a live option for political 
protest in modern American society.  
 The horse jockey anecdote raises still other questions in this connection with 
implications that historians and scholars have rarely considered. Why did the jockey hope 
                                                
3 See Whittenburg, “Planters, Merchants, and Lawyers.” Compared to Massachusetts, court closures in 
North Carolina were episodic and did not extend through the Revolution itself. In South Carolina in the 
early 1770s, elite proprietors called themselves regulators and led the resistance movement against British 
policy in the colonies. See Klein, “Ordering the Backcountry”; Weir, Colonial South Carolina, 291-340.   
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that the courts would never sit again?4 And did, as the horse jockey suggested, Adams 
and his “colleagues” in some way cause either the court closures or the horse jockey’s 
hostile attitudes toward the courts, or both? Adams took these possibilities seriously and, 
indeed, part of the “profound reverie” he experienced lay in the question the horse jockey 
prompted Adams to ask himself: “Is this the Object for which I have been contending?”5 
Adams never answered. Yet, if understanding the Revolution’s intellectual legacy in 
Massachusetts counts as a legitimate historical enterprise, the question merits 
investigation.  
Adams himself opined that the opposition to the courts in Massachusetts during 
the American Revolution came from “the Sentiments of Debtors” and standard scholarly 
works in this area have roughly adhered to Adams’s interpretation.6 The historical record, 
however, does not bear out the economic explanation with regard to court closures in the 
1770s. First, it does not explain the forced closure of criminal courts. Second, low taxes, 
abundant paper money, and non-importation/consumption agreements meant that 
domestic farmers and others in the laboring classes, who more often than not stood on the 
                                                
4 Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 3:326. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See Taylor, Western Massachusetts in the Revolution; Newcomer, The Embattled Farmers; Handlin and 
Handlin, Commonwealth; Hoerder, Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts. Alan Taylor’s study of 
Maine in the age of Independence opposes the backcountry settlers or “liberty men” to “great proprietors” 
and contends that, together with the Shaysites, Whiskey Rebels, and Wild Yankees, the Maine settlers 
interpreted the Revolution to protect “small producers from the moneyed men.” Taylor, Liberty Men and 
Great Proprietors, 6. Taylor eschews economic reductionism and accords significance to an “agrarian” 
ideology purportedly distinct from class interest and to Christian religion in the backcountry. The liberty 
men embraced a Lockean labor theory of property, while the proprietors endorsed a legalistic theory of 
property rights derived from previous royal patents. Taylor does not, however, give any sustained attention 
to legal culture or attitudes towards constituted judicial courts. For a more ideological approach in 
Massachusetts in particular that pits Lockean individualism against Harringtonian republicanism in the 
1770s and 1780s, with some attention to the courts, see Brooke, Heart of the Commonwealth, 131-232; 
Brooke, “To the Quiet of the People.” For a work that sees the period through the prism of political parties, 
see Patterson, Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts. 
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debtor side of credit transactions, fared quite well economically from 1775 to 1780—
precisely the period during which so many courts remained closed.7 Those individuals 
who resisted the courts during this period never expressly cited an inability or 
unwillingness to pay their debts. They rather voiced constitutional objections to the 
courts.  
But what kind of constitutionalism could provide the rationale for obstructing the 
constituted courts of law in Massachusetts by popular force for more than six years, in 
some areas long after the break from England? How did the western populists make sense 
of their rebellion against judicial power? Historians have of course devoted considerable 
attention to Massachusetts during the Revolution, including the western counties. Rarely, 
however, has one pursued these specific questions through the turbulent course of events 
that marked the 1770s in Massachusetts.8  
I. Judicial Power and the Whig Mind  
Three types of courts existed in eighteenth-century Massachusetts: (i) a supreme 
provincial court—called the Superior Court of Judicature—staffed with one chief justice 
and four associates that rode circuit in the counties, with broad appellate jurisdiction and 
substantial original and concurrent jurisdiction in serious criminal matters; (ii) the four-
judge Inferior Courts of Common Pleas (“Common Pleas”), one per county, which heard 
civil matters, particularly contract cases; and (iii) the Court of General Sessions, one per 
                                                
7 See Harlow, “Economic Conditions in Massachusetts During the Revolution.” See also Handlin and 
Handlin, Commonwealth. 
8 For examples of historical works that focus on this period but sidestep attitudes toward the judiciary, see 
sources cited in note 6, particularly Patterson, Hoerder, and Newcomer. For one partial exception, see 
Brooke, “To the Quiet of the People,” 434-35, 439. For legal-historical scholarship addressing the idea of 
judicial independence in Massachusetts and elsewhere up to 1787, see Gerber, A Distinct Judicial Power; 
Black, “Massachusetts and the Judges”; Smith, “An Independent Judiciary.”      
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county, on which all justices of the peace in the county had the privilege to serve, which 
heard criminal matters and performed a variety of other administrative functions, 
including the assessment and collection of county taxes. The justices of the peace did not 
technically preside over “courts,” but handled debts, trespasses, and violations of the 
peace not exceeding forty shillings or a fine of twenty shillings, in some instances 
simultaneously prosecuting and adjudicating these matters. Admiralty courts, whose 
expanded jurisdiction the American Whigs repeatedly attacked on constitutional grounds, 
also contributed to the mix, as did probate tribunals. With the Council’s consent the royal 
Governor appointed all the judges and justices, as well as the county sheriffs.9  
The provincial Whig mind’s chief bugaboo with respect to the judiciary lay in the 
royal judges’ dependence on the king. When resistance turned to revolution in the 1770s, 
the American perception that the provincial judges had become the king’s legal 
instruments held pivotal significance: “He has made Judges dependent on his Will 
alone,” the Declaration of Independence proclaimed to the world. Anxieties on this score 
had origins earlier in the eighteenth century. Prior to the imperial struggle, royal 
patronage had greased the provincial judicial wheels. The judges played an essential role 
in what one historian has called the “sociology of corruption” that shaped the thinking of 
provincial Whigs.10  
Importantly, however, the king and his judges did not alone exercise the judicial 
function in Massachusetts. The royal judges had to contend with a formidable intra-
                                                
9 Washburn, Sketches of the Judicial History of Massachusetts, 151-70. For the 1691 royal charter, see Acts 
and Resolves of the Province, 1:1-20.  
10 Bushman, King and People, 190; Bushman, “Massachusetts Farmers and the Revolution.”  
             
 
   19 
institutional adversary that did not depend on the king: the provincial jury. Culled by 
litigants from venires chosen by town selectmen on a case-by-case basis and otherwise 
conceived as representative institutions, local juries and not the judges stood at the center 
of the provincial legal system.11 Two facts attest to the jury’s tremendous significance in 
eighteenth-century New England. First, appeals from Common Pleas to the Supreme 
Court of Judicature entitled civil litigants to a de novo jury trial.12  Second, juries wielded 
virtually uncontroverted authority to determine both law and fact.13  
The widely read French philosopher, Montesquieu, described the jury-centered 
Anglo-American judicial tradition in terms that invoked the practices and ideals 
embraced by the American provincials.14 “In each state there are three sorts of power,” 
Montesquieu wrote, “legislative power, executive power over things, and executive 
power over things depending on civil right,” the last of which Montesquieu called “the 
power of judging.” The jury performed the essential judicial function on this view. Jurors 
remained not only dependent on the people but conceptually at one with them. So 
conceived, judicial power flowed directly from the “body of the people” on an ad hoc 
                                                
11 This had not always been the case. In the seventeenth century, criminal cases did not generally get tried 
by juries in Massachusetts. As part of a larger thesis concerned with illuminating the legal Anglicization 
that occurred in the transition from colony to royal province, John Murrin argues that in the last decade of 
the seventeenth century the crown “forced Massachusetts to accept juries for criminal trials.” Murrin, 
“Anglicizing an American Colony,” 187. Controversies arose in the early eighteenth century between the 
provincials and the royal officials over how to select jurors, with the former defending the established 
method of popular election and the latter supporting royal appointment. The provincials prevailed on this 
issue until 1742 when the widespread practice of “electioneering for sympathetic jurors” caused Governor 
Shirley to arrange a compromise between the English and the Massachusetts method. After 1742, jurors 
were chosen by lot. Ibid., 183. No right to a jury applied in proceedings before justices of the peace in 
either the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ibid., 183-84. See also Murrin, “Magistrates, Sinners, and 
A Precarious Liberty.”  
12 Acts and Resolves of the Province, 1:466 (June 18, 1701, chap. 6).   
13 See, e.g., Erving  v. Cradock (1761), in Quincy, Reports of Cases, 553-565.  
14 See Rakove, “Original Justifications for Judicial Independence,” 1064.  
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basis, to remain extant “only so long as necessity requires.” As such, it did not properly 
vest in any “permanent senate” or “fixed” tribunal. “[T]he power of judging, so terrible 
among men,”  Montesquieu concluded, “being attached neither to a certain state nor to a 
certain profession, becomes, so to speak, invisible and null.”15   
As standing judicial officials, the royal judges in Massachusetts posed something 
of a threat to the Monstquieuan ideal. Yet in the constitutional controversies in the 1770s, 
no one overtly disputed the jury’s fundamental role in the legal system. Nor after 1776, 
for that matter, did any serious dispute arise over the legislature’s supremacy over courts 
as institutions, which included the power to create and abolish courts, to suspend the 
judicial process, to monitor the judges’ conduct, and to participate in removing the judges 
under appropriate circumstances. Rather, the constitutional issues that arose during the 
American Revolution, in both the imperial debate and, later, the domestic one, revolved 
primarily around the judges’ appointment, tenure, and support—fairly arcane legal issues 
that nevertheless, according to John Adams and so many others, struck at the very 
“Essence of the Constitution.”16 Indeed, in his contributions to newspaper debates in the 
early 1770s with William Brattle, no one did more than Adams to popularize the legal 
obscurities associated with the dimly understood concept of judicial independence.17    
Yet while New England Whigs like Adams fought hard in the 1760s and 70s to 
prevent the Crown-appointed governors from assuming untrammeled power over the 
judicial function, it bears noting that the provincial experience in the eighteenth century 
                                                
15 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 157-58, 160. For Montesquieu’s significant ideological influence in 
post-Revolutionary America, see Lutz, “The Relative Influence of European Writers,” 192-93. 
16 Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 2:299. 
17 Adams, Works, 3: 513-574.  
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also rendered it difficult to conceive of the judicial power as anything other than a part of 
the executive branch. Even John Adams—one of the more forceful proponents of judicial 
independence in and after 1776—had previously depicted the “grand” division in 
government as between legislative and executive, with the “administration of justice” 
resting in the executive branch.18 “[H]owever we may refine and define,” wrote another 
American commentator in 1776, “there is no more than two powers in any government, 
viz. the power to make laws, and the power to execute them; for the judicial power is 
only a branch of the executive.”19  
The imperial legal structure encouraged this conceptual incorporation of courts 
into the executive sphere. Under the 1691 charter, the royal Governor and Council 
appointed the judges and all writs ran in the name of the king. At the dawn of the 
imperial struggle, plural office holding had become the norm, and a matrix of governors, 
lieutenant governors, councilmen, advisors and, of course, judges, all bound together by 
royal patronage and nepotism, often arrayed its resources against an ever-jealous House 
of Representatives.  
The royal judges presented a special case, however, for two reasons. First, the 
English government treated English judges different than it did American ones. The 
common law courts in England had traditionally been the king’s courts and the king 
accordingly had broad, unchecked authority over the judges. Royal control over the 
judges, however, produced great controversy in the seventeenth century. In the Glorious 
Revolution’s immediate aftermath the English Whigs succeeded in weakening the 
                                                
18 Ibid., 481. 
19 [Anonymous], Letter IV (Philadelphia, 1776), in Lutz and Hyneman, American Political Writing, 1:387.  
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traditional link between the judges and the crown.20 1701’s Act of Settlement established 
that English judges would serve for life on good behavior subject to removal by 
parliamentary address.21 But the protection did not extend to the colonies where the 
judges sat at the Crown-appointed governor’s (and ultimately the king’s) pleasure.22 The 
imperial crisis and the rash of smuggling cases that it spawned heightened the colonial 
awareness of this discrepancy. “[W]hat innumerable acts of injustice may be committed,” 
John Dickinson wrote, “and how fatally may the principles of liberty be sapped, by a 
succession of judges utterly independent of the people?”23  
Second, the provincial House of Representatives had no constitutional power over 
the judges’ appointment beyond pro forma participation in the selection of a council. One 
could make a similar point with respect to the royal governors. As royal appointees twice 
removed and possessing arguably greater coercive power over individuals than the 
Governor (including the power to reduce households to poverty and dependence through 
the adjudication of debt obligations), the judges and their obedient sheriffs evoked much 
deeper popular concerns.  
Prior to the imperial struggle, the provincials possessed two means by which to 
hold the judges accountable to the people. As we have noted, the local jury, wielding 
power to find law and fact in common law cases, served as one check on the judges.24 
Second, if the people speaking through the House of Representatives had scant control 
over either judicial appointments or tenure during the eighteenth century, the House did 
                                                
20 See Black, “Massachusetts and the Judges,” 103-08. 
21 12 & 13 Wm. III c. 2.  
22 Black, “Massachusetts and the Judges,” 110.  
23 See Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, No. IX, in Tracts of the American Revolution, 150. 
24 See generally Reid, In a Defiant Stance; Nelson, Americanization. 
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retain the right to determine the judges’ salaries on an annual basis. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, the House clung to this check on the judges with as much vigor as it 
did with respect to gubernatorial salaries.25 It bears emphasis that the representatives 
historically granted meager support to the judges, barely a living wage—a revealing 
indication of popular attitudes toward the judges on the eve of the Revolution.26       
Both mechanisms of popular control, however, came increasingly under attack 
during the imperial struggle. The record reveals Parliament’s continuing attempts during 
the imperial controversy to effect end-runs around the local jury mechanism in New 
England with respect revenue and certain high profile criminal matters, by expanding the 
vice-admiralty jurisdiction (which traditionally did not require juries), increasing the 
number of vice-admiralty courts, and by seeking to remove sensitive cases to other 
colonies or, in some instances, to London.27 These moves drew strenuous objections from 
the Whigs in Massachusetts, forcing would-be jurors and other American malcontents to 
employ extra-judicial means of resistance.  
Nowhere did the tensions between royal judges and provincial juries flare up with 
greater intensity in the early seventies than in the Superior Court of Judicature, which 
became a specific target of popular criticism in connection with the Boston Massacre 
                                                
25 Bushman, King and People, 138, 174. 
26 Washburn, Sketches, 161. The salaries received by judges of this court was “always inconsiderable.” 
Ibid. Peter Oliver’s Address to the House of Representatives on February 3, 1774 suggests the meager 
House grants as one reason he felt inclined to take the royal grants. Oliver Address, Robert Treat Paine 
Papers, P-392, Reel 3, Mass. Historical Society. 
27 For contemporaneous colonial commentary on relevant provisions of the Sugar Act, see Oxenbridge 
Thacher, Sentiments of a British American, 7-9. For the act establishing new vice-admiralty courts in 
Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston, see 8 Geo. III, chap. 22. For the act authorizing venue changes in 
trials of Crown officials relating to law enforcement, see 14 Geo III, chap. 39. In the 1760s, Parliament 
started vesting the vice-admiralty courts with an expanded jurisdiction that even Englishmen would have 
never accepted. “Parliament blundered,” John Murrin concludes, “not by forcing the colonists into an 
English mode, but by forcing them out it.” Murrin, “Anglicizing an American Colony,” 194. 
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cases. In those cases the royal judges, fearful that the indicted British soldiers would not 
receive a fair trial until the popular temper abated, dodged Whig demands for summary 
justice and delayed hearings for a long as possible, producing “endless calumnies and 
insults” in the Boston papers.28 In so doing, the judges sought to avoid the jury in the first 
instance.  
Yet Superior Court judges also found ways around jury verdicts once rendered, as 
in the case of Ebenezer Richardson, a customs official who killed a boy when firing on a 
mob that sieged his house in 1770. Although the jury convicted Richardson, the judges 
delayed sentencing until a royal pardon came, whereupon the judges suffered through 
even greater abuse from radical Whigs.29 As the grand jury charges in the early 1770s 
demonstrate, the Superior Court judges seemed most interested in preserving the status 
quo and upholding established authority.30 Such conduct might have earned the judges a 
modicum of respect among Tories and lawyers. Yet as tensions heightened in the late 
phases of the imperial struggle, the judges’ very steadiness became untenable and 
unpopular. As early as 1770, Chief Justice Peter Oliver could write that the court’s 
authority had little if any “force.” “Forms were maintained without much power.”31  
Against this background, the momentous controversy over the judges’ salaries 
took place. In 1772, the British ministry announced intentions to establish royal salaries 
                                                
28 Cushing, “Judiciary and Public Opinion in Revolutionary Massachusetts,” 169.  
29 For John Adams’ defense counsel notes on the Richardson case, see Adams, Legal Papers, 2: 411-16. 
For scholarly discussions of the Richardson affair, see Zobel, “Law under Pressure,” 201, and Wilf, Law’s 
Imagined Republic, 15-38. 
30 For discussion of Superior Court jury charges, see Cushing, “Judiciary and Public Opinion.” 
31 Quoted in Wilf, Law’s Imagined Republic, 37. 
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for both the governor and Superior Court judges granted out of American tax revenues.32 
The announcement reignited constitutional controversy after the relative lull following 
the Boston Massacre. Indeed, no other event in the early seventies before the Coercive 
Acts roused Massachusetts towns to action to the same extent.33 Boston castigated “the 
mischievous tendency of this innovation” and protested that the move would “compleat 
our slavery.”34 The royal salary measure, John Adams believed, “levelled the Axe at the 
Root and if not opposed the Tree would be overthrown from the foundation.”35  
In an early letter to Samuel Adams, the Marblehead merchant and recently elected 
House representative Elbridge Gerry commented with regard to the salary grants that “[i]t 
is now no longer a Matter of Doubt with any person that the Ministry are unalterably 
determined to deprive Us of our constitutional Right and Liberties.”36 When Gerry later 
suggested to Sam Adams that Boston lead a systematic public shaming of the judges 
should any of them accept the royal grants, the latter instead began the process of 
establishing the committee of correspondence system to communicate with other towns 
and colonies on such pressing issues, which Marblehead promptly joined.37  
                                                
32 Hutchinson, History of the Province, 361-62. For an excellent discussion of the salary controversy, the 
challenges to the Superior Court of Judicature’s authority that it presented, and how the leading provincial 
legal minds dealt with it, see former Massachusetts judicial archivist Catherine S. Menand’s “The 
Revolutionary Moment and the Supreme Judicial Court.” For a lengthier account of the salary controversy 
with discussions of English constitutional history, see Black, “Massachusetts and the Judges.” 
33 For examples of the town outcry, see Attleborough Town Resolves, Jan. 18, 1773, in Daggett, History of 
Attleborough, 120-21; Malden Town Resolves, Jan. 4, 1773, in Corey, History of Malden, 729. For 
additional denunciations in the towns, see Paige, History of Cambridge, 145-46; Brooks, History of 
Medford, 159; Hudson, History of Marlborough, 149. 
34 Boston Town Records, 1770-1777, in Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, 18:106, 
102 .  
35 Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 3:299. 
36 Elbridge Gerry to Samuel Adams, Oct. 27, 1772, Elbridge Gerry Papers, P-362, Reel 1, Mass. Historical 
Society.  
37 See Brown, Revolutionary Politics in Massachusetts, 48-57. 
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Meanwhile, the House of Representatives, determined to move forward with its 
own annual grants, instructed the treasurer to inquire how the judges would choose to 
accept their recompense—from the House or the Crown. At this point in time, Peter 
Oliver (brother of Andrew Oliver, the lieutenant governor) served as chief justice on the 
Superior Court, while Foster Hutchinson (the governor’s brother), Nathaniel Ropes (a 
Salem merchant), William Cushing (a Maine lawyer whose father and grandfather had 
also served on the court), and Edmund Trowbridge (former attorney general) served as 
associate justices. At first, all five judges reported to the treasurer’s inquiry that they 
would accept only half their salaries from the House, with the implication that the other 
half would come from the king. This proved unacceptable to the House and more 
controversy followed.38  
For his part, John Adams seemed very concerned to find a constitutional remedy 
to the impasse rather than resort to crowd action. “I dreaded the Effect upon the Morals 
and temper of the People, which must be produced, by any violence offered to the 
Persons of those who wore the Robes and bore the sacred Characters of Judges.”39 But 
how to resolve the issue in favor of the people’s liberty without subjecting the likes of 
Peter Oliver to a tarring and feathering at the Liberty Tree? In his autobiography Adams 
took credit for first articulating the constitutional solution: “I said it was nothing more nor 
less than an Impeachment of the Judges by the House of Representatives before the 
Council.”40 But could the House constitutionally do this?  
                                                
38 Frieberg, Journal of the House of Representatives, 1773-1774, 50:86-87. 
39 Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 3:299. 
40 Ibid., 3:300 
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In what followed, probably the three greatest legal minds in Massachusetts—John 
Adams, Joseph Hawley, and Edmund Trowbridge—worked together to find an answer. 
They did so not as impartial arbiters but legal advocates for the province. Of the three, 
Trowbridge stood as the most respected professional lawyer in the province; Whigs and 
Tories alike lauded his tremendous legal skills and knowledge. Having consulted with 
Adams, Joseph Hawley apparently spent a weekend in Cambridge with Judge 
Trowbridge investigating the legality of Adams’ impeachment proposal.41 Trowbridge’s 
manuscript notes demonstrate extensive writing and research on the topic in 1772.42  
Trowbridge concluded that impeachment of the judges did fall within the House’s 
power under the charter, but added that the Council could also constitutionally acquit the 
judges and by all appearances would do so in this case.43 The pro forma finding of 
constitutional authority for the House, however, gave Adams and the Whigs all they 
needed to wage this political battle and thereupon they advised the House to move 
forward with impeachment proceedings. The credible threat of impeachment, in turn, 
caused four justices to reconsider their positions. Thereafter Trowbridge agreed not to 
take the royal salary and Ropes, Cushing, and Hutchinson reluctantly followed, if only to 
avoid the public shaming that would have ensued in an impeachment proceeding.44  
                                                
41 Ibid., 300-301. 
42 Trowbridge’s legal notebooks on this issue are in the Dana Family Papers, Box 63, Massachusetts 
Historical Society. Robert Treat Paine also looked extensively into the topic, on which see Draft of Address 
of House of Representatives to Governor Respecting Impeachment of Peter Oliver as Chief Justice, [June 
9] 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, P-392, Reel 18, Mass. Historical Society.  
43 Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 3:301.  
44 A June 28, 1773 House Resolution acknowledging Trowbridge’s favorable response, but that the House 
had not yet received word from Oliver, Hutchinson, Ropes and Cushing, is in the William Cushing Papers, 
Ms. N-1069, Mass. Historical Society.   
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Only Chief Justice Peter Oliver, who had served on the court since 1756, 
continued to press the issue. In an address to the House of Representatives dated 
February 3, 1774, Oliver, who lived in a Middleborough mansion and owned an iron 
works, grieved about the inadequacy of past House grants, extolled his unimpeachable 
record on the court, and asserted that he would need the king’s permission to forego the 
royal grant in any case.45 In response, the House voted to impeach the Chief Justice 96-
to-9, and demanded that the Governor and Council follow suit.46 Yet, true to Judge 
Trowbridge’s prediction, the Council declined to act.  
The vitriol in the press, however, continued unabated and some participants began 
to consider another way to voice their protest should the impeached Oliver continue to 
sit: refusing jury service. The prospect made the judges uneasy. Oliver favored fining 
jurors in advance if they refused to be sworn, but the shrewd Trowbridge convinced him 
not to persist with this point. Fearing for his life, Oliver grudgingly decided not to ride 
the spring circuit. This left the bare quorum of Trowbridge, Cushing, and Hutchinson to 
hold court in Middlesex and Worcester.47  
II. Coercion and Its Consequences 
As protests over the salary issue mounted in early 1774, news of the so-called 
“Coercive Acts” reached the province. These laws represented Westminster’s audacious 
attempt to punish Massachusetts for the Boston Tea Party and otherwise to establish 
                                                
45 [Peter Oliver], Address to the House of Representatives, Feb. 3, 1774. A manuscript copy of Oliver’s 
statement is in the Robert Treat Paine Papers, P-392, Reel 18, Mass. Historical Society.  
46 Frieberg, Journal of the House, 50:117, 134-39, 146-48. 
47 Nathaniel Ropes had died early in 1774. For a memo probably written by Trowbridge revealing his effort 
to keep the court in operation while Oliver sought to impose penalties on recalcitrant jurors, see 
Trowbridge, “Hitherto Unpublished Manuscript.” The original is located in the Massachusetts Judicial 
Archives. 
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supreme royal authority over the recalcitrant province once and for all. The first 
enactment, the Boston Port Bill, imposed a military blockade on the city’s harbor—to go 
into effect on June 1, 1774. By the Port Bill’s terms, the blockade would continue until 
Boston fully compensated the East India Tea Company for the destroyed tea and the 
King-in-Council found the province as a whole amenable to obeying Parliament’s laws in 
all cases whatsoever.48 Although the Port Bill shocked and outraged the Whigs, the royal 
navy’s presence rendered them effectively powerless to resist the blockade. For the 
moment, the only hope lay in forming an intercolonial non-importation pact that might 
force Britain to relax its policy.49   
For our purposes, however, two other enactments contained in the Coercive 
Acts—the Government Act and the Administration of Justice Act—boast the most 
significance. And here, as it happened, the Whigs could and did resist. These laws 
threatened local popular control over provincial judicial institutions to an extent never 
before witnessed. In addition to prohibiting town meeting activity other than for elections 
of town officials (essentially barring convention and committee activity), the Government 
Act purported to give the royal governor exclusive authority to appoint all provincial 
judges without consulting the House-elected Council, as well as the power to remove the 
county judges for any reason whatsoever. By granting the governor similar authority over 
sheriffs, empowering sheriffs rather than town selectman to select juror pools, and 
authorizing removal of capital cases against crown officials to other colonies or even 
                                                
48 14 Geo. III, chap. 45 (Port Bill), reprinted in Force, American Archives, 1:61-66. 
49 On revolutionary-era non-importation and non-consumption movements, see Breen, Marketplace of 
Revolution.  
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England, these acts also posed significant threats to the capacity of local juries to resist 
imperial encroachments.50 
To implement the Coercive Acts, the Crown sent a new governor to the province, 
Thomas Gage, who arrived in June and immediately prorogued the General Court. Under 
the Government Act’s auspices, Gage then proceeded to issue new commissions for 
judges, justices, and sheriffs. He also appointed a mandamus council to include sitting 
Supreme Court of Judicature justices Oliver, Hutchinson and Ropes’ replacement, the 
wealthy landowner William Brown.51 
There followed a complete breakdown in the imperial legal order. “Counsellers, 
Judges, Justices, Sheriffs or Jurors, not chosen according to [the charter],” Marblehead 
instructed its representative on June 6, 1774, “will have no more right of Authority over 
the Province than a Nuncio or Ambassador from the Pope of Rome.”52 Now perceived as 
unconstitutional “ministerial tools and hirelings” and “common plunderers,” the royal 
“executive courts” lost any constitutional legitimacy they had previously enjoyed and, as 
the institutions most directly affecting people’s lives in the localities, became prime 
targets in the province-wide movement to nullify the Coercive Acts.53  
Some counties issued resolves to prevent the courts from sitting and, if the judges 
attempted to proceed anyway, crowds (often armed) would obstruct them and jurymen 
                                                
50 14 Geo. III, chap. 39, c. 45, reprinted in Force, American Archives, 1:104-12, 129-32.  
51 See Administration of Mandamus Council Oaths, Aug. 8, 1774, in Wroth, Province in Rebellion, 1:523.  
52 Marblehead Instructions, June 6, 1774, in ibid., 1:496. 
53 Plymouth County Convention Resolves, Sept. 26-27, 1774, in ibid., 2:943; Boston Committee of 
Correspondence Minutes, Aug. 27, 1774 (with delegates from Worcester, Essex, Middlesex, and Suffolk), 
in ibid., 1:691. 
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would refuse service.54 In other counties, crowds with a spokesman or two at their head 
would line up the judges and attempt to extract oaths from them promising to treat the 
Coercive Acts as null and void, and to refuse commissions thereunder.55 Even when the 
judges signed these recantations, however, resisters still forced adjournments pending 
further developments.  
This occurred, for example, during the famous showdown in Barnstable, wherein 
town selectman Nathaniel Freeman led a crowd of approximately fifteen hundred people 
hailing from the southern counties against the royal judges. Justice James Otis ordered 
this redoubtable “body of the people” dispersed, asserting that “the juries have been 
drawn from the boxes as the law directs” and that, in any case, the parties had rights to 
appeal. To loud applause, Freeman rejoined that the referenced appeal lay to an illegal 
and unconstitutional court, where a sheriff entirely dependent on the king would draw the 
venire. The judges and sheriff therefore grudgingly signed recantations. But Freeman and 
his followers forced adjournments anyway.56       
Neither the southern nor eastern counties, however, set the original precedent for 
popular action against the courts in 1774. Rather, new voices in the three counties west of 
Middlesex—Worcester, Hampshire, and Berkshire—emerged early in the controversy 
over the Massachusetts Government Act’s judicial provisions and thereafter assumed a 
leading role in the movement to resist the courts. On August 15, 1774, western towns 
demanded in no uncertain terms that “no Business be transacted in the Law” in any of the 
                                                
54 See, e.g., Middlesex County Convention Resolutions, Aug. 30-31, 1774, in ibid., 2:892-93.  
55 See, e.g., Hampshire County Congress Letter to Boston Committee of Correspondence, Aug. 31, 1774, in 
ibid., 2:884-85. 
56 Trayser, Barnstable, 122-23. See also Barnstable County Meeting, Sept. 27-28, 1774, in Wroth, Province 
in Rebellion, 2:947-54.  
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extant courts, “and the People of this Province [shall] fall into a State of nature until our 
Grievances are fully redressed by a final Repeal of those injurious oppressive & 
unconstitutional acts.”57 Clerks, sheriffs, and jurors refused to serve. On August 18, in 
what one historian has called “the first act of open rebellion in New England,” a crowd of 
fifteen hundred prevented the courts from sitting in Great Barrington.58 Crowds in 
Worcester and Hampshire counties soon followed suit and thereupon lawsuits in the 
established county courts throughout Massachusetts came to a halt.  
On August 30, 1774, the Superior Court of Judicature attempted to convene a 
session in Boston, now with the embattled Peter Oliver in attendance. Royal troops 
surrounded the courtroom. The regulars could do nothing, however, when nearly fifty 
summoned grand and petit jurors refused to serve, citing Oliver’s unfitness, the 
Government Act’s innovations with regard to judicial appointments, and the oaths taken 
by certain justices commissioned by Gage as mandamus counselors to execute the 
Coercive Acts.59 Handbills appeared “threatening certain Death to any and all of the Bar 
who should presume to attend the Superior Court then sitting.”60 After dealing with a few 
technical matters sua sponte, the justices had no choice but to continue docketed cases to 
forthcoming terms.  
Many observers, however, lacked confidence in the Superior Court’s ability to 
preserve itself in so hostile a political environment. Perceiving the strength of the 
                                                
57 Records of Pittsfield, 1:184-85; see also Taylor, Western Massachusetts, 75-76. For other conventions in 
the west that propounded similar resolves, see Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress, 601-660.  
58 Heimert, Religion and the American Mind, 180.   
59 The Boston grand and petit jurors’ statements appeared in the Boston Gazette (Supplement), Sept. 5, 
1774, cols. 1-2. See also Administration of Mandamus Council Oaths, Aug. 8, 1774, in Wroth, Province in 
Rebellion, 1:523.    
60 William Tudor to John Adams, Sept. 4, 1774, in Adams, Papers, 2:139. 
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opposition’s resolve, the eyewitness William Tudor, an attorney colleague of John 
Adams’, predicted that the Superior Court’s truncated session in Boston would be “the 
last common Law Court that will be allowed to sit in this or any other County of the 
Province.”61 True to Tudor’s prediction, amid the political takeover by the provisional 
congress in October and with Boston to come under siege in 1775, the royal Superior 
Court judges made no attempt to complete their circuits in 1774 and 1775. And when 
they attempted to hold one in Suffolk in 1775, the jurors again rebuffed them.62 The royal 
judges would never preside over another case again. “The course of the law,” Thomas 
Hutchinson wrote in his history of the province, had “wholly stopped.”63  
Once it had become clear that the established courts would no longer hear cases, 
the provincial government and many county conventions admonished inhabitants to avoid 
all disputes and conflicts. Indeed, the Suffolk Resolves and its many imitators deemed 
those who refused either to settle their disputes or to submit to local arbitration traitors to 
the common cause.64 Yet, presumably, so long as the towns effectively dealt with the 
disputes within their borders no foul occurred. As it happened, many towns proceeded to 
administer justice at the local level in and after 1774 and their experiences would prove 
intellectually formative in the coming years.65  
                                                
61 Ibid.  
62 See Supreme Court of Judicature Record Book, Reel 16, Mass. Archives.  
63 Hutchinson, History of the Province, 454. 
64 Suffolk Resolves, Sept. 9, 1774, in Province in Rebellion, 2:914-20. 
65 In a few instances, county conventions assumed many of the same functions traditionally performed by 
the sessions courts. During its September 20, 1775 meeting, for example, the Worcester convention 
addressed a number of quarter sessions issues. The convention also directed the sheriff to hold for trial all 
individuals detained on criminal charges, but reiterated the need to avoid any and all civil litigation “as the 
ordinary course of justice must be stayed.” Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress, 627-52; see 
also Brooke, Heart of the Commonwealth, 154-55.    
             
 
   34 
In some cases, the towns created their own “courts” that, if only due to their 
localistic and unprofessional character, called to mind juries. South Brimfield, for 
example, voted for twelve men to serve “as a Court of Justice and Honour, to judge and 
determine all controversies that may hereafter arise” and Malden created a similar 
tribunal for itself.66 Attleborough established a superior and an inferior court for the 
town, electing four men to sit on the former, and seven on the latter.67 Windsor 
authorized its selectman to issue writs and adjudicate complaints against thieves and 
offenders to the peace.68 Pittsfield selected seven men to serve on a committee to 
“Regulate disturbances & Quarels” and otherwise charged specially selected boards of 
arbitrators to decide cases.69 The Pittsfield revolutionary committees, like so many others, 
assumed jurisdiction in civil as well as criminal matters and, in some instances, 
intervened and awarded damages and execution in cases that would have otherwise gone 
to Common Pleas.70  
Town justice usually combined anticipatory policing with judicial-retributive 
functions. Certainly numerous towns created committees of inspection and safety to 
ensure compliance with applicable non-importation and non-consumption obligations 
enacted by the Continental Congress and adopted by the state governments; and 
otherwise to police loyalists. Massachusetts towns made special resolutions to enforce the 
internal anti-monopoly laws and required inhabitants to “lay before the court” possible 
                                                
66 History of the Connecticut Valley, 2:1068; Cushing, History of the Transition from Provincial to 
Commonwealth Government, 91.  
67 Daggett, History of Attleborough, 121-22; Washburn, Sketches, 165 n.1. 
68 See Taylor, Western Massachusetts, 76 
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loyalists.71 A York County convention specifically instructed the towns to enforce laws 
prohibiting peddlers and hawkers, and directed the selectmen to withhold license 
renewals from innkeepers who harbored them.72  Elsewhere the committees operated 
under more general charges. Billerica, for example, created a twelve-person committee of 
“conservators” to prevent mobs, disorders, and to persuade inhabitants peaceably to 
resolve their differences. If the conservators failed to resolve a given dispute, the 
selectmen sitting in town meeting would decide the matter.73  
In some instances the enforcement committees constituted themselves as tribunals 
and exercised quasi-judicial power. In Bernardston, for example, the committee of safety 
tried one Jacob Orcutt in 1775 for altering a six-penny bill to a six-pound note, adjudging 
him guilty and sentencing him to thirty lashes on the bare back. The town constable could 
not bring himself to execute the punishment. So militia officer Ezekiel Foster performed 
the task and, with fraternal spirit, then offered Orcutt a shot of rum.74 
If many towns administered local justice on the committee model, however, 
others did so on the justice of the peace model. Barnstable County, for example, 
instructed all of its town justices serving prior to the new appointments under the 
Government Act to act in their “single Capacity” to prevent “Vice, Immorality, Breaches 
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of the Peace, and all high handed offenses”—a significant expansion of the jurisdiction 
afforded to the royal justices of the peace under the old charter.75  
III. Groping for a Government 
When Governor Gage dissolved the General Court in June 1774, he simply 
wanted some time to implement the reforms required by the Coercive Acts and expected 
to reconvene the Court soon thereafter. Yet in dissolving the Court, Gage cut himself off 
from the localities. With all the independent town meeting, convention, and committee 
activity that ensued, Gage soon felt himself losing control of the province. On September 
1, 1774 he issued writs for the election of a General Court to meet at Salem on October 1. 
In the interim, however, came further resolves from the counties proclaiming the 
Coercive Acts null and void, and promising continued  obstruction. The Continental 
Congress soon fully endorsed this stance.76 As a result, at the eleventh hour Gage 
determined it inexpedient to convene a General Court and purported to cancel the 
planned Salem meeting. Yet under John Hancock’s chairmanship, an assembly consisting 
of nearly a hundred elected representatives convened anyway.77 All agreed that Gage’s 
claim on the governorship lacked legitimacy and refused to recognize it. Otherwise, 
however, none knew quite how to proceed and, wanting unequivocal instructions from 
the Continental Congress, determined simply to continue operating as before, albeit 
without a governor.  
                                                
75 Barnstable County Congress, Nov. 28, 1774, in Wroth, Province in Rebellion, 2:1325. For the original 
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In June 1775, the Continental Congress essentially ratified this approach, advising 
Massachusetts to establish a new government pursuant to the existing charter.78 A month 
later, the provisional legislature solicited representatives from the towns and most of the 
towns complied. Soon thereafter a newly constituted House of Representatives convened 
with well over a quorum of representatives. This body, in turn, elected a small Council, to 
act in both legislative and executive capacities. In its executive capacity, the Council 
began in August 1775 appointing new executive officials to “see [the] Laws inforced.”79 
The Council first appointed justices of the peace, which elicited little immediate 
opposition. In October, however, it appointed new justices to serve in the Superior Court 
of Judicature and in the existing county courts.80  This move triggered substantial 
controversy. 
The early judicial appointments took place in a very tense environment in which 
Gage and his mandamus council continued to claim authority. “[T]he Exercise of Judicial 
Powers without Authority from the Crown,” John Adams wrote, “would be probably the 
most offensive Act of Government to Great Britain and the least willingly pardoned.”81 
The courts remained closed, even as many sitting royal judges had agreed not to enforce 
the Government Act and a few began positioning themselves to make common cause 
with the patriots. Yet even after Lexington and Concord, and even after the loyalist 
departures in March 1776, considerable ambiguities remained in the west as to whether 
                                                
78 Ibid., 359. 
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the established political and administrative elite would embrace Independence, 
particularly once Gage offered to pardon those pledging loyalty to the Crown. These 
factors created an environment of suspicion in the west toward the new judicial 
appointees, the identity of whom, in some cases, created additional misgivings.  
Who did the provisional Council name to serve on the courts? To the Superior 
Court the Council named none other than John Adams as chief justice, together with 
royal holdover but vocal convert to the common cause William Cushing, and new 
appointees Robert Treat Paine, William Read, and Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant. In contrast 
to the old royal judges, all the new appointees had professional legal training and 
experience. 82  Even the legal community, however, viewed the appointments as 
particularly delicate because treason indictments would surely follow if the war ended 
badly. Despite the uncertainties Adams and Cushing accepted the commissions, even 
though Adams, also a member of the Council and the Continental Congress, knew very 
well he would not have the time actually to fulfill his duties. Read, Sargeant, and Paine, 
however, all declined the appointment, as did the preeminent James Warren.83 Only 
acceptances by the untrained but popular Jebidiah Foster and the Maine lawyer and rising 
star James Sullivan made possible the quorum necessary for the newly constituted 
Superior Court to sit in Ipswich on June 18, 1776, which it did without considerable 
backlash. 
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Although Adams did not join the court in Ipswich, he authored a statement for the 
judges to read to grand jurors intended as “an appeal to the conservative principles of the 
people.”84 Above all, the statement sought to justify reestablishing the courts “whose 
Happiness is so connected with that of the People, that it is difficult to suppose they can 
abuse their Trust.” While lauding the extent to which the existing government “remained 
under the Influence and Controul of the People,” the statement also demanded “proper 
obedience” in the people on pain of “exemplary punishment.” The new justices clear tilt 
in favor of supporting established government and the status quo could not have put them 
in good stead with emerging revolutionary radicals in the west and elsewhere. That the 
judges, moreover, proceeded under a charge to do more than simply decide cases, but 
also “by their Advice, Exertions, and Examples” to help effectuate a “general 
Reformation of Manners,” evinced the kind of monarchial paternalism from which 
Americans would, but a few weeks later, break away forever.85  
At the county and town level, the level at which judicial power touched a far 
greater proportion of people, the Council appointed established Whig placeholders in the 
east with little significant controversy.86 In the west, the political demographic of the 
appointees differed by county and so too did the popular response. In Hampshire and 
Berkshire counties, many commissions named conservative “river gods” and their allies 
with track records of opposing eastern resistance to imperial measures in the 1760s, 
supporting royal governors, and rigging judicial appointments in their favor.87 Worcester, 
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however, unlike Hampshire or Berkshire, had a constituency of populist leaders born out 
of the land bank controversies in the 1740s and 1760s that stood staunchly on the 
country-side of the Court-Country dichotomy, many of whom received judicial 
commissions in 1775.88  This provided a modicum of institutional continuity during the 
revolutionary crisis in authority and helped pave the way to the relatively early re-
opening of some courts in Worcester in 1776.  
Yet at points westward, where no substantial populist tradition existing coming 
into the Revolution and where Court partisans monopolistically held county offices on 
the model of a closed corporation, there appeared and persisted a deep suspicion among 
the ministers and their congregations that the river gods and their eastern patrons had 
engaged in a massive illegal power grab that portended tyranny to no less a degree than 
did the Coercive Acts. Here the established Court partisans would prove a persistent, if 
not entirely effective, foil to the emerging “constitutionalists” in Berkshire and 
Hampshire in the coming years, adding a dimension to the constitutional debates there 
that did not exist in Worcester. Allegations of corrupt judicial appointees filled the early 
petitions from Berkshire to the provisional government.89 It did not help matters that 
judicial commissions and writs under the provisional government still ran in the name of 
the King of England, a fact to which many westerners cited as an additional reason to 
refuse to recognize the appointments and keep the courts closed.90  
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In a petition dated December 26, 1775, Pittsfield launched its attack on the 
provisional government’s judicial maneuvering. Written in Congregationalist minister 
Thomas Allen’s hand, the petition protested the judicial appointees as “greatly obnoxious 
to people in General” and the current “Mode of Government” as wrongly established. 
Provincial opposition to the Coercive Acts had originally rested, in part, on the 
contention that the laws violated the royal charter. The Pittsfield petition marked a 
momentous reversal in popular sentiment in this regard. The charter, the petition 
declared, had proven itself “lame and essentially defective” and could not serve as a 
proper foundation for a “free republic.” After all, the charter derived its authority from 
the king and not the people. Yet the charter’s chief substantive defect, the petition urged, 
lay less in its connection to the king than in its provisions for “nominating [government 
officials] to office by those in power.” So long as the appointive power remained vested 
in any entity but the people, the charter lacked legitimacy no matter what side of the 
Atlantic on which the person(s) possessing this power stood. The petition thus demanded 
a new constitution and made one specific and portentous stipulation regarding its 
provisions: every town had to retain the privilege of annually electing its own justice of 
the peace, and every county its judges. Once such a constitution became implemented, 
“you’ll [f]ind us the most meek and inoffensive Subjects of any in this province.” Until 
then, the petition concluded, the courts could not and would not sit.91 
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 Increasingly disposed in the business of managing a war with England and yet 
fearful that anarchy would soon rend the western counties asunder, the provisional 
government did what it could to respond to the towns’ grievances short of abandoning the 
charter. First, two months before Independence it found the pluck to order that all 
commissions and writs run in the name of the “Government and People of the 
Massachusetts Bay,” and that no reference to the king ever again appear in the legal 
process. 92  
Two days later, at the behest of Berkshire placeman William Whiting, the 
provisional legislature passed a so-called “Confession Act,” which simultaneously paid 
heed to techniques of local justice practiced in the towns and to preferences for annually 
elected judges, while also attempting to regulate the town processes. 93  It provided for the 
extra-judicial resolution of debt matters involving twenty pounds or less—a very 
substantial amount when compared to the forty shilling ceiling previously applicable to 
the civil jurisdiction possessed by the royal justices of the peace. By the act’s terms, 
debtors could make a “recognizance” or confession of a debt before a town arbiter, 
promising payment by a particular date on a stipulated schedule. The legislation carefully 
avoided referring to the person taking the confession and keeping records as a judge or 
judicial official, let alone the forum as a “court,” or to the parties as “debtors” or 
“creditors,” let alone plaintiffs or defendants. It seemed rather to carve out a dispute 
resolution mechanism that would proceed largely independent of and outside the courts 
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of record. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the statute for our purposes, however, 
lay in the means of selecting the arbiter: annual election in each town.94    
Summary and Conclusion 
Prior to the Revolution the Hanoverian kings possessed greater discretionary 
authority over the tenure of Massachusetts judges than they did over the tenure of English 
judges. At the same time, the Massachusetts judges enjoyed substantial independence 
from American provincials. Two popular checks on the royal judges existed in 
eighteenth-century Massachusetts: the trial jury and annual legislative salary 
determinations. To the Americans’ great dismay, London endeavored to erode both 
checks during the imperial struggle. In defending the status quo on the salary question, 
American Whigs put new glosses on existing conceptions of the judicial function within 
the constitutional order that accorded primacy to popular accountability.  
The judicial provisions in 1774’s Coercive Acts deeply offended these 
sensibilities. In response, the people of Massachusetts declared the provisions null and 
void, and then made good on the proposition by refusing jury service and otherwise 
preventing the established judicial courts from sitting through crowd intimidation. In this 
revolution against judicial power—which lasted fully six years in some areas—popular 
consent and localized justice prevailed over independent magisterial authority as the 
organizing principles of government.  
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On the eve of Independence, the provisional legislature did what it could to 
accommodate the malcontents. Western counties, however, still refused to recognize any 
“executive courts” appointed by the provisional council under the old charter and, for 
good measure, began to suggest that their constituent towns had quite enjoyed living in 
the little commonwealths they had erected without courts or law since 1774.95 Even in 
Boston, a milieu of suspicion persisted. For although the provisional legislature had 
vacated the royal judgeships, removed references to the king in judicial writs, and passed 
a two-year Confession Act, legislators did nothing to alter the inherited structure of the 
judiciary. All existing court orders, decisions, and actions remained on the books. By all 
appearances, the newly appointed judges, the council, and many others in the provisional 
government attempted to move forward as if nothing had changed.  
But even as the Superior Court and the eastern county courts struggled back onto 
their feet, so much had changed. Disassociation from the king left the Massachusetts 
courts in an uncertain position, for like other courts in the common law tradition their 
legitimacy had always rested on essential institutional and cultural connections to the 
king. At the same time, opposition to royal salaries and to the Government Act’s judicial 
provisions had cultivated rhetoric and ideals with respect to the judicial power that 
emphasized not only (i) the judges’ independence from the executive power, but also, and 
more importantly, (ii) a proper dependence on the people. Both principles flowed from 
the American Revolution’s cardinal tenet—that all legitimate government rested on the 
consent of the governed. And yet, asserted strictly, each in its own way would ultimately 
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prove too much for their Whig progenitors to tolerate in the coming years. By contrast, 
during the constitutional debates in and after 1776, many westerners would stand firmly 
on these principles to articulate a dissenting judicial vision that departed from received 
doctrine to a far greater extent than the settlement ultimately embodied in the 
Constitution of 1780. In this dissenting vision lay the American Revolution’s true legal 
legacy.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE CONTESTED  
 
*   *   * 
Introduction: Consensus and Conflict in the Age of Independence 
The invectives against the courts in revolutionary Massachusetts cited in the 
historical literature typically flow from the pens of individuals in the western counties—
Worcester, Hampshire, and particularly Berkshire. Scholars interested in attitudes toward 
the courts in revolutionary Massachusetts, however, too often forget that town and 
country united in their opposition to the courts in the beginning. Indeed, one key to the 
significance of the horse jockey anecdote described in the last chapter lay in Adams’s 
momentary recognition that perhaps he had helped create the antijudicial “spirit” that 
animated the horse jockey.  
To be sure, Adams could not easily deny that he and others of his ilk had played a 
role in producing the principles on which the westerners relied and in legitimating the 
means by which they asserted them. Had not Adams condoned extra-legal popular 
resistance to Britain’s increased ministerial presence in the colonies beginning with the 
Stamp Act? Had not Adams suggested that attacks on customs collectors and, more 
recently, the destruction of tea in Boston Harbor boasted constitutional legitimacy? Had 
not patriots everywhere under Adams’ leadership expressly sanctioned the opposition to 
the courts in Massachusetts in the Coercive Acts’ wake? Had not the first Continental 
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Congress, with Adams in attendance, expressly approved “the opposition by the 
Inhabitants of Massachusetts-bay, to the execution of the late acts of Parliament” and 
declared all commissions under the Massachusetts Government Act void?1 
This early spell of revolutionary consensus, however, soon yielded to divisions 
over who should rule at home, how, and on what basis. Having remained fairly quiet 
during the imperial struggle but now galvanized by the Coercive Acts and inspired by 
charismatic ministers, western Massachusetts entered into a politically active phase of 
strict insistence upon revolutionary principles with respect to judicial power and, on this 
basis, continued to prevent the courts from sitting. By contrast, the established Whig elite 
in the east and “friends of order” elsewhere, while supportive of resistance to royal 
salaries and the Coercive Acts, began over time to pull back from principles that many 
had previously espoused and to advocate the re-establishment of judicial order in 
Massachusetts on the model provided by the Glorious Revolution judicial settlement in 
England.  
When the Declaration of Independence finally came in 1776, the nascent 
revolutionary factions within Massachusetts interpreted it in substantially different ways 
with important domestic constitutional implications. Westerners and many ministers 
throughout the state believed that, if any doubt remained, the Declaration had decisively 
placed the province into a “state of nature” and that all judicial power had therefore 
devolved on the towns and people. Those seeking to establish the provincial government, 
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on the other hand, many of whom made the law their vocation, pursued alternative 
interpretations more conducive to law and order.  
In the four-year constitutional debate in Massachusetts that ensued, the eastern 
Whig elite would distinguish themselves from the western libertarians on many 
constitutional issues among which judicial power loomed large. In the process, a distinct 
reversal of roles occurred. Eastern Whigs steeped in imperial debates and now 
increasingly assuming positions of power under the provisional government, became 
relative conservatives, the “friends of order,” while westerners out of power became 
radicalized. Thereupon, as Fisher Ames later observed, “[t]he people . . . turned against 
their teachers the doctrines which were inculcated in order to effect the late revolution.”2 
In the process, contrasting attitudes toward judicial power emerged that would animate 
the constitutional debates in the late 1770s. Those debates, in turn, forged new features in 
the respective parties’ positions.  
I. The Constitution of 1778 
Most of the other states framed new constitutions for themselves in 1776 and 
1777—all with a distinctly popular cast that made the legislatures legally and practically 
supreme over both the executive branch and the courts.3 Massachusetts, however, could 
not reach a revolutionary constitutional settlement so quickly. In fact, not until 1781 
could the Bay State boast either a governor or a homemade constitution. Why? To be 
sure, from 1775 to 1777 the war itself demanded substantial political resources in New 
                                                
2 Camillus No. 1, Independent Chronicle (Boston), Mar. 1, 1787, in Ames, Works, 11. 
3 For further discussion of the state constitutions, see Chapter 5.  
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England and certainly this accounted for some of the delay. Substantive constitutional 
controversies, however, did the most to prevent an earlier settlement in Massachusetts.  
As we have seen, in July 1775 the provisional legislature, acting on long-awaited 
instructions from the Continental Congress, managed to solicit enough representatives 
from the towns to create a new House of Representatives, which in turn appointed a 
Council. By default, however, the new government’s only constitutional authority lay in 
the existing royal charter. Yet by year’s end strong objections to the charter’s propriety 
had arisen in the west and there soon followed demands to establish a new frame of 
government altogether.  
The provisional Council’s judicial and field-grade militia commissions in 
September 1775 triggered the first round of objections to the charter in the west. With the 
controversy over the Act of Representation enacted by the provisional legislature on May 
4, 1776, however, came growing skepticism about the charter’s legitimacy in both the 
east and west.4 The long-standing previous rule had assigned one representative to each 
town. Passed hastily in response to a petition from a single eastern county (Essex), the 
Act of Representation overturned the traditional rule and instead tied the allowable 
number of representatives to population. Plainly the change redounded to the benefit of 
the populous (and propertied) eastern towns, but to the detriment of the smaller western 
towns. Substantial political strife ensued. Opponents argued that the legislation would 
make the House unwieldy and would lead to a government takeover by the eastern 
mercantile gentry. The legislation’s real significance, however, lay in the ultimate 
                                                
4 “An Act for More Equal Representation, May 4, 1776,” in Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 78.  
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question that it begged: by what legitimate constitutional authority could the General 
Court purport to alter its own representation ratio in the first instance?   
The answer increasingly reached in Massachusetts: none. A few weeks later, the 
Declaration of Independence made this conclusion nearly inescapable. Thereupon most 
of the other states began in earnest to frame new constitutions for themselves and by 
summer’s end nearly all the towns in Massachusetts could agree that the Bay State also 
needed a new constitution. The old charter simply no longer made sense in the American 
environment. Although a few conservative councilmen gravitated toward retaining the 
charter with modifications (as Rhode Island and Connecticut had done), representatives 
in the House stood ready to accommodate their constituents’ demands on this score. Yet 
the question of just how to create a new constitution remained.  
In September 1776, the House queried the towns as to whether the existing 
legislature might frame and enact a new frame of government.5 The returns reflected a 
strong consensus that the towns and not the legislature should ratify the document. The 
towns, however, divided over the framing method. In other states, the established 
legislatures had performed the task, but compelling critiques of this approach had already 
begun to appear.6  In response to the House’s inquiry, most of the towns in Massachusetts 
consented to the General Court drafting the document for the towns’ approval. Yet a 
robust minority, including Boston, Lexington, and many towns in Worcester county, 
demanded a convention composed of delegates specially elected by the towns. Few in the 
                                                
5 See “Resolution of the House of Representatives, September 17, 1776,” in ibid., 99. 
6 “[Anonymous], The Alarm: or, an Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the Late Resolve of 
Congress, Philadelphia, 1776,” in Lutz and Hyneman, American Political Writing, 1:325; Randolph, 
“Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia,” 43.  
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minority expressed clear rationales for a special convention at this point. Those that did 
complained about the inequitable representation ratio in the existing House.7   
Upon reviewing the returns, the House quickly resolved that the towns should 
have the right to ratify the new constitution. On the framing question, a committee 
initially erred on the side of caution, recommending a special convention. Alas, however, 
the House sitting in full session rejected this proposal and in June 1777, eager to restore 
constitutional order as soon as possible, resolved itself and the Council into a convention 
to draft a new constitution. Over the next eight months, the convention episodically 
pursued this task and, in March 1778, sent its proposed frame of government to the towns 
for approval.8  
 A relatively concise document, the proposed constitution of 1778 found its 
primary inspiration in the old charter and, save for the creation of a governor, would have 
substantially maintained the political and judicial status quo. To be sure, the drafters 
(primarily eastern gentry) rejected the purely democratic Pennsylvania model and 
gravitated toward the more balanced constitutions of Maryland and New York. Thus, the 
document created a legislature consisting of “two separate and distinct bodies”—a House 
of Representatives and a Senate.9 Property requirements for holding elected office 
applied, and differed as between House members, Senators, and the Governor. The 
document contained no declaration of rights.  
                                                
7 See Returns of the Towns, Sept.—Oct. 1776, in Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 101-163. See also 
Resolution of Worcester County Towns, Nov. 26, 1776, in ibid., 164. For Boston’s further objections dated 
May 26, 1777, see ibid., 176.  
8 Taylor, Colony to Commonwealth, 48; Journal of the Convention, June 17, 1777—Mar. 6, 1778, in 
Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 177-89. 
9 Proposed Constitution of 1778, Article XIV, in ibid., 196. For the full proposed constitution, see ibid., 
190-201. 
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On the other hand, all elected officials faced direct popular elections on an annual 
basis, universal white male suffrage applied to House elections, and only a small property 
requirement applied to voting for the other elected officials. The annually elected 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senate, and House of Representatives would constitute a 
resurrected General Court to possess supreme power, including the “full power and 
authority to erect and constitute judicatories and courts of record, and other courts.”10 The 
document implied a formal separation of powers. The Governor, however, possessed no 
veto over legislation and the proposed constitution lacked provisions establishing a 
distinct judicial department within the government. It simply assumed without saying that 
the provincial court structure would remain the same.  
The means of judicial appointment and tenure set out in the proposed constitution 
resonated with John Adams’s views. The Governor and Senate would appoint all judges 
straight down to the local justices of the peace. All the judges would enjoy tenure on 
good behavior. Lower law enforcement officers served at the pleasure of the Governor 
and Senate. Much to the dismay of some commentators, however, the document left the 
means of the judge’s support—a delicate issue after the salary controversy—unclear. It 
also failed to specify a method for removing the judges.11  
The towns overwhelmingly rejected the proposed constitution of 1778 for a 
number of reasons. Ongoing disputes about the ratio of representation, for example, 
produced many complaints. That the proposed constitution did not contain a declaration 
                                                
10 Proposed Constitution of 1778, Article XIII, in ibid., 196. 
11 Proposed Constitution of 1778, Articles XIX, XXIV, XXVI, in ibid., 198-99.  
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of rights also drew numerous objections, as did property requirements for voting and 
holding office.12   
The very means by which the provisional government had formulated the plan 
attracted substantial criticism. During these debates new rationales emerged for the idea 
that the framing process required a special convention of the people distinct from the 
legislature. To permit a sitting government to frame a constitution, declared one leading 
western voice, “would make them Greater than the people their Master.”13 Here the 
farmers in western Massachusetts contributed to a momentous intellectual epiphany 
within American constitutional culture that would shape the ratification procedures for 
the Constitution of 1780 and no less the nation’s constitutional founders in 1787: an 
operative constitutional distinction between fundamental law and legislation effectuated 
through contrasting modes of enactment. From this perspective, mere legislation no 
longer attained the status of law unless propounded in accordance with written 
fundamental law whose creation and enactment had to differ in kind from the enactment 
of those legislative laws whose existence presupposed it. Once this argument became 
articulated in Massachusetts and elsewhere few could dispute its force.   
Yet if areas of consensus formed in Massachusetts in opposition to the 
constitution of 1778, fundamental disagreements also arose over the role, nature, and 
scope of judicial power within the proposed framework. Roughly two contrasting 
positions presented themselves. On the one hand, we have the views cultivated by John 
Adams, the foremost opinion leader in the revolutionary legal elite appointed Chief 
                                                
12 For the town returns, see ibid., 202-323. 
13 Allen, “Vindication” [1778], 524-25.  
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Justice of the Superior Court of Judicature in 1775. As early as 1774 in “Thoughts on 
Government,” Adams offered a full-throated endorsement of a strong independent 
judiciary that owed much to post-Glorious Revolution English constitutional 
jurisprudence. “The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of 
the people, and every blessing of society,” he wrote, “depend so much upon an upright 
and skillful administration of justice, that the judicial power ought to be distinct from 
both the legislative and executive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check 
upon both.”14  
Toward these ends, he proposed appointment by the Governor with the consent of 
the Council, tenure on good behavior, impeachment by the House before the Governor 
and Council, and salaries “established by law.” The judges “should not be dependent on 
any man or body of men.”15 These principles found some expression in the proposed 
constitution of 1778. Yet Adams and others in his cadre also recognized that 
Massachusetts democrats might prefer “a government more popular.” 16  Judicial 
independence on the English model remained Adams’ ideal. But when John Rutledge 
queried him before a rapt audience in the Continental Congress on the proper form of 
government in the states, Adams responded: “[A]ny form that our people would consent 
to institute, would be better than none, even if they placed all power in a house of 
representatives, and they should appoint governors and judges.”17   
                                                
14 Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” in Adams, Works, 4:198. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Notes on June 7, 1775 debates, in ibid., 3:17. 
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The positions developed by western constitutionalists in the late 1770s tracked 
this latter aspect of Adams’ early thinking, even as Adams and men of his ilk soon 
abandoned it as a workable constitutional option. The westerners reconceived the judicial 
power so as to render it consonant with their larger vision of constitutional government 
predicated on the ongoing active consent of the governed and their commitment to legal 
localism. They could accept that the judicial power involved the exercise of an 
independent function. But otherwise the key theme that ran throughout the westerners’ 
commentary beginning as early as 1775 suggested, if not the total abolition of the state 
courts in favor of local justice, then their reconstitution as representative institutions so 
that they embodied the principles and ideals enunciated during the early controversies 
over the royal salaries and Government Act.  
How? Life tenure on good behavior did not even qualify for consideration. Nor 
did executive appointments with or without the consent of a Council or Senate, because 
they too closely mirrored the practices under the discredited charter and, particularly as to 
the county and town courts, shut the appropriate constituents out of the selection process. 
Instead, most of the towns in western counties (and a few in the east) that made detailed 
comments in their returns in 1778 voted to subject most or all judges to annual elections 
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by the people or legislature.18 As the saying went at the time, “WHERE ANNUAL ELECTION 
ENDS, SLAVERY BEGINS.”19  
Few if any in Massachusetts seriously disputed that the annual election 
requirement must apply to all legislators, to the Governor and his lieutenant. Men such as 
John Adams, James Sullivan, Theophilus Parsons, and Theodore Sedgwick, however, 
increasingly felt uneasy about applying this fundamental principle of the Revolution to 
the judges. All power, they could agree, originally resided in the people at large. With 
respect to the judges, however, these men believed the most prudent course consisted in 
the people consenting to a framework that relinquished their own control over the judges 
in order to insure coolness and impartiality in the administration of justice. Populists in 
the west and elsewhere, on the other hand, extended the principles of popular consent and 
annual election into the judicial sphere without reservation. Many embraced a rule of 
electoral proportionality as to the judges’ jurisdiction so that each town would elect its 
own justice of the peace, each county its own county judges and, finally, the province as 
a whole, speaking either through original suffrages or a lower legislative chamber, would 
elect Superior Court judges.       
The towns’ favorable experiences administering justice at the local level serve as 
critical context for understanding the anxious popular response to the proposed 
constitution of 1778’s judicial provisions. By all appearances, town justice seemed to 
                                                
18 See, e.g., Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 213 (Greenwich), 216 (Hardwick), 217 (Charlemont), 
221 (Rochester), 221 (Pittsfield), 226 (Chesterfield), 228 (Williamson), 235-37 (Sutton), 244 (New Salem), 
256 (Lenox), 277 (Georgetown), 286 (Shelburne), 290-91 (Plymouth), 302 (Spencer), 313 (Westminster), 
321 (Pelham). Most of the returns rejected the constitution without referring to its judicial provisions or 
suggesting alternatives.  
19 “Demophilus [George Bryan?], The Genuine Principles of the Ancient Saxon or English Constitution, 
Philadelphia, 1776,” in Lutz and Hyneman, American Political Writing, 1:354. 
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work just fine in the period from 1774-76. “[F]or nearly three years,” one commentator 
celebrated, “the public peace was preserved inviolate . . . without law. Perhaps the only 
instance since the world began.”20 These sorts of comments appeared with increasing 
frequency in and after 1776, particularly among the ministers. Reverend William Gordon 
in Boston could marvel at the “order that prevails through the country now” 
notwithstanding the suspension of established courts of record. This, Gordon wrote, 
attested that “the morals of this people [in Massachusetts], taken collectively, are superior 
to those of other places.”21 Herein lay an anti-judicial ideal akin to the hope expressed by 
Adams’ horse jockey that the courts never sit again, or as Joseph Greenleaf put it, that 
“courts & lawyers may always be as little needed.”22  
The popular cant that reached culmination after the Declaration of Independence 
declared that the people had fallen into a “state of nature.” This rhetoric had precedent in 
the imperial struggle, but attained a new concrete significance in and after 1776 for 
obvious reasons. During the imperial struggle it functioned as a veiled threat to the 
English government and its provincial magistrates. As late as 1773, the to-be loyalist 
Daniel Leonard argued that England’s conduct and policies had destroyed the social 
compact and placed the province in a state of nature, “whereby our natural right of self 
defence, and revenge returns.”23 After 1776, however, as the struggle over home rule 
                                                
20 “[Anonymous], The Alarm: or, an Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the Late Resolve of 
Congress, Philadelphia, 1776,” in Lutz and Hyneman, American Political Writing, 1:325  
21 William Gordon, “A Discourse Preached December 15, 1774,” in Thornton, Pulpit of the American 
Revolution, 206.   
22 Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine, Oct. 16, 1774, P-392, Reel 3, Robert Treat Paine Papers, Mass. 
Historical Society.  
23 Massachusettensis [Daniel Leonard], “To All Nations of Men,” Massachusetts Spy, Nov. 18, 1773, in 
Lutz and Hyneman, American Political Writing, 1:215; for the entire essay, see ibid., 209-16. For an earlier 
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yielded to tensions over who should rule at home, the established elite began to back 
away from the state of nature argument (which undermined their own authority) and 
westerners thereafter seized upon it to justify continued closure of the regularly 
established courts.24  
 The return to the state of nature had special significance with respect to the courts 
for it meant that the people and towns had re-assumed all judicial power. Until the towns 
voluntarily relinquished this power, courts in the traditional sense could not exist. The 
very idea subverted the provincial government’s claimed authority and otherwise struck 
fear into the friends of order in Massachusetts, who increasingly castigated the populists 
as lawless anarchists, enemies to order, and some even suggested treasonous. Yet, as we 
have seen, the townspeople did not experience the so-called state of nature as lawless or 
anarchical per se.  
The ministers deserve much of the credit for domesticating and even “legalizing” 
the supposed state of nature into which Massachusetts fell for the period 1776 to 1780. 
One leading Berkshirite minister emphasized that, while he and his county brethren did 
not feel bound either to the old charter or the provisional government, there remained the 
“Eternal Law of Nature to which we are allways and Invariably subject.”25 In a 1776 
Election Day sermon in Boston, Samuel West conjured the state of nature not as 
                                                                                                                                            
invocation of returning to the state of nature, see Letter from Joseph Hawley, in Boston Evening-Post, July 
13, 1767, 1-2, wherein Hawley attempted to defend the Lanesborough rioters’ obstruction of the legal 
process during the Stamp Act controversy. For a provocative interpretation of Hawley’s arguments, as well 
as Tory lawyer Jonathan Sewall’s counterclaims, see Reid, “In a Defensive Rage,” 1056-62.    
24 For western placemen William Whiting’s argument that Massachusetts had emerged out of the state of 
nature into a pre-constitutional general “civil society,” see “Address to the Inhabitants of Berkshire 
[1778],” in Taylor, Colony to Commonwealth, 101-05. 
25 Allen, “Vindication,” 525. 
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Hobbesian anarchy, but as desirable and lawful. “The most perfect freedom consists in 
obeying the dictates of right reason, and submitting to natural law.”26  
Indeed, we cannot easily overestimate the extent to which the ministers, by 
casting the conflict with England as part of a dramatic apocalyptic struggle between 
liberty and arbitrary power, contributed to ordinary Americans’ perceptions of the 
Revolution’s significance. 27  In so doing, however, they propounded open-ended 
conceptions of liberty that often conflated the distinction between its natural and civic 
registers.28 The millennial dimensions of the revolutionary sermons demand special 
attention here in assessing the attitudes of the westerners, for the sermons had important 
legal implications. Above all they made victory in the Revolution tantamount with the 
arrival of the millennium and universal moral regeneration. As the influential New Light 
ministers of the previous generation had argued, this meant that the “courts of law would 
necessarily wither away.”29 A perfectly virtuous people living under God in end times 
would no longer need courts of law, let alone lawyers. The dictates of natural law, 
operating within the confines of each individual’s converted conscience, would reign 
supreme and produce perfect order and harmony.        
During the late phases of the imperial struggle, the Whig elite had adopted 
homologous arguments to justify the break with England. Yet no sooner had the 
                                                
26 Samuel West, “On the Right to Rebel Against Governors (Election Day Sermon), Boston, 1776,” in Lutz 
and Hyneman, American Political Writing, 1:415. For similar statements, see Samuel Langdon, “A Sermon 
Preached Before the Honorable Congress of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay,” May 31, 1775, in 
Thornton, Pulpit of the American Revolution, 250. 
27 See Hatch, Sacred Cause of Liberty. 
28 E.g., Nathanial Niles, “Two Discourses on Liberty,” Newburyport, Mass., June 5, 1774, in Lutz and 
Hyneman, American Political Writing, 1:269-70.  
29 Heimert, Religion and the American Mind, 182. For civic millennialism in revolutionary sermons, see 
generally Hatch, Sacred Cause of Liberty.   
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Declaration of Independence placed Americans in “separate and equal Station to which 
the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them” than the American legal mind, 
finding the free-ranging conception of liberty under natural law propounded by the 
ministers difficult to contain and, shocked by “the exaggeration in entitlements that 
followed therefrom,” began efforts to stem its flow.30 In Massachusetts, the positions 
taken by western populists with respect to the relative desirability of a state of nature 
produced particular alarm among eastern lawyers. Penned by the youthful conservative 
Newburyport lawyer Theophilus Parsons as Essex County’s response to the constitution 
of 1778, The Essex Result sounded some of the key themes advanced by the lawyers and 
gentry at this time.  
As to the proposed constitution, Parsons did not like it. To be sure, he agreed with 
the virtually unanimous call for a declaration of rights. For the most part, however, 
Parsons evinced uneasiness with the constitution’s more democratic features. He called 
for an executive veto, greater representation of property, higher property requirements for 
officeholders, indirect election of representatives and senators through county 
conventions, and a more robust articulation of judicial independence. Responding as 
much to the state of the west as to the constitution itself, The Essex Result stressed the 
need for positive legal constraints on natural liberty going forward and advised entrusting 
only “men of education and fortune” with the responsibilities of constitutional 
governance.31 The disquisition evidenced deep misgivings about the egalitarianism and 
                                                
30 Ferguson, “Dialectic of Liberty,” 47.  
31 “The Essex Result,” in Parsons, Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, 369. “Yet, when we are forming a 
Constitution, by deductions that follow from established principles, . . . we are to look further than to the 
bulk of the people, for the greatest wisdom, firmness, consistency and perseverance.” Ibid. 
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open-ended conceptions of popular liberty flowing from the perceived devolution of 
power to the people after Independence. “The idea of liberty has been held up in so 
dazzling colours, that some of us may not be willing to submit to that subordination 
necessary in the freest states.”32 Natural law receded into the background in Parson’s 
analysis and, by all appearances, became operationalized as a limit on legislative law 
capable of justifying revolution, but inadequate to the task of governing a society in the 
ordinary course. The theoretical emphasis here shifted from the rights retained in a state 
of nature championed by the ministers and Berskshirites to the absolute necessity of 
alienating some portion of those rights to central legislative, executive and judicial 
powers so as to produce a “necessary subordination” among the people.33 
Parsons linked civil liberty to structural governmental constraints memorialized in 
a positive written constitution. One of the key structural constraints, according to The 
Essex Result, involved a distinct judicial branch, here articulated with notable emphasis. 
At the same time, The Essex Result offered a full-throated endorsement of legislative 
supremacy operating through representative majority rule. The judiciary’s role would 
consist in enforcing legislation notwithstanding dissenting minorities and in assessing 
private contract violations and damages. Where previous jurisprudential writers had 
discussed the judicial function as part of the executive, in his opening comments Parsons 
moved closer to a tripartite separation in the manner earlier invoked John Adams. He 
described the supreme power to consist of three distinct branches—“the legislative, 
                                                
32 Ibid., 364. 
33 Ibid., 363. 
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judicial, and executive.”34 Commentary on the judicial branch occurred immediately after 
the legislative with the result that the reader encounters Parsons extolling the virtues of an 
independent judicial power before hearing anything about the executive branch.  
As a structural matter, the Essex Result adopted a set of constitutional guarantees 
respecting independence for judges that anticipated those found in the federal 
Constitution in 1787, including tenure on good behavior and removal by trial and 
impeachment in the legislature. Whereas the whole flow of constitutional thought during 
the imperial struggle had emphasized an appropriate separation of the judiciary from the 
executive, Parsons here placed some emphasis on the separation of the judiciary from the 
legislature. He seized, for example, upon the proposed constitution’s failure to specify 
means of judges’ support, which he argued should remain exempt from legislative 
tampering.35 He preferred executive appointment of judicial officials in every instance.36  
The Essex Result also sketched out a distinct interpretive role for judges (“[i]f the 
legislative and judicial powers are united, the maker of the law will also interpret it”), 
even as Parsons could imagine the judges doing little more than simply applying what the 
supreme legislature had commanded and enforcing established common law rules in 
contract cases.37 The work provides no indication that Parsons contemplated the judges 
performing any special role enforcing rights outside contracts, let alone reviewing 
legislation. Yet he did offer some succor to the westerners. For Parsons also 
acknowledged that judges did not fully comprise what he called “the judicial power.” 
                                                
34 Ibid., 370. 
35 Ibid., 388. 
36 Ibid., 360. 
37 Ibid., 373. 
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“[I]n this territory,” he wrote, the judicial power “has always been, and always ought to 
be, a court and jury.”38 And as Parsons also knew, while legislation controlled judges in 
Massachusetts, it did not necessarily control juries. Still, The Essex Result insinuated the 
English truism that the judges “ascertain[ed] the law” while juries “tr[ied] all facts”—a 
portentous statement, to be sure, but one contradicted by the Massachusetts experience.39  
II.  An Uncertain Settlement: The Constitution of 1780 
Attacked from multiple angles, the proposed constitution of 1778 met with a 
strong defeat. The oppositional consensus vis-à-vis the constitution itself, however, 
obscured deeper constitutional conflicts, which in turn figured in an ongoing dispute 
about whether the current government, sitting under no other constitution but the old 
charter, remained legitimate enough to govern the society in the interim. Many 
westerners answered no and, as their chief means of protest, refused to permit the county 
courts to sit. Meanwhile, a growing chorus of eastern voices espousing views consonant 
with The Essex Result accused the westerners of lawlessness and disloyalty in obstructing 
the courts. By 1778 the Worcester county courts, staffed with many of the same populist 
justices who sat on these courts prior to the Revolution, had reopened to little 
controversy. Although a few Hampshire courts began to sit by 1778 as well, Hampshire 
towns tended toward the constitutionalist position embraced until the end by the 
Berkshirites, who would recognize no centrally created courts of justice without a proper 
constitution to support them, consented to by the people. The debate over the constitution 
of 1780, moreover, saw the emergence of an alternative set of ideals with respect to 
                                                
38 Ibid., 372 (emphasis added). 
39 Ibid., 382. 
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judicial power and independence that contrasted dramatically with the ones embraced by 
the likes of John Adams and Theophilus Parsons.    
The friends of order seeking to affirm the provisional government’s authority 
notwithstanding the absence of an accepted constitution saw court obstructionism as an 
insult to the constituted authorities and a recipe for anarchy. These men expressed 
particular concern over the absence of any established criminal jurisdiction for this meant 
that, in theory, murderers and thieves could run free. While the experience of the towns 
did not seem to bear out this conclusion, in early 1778, eager to establish courts with 
enforceable criminal jurisdiction in Berkshire and Hampshire, the provisional 
government nevertheless ordered the Court of General Sessions to begin sitting there.40  
The move set off a firestorm in the west. In August, a Berkshire county 
convention voted overwhelmingly to continue keeping the courts closed and petitioned 
the General Court to initiate a special convention for framing a new constitution.41 Then 
Pittsfield went one step further. In October 1778, at a time when every county east of 
Hampshire had permitted the constituted courts to open, Pittsfield purported to create its 
own independent criminal justice system. According to its plan, a five-person committee 
of selectman would “hear and determine” all crimes and breaches of the peace under the 
combined jurisdiction traditionally held by justices of the peace and the Courts of 
General Sessions. The defendant would receive one appeal, decided by a jury of six men 
chosen by an appointed official from a venire of twenty-four freemen nominated jointly 
                                                
40 See Acts And Resolves of the Province, 20:201 (Dec. 3, 1777, chap. 518).  
41 Berkshire Petition to the General Court, Aug. 26, 1778, in Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 366-
68. 
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and severally by the parties. The jury’s verdict would be “final and conclusive” and the 
defendant would have no further appeal.42        
Not surprisingly, neither Pittsfield’s ongoing refusal to let the county courts sit, 
nor its attempt to establish its own criminal justice system met with approval from the 
friends of order. Yet at this point western voices also appeared to challenge the continued 
judicial obstructionism occurring in Berkshire. The town of Worcester castigated the 
Berkshirites for opposing “legal government,” creating an illegal imperium in imperio, 
undermining constituted authority, and otherwise promoting anarchy and confusion. 
Massachusetts needed a proper constitution, yes, but the courts should stay open in the 
interim because the people had elected representatives and had thereby delegated 
sovereignty to the provisional government until the enactment of a new constitution.43 
The Berkshirite placeman and future Shaysite, William Whiting, expressed similar 
views.44  
These developments prompted the provisional government to conduct a formal 
committee inquiry into whether the Berkshire towns would in fact agree to support the 
provisional government’s authority. Although it received strong objections from 
Pittsfield, the assigned committee nevertheless concluded that the appointment of “proper 
Civil Officers” would quiet “the Clamours about Executive Courts.”45 Early in 1779, the 
Council thereupon appointed four judges to sit on a court of common pleas, while the 
                                                
42 Pittsfield Town Meeting Resolves, in Smith, History of Pittsfield, 1:382.  
43 Response of Worcester Committee of Correspondence, Oct. 8, 1778, in Handlin and Handlin, Popular 
Sources, 369-73. 
44  [William Whiting], “Address to the Inhabitants of Berkshire [1778],” in Taylor, Colony to 
Commonwealth, 101-05. 
45 Committee Report, Jan. 14, 1779, in Acts and Resolves of the Province, 5:1032.  
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legislature issued pardons for all “riots, routs and unlawful assemblies” and directed that 
the Superior Court meet in Berkshire annually.46  
The move did not calm but galvanized the Berkshire constitutionalists who 
proceeded to call for a new county convention to address the recent judicial 
appointments.47 A Hampshire county convention thereafter affirmed its common cause 
with the Berkshirites when it reaffirmed that the provisional government lacked 
legitimacy in March 1779. Emphasizing the “uneasiness in the people of this County with 
respect to the execution of Law” and expressing a fear that delay worked to the advantage 
of “Designing men,” Hampshire again demanded a new constitutional convention.48 
Without a written constitution consented to by the people, county delegates asserted, the 
provisional government’s enactments constituted mere “Legislation without Law.”49   
Yet on the question of the courts in particular, the Berkshirites apparently had 
more fight in them in 1779 than did their Hampshire counterparts. When the Superior 
Court attempted to sit in Great Barrington on May 4, 1779, a crowd of hundreds took 
possession of the courthouse and, unwilling to cross the people, the justices did not 
attempt to hear cases.50 The county’s address to the court recognized the “Necessity of 
Law,” but again argued “for the non admission of Law on the present foundation.”51 The 
address made a few legalistic points to anticipate possible rejoinders from the judges. It 
                                                
46 Committee Report, Feb. 5, 1779, in ibid., 5:1032-1033; “An Act of Pardon...,” in ibid., 5:932-933 (Feb. 
27, 1779, chap. 38). 
47 See, e.g., Stockbridge petitions and resolves, Mar. 8-29, 1779, in Taylor, Colony to Commonwealth, 106-
108. 
48 Resolutions of Hampshire Convention, Mar. 30, 1770, and Petition of Hampshire Towns, Apr. 20, 1779, 
in ibid., 109-110. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Taylor, Western Massachusetts, 98. 
51 Berkshire County Address to the Superior Court, May 3, 1779, in Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 
387. 
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stated, for example, that the provisional government’s judicial appointments failed even 
to conform to the royal charter of 1691 and, even assuming they did so conform, the 
Declaration of Independence superseded the Continental Congress’s previous advice to 
proceed in establishing a new government under the old charter.  
Later in the 1780s Joseph Hawley would observe that “two thirds these Western 
People fully believed that they were miserably deceived by Hutchinson’s opposers.”52 Yet 
this suspicion of counterrevolutionary motives in the Massachusetts representative elite 
had roots in the 1770s. Berkshire’s 1779 address confirmed its ongoing concern about 
“the Spirit and Principle which actuates many of the men who would inforce” the charter, 
a concern no doubt shared in Hampshire where the “great men” of the Connecticut River 
vied to maintain power notwithstanding the constitutionalists and court resisters. Most 
important, the Berkshirites continued to maintain that the charter itself contravened 
revolutionary principles.53   
With the proposed constitution of 1778 now dead, it soon became clear that 
people all across the state wanted to convene another, specially constituted convention to 
frame a new constitution that addressed the problems identified in the town returns. In 
June, having received a generally positive response to its query to the towns on the 
question, the House of Representatives called for a convention and outlined the 
procedures for electing delegates and for ratification. Significantly, property 
qualifications would apply neither to the election of delegates nor to ratification by the 
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towns. As opposed to the simple majority traditionally required to pass legislation, 
ratification would require approval from at least two-thirds of “those who are free and 
twenty years of age.”54  
The very calling of a special non-legislative convention in 1779 together with 
supermajority ratification requirements marked a pivotal moment in American 
constitutional history, for these procedures viably operationalized the distinction between 
fundamental law (increasingly conceived as a written constitution) and ordinary law 
inherited from the imperial struggle and articulated with such intensity by the westerners 
in the period after 1775. Assuming two-thirds of the voters approved an appropriate 
constitution, however, it also had the potential—doubtless perceived by the friends of 
order—to republicanize appointive, life tenured judges by endowing them with a measure 
of popular consent in the first instance.  
The constitution eventually produced by the convention that met intermittently in 
Cambridge from September 1, 1779 to June 16, 1780 stands, in the estimation of many 
historians, as the state constitution that most influenced the federal Constitution of 1787. 
The supposed affinity actually does not hold with respect to the political branches, for it 
overlooks the fact that the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 provided for annual 
popular elections not only for the lower house, but the Senate, and Governor. With 
respect to the judiciary, the Massachusetts constitution did provide important precedent 
for the federal Constitution. The better point of historical reference in this regard, 
however, remains the judicial settlement in England after the Glorious Revolution, which 
                                                
54 See Returns of the Towns, Feb. 20, 1779, May 1779, in ibid., 389-401; General Court Resolves, June 21, 
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provided the model for influential legal minds in Massachusetts such as John Adams, 
Theophilus Parsons, and James Sullivan—all in attendance at the convention.   
Although most towns in 1779 did not give their delegates to the convention any 
specific substantive instructions, towns in the west continued to press for annual elections 
of judges and county sheriffs.55 The town of Dudley felt compelled to request that every 
Town retain “a Right to Choose their Justice of the Peace annually.”56 At the convention 
itself, the committee tasked with writing a draft declaration of rights and constitution 
included delegates from all the counties, though counties west of Middlesex still 
constituted a minority.57 The convention gave the committee a single charge: “That the 
Government, to be framed by this Convention, shall be a FREE REPUBLIC.”58  
The draft constitution reported for the convention’s consideration bore the distinct 
footprint of John Adams, particular with respect to the judiciary. Significantly, discussion 
of the judicial provisions took place when attendance had shrunk to a fraction of its 
earlier numbers.59 Particularly once winter set in, western delegates had a practical 
disadvantage since the convention met in Cambridge. Still, the record reveals attempts by 
certain unnamed delegates to abolish the sessions courts altogether and possibly the 
inferior courts of common pleas as well.60 This would have produced a stripped down 
                                                
55 Pittsfield, for example, demanded annual popular elections for all judges, from the Superior Court to the 
county courts. Smith, History of Pittsfield, 1:366-67. For instructions to the same effect in Williamstown, 
see Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 414-15; and in Stoughton, ibid., 426.  
56 Dudley Instructions, Aug. 24, 1779, in ibid., 428. 
57 Journal of the Convention, 25, 28-29. 
58 Ibid., 24. 
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two-tiered judicial system consisting of local justices of the peace and a single superior 
court.  
While the convention appointed a committee to investigate these matters, no votes 
appear on the record and the proposed constitution sent out to the towns left the existing 
judicial structure intact except that it changed the name of the high court from the 
Superior Court of Judicature to the Supreme Judicial Court. With respect to judicial 
tenure, a good behavior standard for Supreme Judicial Court judges passed 78-to-35 in 
early November.61 Such tenure for common pleas judges (i.e., those that handled civil 
litigation) met with defeat at that time with 57 in favor, 69 against. Yet the convention 
later pushed this provision through in February, 62-to-24, when attendance numbers had 
shrunk substantially.62 In fairly close votes, with few attendees, the convention also 
approved appointment of all judges by the Governor with the consent of a nine-person 
executive council chosen annually by the Senate and House.63  
When the convention sent the constitution to the towns for their votes, it included 
a prefatory address summarizing the proposed plan. A government needed “Power to 
exert itself” lest it become a “useless Piece of Machinery.” Yet power without restraint 
equaled tyranny. The address emphasized that, while the commonwealth would have an 
executive power, it no longer had a king. The Governor “is emphatically the 
Representative of the whole People” and would face additional checks from the 
legislature and the Council. The address described judicial tenure on good behavior as 
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“necessary for your own Safety.” It responded directly to the westerners, moreover, on 
the question of annual elections. “Men who hold their places upon so precarious a Tenure 
as annual or other frequent Appointments will never so assiduously apply themselves to 
study as will be necessary to the filling their places with dignity.”64  
Largely the work of John Adams, with the able support of other leading legal 
minds, the constitution sent to the towns for approval in March 1780 embodied probably 
the boldest vision of separated powers to date in the American states. Article XXX 
famously describes the strict separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers 
in government as the very definition of a “government of laws and not of men.”65 To 
begin, the 1780 constitution provided for a stronger, independent executive power along 
the lines suggested in The Essex Result. The Governor would receive, among other 
powers, an (overridable) veto on legislation, executive authority over the militia “in times 
of rebellion,” and broader appointive powers than contemplated in the constitution of 
1778.  
The document, however, places even greater emphasis on an independent 
judiciary. In the opening declaration of rights we encounter a whole new kind of rhetoric 
to describe the need for judicial independence. “It is essential to the preservation of the 
rights of every individual, his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an 
impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice.”66 Accordingly, the 
Governor would appoint the judges and the judges would enjoy tenure on good behavior. 
                                                
64 Address of the Convention, Mar. 1780, in Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 439. 
65 Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1, art. XXX. 
66 Ibid., Part 1, art. XXIX. 
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(In a small nod to localism in the west, commissions for Justices of the Peace would 
expire in seven years.)67  
On the question of removing commissioned state judges, the constitution followed 
the model provided by England’s Act of Settlement, which in some ways qualified the 
good behavior tenure guarantee: the Governor, with the council’s consent, could remove 
the judges for any reason whatsoever upon summary address by the legislature.68 It 
provided for “PERMANENT and honorable salaries” for Supreme Judicial Court justices, 
though left often the possibility for tinkering with the county and town judges’ salaries.69 
In essence, the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 tracked the Glorious Revolution 
judicial settlement with the result that, except on the question of salaries for county 
judges, Massachusetts judges would enjoy the same independence from the other 
departments of government and the people themselves enjoyed by the English judges. 
Even as it carried forward the provincial judicial structure and hierarchy, it endowed the 
judges with a form of judicial power quite new to Massachusetts.    
With all this said, the constitution of 1780 also reflected considerable concessions 
to the more democratic-minded delegates that dialed back The Essex Result’s ambitions 
and heeded the town commentary on the 1778 constitution. The drafters inserted a 
declaration of rights comprising thirty articles at the document’s head. Whereas the 
constitution of 1778 began with the austere words, “There shall be convened, held and 
kept, a General Court,” the constitution of 1780 began with “All men are born free and 
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equal, and have certain natural, essential, and inalienable rights.” The 1780 constitution 
retained direct annual elections across the board, substantially reduced property 
qualifications for holding office as compared to the 1778 constitution, and applied the 
same traditional (very moderate) property requirement for voting across all elected 
offices. Populists, to be sure, continued to advocate universal manhood suffrage and 
issued blanket objections to property qualifications for holding office. Still, these features 
of the 1780 constitution suggest a frame of government less “mixed” in the sociological 
sense and more egalitarian and democratic than observers (both then and now) have 
described it.   
As to the judges, recall that in 1778 Theophilus Parsons would have given 
accused judges a full trial in the House and then impeachment proceedings before the 
Senate before removing them, a procedure later adopted by the federal Constitution 
which strengthened the good behavior guarantee. The 1780 Massachusetts constitution 
would allow removal by quicker means, arguably more responsive to the popular will, 
that did not require findings of misbehavior. As noted, moreover, town justices received 
fixed-term appointments and the constitution nowhere provided for fixed salaries for 
judges commissioned on courts below the Supreme Judicial Court. Furthermore, the 
declaration of rights contained robust provisions guaranteeing trial by local jury to all 
citizens without discrimination or prejudice and the constitution made no suggestion, as 
in The Essex Result, of confining juries to fact-finding only. Finally, while the judges 
retained some independence from the other branches and the people, the people’s 
legislative representatives would possess substantial control over courts, including the 
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perpetual power to create (and presumably destroy) “judicatories and courts of record, or 
other courts,” and the power to suspend the legal process under appropriate 
circumstances.70  
As noted, the procedures established by the convention for ratification required 
approval by two-thirds of the towns. The convention, however, otherwise left open 
precisely how the towns should respond. As it happened, the town returns did not admit 
of any hard and fast interpretation of the popular response. Some towns provided 
commentary on each provision without voting on the whole. Others commented on only a 
small portion of the constitution. Still others provided no commentary.  
The new Declaration of Rights at the document’s beginning did much to ingratiate 
skeptics to the proposed framework, with two important exceptions: First, Article III of 
the Declaration of Rights, which established protestant Christianity as the state religion, 
drew many objections, particularly from the Baptists in Worcester.71 Second, Article 
XXIX, which urged the people, for their own “safety,” to accept permanent salaries and 
tenure on good behavior for Supreme Judicial Court judges, encountered considerable 
resistance in the west.72  
So, too, did the other provisions in the constitution respecting judicial 
appointment and tenure. In keeping with the principles inherited from the royal salary and 
                                                
70 Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 2, chap. I, sec. 1, art. III; ibid., Part 1, art. XX. In his capacity as justice on the 
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Massachusetts Government Act controversies, westerners argued that the judges must 
retain independence from the executive branch, but could never become independent of 
the people themselves in a free republic. The constitution of 1780, they believed, failed to 
heed these principles. Towns in Berkshire, Hampshire and, to a lesser degree, Worcester 
continued to demand periodic popular election or House appointment of all judges.73 As 
one town put it, annual election of the judges in the counties would “keep[] each Branch 
more Immediately Dependent on the People—and therefore will Serve to keep the three 
Branches Distinct and Independent of each other . . .  as each Branch are the Substitutes 
of the People.”74 Other towns took specific issue with permanent salaries rather than 
tenure on good behavior, pressing for annual judicial salary determinations in the 
House.75 Still others passed over the constitution’s judicial provisions in silence.76    
The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 often gets lauded as the oldest extant 
constitution in the world. This attests to what legal philosophers call the “sociological” 
theory of constitutional legitimacy,77 for notwithstanding the ambiguity of the town 
                                                
73 For Hampshire county towns, see ibid., 534 (Ashfield), 540 (Belchertown), 544 (South Brimfield), 551 
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returns, it remains eminently clear that the constitution in its entirety did not receive the 
supermajority approval that the convention had required in 1780.78 From what can be 
discerned, probably each provision received, at least, a bare majority of town votes. 
Along with fifteen-year amendment bar and property qualifications for voters and elected 
officials, the provisions respecting the judicial branch seemed to lie at the low end of the 
approval continuum.79  
Having received the returns, however, the convention manipulated them to 
produce the desired result—a return to constitutional government in Massachusetts—so 
as to take the wind out of the westerners’ sails. In some cases, this vote juggling 
amounted to an outright fraud, such as when the convention counted “yeas” on amended 
provisions as “yeas” on the original provisions!80  
In any event, with many in Massachusetts both exhausted from the long 
constitutional struggle and uneasy about the state lagging so far behind other states in 
establishing a written frame of government, the proposed constitution went into effect 
late in 1780, unamended, without significant recorded protest. Thereafter the Berkshirites 
began to let the courts sit, marking the apparent end to the most intense crisis the 
Massachusetts judicial system had ever experienced.  
We should resist, however, the conclusion that the Massachusetts constitution of 
1780 advanced any unqualified “counterrevolutionary” agenda. Without question, in 
response to the unbounded democratic energies displayed in the west, the Bay State legal 
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mind embarked on an intellectual shift vis-à-vis the judicial power that found significant 
expression in the constitution of 1780. Yet it also seems hard to deny the remarkable 
extent to which the constitution that went into effect in 1780 gave powerful expression to 
the Revolution’s central political doctrine—that all legitimate government rested on the 
consent of the governed. Witness Article V of the declaration of rights: “ALL power 
residing in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers 
of government, vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their 
substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.”81  
Particularly from the perspective of 1787, annual popular elections of the 
Governor, Senate, and House make the Massachusetts constitution one of the most 
democratic of the early state constitutions as a political matter. Like the other state 
constitutions, it emphasized popular political controls on government, rather than rights-
based controls let alone judicial resolution of important constitutional issues. Although it 
purported to embody a settlement on judicial independence, it did not contemplate the 
power of judicial review.82 To the contrary, it provided that “[t]he power of suspending 
laws, or the execution of them, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature.”83 As it 
had in the other states, in 1780 legislative supremacy won the day in Massachusetts.  
Moderate property requirements for voting and for holding elected office did 
apply. Observers would later argue that the framers designed the Senate primarily to 
                                                
81 Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1, art. V. 
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   78 
represent property rather than persons.84 Even so, all elected officials remained fully 
accountable to constituents through popular elections every year. Only the judges could 
claim considerable constitutional independence from the people. This, of course, could 
not comfortably exist within the consent-based constitutional vision inherited from the 
imperial struggle and Revolution that otherwise inspired the state constitution makers in 
and after 1776. With the exception of New York, the other state constitutions did not go 
quite so far as Massachusetts to insulate the judges from popular oversight, even as all 
reflected a similar commitment to ultimate legislative supremacy. 85  In theory, the 
constitution of 1780 itself, insofar as it enjoyed popular sanction, did something to 
resolve the conflict between popular consent and independent judges. The convention 
votes and town returns on particular issues demonstrate, however, that more than a few in 
Massachusetts declined to give their consent to judges unaccountable to the people by 
election within their respective jurisdictions.  
Still, no immediate revolt occurred upon ratification. The Berkshirites permitted 
the courts to sit and, by all accounts, the judicial system began to fire on all cylinders for 
the first time since 1774. Notwithstanding the constitution’s failure to provide for annual 
judicial elections, some towns held justices of the peace and county judges popularly 
accountable anyway by electing them to the House of Representatives.86 The newly 
constituted legislature did not at first direct its attention to the judiciary. Perhaps 
legislators did not want to tinker with such a delicate issue so early in the new 
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government’s tenure. The only legislation that passed in the first sessions respecting the 
courts simply transferred the established jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Judicature 
to the new Supreme Judicial Court.87 No similar act appeared for the county courts, 
which nevertheless proceeded to hear cases within their historical jurisdiction at 
increasing rates.88  
Conclusion: Fiscal Crisis and Traditions of Resistance in the 1780s 
As it happened, fiscal issues occupied most of the newly constituted government’s 
attention in the period immediately following the constitution’s enactment. The war had 
necessitated substantial paper money emissions, which the provisional government 
backed with tender laws. Nothing the government did before 1781—including enacting 
price and wage fixing laws89, as well as calling in the state’s bills in exchange for 
treasurer’s notes that the legislature did not make legal tender90—could adequately stem 
the inflation produced by war emissions. Debtors and farmers reveled in the war 
environment. Creditors and merchants suffered. In May 1780, as per instructions from the 
Continental Congress, Massachusetts called in its share of continental bills, made a 
substantial “new emission” of state paper which the government declared legal tender, 
and enacted additional taxes payable in specie to stabilize the new money.91 The new 
emission paper nevertheless rapidly depreciated, as did the extant continentals. This 
proved the straw that broke the camel’s back for an emerging cadre of fiscal reformers.  
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Much to the dismay of farmers and debtors, for the next few months merchants, 
creditors, and their allies in the Senate mounted a successful campaign to retire the state 
debt and abolish soft money. 1781 legislation known as the Consolidation Act provided 
for the refunding of all state debts, repayment in specie over time and, more 
controversially, that unelected judges on the Supreme Judicial Court would finally 
determine the market value of new emission notes.92 A spirited movement to repeal the 
act’s modification of the new emission’s legal tender characteristics met with success in 
the House, but the Senate refused to budge. Thereafter the Senate pushed through 
legislation that completely abolished the legal tender features of the new emission notes 
so that creditors needed no longer to accept it as payment on their accounts.93     
Meanwhile, taxes soared higher and higher, with the farming communities 
bearing a disproportionate share of the direct taxes. Prices plummeted, specie flowed into 
the hands of the eastern commercial elite, and debt litigation in the county courts 
skyrocketed.94 Within this radioactive context, resistance toward the established county 
courts once again reared its head in the west. Fees and costs borne largely by litigants in 
the courts of common pleas came under particular fire, as did excessive attendance fees 
paid out of the treasury for judges on the general sessions courts.  
Both Hampshire and Worcester counties issued petitions in 1781 that would have 
suspended creditor suits in the county courts while taxes remained so high, renewed the 
Confession Act (which had expired in 1778), enlarged the jurisdiction of the justices of 
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the peace, and reduced attorneys’ fees. Hampshire would have abolished the sessions 
courts entirely, giving its criminal jurisdiction to common pleas and returning final 
licensing discretion to town-elected selectmen.95  
In Berkshire county, a crowd of three-hundred obstructed the Court of Common 
Pleas on February 26, 1782. Lanesborough justice of the peace James Harris presented a 
petition to adjourn or suspend civil cases until the next term. 96  On April 4, at 
Northampton in Hampshire county, the controversial disbarred minister Samuel Ely 
beckoned the surrounding towns to oppose the Court of Common Pleas then sitting, and a 
week later he and others gathered to obstruct the Supreme Judicial Court, reportedly 
declaring: “Come on my brave boys, we will go to the wood pile and get clubs enough, 
and know their grey wigs off, and send them out of the world in an instant.”97 With a 
constitution in his pocket that “the Angel Gabriel could not find fault,” Ely contended 
that excessive salaries for judges and the grant of fiscal power to the Supreme Judicial 
Court justices to valuate bills of credit, violated the Massachusetts constitution. “The 
courts ought not sit” and “the attorneys, Sheriffs, & all Officers should be sacrificed.”98  
The mood, however, had somewhat changed as compared to the late 1770s. 
Conservative factions in both Hampshire and Berkshire opposed the renewed efforts to 
close down the courts. Responding to a request to participate in a convention, Boston all 
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but deemed convention activity illegal under the established constitution. 99  The 
government, moreover, took immediate punitive action against both James Harris and 
Samuel Ely. In response to the Ely affair, in July 1782 the legislature also enacted laws 
formally “establishing” the Supreme Judicial Court, the Courts of Common Pleas, and the 
Courts of General Sessions under the constitution of 1780.100  
Yet the court resisters of 1782 exerted some affirmative legislative influence as 
well, including a moderate revision of the quarter sessions fee table (though court fees 
otherwise continued to rise)101, and a law expanding the jurisdiction of town justices to 
cases up to four pounds (not nearly the twenty pound ceiling earlier conventions had 
demanded and for which the Confession Act of 1776 had provided).102 The latter act 
infuriated county lawyers who, rarely needed or retained in proceedings before justices of 
the peace, stood to lose profitable business; most ignored the legislation and filed their 
cases in common pleas.103 Although the legislation permitted appeals to common pleas 
and beyond, members of the Suffolk County Bar Association nevertheless deemed it 
“contrary to the constitution” on the apparent grounds that it deprived litigants of a jury 
trial.104   
Controversy over the courts in the period prior to Shays’s Rebellion roughly lined 
up with the divide over fiscal issues, with those opposed to taxation and hard money 
continuing to resist the established courts, and those supportive of the Consolidation Act 
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and its legislative progeny (including the old Berkshire constitutionalists!) doing their 
best to support the judicial system. The former contingent tended to owe debts, while the 
latter tended to own notes. Yet to reduce these controversies to naked economic conflicts 
does an injustice to the historical record.  
The reforms demanded during this period reflected a continuing distrust of the 
established court system and a preference for affordable local justice administered by 
town elected officials. Advocacy for renewing the Confession Act by itself established 
that reformers in the 1780s did not want to avoid debts so much as established courts 
staffed with permanent unelected judges. In this regard, the constitutional issues over the 
proper role and function of the judicial power that convulsed Massachusetts in the late 
1770s did not die in 1780. Unsatisfied with the constitution of 1780, reformers began to 
look elsewhere for “fundamental law.” Some looked to the ordinary individual’s common 
sense or conscience. By contrast, the threat of paper money, tender legislation, and 
private debt relief prompted the lawyers, creditors and other fiscal disciplinarians to 
begin groping for enforceable fundamental constitutional directives in the common law 
of private contracts.    
Even as these contrasting points of constitutional reference emerged, the period 
after 1784 experienced relative judicial stability. In 1786, however, as tax burdens 
mounted, the western counties would unite to participate in a rebellion against the courts 
and a revolution against the law that would forever change American history. The 
Shaysites’ grievances and the means employed to assert them certainly had origins in the 
1770s and early 1780s. Yet the 1780s also saw the emergence of new egalitarian habits of 
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thought, including an anti-aristocratic sociology that shaped popular attitudes toward 
legal institutions in distinctive ways. Of course, the contraction of paper and burdensome 
specie taxes that benefited the security-holding commercial elite ranked high on the 
Shaysites’ list of grievances. But so too did excessive court fees and the structure of the 
jurisdiction in the county courts. Towns from Middlesex westward continued to seek and 
idealize local control of justice, including restoration of the Confession Act.105 In addition 
to repealing specie taxes, abolishing the Senate, and changing the existing representation 
ratios, the Hampshire county convention on August 22, 1786 urged annual election of all 
magistrates and judges and the abolition of the county courts.106      
On the eve of the armed uprising, however, the Revolution’s true believers in 
Massachusetts had trained their sights on still other objectionable features of the 
ascendant judicial power—to wit, an expanding guild of professional lawyers from whose 
ranks the judges increasingly came, and the body of legal doctrine inherited from 
England called the common law on which they relied.   
                                                
105 Brooke, “To the Quiet of the People,” 442-456.  
106 Hampshire Herald (Northampton), Sept. 5, 1786. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LAW & PROFESSIONALISM  
IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 
 
*   *   * 
I. The American Revolution against Lawyers 
In the spring of 1786, the artisan and political upstart Benjamin Austin Jr., writing 
under the pseudonym “Honestus,” published a series of newspaper essays in Boston’s 
Independent Chronicle contending that neither professional lawyers nor the common law 
had any rightful place in a “free republic.”1 Austin’s writings provoked a statewide public 
debate lasting well over a year and produced an unprecedented explosion of popular anti-
lawyer activity across Massachusetts.2 Yet if Austin helped raise post-Revolutionary 
antilawyerism to a unique pitch of intensity in Massachusetts, hostilities toward lawyers 
extended well beyond the Bay State’s borders at this time. Circulating and proving 
                                                
1 The Honestus essays ran from March 9 to June 15, 1786 in the Independent Chronicle. The publishers of 
the Chronicle, Adams & Nourse, reprinted all of the essays, except the one that originally appeared June 
15, in Honestus [Benjamin Austin], Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law: As Published 
Occasionally in the Independent Chronicle (Boston, 1786). The collected essays were republished in 1814 
and again in 1819 in Boston. The American Journal of Legal History reprinted the 1819 version in 
Surrency, “The Pernicious Practice of Law—A Comment.”   
2  Observers continued to reference Austin’s writings during the ratification debates. E.g., Junius, 
Massachusetts Gazette, Jan. 4, 1788, in DHRC, 5:612; White, Debates and Proceedings of the Convention 
in 1788, 168, 203. Massachusetts yeoman William Manning’s manuscript “The Key of Libberty” (1798) 
provides powerful evidence that the antilawyerism expressed in Austin’s writings continued to influence 
Bay State farmers in the 1790s. The Manning manuscript appears in Morison, “William Manning’s The 
Key of Libberty.” Austin’s preface to the 1819 republication of his antilawyer essays noted that the essays 
had “retained a peculiar celebrity” through the years. Ibid., 245. 
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influential outside Massachusetts, Benjamin Austin’s writings in fact gave voice to a 
powerful resistance movement sweeping through postwar America.3   
Contemporaneous observers accorded historic significance to the antilawyer 
controversies. “[S]ince the settlement of this country, Independence not excepted,” wrote 
one, “there never was a more popular question agitated than this by Honestus.”4 Having 
closely followed the matter, the up-and-coming Bay State lawyer John Quincy Adams 
became convinced that Austin and his compatriots had “kindle[d] a flame which will 
subsist long after they are forgotten.” Adams saw in Austin’s writings not just the work 
of one man but a manifesto for a movement, an obstreperous spirit in the air that 
threatened to destroy established legal systems in all the states. Austin’s “poison,” Adams 
concluded, “has been so extensively communicated that its infection will not easily be 
stopped. A thousand lies in addition to those published in the papers have been spread all 
                                                
3 Gawalt, Promise of Power, 63. Scathing editorials attacking lawyers filled the newspapers in other states 
during this period. Chroust, Rise of the Legal Profession in America, 2:18-19; Chroust, “Dilemma of the 
American Lawyer,” 53-56; Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 32-58. For 
antilawyerism in Virginia, see Roeber, Faithful Magistrates; in North Carolina, see Whittenburg, “Planters, 
Merchants, and Lawyers,” 231-37; in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, see Ellis, Jeffersonian 
Crisis; in New Hampshire, see Reid, Legitimating the Law; in Delaware, see Rowe, “Jesse Higgins and the 
Failure of Legal Reform”; in Maryland, see Sawyer, “Distrust of the Legal Establishment” and Nolan, 
“Effect of the Revolution on the Bar”; in New York, see Dillon, New York Triumvirate, 101-117. Austin 
“gained a national reputation in 1786” and his antilawyer writings exerted “widespread influence.” Hatch, 
Democratization of American Christianity, 26; Warren, History of the American Bar, 219. New York 
papers reproduced excerpts from Austin’s anti-lawyer essays. Daily Advertiser (New York), June 26, 1786, 
2. Published in the crucible of the debate Austin had provoked, the Roxbury town meeting’s anti-lawyer 
instructions appeared in both New York and Philadelphia. Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), May 19, 
1786, 3 (reprinting a column published in New York). Days after Austin’s last essay installment, Braintree 
instructions to abolish lawyers appeared in Philadelphia. Freeman’s Journal (Philadelphia), June 21, 1786, 
2. Bound copies of Austin’s writings also circulated in Pennsylvania. Literary Intelligencer (Philadelphia), 
May 1, 1807, 1. Shortly after Austin’s last essay in June, Connecticut editors included in their stories 
references to public discontent with the “abuses in the practice of the law” in Massachusetts. New Haven 
Gazette & Conn. Mag. 1 (1786): 243. Austin’s essays appeared and gained supporters in New Hampshire. 
Old Honesty, Essex Journal, Massachusetts & New Hampshire General Advertiser (Newburyport, MA 
with circulation in NH), Apr. 5, 1786, 2. James Sullivan noted that the “spirit of disorder” provoked by 
Austin extended into New Hampshire. Amory, Life of James Sullivan, 1:191. Finally, Rhode Island papers 
referenced Austin’s attempts to abolish lawyers. Newport Herald, Nov. 8, 1787, 2. 
4 Jus, Massachusetts Centinel (Boston), Apr. 22, 1786, 2. 
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over the country to prejudice the people against the ‘order,’ as it has invidiously been 
called.”5  
John Quincy Adams took the Austinites quite seriously. Historians have not 
shared his enthusiasm for the topic. Historical treatments of the Austinite controversy in 
1786 have typically confined themselves to short passages in larger works in political 
history, usually relying on sound-bite quotations without any holistic analysis. Here and 
there one finds unelaborated references to post-Revolutionary egalitarianism, colonial 
“pre-modern” nostalgia or, more often, economic aggravators as factors that led Austin to 
attack lawyers and their laws in 1786. But no historian has placed Austin’s essays 
(together a short book) in their proper cultural context or attempted to assess their larger 
historical significance. None has explored the links between the Austinite controversy 
and Shays’s Rebellion. None fully explains why this outspoken Bay State firebrand 
waged such a ferocious attack on the legal profession, why so many rallied behind him, 
or why many others mobilized to discredit him.6 
                                                
5 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 23, 1787, in Adams, Diary of John Quincy Adams, 73-74. 
Adams went on to note that, despite the popular agitation against lawyers, the profession’s numbers 
continued to grow. Ibid., 74. 
6 Only three articles, each rather short, devote themselves specifically to Austin’s 1786 essays. Grant, 
“Benjamin Austin, Jr.’s Struggle with the Lawyers,”; Grant, “Observations”; Kaplan, “‘Honestus’ and the 
Annihilation of Lawyers”; see also Surrency, “Pernicious Practice,” 241-243. Charles McKirdy’s 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation includes a substantial discussion of Austin’s writings. McKirdy, “Lawyers 
in Crisis,” 116-28. Thumbnail discussions of Austin’s essays within larger studies include Auerbach, 
Justice Without Law?, 33-34; Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 45; Chroust, Rise of 
the Legal Profession, 2:19-20, 57; Cook, American Codification Movement, 12-15; Ellis, Jeffersonian 
Crisis, 113-14; Friedman, A History of American Law, 94; Gawalt, Promise of Power, 52; Heimert, 
Religion and the American Mind, 451, 599; Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 148; Miller, Life of 
the Mind in America, 106; Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology, 32; Warren, History of the American Bar, 
219, 228; Chroust, “American Legal Profession,” 489-490; Chroust, “Dilemma of the American Lawyer,” 
54-55. For studies that suggest but do not explore the link between the Austinites and the Shaysites, see 
Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law, 69; Szatmary, Shays’s Rebellion, 42-43; Matz, “Lawyers 
and Shays’ Rebellion,” 7-8. Studies that conspicuously fail to make any mention of Austin include: Papke, 
Heretics in the Temple; Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution; Gordon, “Book Review: The 
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To be sure, New Englanders in 1786 could not have viewed hostility toward 
lawyers as unprecedented.7 The Puritans originally banned private lawyers, as did the 
Quakers.8 New Light ministers during the Great Awakening mounted campaigns against 
lawsuits and lawyers. Edwards, Whitfield, and Bellamy preached that law and Christian 
religion operated at “cross-purposes” and that all law would ultimately wither away in the 
Work of Redemption.9  
Yet even as Austin’s writings echoed earlier traditions, they also embodied a 
constellation of attitudes and understandings that represented something new in American 
history. His writings and the responses they elicited completely shed the theological 
frame that marked earlier anti-lawyer sentiment. Austin employed an anti-aristocratic 
worldview peculiar to the 1780s but never before applied to the legal profession to 
conclude that the swelling “order” of Massachusetts lawyers would, if not immediately 
“annihilated,” evolve into a full-fledged aristocracy and destroy the young republic. 
                                                                                                                                            
American Codification Movement.” Studies which situate Austin in the context of party politics in 
Massachusetts include Formisano, Transformation of Political Culture; Goodman, The Democratic-
Republicans of Massachusetts. For a biographical sketch of Austin, see Wakelyn, Birth of the Bill of Rights, 
1:10-12. 
7 Robert W. Gordon, “Book Review: The American Codification Movement,” 436-41; Auerbach, Justice 
Without Law?, 19-46. In England during the Civil Wars and Commonwealth period (1640-1660), a number   
of radical law reform movements sprouted up, some on highly antilegalistic platforms, but all disappeared 
rather rapidly after the Restoration. See Prall, Agitation for Law Reform During the Puritan Revolution; 
Veall, Popular Movement for Law Reform; Abel, Politics of Informal Justice; Warden, “Law and Law 
Reform in England and New England.” For a discussion of antilegalism in seventeenth-century England 
prior to the Restoration, as evidenced in ballads, songs, and other forms of popular literature, see Hill, 
Liberty Against the Law. 
8 The Body of Liberties of 1641, no. 26, in Whitmore, Colonial Laws of Massachusetts, 39; Clarkson, 
Portraiture of Quakerism, 2:79-80. For the bans on lawyers in seventeenth-century Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania, see Warren, History of the American Bar, 104, 130.  
9 Heimert, Religion and the American Mind, 180-82. 
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Conservative by professional constitution, lawyers have historically not fared very 
well in revolutions.10 The American experience represents a partial exception to this 
rule—at least in the early stages. The revolutionary revolt against lawyers came late in 
the day on American shores. As part of a process historians have called “Anglicization” 
that touched all aspects of colonial society and culture, the colonial bar developed strong 
attachments to English law and legal culture over the course of the eighteenth century.11 
At mid-century, an increasingly formalistic legal consciousness accompanied this 
Anglicizing trend.12 And yet no sooner had the lawyers finally built a professional 
identity on English foundations than an emotionally charged resistance movement against 
the mother country began to take shape.  
By every appearance, this seemed a recipe for professional disaster. But in fact it 
became a professional boon. In a “remarkable shift toward Whiggery,” a number of 
younger practitioners—Otis and Adams in Boston, the “Triumvirate” in New York, 
Dickinson and Wilson in Philadelphia, Jefferson in Virginia, Dulany in Maryland—
successfully assumed intellectual leadership of the resistance movement and thereafter 
the American Revolution, giving the profession a power and prestige never previously 
enjoyed.13 This, together with the loyalist departures, the court closures, and the esprit de 
                                                
10 See Witt, Patriots and Cosmopolitans, 19, 293 n.6, 293 n.7 (2007); Bell, Lawyers and Citizens; Huskey, 
Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State, 33-79. 
11 On the Anglicization of the Massachusetts legal profession in the eighteenth century, see Murrin, “Legal 
Transformation of Bench and Bar.” For an analysis of Anglicization within provincial material culture, see 
McConville, King’s Three Faces, 146-52. For analyses of Anglicization in individual states, see Bilder, 
Transatlantic Constitution (Rhode Island); Murrin, “Anglicizing an American Colony” (Massachusetts); 
Bushman, King and People (Massachusetts); Mann, Neighbors and Strangers (Connecticut); Moglen, 
“Settling the Law” (New York). 
12 See Mann, Neighbors and Strangers; Pound, Formative Era of American Law, 6. 
13 Murrin, “Legal Transformation,” 565, 566; Dillon, New York Triumvirate; Roeber, Faithful Magistrates 
and Republican Lawyers, 159. 
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corps that attended the war, insulated Massachusetts lawyers from any sustained criticism 
during the Revolution itself. The full-throated attacks on the courts in the 1770s generally 
did not extend to the legal profession as such.14 
Certainly those lawyers who refused to renounce their oaths to the king, had 
claimed neutrality, or who had otherwise remained “timid” during the Revolution became 
objects of suspicion.15 As did those who chose to represent loyalist defendants in criminal 
cases once the courts reopened.16 Yet timid neutrals felt the patriots’ glare whether or not 
they called themselves lawyers. And the lawyers who prosecuted crimes against loyalists 
became immensely popular in the early 1780s.17   
Certainly the lawyers’ active participation in the civil litigation boom following 
ratification of the Constitution of 1780 set the stage for the Austinian challenge in 1786.18  
The lawyers’ professional connections to English legal culture, moreover, may very well 
                                                
14 The ministers continued to evince hostility to the lawyers in the 1770s. E.g., Timothy Dwight, “Extract 
from a Valedictory Address,” 142; see also note 9 and accompanying text. The ministers’ hostilities to the 
lawyers, however, derived from the fact that increasing numbers of college graduates had begun to choose 
the law over the ministry, and from their fear that lawyers would soon surpass them as authority figures 
within the society.   
15 Oct. 9, 1780 entry, Pynchon, Diary of William Pynchon, 75. In 1778, Hampshirites formally complained 
about the litigation practices of neutral Hampshire county lawyers Simeon Strong and Moses Bliss. Petition 
to the Judges of the Superior Court, Sept. 22, 1778, William Cushing Papers, Ms. N-1069, Massachusetts 
Historical Society.  
16 For Theodore Sedgwick’s defense of loyalists, such as David and Henry Van Schaak, Elijah Williams, 
and William Vassal, see Welch, Theodore Sedgwick, 22-24, 29-30. Bostonian lawyer Perez Morton 
petitioned the general court to order a town committee to desist from seizing emigrant Mary Swain’s 
property. Gawalt, Promise of Power, 49. Pennsylvanian James Wilson, who had successfully defended a 
number of Tory sympathizers in some highly publicized treason trials, had to fend off an attack on his 
home by an angry mob in 1779, on which see Smith, “Attack on Fort Wilson” and Larson, “Revolutionary 
American Jury.” 
17 By the 1780s Caleb Strong, who served as a county attorney for Hampshire during the Revolution, had 
become the “most popular man” in the county. Sibley’s Harvard Graduates, 16:97. 
18 In December of 1786, William Whiting complained that “a certain order of men among us . . . have 
acquired Property and Influence for six or seven years past.” Whiting, “Some Remarks on the Conduct of 
the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Interrupting the Sitting of the Judicial Courts in 
Several Counties in this State [Dec. 1786],” William Whiting Papers, Ms. N-442, Massachusetts Historical 
Society.  
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have rendered them uniquely suspect on the question of loyalty in the immediate post-
Revolutionary period.19 The smattering of anti-lawyer commentary from 1780 to 1785, 
however, serves only to dramatize the significance of the Austinian challenge in 1786. 
The sheer volume of words uttered about and against lawyers as a class in 1786 
distinguishes the event from all the antilawyerism that came before it. Austin’s writings, 
moreover, provoked strong editorial responses on all sides of the issues he raised.20 The 
record reveals a plethora of colorful pseudonymous characters with diverse viewpoints 
popping up in the Independent Chronicle, The Massachusetts Centinel, and other 
Massachusetts newspapers, championing, opposing, or otherwise commenting on 
Honestus’s assertions.  
The immediate consequences of Austin’s writings in Massachusetts, however, 
extended well beyond the beyond the broadsheets. Town meetings and, in time, county 
convention activity targeting lawyers surged following publication of Austin’s essays. On 
May 1, 1786, for example, based on the “[m]any complaints [that] have of late prevailed 
from the pernicious practice of the law,” Roxbury residents instructed their appointed 
representative to pursue the legal profession’s total abolition.21 Days later, Stoughton 
residents directed their representative to eradicate “the pernicious practice of the law as 
most elaborately and feelingly held up in public view by some eminent patriot under the 
                                                
19  The lawyers, for example, did not escape Samuel Ely’s wrath in 1782. Massachusetts Gazette 
(Springfield), May 14, 1782; Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket Book (1781-82), 179-180, 
Mass. Archives. 
20 Scholars that discuss Austin have tended to ignore this. Exceptions, while thin on discursive analysis, are 
Fredric Grant’s short articles. Grant, “Benjamin Austin, Jr.’s Struggle”; Grant, “Observations on the 
Pernicious Practice.” 
21 Worcester Magazine, no. 6, May 11, 1786, 71. 
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signature of Honestus.”22 Town meetings in Boston, Lynn, Dedham, Concord, East 
Sudbury, Watertown, and Acton responded to Austin’s writings with similar instructions 
and resolves in the coming weeks.23  
So loud did the public outcry against the lawyers become in the rebellious spring 
of 1786 that annually elected legislators on the General Court felt compelled to prioritize 
the issue and respond. “[A]cts against lawyers, or more truly against law,” Christopher 
Gore wrote to Rufus King on June 25, “now occupy the time of the H. of Reps.”24 On 
July 7, 1786, lawmakers passed “An Act for Rendering the Decision of Civil Causes, as 
Speedy, and as Little Expensive as Possible,” providing for a scheme of arbitration in lieu 
of litigation that bore resemblances to Austin’s own reform proposals.25 Yet the lawyers 
successfully circumvented the act’s provisions by appeals to common pleas.26 A proposed 
bill that sought to destroy the lawyers’ monopoly and abolish common pleas altogether—
                                                
22 Huntoon, History of Canton, 428. Weeks later, Stoughton residents again demanded that “the order of 
Lawyers, as they now practice, be entirely annihilated.” Ibid., 429. 
23For the Dedham town meeting instructions, see Warren, History of the American Bar, 215; for Boston 
instructions, see Honestus [Benjamin Austin], Independent Chronicle, May 18, 1786, 1; for Lynn 
instructions, see Plymouth Journal, May 16, 1786, 3. The proposed Boston instructions did not ultimately 
pass. Honestus, Independent Chronicle, May 18, 1786, 1. On the Concord, East Sudbury, Watertown, and 
Acton instructions issued in the spring of 1786 in response to Austin’s writings, see McKirdy, “Lawyers in 
Crisis,” 259. 
24 King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 1:138. 
25 Mass., Acts and Laws 1786-1787, 55-57 (July 7, 1786, chap. 20). The legislature enacted the law 
“[u]nder pressure of radicals like Benjamin Austin.” Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 151. A 
number of other reform bills prompted by Austin’s writings and related town instructions stalled in the 
upper house during this period. McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 131-132. Calls for a statewide convention to 
consider a major overhaul of the state constitution ensued. Taylor, Western Massachusetts in the 
Revolution, 136-37.  
26 Horowitz, Transformation of American Law, 148-55. 
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the court that Austin called “a nursery to increase the number of practitioners”—died in 
the Senate.27  
The positive consequences flowing from Austin’s assault on the legal profession, 
however, had only just begun. Shays’s Rebellion broke out in Massachusetts but weeks 
after Austin concluded his essay series and in the rash of extralegal conventions, town 
meetings, and courthouse blockades that ensued in western Massachusetts the rebels 
seem to have made Honestus their muse. In August, just prior to the rebellion’s outbreak, 
county conventions in Worcester, Hampshire, and Middlesex demanded the legal 
profession’s reform or abolition.28 Middlesex and Worcester renewed these demands in 
October after the rebellion had begun.29 Town meetings passed additional resolves and 
instructions to the same effect during the rebellion’s pendency, including the hometown 
of the most famous lawyer in Massachusetts (Braintree), which instructed its 
representative to “crush or at least put a proper check or restraint on that order of 
Gentlemen denominated Lawyers the completion of whose modern conduct appears to us 
to tend rather to the destruction than the preservation of the Commonwealth.”30 The 
fulminations against the lawyers, whom one leading Shaysite felt certain had conspired 
                                                
27 Honestus, Independent Chronicle (Boston), June 15, 1786; Journal of the House of Representatives 
(1786-1787), 7:114, 164, Massachusetts Archives; Journal of the Senate (1786-1787), 65, Massachusetts 
Archives.  
28 On the Worcester convention, see Massachusetts Centinel, Aug. 26, 1786, 3; on the Hampshire 
convention, see Worcester Magazine, no. 25, Sept. 1786, 294-295; on the Middlesex convention, see 
American Recorder & Charleston Advertiser (Charlestown, Mass), Sept. 1, 1786, 2. 
29 See Salem Mercury, Oct. 21, 1786, 2. 
30 Adams, Three Episodes of Massachusetts History, 2:897. For other contemporaneous town instructions 
to this effect, see McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 136 n.101, 137 n.102; Independent Chronicle, Oct. 1, 
1786, 1. 
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“to strip the People at large from their share in government,” persisted right up to the 
point of military suppression in January.31   
The underappreciated link between the antilawyer movement and Shays’s 
Rebellion points up one last facet of the former’s historical significance: it served as a 
key link in the chain of events leading to the nation’s constitutional founding. Indeed, this 
dissertation shall contend that the revolution against lawyers and the common law 
spearheaded by Benjamin Austin helps explain the motivations behind the movement to 
frame a new Constitution, as well as the constitutional framework thereafter created, in 
ways that previous historians have overlooked.32 
Historians have not perceived this link because they have almost invariably 
treated Austin’s writings as monological pronouncements when, in fact, they operated 
within a broader public dialogue. We cannot understand the import of Austin’s essays or 
why he wrote what he did without also understanding the larger discursive context within 
which he operated, including to whom and to what claims his arguments responded. As it 
happened, Austin’s primary antagonists in these newspaper debates made the law their 
vocation. The debates Austin provoked therefore reveal as much about post-
Revolutionary lawyers as they do about the popular backlash against them.    
Yet to truly understand the lawyers’ perspective—a perspective that will become 
increasingly important in later chapters—requires independent consideration of the 
profession’s history. The balance of this chapter traces the evolution of the Massachusetts 
                                                
31  William Whiting, “Some Remarks on the Conduct of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts . . .” [Dec. 1786], William Whiting Papers, Ms. N-442, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
32 See Chapter 4, Conclusion; Chapter 5, Section II.  
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legal profession in the eighteenth century to the point at which the Austinites confronted 
it in the 1780s. Chapter 4 turns to the Austinite controversy itself.   
II. Massachusetts Lawyers in the Eighteenth-Century 
Fewer than a hundred lawyers practiced in Massachusetts at the time Austin 
launched his attacks in 1786. That these practitioners wielded a monopoly on legal power 
incommensurate with their numbers seems clear enough. Any power that the profession 
had acquired, however, had come out of a long historical struggle dating back to the 
founding of Massachusetts Bay.  
The Puritans had so distrusted lawyers that the General Court initially banned 
them entirely.33 The brief reigns of Dudley and Andros resulted in qualified acceptance of 
lawyers under the new charter, but in 1701, in an act testifying to the persistence of the 
old Puritan hostilities, the General Court expressly permitted litigants to represent 
themselves and to seek the assistance of non-lawyers. It also set an uncomfortably low 
cap on attorneys’ fees.34 Against these and other headwinds, the profession could only 
grow slowly and haltingly in the early eighteenth century. The low fee cap sent the best-
trained men looking for other sources of income, leaving the day-to-day practice to the 
untrained “pettifoggers,” particularly in the areas outside Boston.  
At the same time, the reorganization of the courts under the royal charter, the 
presence of governors willing to extend political patronage to the provincial bar, and the 
lucrative commercial environment in the relatively peaceful decades following the Treaty 
                                                
33 The Body of Liberties of 1641, no. 26, in Whitmore, Colonial Laws of Massachusetts, 39. 
34 “An Act Relating to Attorneys,” in Acts and Resolves of the Province, 1:467 (June 20, 1701, chap. 7, sec. 
3). 
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of Utrecht, all combined to facilitate a professional bar’s growth in Massachusetts during 
the first half of the eighteenth century that outpaced every other colony. By 1730, a 
number of new arrivals to the province trained in England as barristers—including Robert 
Auchmuty, William Shirley, and William Bollan—began ascending through the 
provincial ranks to royal officialdom, bringing English legal culture with them. Their 
examples demonstrated that, notwithstanding the low fees, the “conscientious practice of 
law” could serve as a stepping-stone to royal favor—and could supplement incomes as 
well.35 By the mid-1730s, men such as John Read, Edmund Trowbridge, Phineas Lyman, 
and Robert Auchmuty formed a small yet competent and financially secure professional 
bar in Boston. These men, in turn, began receiving apprentices eager for doctrinal 
knowledge and practical know-how to negotiate an increasingly complex legal 
environment.36 Perhaps secularization increased the profession’s attractions, or perhaps 
the profession’s attractions facilitated secularization. In any event, by midcentury 
Harvard graduates increasingly chose the law over the ministry.37 
Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, no formal admission 
requirements applied to new lawyers in any of the provincial courts over and above 
taking the attorneys’ oath, which itself required no educational or professional 
attainments and which the royal judges rarely if ever enforced against practitioners.38 
Early in the eighteenth century, however, members of the nascent attorney elite in the 
east began efforts to exclude the irregular and untrained “pettifoggers” from the 
                                                
35 Murrin, “Legal Transformation,” 550. 
36 Mckirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 29-30. 
37 See Sibley’s Harvard Graduates, vols. 13-15 (1750-1760), passim.  
38 “An Act Relating to Attorneys,” in Acts and Resolves of the Province, 1:467 (June 20, 1701, chap. 7, sec. 
2). 
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profession. By the 1740s, it had become an unofficial rule among the elite that new 
applicants to the bar had to possess a college education and an apprenticeship with an 
established practitioner before taking the oath.39 The judges, moreover, began requiring 
the “Consent of the Bar” before admitting an applicant.40  
Becoming more pronounced after mid-century, professional Anglicization 
accompanied these moves toward self-regulated exclusivity and distinction. The 
profession, for example, began formally distinguishing between “barristers” and 
“attorneys,” along the lines established in England. The lawyers also began a trend of 
convening exclusive societies on the model of London’s Society of Gentleman Practisers 
in the Courts of Law and Equity, designed to regulate admissions, practice, and otherwise 
to give the profession distinction.41 1758 saw the creation of the Suffolk County Bar 
Association, formed because, in the words of John Adams, “the practice of the Law was 
grasped into the hands of Deputy Sheriffs, Pettyfoggers and even Constables.”42  
Yet the pettifoggers and other perceived hacks did not pose the only threat to the 
lawyers’ sense of professional distinction. So too did the royal judges. So long as formal 
admission to the courts served as the sine qua non of bar membership, then the lawyers 
would need the bench’s approval and support in their efforts to consolidate and 
distinguish the profession. A considerable number of lawyers endeavored to secure the 
                                                
39 For Jeremy Gridley’s reference to this procedure when recommending John Adams and Samuel Quincy 
to the Suffolk Court of Common Pleas, see Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 1:58-59. 
40 Ibid., 59. 
41 Founded in 1739 by London attorneys and solicitors, the Society of Gentlemen Practisers in the Court of 
Law and Equity formed itself in order to exclude irregular representatives, heighten admission 
requirements and otherwise regulate the practices of law. It acted only on its own claimed power and 
authority, but nevertheless purported to regulate judicial proceedings. Records of the Society of Gentlemen 
Practisers, 2.  
42 Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 3:274. 
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judgeships for themselves, but few members of the provincial bar received these 
appointments. With important exceptions, the royal judges appointed after 1700 came 
from distinguished families with close connections to England, but lacked formal legal 
training or practice experience.43 Many pursued incomes outside the law. By the 1740s, 
on the other hand, the distinguished provincial lawyers had formal education, law 
apprenticeships, and experience in both the county courts and Superior Court. Whereas 
the judges received only what meager support the House of Representatives let slip, 
together with whatever they might acquire moonlighting in non-legal vocations, at mid-
century the lawyers began to amass considerable wealth through lucrative commercial 
retentions alone.44  
Hence, throughout the provincial period bench and bar remained fairly distinct in 
Massachusetts.45 Latent tensions existed here but they produced no significant overt 
conflicts before 1760. In that year, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Judicature, 
Stephen Sewall, passed away and the duty to choose a successor devolved upon Governor 
Bernard. In the controversy that followed, the bar made its official entry into provincial 
political life. Many lawyers, including John Adams, Oxenbridge Thacher, and James 
                                                
43 For judicial appointments and biographies during the provincial period, see Davis, History of the 
Judiciary of Massachusetts, 86-242. For a discussion of the same, see McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 16-
17. 
44 The salaries received by judges of this court was “always inconsiderable.” Washburn, Sketches of the 
Judicial History, 161. Peter Oliver’s Address to the House of Representatives on February 3, 1774 suggests 
the meager House grants as one reason he felt inclined to take the royal grants. Oliver Address, in Robert 
Treat Paine Papers, P-392, Reel 3, Mass. Historical Society. William Cushing, the de facto Chief Justice, 
had to petition the provisional Council and House for payment of his salary in 1776. See Cushing, “Petition 
for Salary [1776],” Cushing Papers, Ms.-N-1069, Mass. Historical Society. As late as 1780, Caleb Strong 
declined an appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court on the ground that the salary remained too low for 
men “without private means.” Sibley’s Harvard Graduates, 16:96. 
45 Massachusetts could not claim total singularity among the other colonies in this regard. See Warren, 
History of the American Bar, 74-75. To a far greater extent that in other colonies, however, the provincial 
Chief Justices in New England remained laymen. Ibid., 75. 
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Otis, Jr., urged that Bernard should choose one of their own.46 William Brattle and James 
Otis, Sr., both lawyers, seemed the most obvious choices. Bernard procrastinated for 
some time, but finally chose Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson who had six years 
experience on the Court of Common Pleas and eight years as probate judge, but could not 
call himself a lawyer. While some of the older lawyers did not object to the appointment, 
many others reacted negatively, criticizing Hutchinson on the grounds that he lacked 
doctrinal competence.47  
Hutchinson responded tactfully by playing to the bar’s preoccupation with status 
and distinction. The new Chief Justice “cloaked the entire profession in exterior dignity” 
by ordering that judges, barristers, and attorneys each wear different gowns, and that only 
lawyers with the rank of barrister could plead before province’s high tribunal.48 For good 
measure, in 1764 the administration appointed the elder Otis chief justice of the 
Barnstable Inferior Court of Common Pleas.49 Most of the lawyers gladly played along 
with the new Chief Justice’s gambit and in the ensuing decade the bar associations 
succeeded in further operationalizing the Anglicized ranking system first formalized by 
Hutchinson.  
By 1770, the Essex and Suffolk bar associations had enacted the first formal bar 
rules in Massachusetts, establishing graded minimum requirements for attorneys and 
                                                
46 For Adams’ unpublished essay discussing the need for the judges to have legal education and training, 
see Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 1:167-68. For James Otis, Jr.’s views on the matter, doubtless 
colored by this father’s role in the controversy, see Boston Gazette, Apr. 4, 1763. For Oxenbridge 
Thacher’s views, see Thacher, Considerations on the Election of Counselors. 
47 Hutchinson, History of the Province, 86-88. For John Adams’s criticism of Hutchinson’s failure to 
understand legal principles, see John Adams to William Tudor, Mar. 18, 1817, in Adams, Works, 2:313. 
48 Murrin, “Legal Transformation,” 562; Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 3:276. The Court called 26 
barristers in August 1762, and 15 more prior to the Revolution. Superior Court of Judicature, Minute Book, 
Suffolk, Aug. 1762-Aug. 1764, Massachusetts Archives.  
49 Davis, History of the Judiciary, 111.  
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barristers. The regulations made a three-tiered seven-year training program a prerequisite 
for the rank of barrister. No court, the regulations implied, could admit applicants to its 
bar without the bar’s consent and recommendation. As conditions precedent to the 
lawyers recommending a person for admission to the county Court of Common Pleas, the 
new regulations required that the applicant have: (i) a college education or a “liberal 
education equivalent in the judgment of the bar,” and (ii) a completed three-year 
apprenticeship with a barrister or, in Suffolk, an approved attorney. Only after two years 
of practice in Common Pleas could the applicant request the recommendation of the bar 
for admission to the Superior Court of Judicature as an “attorney,” a rank that did not 
include pleading privileges. Only after two more years of practice as an attorney in the 
Superior Court could the lawyer receive the rank of barrister, which entitled him to plead 
in the Superior Court. Beyond training requirements, the Essex and Suffolk bars 
established their own minimum fee schedules. Finally, in an additional effort to squeeze 
out the irregular pettifoggers, bar members agreed not to participate in any case 
commenced by a non-member acting as representative.50 
The imperial crisis, however, put serious strain on any sense of solidarity that the 
profession had acquired. In 1764, the bar in Massachusetts consisted mostly of friends to 
the English government. All had become captivated by common law formalities, English 
legal history, writ procedures, manners, apparel, and professional distinctions. The Stamp 
Act controversy caused a dramatic turn toward whiggery among the younger lawyers, a 
                                                
50 For the Essex and Suffolk regulations, see “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 149-40. While records of 
the other county bar associations do not exist, John Murrin’s examination of the practitioners in those 
counties from 1761-1776 reveals that “similar rules must have been in force everywhere.” Murrin, “Legal 
Transformation,” 563. 
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development that magnified the distinction between the Whigs and Tories in the 
profession and, in time, altered its ideological make-up.51 Nearly all the act’s leading 
colonial opponents called themselves lawyers. In Massachusetts, John Adams, Joseph 
Hawley, and James Otis, Jr. flooded the presses with writings opposing the act.52 Otis, 
Adams, and Jeremy Gridley formed the dream team that argued the town of Boston’s 
opposition to the act before the Governor in Council on December 20, 1765.53  
The emerging political rift within the profession during the imperial controversy 
had effects on the relationship between bench and bar. Notwithstanding Chief Justice 
Hutchinson’s earlier efforts to woo the bar, overt conflicts did appear between the more 
vocal Whig lawyers and the Superior Court. Following Joseph Hawley’s public criticism 
of the Superior Court’s rulings in connection with the Lanesborough riots, for example, 
the Court did not hesitate to deprive Hawley of his barrister rank.54 
Yet if the Superior Court judges took offense at positions advocated by Whig 
lawyers, so too did older members of the bar. The prominent examples of certain lawyers 
opposing the Stamp Act do not permit us to generalize about the profession as a whole. 
Most Massachusetts lawyers did not vocally resist the act and a few, like Benjamin 
Gridley, sided with England, to the dismay of Whigs like Adams and Otis.55  
Still, the Whigs had the wind in their sails. After 1765 Harvard began turning out 
                                                
51 See Murrin, “Legal Transformation,” 565-67. 
52 McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 56.  
53 Adams, Diary and Autobiography, 1:267. 
54 Superior Court of Judicature, Minute Book, 1767, Massachusetts Archives; see also Brown, Joseph 
Hawley, 63-67. Hawley’s criticisms of the Court’s decision appeared in the Boston Evening-Post, July 6, 
1767 and July 13, 1767.  
55 For Benjamin’s Gridley’s position, see Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, 155. For John Adams’s 
criticisms of provincial lawyers too deferential to the British ministry, see Adams, Diary and 
Autobiography, 1:299-300. 
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increasing numbers of Whig lawyers, which in the late sixties far outnumbered Tories 
among new entrants into the legal profession.56  Sensing the trend and recognizing the 
lawyers’ increased political importance after the crisis of 1665-66, the administration 
began courting that portion of the bar that had not insistently opposed the Stamp Act with 
appointments to judicial positions. The appointments included many well-respected 
lawyers. In the administration’s campaign to bring the undecided lawyers to its corner, 
Edmund Trowbridge, easily the most respected lawyer in Boston, found himself 
appointed justice on the Supreme Court of Judicature in 1767. In the same year, Daniel 
Bliss, David Sewall, Nathaniel Peaslee Sergeant, David Ingersoll, and Daniel Leonard—
all young, uncommitted lawyers with practices outside of Boston—received justice of the 
peace commissions.57 Jeremy Gridley became attorney general and Jonathon Sewall 
advocate general.58  
As the Whigs began to exert increasing influence in the General Court after 1770, 
Tory control over the judiciary became critical from the administration’s perspective. 
Accordingly, Hutchinson appointed his brother, Foster, to the high court in 1771 and 
made Peter Oliver chief justice soon thereafter. Neither man had legal training. Oliver’s 
appointment in particular ruffled many feathers among the Whig lawyers.59 Against this 
background, the Crown made further efforts to commandeer the provincial judiciary 
through royal salary grants and thereupon, as we have seen, the conflict between the 
                                                
56 See Murrin, “Legal Transformation,” 566. 
57 See Council Records, vol. 15 (1767), Massachusetts Archives.  
58 Ibid. 
59 For John Adams’s critical comments, see Adams, Works, 2:282.  
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lawyers and the Superior Court reached a momentous pitch.60  
If the imperial controversies put strain on the provincial bar’s unity, the American 
Revolution basically destroyed it. The Revolution split the bar down the middle. In the 
process, of course, many Whig lawyers became patriots and many Tories became 
loyalists. A few Whig-leaning lawyers became loyalists and some Tory-leaning lawyers 
proclaimed themselves patriots. 61  Many simply remained quiet. From the bar’s 
perspective, 1775 forced a choice that, until that time, had been framed in terms that 
permitted many lawyers to temporize and procrastinate. At the moment of reckoning, 
perhaps the best predictor of which side the Massachusetts lawyer took in the Revolution, 
if they took a side at all, hinged on a combination of two factors: age and place holding 
status. Most younger lawyers without official positions rebelled. Older lawyers with 
positions tended to remain loyal. In the profession’s upper ranks, the barristers and 
attorneys divided fairly evenly. So too did the county lawyers with two exceptions: 
loyalist lawyers dominated in Worcester county, and rebel lawyers dominated in the 
southern counties. Otherwise region provides little predictive value in explaining the 
bar’s internal split in 1775.62       
However we explain the split, the loyalist departures in 1776 dramatically reduced 
the bar’s numbers and rendered the undeclared lawyers that remained inherently suspect. 
                                                
60 See Chapter 1.  
61 Probably the best example in the former camp is Daniel Leonard who, writing under the same 
pseudonym (Massachusettensis) could, in 1773, advocate resistance to “our oppressors” based on rights 
retained in a state of nature; but barely a year later, in 1774, after the Coercive Acts, could argue that the 
provincial Whigs themselves had “little by little destroyed your real liberty” and that the circumstances 
counseled submission rather than resistance. Massachusettensis [Daniel Leonard], Massachusetts Gazette, 
Dec. 26, 1774, in Jensen, Tracts of the American Revolution, 295; cf. Massachusettensis [Daniel Leonard], 
“To All Nations of Men,” Massachusetts Spy, Nov. 18, 1773, in Lutz and Hyneman, American Political 
Writing, 1:209-16. Theodore Sedgwick arguably falls into the latter category.   
62 McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 89-107. 
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The court closures in the late 1770s meant that lawyers during the Revolution had no 
forum in which to bring or defend cases. In the west, as we have seen, the judicial 
moratorium lasted six years.63 Despite these setbacks, however, after 1775 the patriot 
lawyers—John Adams, Joseph Hawley, the Otises, Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant, Robert 
Treat Paine, Theodore Sedgwick, David Sewall, William Cushing, James Sullivan, 
Theophilus Parsons—began assuming positions of leadership in establishing the new 
government and a new constitutional framework. In large part, they succeeded in 
executing their plans with respect to the judicial power. Lawyers that could never have 
dreamed of judicial appointments under the royal government now saw them in 
increasing numbers, particularly after 1780.  
Herein lay an underappreciated effect of the Revolution: for the first time in 
history, bench and bar merged in Massachusetts. The most famous whig lawyer of all in 
1776, John Adams, found himself named Chief Justice of the Superior Court of 
Judicature in 1776. With only two exceptions in the period after 1776, trained lawyers 
received all the judgeships on the high court and many more populated Common Pleas 
and the probate courts. Every state prosecutor except one during this period had legal 
training and formal bar membership.64  
The appointments, enlistments in the Continental Army, and other wartime 
exigencies (including the court closures) meant that more than a few preeminent lawyers 
withdrew from private practice during the Revolution. Suspicions in the west and 
elsewhere that even those lawyers that claimed the patriot mantle had become too 
                                                
63 See Chapter 1. 
64 Gawalt, Promise of Power, 39-40. 
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Anglicized to stay true to the common cause did not help matters for those lawyers that 
remained.65  
Alas, however, the return to relative constitutional and judicial normalcy in 1780, 
along with creditor-friendly fiscal policies, helped create a favorable environment for the 
profession. Most important, judicial business increased substantially after 1780 and, by 
1783, a virtual litigation explosion had commenced in the state of Massachusetts.66 
Creditor litigation overwhelmed the court dockets. To take one particularly dramatic 
example, whereas in 1780 the Worcester country Court of Common Pleas had 246 cases 
on its docket, by 1783 it had nearly 3183, and sustained the same massive case load 
straight through 1786.67 The litigation bonanza attracted many new entrants into private 
practice and, indeed, a few of the older names—like Paine, Sullivan, and Sedgwick— 
could not resist returning to practice during these years to claim some share of the pie. By 
1785, having begun the decade with its numbers halved by Revolution, the profession 
had more than replenished the deficiency.68   
The bar associations, moreover, survived the Revolution intact and the early 
1780s saw eastern lawyers continuing their pre-Revolutionary efforts to distinguish, 
numerically restrict, and hierarchize the profession. The associations used sizable 
minimum fees for their mandatory three-year apprenticeship to mediate the flow of new 
                                                
65 Certain lawyers’ willingness to represent loyalists in criminal cases in the late 1770s seemed to confirm 
this suspicion of retained loyalism.  
66 Gawalt, Promise of Power, 29. 
67 McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 235. 
68 Morris, “Legalism versus Revolutionary Doctrine,” 207; Gawalt, Promise of Power, 14. 
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entrants.69 In 1783, the Suffolk bar reinstated its rule limiting each barrister to three 
apprentices at one time.70 The next year it clamped down on educational requirements by 
mandating an examination by special committee for those lawyers without college 
degrees.71 The lawyers’ newfound control of the judiciary streamlined the process of 
implementing their regulations. In 1781, the new Supreme Judicial Court, now staffed 
with trained and experienced bar members, renewed the English practice of elevating 
distinguished practitioners to the rank of barrister.72 1782 legislation further advanced the 
profession’s goals of self-regulation by empowering the state’s high court to regulate the 
admissions of lawyers to practice.73 The next year the court instituted a special writ for 
calling barristers. 74  Finally, in 1784 the profession chaperoned a bill through the 
legislature barring sheriffs and deputy sheriffs from serving as legal counselors.75 The 
Suffolk county bar reinforced this measure by ordering its lawyers not to solicit any 
business outside their offices or to hire law enforcement officials to engage clients.76  
More often, however, particularly after 1782, the House of Representatives 
threatened the profession’s efforts to entrench itself. The legislature often directly 
interfered in judicial proceedings.77 More significantly, in 1785 the legislature passed 
                                                
69 “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 154. William Pynchon of Salem stated in a 1785 diary entry that an 
apprentice had come to his office “at the usual terms of study agreed upon”—100 pounds sterling. 
Pynchon, Diary, 215. 
70 “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 157. 
71 Ibid., 159-61. 
72 Superior Court of Judicature, Suffolk, Minute Books, Feb. 1781, Massachusetts Archives. See also 
Davis, History of the Judiciary, 295-96. 
73 Mass., Acts and Laws 1782-1783, 28-30 (July 3, 1782, chap. 9). 
74 Superior Court of Judicature, Suffolk, Minute Books, Aug. 1783, Massachusetts Archives. 
75 Mass., Acts and Laws 1782-1783, 613-15 (Mar. 12, 1784, chap. 44 [1783]).  
76 “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 158, 
77 E.g., Mass., Acts and Laws 1782-1783, 212, 234, 245 (Resolves, May 1782 session: chaps. 49, 92, 112); 
ibid., 323, 331-32 (Resolves, Sept. 1782 session: chaps. 107, 122); ibid., 383, 409-10, 410-11 (Resolves, 
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“An Act Regulating the Admission of Attorneys,” which promulgated broad admission 
standards that purported to nullify any conflicting bar rules. The act also required the 
courts to permit litigants to plead their own cases or seek the “assistance of counsel as 
they shall see fit to engage,” the latter provision clearly intended to cover any person, 
lawyer or non-lawyer, whom a party wished to retain.78   
The lawyers and their brethren on the bench, however, evaded these legislative 
controls with considerable agility. Thus notwithstanding the 1785 legislation’s intent, 
bench and bar continued to require formal legal training for new applicants.79 When an 
untrained practitioner appeared in cases the established lawyers, often with the judges’ 
cooperation, would harass the unwanted irregular out of the court.80 The lawyers also 
successfully convinced the courts that, contrary to the legislation’s clear purpose, the 
term “counsel” as used in the 1785 act meant a professionally trained lawyer only.81 
James Sullivan, who had previously served on the Supreme Court of Judicature and 
helped draft the Constitution of 1780, succeeded in convincing the Common Pleas judges 
to adjourn entire court sessions to accommodate his schedule, citing other instances in 
                                                                                                                                            
Jan. 1783 session: chaps. 44, 88, 89; ibid., 699, 722 (Resolves, May 1783 session: chaps. 48, 88); ibid., 
750-51, 758, 768-69 (Resolves, Sept. 1783 session: chaps. 26, 39, 56.) See also Goebel, Antecedents and 
Beginnings, 98-99. In 1783, the Senate requested an advisory opinion from William Cushing, chief justice 
of the Supreme Judicial Court, as to whether the legislature could stay an action in Common Pleas 
consistent with the constitution of 1780. Cushing answered yes: the legislature could do so for 
“extraordinary reasons—of which, however, they [i.e., the legislature] are the Judge.” Cushing, Response 
to Senate Query [1783], in William Cushing Papers, Ms. N-1069, Mass. Historical Society.     
78 Mass., Acts and Laws 1784-1785, 475-76 (Nov. 4, 1785, chap. 23).   
79 Gawalt, Promise of Power, 60-61. 
80 The case of William Lyman, an unadmitted practitioner in Hampshire harassed out of the court by 
Simeon Strong, Caleb Strong, and Moses Bliss with the cooperation of judges Eleazar Porter and John 
Bliss, illustrates the point. See Hampshire Gazette, Mar. 31, Apr. 7, May 5, May 12, 1790.   
81 See Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Apr. 20, 1786, 1; Journal of the House of Representatives (1785-
1786), 6:232, 240, Massachusetts Archives; Journal of the Senate (1785-1786), 198, 203, 208, 
Massachusetts Archives.  
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which prominent lawyers had done the same.82 Some lawyers began considering the idea 
of controlling the legislature through judicial nullification of legislation on constitutional 
grounds.83 Suffice it to say that by 1786 a legal profession that purported to uphold the 
law seemed to many people in Massachusetts to have commandeered it for themselves. 
                                                
82 Boston Gazette, May 12, 1783; James Sullivan to John Tyng, May 6, 1783, James Sullivan Papers, Ms. 
N-994, Mass. Hist. Society.  
83 Members of the Suffolk County bar purported to hold legislation expanding the jurisdiction of justices of 
the peace unconstitutional. “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 158. Lawyers in Rhode Island, New York, 
and elsewhere advocated judicial review of legislation. See Treanor, “Judicial Review Before Marbury,” 
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constitutional necessity of judicial review in the American states. James Iredell to Richard Spaight, Aug. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE SPIRIT OF ‘86 
 
*   *   * 
The Massachusetts’ legal profession’s efforts to monopolize the practice through 
rigorous admission standards and private “associations,” its privately legislated fee 
structures, and its members’ adeptness in evading legislation designed to control them—
that all this might have irked a few lay observers who had lived though the American 
Revolution remains unsurprising. Republican ideology and anti-English sentiment, 
however, converged to give Americans a new conceptual vocabulary with which to 
understand and criticize the profession, its activities, and its laws. 
I. Law and Aristocracy 
Colonial America, to be sure, never had a landed hereditary aristocracy protected 
by law as in England. 1  Hierarchical social distinctions not dissimilar to those 
characterizing English society did exist in British North America, most prominently the 
distinction between gentlemen and commoners. 2  A psychology of deference and 
dependence sustained a regime of communal hierarchicalism for generations. The 
revolutionary experience and the ideas it spawned, however, imported into American 
culture a far-ranging egalitarianism that eschewed all outward displays of superiority or 
                                                
1 For a time in the eighteenth century, Virginia may have served as one partial exception on which see 
Brewer, “Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia.” Patricia Bonomi takes issue with earlier historians’ 
characterizations of New York’s “great landholders” as an aristocracy in the English sense. Bonomi, A 
Factious People, 180. 
2 Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution, 24. 
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“distinction”—in manner, dress, or other externals—and rejected deference as an anti-
republican mode of social relation. 3  Republican ideology, Gordon Wood writes, 
“destroyed aristocracy as it had been understood in the Western world for at least two 
millennia.” By 1780, a new and emotionally charged fault line had emerged in American 
society: The “principal antagonists” in this divide, Wood observes, “were no longer 
patriots vs. courtiers but had become democrats vs. aristocrats.”4 
Hostility to all things aristocratic must accordingly stand as one of the 
distinguishing features of post-Revolutionary American culture, particularly in 
Massachusetts. Gradually extending itself to virtually every form of social, cultural, and 
political elitism, the concept of an aristocracy functioned negatively to define the early 
American identity as categorically distinct from the English. In this way it reinforced the 
anti-English nativist sentiment that marked popular attitudes during the post-
Revolutionary period and would later animate Austin’s writings. At least in some circles, 
the final break from England represented a symbolic break from aristocracy itself.  
But political independence did not eradicate the aristocratic menace. It continued 
to pose a perceived threat from within. Bostonian fears of a creeping aristocracy found 
expression in the outcry against the Society of the Cincinnati (whose biggest chapter 
resided in Massachusetts) during the first half of 1784.5 Boston’s Independent Chronicle, 
in which Austin would two years later publish his anti-lawyer essays, served as the 
                                                
3 Ibid., 240-41. 
4 Ibid., 241. 
5 Continental Army officers had founded The Society of the Cincinnati—the “first American patriotic 
order”—in 1783. Pursuant to the Society’s original rules, only the eldest male descendants of its founders 
could become members, though the Society did also permit admission of “honorary members.” Davies,  
“Society of the Cincinnati in New England,” 3. 
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leading editorial force against the Cincinnati in New England. In January 1784, the 
Chronicle began reprinting Aedanus Burke’s Considerations on the Society or Order of 
the Cincinnati, the most widely disseminated attack on the Cincinnati.6 This produced an 
eruption of commentary in the coming months.7 Commentators feared that the Cincinnati 
would ultimately forge a “complete and perpetual personal distinction” between itself 
and the “Plebeans.”8  They worried that members would insinuate themselves into 
assemblies through “address, ingenuity, perseverance and prowess,” and thereby organize 
a “political monster” capable of exacting large payments of commutation from the public 
fisc. The “order” thus needed to be “crushed in embryo.”9 Even prominent Massachusetts 
statesmen—including Elbridge Gerry, Stephen Higginson, and John Adams—viewed the 
Cincinnati as a serious threat to republican values, in Adams’s words, “the first step taken 
to deface the beauty of our temple of liberty.”10 
But no sooner had public anxiety over the Cincinnati begun to subside than 
another aristocratic threat had surfaced. Boston elites engaged in lavish spending in the 
early 1780s and felt no compunction about publicly displaying their luxurious lifestyles. 
By the mid-1780s, as men of lesser means had begun to suffer under the burden of 
increasing taxes and debts, the Boston gentry seemed to “wallow[] in luxury and 
amusement.”11 Austin and his family friend Sam Adams took particular umbrage at the 
                                                
6 Cassius [Aedanus Burke], Considerations on the Society or Order of the Cincinnati (Charleston, 1783). 
For the Boston reprints, see Independent Chronicle, Jan. 29, 1784, 1-2; Feb. 5, 1784, 1-2. 
7 Independent Chronicle, Mar. 18, 1784, 3; Apr. 1, 1784, 3; Apr. 8, 1784, 3; Apr. 16, 1784, 3; Apr. 22, 
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8 Independent Chronicle, Mar. 18, 1784, 3.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Quoted in Davies, “Cincinnati in New England,” 11; see also Myers, Liberty Without Anarchy, 51. 
11 Wood, Radicalism, 421. 
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establishment of the so-called Tea Assembly or “Sans Souci Club” in late 1784. 
Perceived as the “exclusive domain of the newly parading gentry,” the club met every 
other week for card playing and dancing. Innocuous enough. But according to Austin 
(writing as “Candidus” in 1785), the people considered the club a “very dangerous and 
destructive institution” that, while perhaps accepted in the “long, established Courts of 
Europe,” stood diametrically opposed to the republican values that, in Austin’s view, 
defined the new nation. In this public dispute about private card games the American 
identity itself hung in the balance. “We, my countrymen,” Candidus announced, “have a 
character to establish.”12 
Although we find much about the Cincinnati and the Sans Souci in the Boston 
papers from 1784 to 1785, few comments specifically directed at lawyers surfaced during 
this time. 13  The ones that did warrant attention. Two merchants writing in the 
Massachusetts Centinel in November of 1785 complained that the growing “useless sort 
of men” called lawyers had since the Revolution invaded nearly every governmental 
institution, including town meetings, and “step by step” had succeeding in obstructing 
equitable policies supported by “7/8’s of the community,” including the establishment of 
a fire society, a chamber of commerce, and bankruptcy legislation.14 “[P]ray tell me what 
pie can be cut,” wrote “Commerce,” “without finding one of their dirty fingers.”15 The 
                                                
12 Candidus, Independent Chronicle, Jan. 27, 1785, 1. Austin’s good friend Samuel Adams probably helped 
to compose the essays attributed to Candidus. 
13 For pre-Honestus critical commentary on lawyers in the Boston papers, see Independent Chronicle, Sept. 
30, 1784, 1; Commerce, Massachusetts Centinel, Nov. 12, 1785, 2; Trade, Massachusetts Centinel, Nov. 
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lawyer problem, wrote “Trade” portentously, “has too long been unnoticed.”16  
These brief commentaries failed to attract much literary attention at the time—
though we might conjecture that Austin himself had read them. New taxes enacted in 
March 1786, days after Austin began his essay series, together with unpaid older taxes 
and the scarcity of money certainly helped worsen an already a touchy economic scene.17 
Yet, even as one early commentator in 1784 portentously bemoaned the tax code’s 
growing complexity with reference to lawyers (“a man must have the memory and 
knowledge of a lawyer to know when he is wrong and when he is right”), the Austinites 
did not make any sustained complaints about taxes.18  
Their critiques rather focused on the lawyers’ role in litigating private contracts 
and debts. Here the scarcity of money aggravated matters considerably for debtors 
without acceptable wherewithal to pay lawyers or creditors. In increasing numbers, 
farmers and merchants alike carried unbearable liabilities. Farmers in the west, of course, 
shouldered disproportionate burdens. Yet equally significant, merchants in the east had 
imported far too many goods from England after the war and by 1785 found themselves 
no less hamstrung than their rural counterparts.19 “Many failures have already happened,” 
Stephen Higginson wrote to John Adams on December 30, 1785, “and many more will 
happen. The distresses of these people must, and will, be communicated to others who 
are connected with them in Business, and this connection is so extensive as to effect a 
                                                
16 Trade, Massachusetts Centinel, Nov. 16, 1785, 2. 
17 Mass., Acts and Laws 1784-1785, 580-605 (Mar. 23, 1786, chap. 74 [1785]). 
18 Independent Chronicle, Sept. 30, 1784, 1. 
19 Stephen Higginson to John Adams, Dec. 30, 1785, in Letters of Stephen Higginson, 732-33. 
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great part of those engaged in Trade.”20 
By 1785, a defaulting debtor in Massachusetts could scarcely avoid contact with 
an antagonistic lawyer. For one, lawyers often served as bill collectors on private 
accounts.21 From the perspective of ordinary debtors, however, the profession committed 
its greatest atrocities working in and through the courts whose common law writs of 
process and execution carried substantial coercive power. Execution on civil judgments 
in Massachusetts issued in the form of a writ based on the English capias ad 
satisfaciendum. The writ commanded the sheriff to seize the defendant’s non-exempt 
personalty and/or realty to satisfy the judgment (including court costs) together with 
execution fees, and in the case of any deficiency to incarcerate the defendant.22 If the 
prisoner swore that he could not support himself in jail and that he had neither hidden nor 
transferred non-exempt property, the jailer could put the prisoner to work, often within 
the “liberty of the yard,” for the jail charges.23  
Until 1787, the law permitted creditors willing to pay these charges to keep a 
debtor in jail indefinitely.24 By the time Austin published his first essay attacking the Bay 
State justice system in March 1786, debtors languished in prisons in unprecedented 
numbers.25 As court dockets exploded with new foreclosures, executions, and replevins in 
                                                
20 Ibid., 733. 
21 E.g., Massachusetts Centinel, Oct. 8, 1785. 
22 Mass., Acts and Laws 1784-1785, 86-97 (Oct. 30, 1784, chap. 38). For the specific writ form, see ibid., 
88-89.  
23 Acts and Resolves of the Province, 2:656-58 (Jan. 4, 1733, chap. 7). If after forty days the creditor failed 
to prove the debtor’s oath or any part of it false, the debtor could obtain release, unless the creditor chose to 
pay the jail charges. Ibid. For a secondary discussion of the same, see Feer, “Imprisonment for Debt in 
Massachusetts Before 1800,” 261. 
24 Acts and Resolves of the Province, 2:831-33 (Feb. 4, 1737, chap. 13). 
25 Feer, “Imprisonment for Debt,” 255. Historians have attempted to minimize the “severity” of 
imprisonment for debt in eighteenth-century Massachusetts. See Feer, “Imprisonment for Debt.” Even Feer, 
 115 
1785-1786, incarceration became a real possibility for many more.  
Against this background, the controversy surrounding the lawyers in 1786 began 
with a seemingly innocuous comment in a piece appearing on January 26, 1786 in the 
Independent Chronicle. A writer calling himself the “Free Republican”—apparently 
Benjamin Lincoln—claimed in a lengthy piece addressing the need for constitutional 
checks and balances in a republican society, that “as the science of the law is intricate and 
perplexing, and cannot be obtained but by long and steady application, professors and 
practicers of it seem a necessary order in a free republic.”26  
All other things being equal, this small comment, inserted at the end of the piece, 
did not on its face seem particularly provocative or controversial. But in the peculiar 
context of 1786 it proved more than enough to antagonize the thirty-three-year old 
Austin, who began scribbling out notes and essays to ensure that the “Free Republican” 
did not have the last word on this issue. The son of an influential provincial councilor and 
the former Boston clerk of the market, Austin had recently assumed a greater political 
visibility within the Boston artisan community and, throughout 1785, published 
provocative pieces in the Chronicle under the names “Candidus” (against the “Sans Souci 
Club”), “Friend to Commerce” (on trade matters), and “Brutus” (against the resettlement 
                                                                                                                                            
however, cannot deny that the period prior to Shays’s Rebellion saw more debtors in prison or facing 
imprisonment. Ibid., 266. See also Brooke, Heart of the Commonwealth, 201, noting that by late 1785, the 
county jail at Worcester “was jammed with debtors.” For debtor petitions to the House in 1786 seeking 
release from imprisonment, see Journal of the House of Representatives,1786-1787, 7:63, 104, 
Massachusetts Archives. The legislature prohibited creditors from keeping debtors in jail indefinitely in 
1787. Mass., Acts and Laws 1786-1787, 590-93 (Nov. 19, 1787, chap. 29). 
26 The Free Republican, Independent Chronicle, Jan. 26, 1786, 1 (emphasis added); see also Treanor, 
“Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause,” noting that Benjamin Lincoln wrote 
under the name “Free Republican.” 
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of refugee Tories).27 As early as 1780, Austin had developed critical views with respect 
to lawyers and in one early instance accused local lawyers of colluding with British 
agents.28 He apparently experienced counter-criticism that silenced him at that time. 
Neither the Free Republican’s essay nor any other immediate cause explains why Austin 
decided to wage war on the legal profession. It rather had deeper roots in the anti-
aristocratic worldview cultivated in the debates over the Cincinnati and Sans Souci, 
except that the legal profession, as Austin planned to argue, posed a much more 
significant threat to the fledgling republic than did the others. 
Austin’s opening essay on March 9, 1786 set forth the basic proposition on which 
he would stand throughout: that republicanism, far from necessitating the legal 
profession, actually required its eradication. Honestus would accept nothing less than the 
profession’s total and permanent “annihilation” in Massachusetts.29 “The cure,” he later 
wrote, “must be radical!”30 Over the next four months Austin published twelve additional 
essays expounding on these themes and rebutting the claims of his many opponents. 
Austin’s essays caused at least as much stir as the Cincinnati controversy two years 
earlier and, as we have seen, resulted in substantial town meeting and convention activity 
to implement his proposed reforms. At the time, readers and respondents invested 
Austin’s impassioned assault on lawyers with immense legal, political and historical 
significance. For them the fate of the nation seemed to hang in the balance. In the words 
                                                
27 Amory, Life of James Sullivan, 1:188; see also Candidus, Independent Chronicle, Jan. 27, 1785, 1; A 
Friend to Commerce, Independent Chronicle, Sept. 1, 1785, 1; Oct. 20, 1785, 2; Brutus, Independent 
Chronicle, Nov. 10, 1785, 2; Jan. 12, 1786, 1. 
28 Wakelyn, Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1:10-12. 
29 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Mar. 9, 1786, 2. 
30 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Apr. 13, 1786, 1. 
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of “Old Rock,” “the cause now before the people is perhaps as solemn and important as 
any that has ever been brought before them.”31 Indeed, at least one respondent suggested 
that Austin had a divine sanction: “His pen has been guided by some superior 
intelligence; the voice of God, and the voice of the people have been in conjunction.”32 
Why did Austin and his choir of supporters consider this matter so momentous? 
What nerve had Honestus struck? What exactly did the Austinites find so profoundly 
offensive about the Massachusetts legal profession in the revolutionary spring of 1786?33 
Austin’s overarching contention, and one echoed time and again by his supporters, 
asserted that the legal profession had become an unrepublican aristocracy that, wielding a 
monopoly on the legal knowledge necessary to prosecute and defend disputes in the 
justice system, threatened to destroy the liberties of the people forever.  
The “Free Republican,” against whom Austin had targeted his first essay, may 
have unwittingly planted the link between lawyers and aristocrats in Austin’s head. As 
noted, the previous writer had somewhat casually referred to the profession as a 
“necessary order.” A few weeks later, we find Austin also applying the term to the legal 
profession but, in contrast to the previous writer, squeezing it for all its fearsome anti-
republican connotations, repeating it over and again, and putting it in scare quotes to 
draw readers’ attention to it. The term would have had considerable resonance for readers 
                                                
31 Old Rock, Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1786, 2. 
32 Perseverance, Massachusetts Centinel, June 17, 1786, 2. 
33 By “Austinites,” I mean: (1) the many individuals who published writings in the Boston papers in 
support of Austin during the Spring and Summer of 1786 (many of whom have been or will be cited 
herein); and (2) other contemporaneous readers who supported Austin in this regard, the existence of whom 
we can reasonably presume based on the intensity of the debates and on the evidence of anti-lawyer 
agitation at Massachusetts town meetings, county conventions, and the like. Post-Revolutionary antilegalist 
currents, moreover, did not confine themselves to Massachusetts; they swept through many other areas of 
post-war America. See Chapter 3, Introduction. These other resisters outside of Massachusetts also qualify 
as participants in the movement to which Austin gave expression. 
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of the Boston papers in light of the controversies over the Cincinnati and the Tea Club—
also deemed anti-republican “orders.” Austin knew very well that his audience would 
recoil at any suggestion of a distinct “order” boasting social, cultural, or political 
superiority. His innovation lay in extending the post-Revolutionary critique of aristocracy 
to claims of legal-epistemological superiority and suggesting that such claims struck at 
the republican experiment’s taproot. “If we are willing to bend under the aristocratical 
tyranny of this ‘order,’” Austin wrote, quoting the penman of the Revolution, John 
Dickinson, “all the boasted acquisitions of our independence are ‘sounds and nothing 
else.’”34 
Austin’s supporters immediately embraced his anti-aristocratic conceptual 
framework. “Root and Branch” worried that if the people did not act quickly, the lawyer 
aristocrats would burrow themselves into the Republic’s very foundations. The people, he 
wrote, should fear “[a]ll orders and combinations of men . . . but when they become so 
daring, as to set themselves as an order and are absolutely established by the tacit consent 
of the people—farewell the liberties of our republic.” Like the Cincinnati, the profession 
therefore had to be “annihilated in its infancy.”35 Another Austinite, “Modestus,” had the 
Chronicle reprint a London article describing a procession of the “Gentlemen of the 
Black Robe” in protest against the House of Commons. The image called up the dramatic 
conflict between lawyers and the people that Austin’s critiques threw into bold relief. 
                                                
34 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Mar. 23, 1786, 1; see also [Dickinson], Letters from an American 
Farmer, in Jensen, Tracts of the American Revolution, 139. William Whiting argued that if not checked 
lawyers would “sap the foundation of our republican government.” Whiting, “Some Remarks on the 
Conduct of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts . . .” [Dec. 1786], William Whiting 
Papers, Ms. N-442, Massachusetts Historical Society.  
35 Root and Branch, Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1786, 2. 
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“[A]gainst their annihilation,” Modestus editorialized, the Massachusetts “order” would 
soon stage a similar “procession.”36 
Austin depicted the legal profession as standing ominously apart from the people 
and thus outside of popular control. Bay Staters had accused the Cincinnati of 
establishing an imperium in imperio and Austin now indicted the legal profession on the 
same grounds. The profession, Austin wrote, “establishes a perpetual power (vastly 
superior to the Judges . . .) over which the people have no control: There being no 
rotation or choice of members . . . in time they become so involved in the very vitals of 
government, that it will be out of the power of the people to remove them.”37 At least the 
judges had to comply with a “good behavior” standard (which Austin interpreted 
expansively) else they face removal by the legislature on address to the governor under 
the Constitution of 1780. Austin’s opponents would later cite to the 1701 attorney oath 
and to the 1782 statute empowering the Supreme Judicial Court to make rules “with 
respect to the admission of attorneys” as evidence that the judges could disbar 
malpracticing attorneys.38 That the judges and lawyers had become for all intents and 
purposes professionally indistinguishable and that their interests increasingly aligned, 
however, meant that the adversity necessary for a meaningful check did not exist here. 
                                                
36 Modestus, Massachusetts Centinel, June 10, 1786, 2. Other participants in the 1786 editorial exchanges 
similarly referred to the legal profession as the “order of the Black Robe.” A Mechanick, Massachusetts 
Centinel, Apr. 26, 1786, 2. One writer found the blackness of the lawyers’ clothes to be an “emblem of 
sin . . . . ‘Tis a Picture of what is within!” Question and Answer, Massachusetts Centinel, Apr. 8, 1786, 3. 
The depiction of lawyers as a “hateful and Detestable aristocracy” persisted through Shays’s Rebellion. 
William Whiting, “Some Remarks on the Conduct of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts . . .” [Dec. 1786], Whiting Papers, Ms. N-442, Massachusetts Historical Society.  
37 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1786, 1. William Whiting believed that lawyers as a class had 
angled to “strip the People at large from their share in government.” Whiting, “Some Remarks on the 
Conduct of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts . . .” [Dec. 1786], Whiting Papers, Ms. 
N-442, Massachusetts Historical Society.  
38 Zenas, Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1786, 1. 
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And compared to the control they exerted over elected officials, the people had only 
modest institutional control over the judges themselves.39  
Even if the legislature possessed a check on the judges, moreover, Austin could 
assert that the Massachusetts legislature had proven itself incapable of restraining the 
legal profession’s own practices.40 Austin drew special attention in this regard to the bar 
associations’ evasions of the 1778 fee statute.41 The law set maximum attorneys’ fees in 
the superior and county courts, but the bar associations went on independently to 
establish separate retainer fees in violation of the statute’s spirit if not letter.42 “The fee-
table is treated like an old almanac,” Austin complained. “They have so established 
certain rules among themselves (as a combined body) that the state may go on to 
regulate; but the ‘order’ will ever find means to augment their Court charges.”43  
The bar associations themselves, to whose record books and secret meetings 
Austin often referred, evoked particularly grave concerns among the Austinites. One 
respondent revealingly called the associations “self-created Legislature[s].”44 With some 
foundation, the Austinites worried that the bar associations would conspire in their covert 
“bar-meetings” to band together and thereby establish a “combined body” with “perfect 
aristocratical influence” throughout the judicial system.45 This would permit members to 
“establish any mode of judiciary process they think proper and, under sanction of law, the 
                                                
39 We shall discuss Austin’s views toward the judges further below.  
40 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Mar. 23, 1786, 1; May 11, 1786, 1. 
41 Acts and Resolves of the Province, 1777-1778, 5:761, 766 (Jan. 24, 1778, chap. 17).  
42 “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 159, 149. 
43 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1786, 1. 
44 Barebones, Am. Herald, June 26, 1786, 3. 
45 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, June 1, 1786, 2. In the summer of 1784, a tri-county bar meeting 
convened with lawyers from Suffolk, Essex, and Middlesex counties, but failed to agree upon a single 
binding set of rules for themselves. “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 156-60. 
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vilest impositions may be practiced.”46 The result? Enslavement of the people. With the 
judges and practitioners in cahoots, the lawyers’ “STAR CHAMBER tyranny” would 
reduce the people to bondage, for “when a people cannot appeal with safety to the laws of 
their country, they are absolute slaves.”47 Did imprisoned debtors, many laboring away 
to pay mounting fees, not find themselves essentially in a state of bondage? Did not the 
lawyers, by the mere filing of litigation, wield overawing power to subject the people of 
Massachusetts to myriad forms of obnoxious judicial coercion over property and body? 
After their long “struggle for freedom,” would the American people permit themselves to 
become “SLAVES to the assuming dangerous power of this ‘order’”?48 
The Austinites also took considerable offense at the lawyers’ large fee exactions, 
which, as litigation mounted in the mid-1780s, enabled practitioners to amass substantial 
personal wealth while many people suffered. Not only had the lawyers commandeered 
the justice system. They also purported to put it up for sale, “rendering the laws a mere 
business of traffic” and the judicial system venal.49 Consequently, the “order” daily grew 
rich while the general community “as rapidly” became “impoverished.”50 The lawyers’ 
fee bounties had placed them on the “pinnacle of luxury and dissipation.”51 Austin seems 
to have imagined the lawyers luxuriating in opulent drawing rooms with members of the 
Tea Club.  
Supporters elaborated on these themes with revealing historical allusions. Writing 
                                                
46 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, June 1, 1786, 2; Apr. 20, 1786, 1. 
47 Ibid., June 1, 1786, 2; Mar. 23, 1786, 1. 
48 Ibid., Apr. 20, 1786, 1. 
49 Ibid., Mar. 23, 1786, 1.  
50 Ibid., Mar. 9, 1786, 2. 
51 Ibid., Mar. 23, 1786, 1. 
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in support of Austin, “A Friend to the Publick” linked law’s “fattened” practitioners to 
the corrosive “luxury” that had destroyed Rome. In her “youthful state,” he wrote, Rome 
had “lived in credit and [was] renowned for arms,” but she later “fell a victim to luxury, 
that fatal disease of the body politick, by not resisting but indulging herself in it.” Sensing 
a symbiotic relationship between lawyers and debt, the writer hoped that “by industry and 
frugality we may be able to wipe off our national and domestic debt” so as to obviate the 
need for the “order” and thus enable men to labor free and secure.52 Writing in support of 
Austin, “Old Rock” similarly criticized the profession’s acquisitiveness, a quality rightly 
condemned, he pointed out, by St. Paul, Homer, Lycurgus and Socrates. Money, and 
money alone, this writer sardonically observed, served as “the noblest principle that 
actuates the Generality of lawyers, so noble and ‘open-hearted’ as to pillage and plunder 
all their country.” The writer advised Massachusetts legislators to pay heed to Lycurgus, 
history’s “ablest law-maker,” who banished money from his realms for centuries 
producing the “grandest and happiest nation recorded in the annals of mankind.”53 
Before Austin could write and publish his second essay installment an organized 
opposition to his stated objectives had already started to coalesce. By all appearances 
most, if not all, of Austin’s antagonists counted themselves members of the “order” to 
which Austin directed his ire, though like Austin they wrote under pseudonyms. In a way, 
the lawyers made claims no less daring than Austin’s. Their arguments elaborated on the 
theme first invoked by the Free Republican, namely that free governments, in order to 
exist at all, required lawyers. “Advocates,” wrote one, “exist naturally in free 
                                                
52 A Friend to the Publick, Massachusetts Centinel, May 6, 1786, 2. 
53 Old Rock, Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1786, 2. 
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governments.”54  
In seeking to demonstrate the republican “necessity” of the profession, the 
lawyers invoked the great classical lawyer-statesmen. Former justice on the Supreme 
Court of Judicature, prominent private practitioner, and future Governor, James Sullivan 
wrote in this vein under the name “Zenas.” 55  Greece had the unimpeachable 
Demosthenes, Sullivan wrote, Rome the estimable Cicero, and “the liberty of Rome fell 
but with the lives of her Lawyers.”56 Sullivan contended that the great Massachusetts 
lawyers fit squarely in the tradition laid down by the classical orator-statesmen. 
Adumbrating the profession’s history in early Massachusetts, he asserted that Bay State 
lawyers had ultimately “fought and suffered to establish their country’s liberty” during 
the Revolution and then, to cap their republican achievements, masterminded the 
Massachusetts Constitution. Pursuing a similar theme, “A Lawyer” spotlighted respected 
figures within the Massachusetts bar, including James Otis, Jr., Oxenbridge Thatcher, and 
John Adams. Could the people reasonably charge these venerable patriots, the 
Revolution’s intellectual architects, with anti-republican designs, as Honestus 
suggested?57   
Where the lawyers looked backward, the Austinites looked forward. History, 
Austin and his compatriots insisted, could not redeem the profession, for what relevancy 
                                                
54 Zenas, Independent Chronicle, Apr. 27, 1786, 1. 
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Sullivan, Ms. N-994, Transcripts, Box 1, Massachusetts History Society.  
56 Zenas, Independent Chronicle, Apr. 27, 1786, 1. 
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did the “rude, unenlightened, uncultivated state” of ancient Greece or Rome have to the 
“present system of jurisprudence in this country”? 58  Rome did not represent any 
republican golden age, as the lawyers had insinuated. Indeed, in those ancient times, “any 
daring fellow had it in their power to make slaves of the people.”59 Modern-day 
Massachusetts republicans, on the other hand, remained “too well informed to be 
deprived of their dear bought rights by any daring fellow whatever.”60 Austin expressed 
alarm that members of the “order” had publically endorsed the principles of Roman 
government, whose “Comitia Centuriata” had ruled that the “richest class should have 
everything at their disposal” and that the “PEOPLE SHOULD BE RARELY CALLED 
TOGETHER, UNLESS FOR MATTERS OF SMALL MOMENT.”61 The lawyers’ 
historical arguments only confirmed their anti-republican motivations and aristocratic 
conceits. If the “order” had its way, “like the Plebians of Rome, the people will be 
obliged to choose a PATRON from among them.”62  
The lawyers’ focus on handful of patriot lawyers, moreover, selectively 
interpreted Massachusetts history. For as we have seen in Chapter 3, with a few notable 
exceptions, the Massachusetts bar as a whole at best sluggishly responded to the Stamp 
Act and, at Independence, at least half the lawyers remained loyalists. In the west, almost 
all the lawyers refused to renounce their oaths to the king.63 In any case, while Austin did 
not deny that a few patriot lawyers had engaged in “respectable” conduct during the 
                                                
58 Root and Branch, Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1786, 2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, May 4, 1786, 2. 
62 Ibid., May 11, 1786, 1.  
63 McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 94, 96.  
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imperial crisis and Revolution, he maintained that the “practice then and now is so 
opposite in almost every instance.”64 Whatever its history, the profession had become a 
“dangerous institution” in the post-Revolutionary years.65 Recognizing that republican 
principles required the profession’s immediate and permanent “annihilation” flowed not 
from an understanding of “Justinian or Theodosius,” or Adams and Otis, but rather from 
“the experience of every man within this State.”66 
Yet the lawyers took their arguments even further. Not only did a “free republic” 
generally require men with special legal knowledge to protect the people’s liberties. The 
Massachusetts constitution of 1780 had rendered professional lawyers “peculiarly 
necessary.” A key participant in the drafting of the constitution, James Sullivan 
elaborated on this claim with reference to particular provisions in the constitution.  
Sullivan emphasized the rights and protections in criminal cases guaranteed by 
Article XII of the declaration of rights, as well the procedural technicalities associated 
with obtaining Article VII habeas corpus relief. He also cited the continuation provisions 
of Chapter VI, Article VI, which maintained in force all laws adopted and in effect at the 
time of ratification, unless repealed by legislation or otherwise repugnant to “rights and 
liberties contained in this Constitution.” Chapter III’s requirement that the judges provide 
advisory opinions to the other departments of government on “important questions of 
law” and on “solemn occasions,” moreover, necessitated that the judges rendering these 
opinions have formal training in the law.  Finally, Sullivan cited to Article XXX of the 
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66 Ibid. 
 126 
declaration of rights, which defined a “government of laws and not of men” as the 
separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial departments within the 
government.67  
Sullivan concluded that no ordinary person without substantial legal training 
could properly expound any of these provisions so as to give the constitution its intended 
effect. The Massachusetts constitution had therefore stitched the professional legal mind 
into its very architecture. Citizens had no “power” to abolish lawyers, Sullivan argued, 
“without overturning the constitution.”68 Yet Sullivan emphasized that even the latter 
option had limited, if any, applicability, for the people had no legal power at all to 
substantially change let alone overturn the constitution. “I aver that the system of law 
which we have been under, never can be altered materially, consistently with the freedom 
of the people.”69 
Austin did not dwell at length on the specific constitutional niceties cited by the 
lawyers, for to do so would have permitted the lawyers to frame the debate in their own 
terms. One might reasonably conclude that, from Austin’s perspective, to the extent the 
lawyers’ arguments had any merit they counseled substantial revisions of the provisions 
in question. Yet the Austinites did not openly advocate this result.  
Instead, they located other provisions in the constitution that the lawyers 
themselves had passed over but that, according to Austin, rendered the lawyers’ practices 
unconstitutional. Specifically, Austin cited to Article XI of the declaration of rights which 
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provided: “Every subject of the commonwealth . . . ought to obtain right and justice 
freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; 
promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.”70 By their self-legislated fees and 
jurisprudential conceits, the lawyers not only contravened Article XI but made a mockery 
of it. Another Austinite contended that by threatening to “strip the People at large from 
their share in government” the lawyers’ practices flew in the face of Article V’s 
guarantee that all power reside “originally in the people” and that all government, 
including the judiciary, “are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable 
to them.”71 The lawyers  offered no rebuttal to these claims.    
II. A Disposition Unfriendly to Law Itself 
Responding to the uproar that Austin had aroused, Caleb Strong—a Hampshire 
county lawyer and state senator who would go on to serve as a delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention, a U.S. senator, and Governor of Massachusetts—concluded 
that Austin’s essays represented much more than just an animosity toward lawyers. The 
assaults on lawyers, Strong wrote to Nathan Dane on June 24, 1786, “originate more 
from a Disposition unfriendly to regular Government and the Law itself than from the 
Conduct of those who practice it.”72 “[A]cts against lawyers,” Christopher Gore wrote to 
Rufus King a day later, “or more truly against law, now occupy the time of the H. of 
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Reps.”73 Passages in Austin’s and his supporters’ essays do substantiate this allegation. 
“Legal impositions are the worst species of tyranny,” Austin wrote—the italics his. 
“Every act which is passed, so far from relieving the people, serves only as a link in the 
grand chain of TYRANNY.”74 Austin here appears to have equated law with tyranny 
without qualification. Or again: “It is really preferable to be in confusion for want of law, 
than to be ruined with law.”75 Consider the words of “Cousin German” writing in support 
of Austin on March 30, 1786:  
To be revenged on those Philistines the lawyers, by their utter destruction, let 
us put our shoulders to the great fabric of the law, on which they are 
supported, and lay it in ruins . . . . If, like that strong man upon record, we 
should perish with them, we shall perish in triumph!76 
Had, as the lawyers alleged, Honestus and his disciples commenced a revolution 
against law itself? Austin denied the allegation.77 He stated that his goal lay rather in 
setting the “law” on a more egalitarian foundation, so that all people, whether rich or 
poor, well-read or not, could “ever be on an equality, while they are appealing to the 
JUSTICE of their country.”78 The lawyers made this impossible. Driven not by an honest 
sense of justice but by the selfish interests of their clients and, above all, by the desire to 
receive “a large reward” and to increase their own power and independence, the lawyer 
“warp[ed] the laws to answer his particular purposes,” introducing a “multiplicity of 
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needless and almost unintelligible words” and “mystical phrases.”79 The law had thus 
become the “mere pageantry of the profession, calculated to perplex the jury and deceive 
the wondering crowd.”80 
The plot, however, thickens for Austin went on to assert that the problem’s crux 
lay not only in the lawyers’ own “pernicious practices,” but in the fact that the “order” 
had, apparently under the banner of the continuation provisions in Chapter VI, Article VI, 
introduced the “whole body of English laws” into the American justice system. Yet laws 
deriving from England’s “aristocratical institutions” and “applicable to Kings, Lords and 
Commons,” Austin declared, had no place in “our young Republic.” “We may as well 
adopt the laws of Medes and Persians.”81 To some degree, such comments reflected a 
post-Revolutionary nativism vis-à-vis England now extended to the realm of 
jurisprudence. Ill-suited to the state’s “particular circumstances,” even the ancient 
liberties set out in Magna Carta did not perforce apply in Massachusetts under this 
nativistic standard.82  
Austin’s claims regarding the common law, however, had further implications. 
They belied a deep-seated fear of the lawyers’ increasing independence from the people. 
The doctrine of popular consent and its structural constitutional corollary, legislative 
supremacy, that held so much intellectual sway for post-Revolutionary Americans 
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rendered the common law anomalous and suspect, for the people themselves had no 
meaningful part in its making. Rather, unelected judges and unaccountable lawyers, 
historically English, created and re-created the common law through independent legal 
discretion made possible by the common law’s very prolixity.  
The common law seemed to the Austinites so vast, indefinite, and contradictory 
that it permitted the lawyers to advance almost any conclusion through a careful if 
specious selection of maxims and instances. The “grand artillery” of precedents “brought 
from Old English Authorities” served to “embarrass all our judiciary causes” by 
permitting the lawyers to “cull and select precedents to answer every purpose: the 
omnipotence of their laws can reconcile all contradictions.”83 Nor, as we have seen, did 
the bar hesitate to employ common law rules of construction to twist, distort, and 
sometimes purportedly nullify legislation enacted by the people’s representatives. Made 
by the few yet enforceable against all, the common law thus epitomized aristocratic 
tyranny for the Austinites. This, wrote one of Austin’s nineteenth-century intellectual 
descendants, Robert Rantoul, together with the fact that no ordinary man could discern 
what it commanded until “after the judge has decided,” meant that the common law did 
not qualify as law in a republican society in the first instance.84 
Hence, according to the Austinites, the lawyers possessed not only an 
unrepublican monopoly on making the common law. They also held a monopoly on 
understanding, parsing, and applying it. In Sir Edward Coke’s famous words, the 
common law consisted of “artificial reason” that only people trained and experienced in 
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the law could ever apprehend and employ.85 By its canonical proponents’ own admission, 
then, the common law did not jibe with ordinary logic and common sense. On this basis, 
the Austinites concluded that it flouted and insulted the common man and therefore the 
people themselves.  Serving only to “perplex the mind,” the common law could never 
“inform the judgment” and, indeed, its “numerous volumes . . . arranged in formidable 
order” only operated to “batter down every plain, rational principle of law.”86 The 
lawyers’ essays in response to Austin, moreover, while eloquent and at points 
compelling, only confirmed that the bar had a vested interest in perpetuating a legal 
regime that necessitated the professional legal mind and thereby precluded ordinary 
litigants from speaking for themselves. Whether or not the Massachusetts constitution did 
so, the common law by itself effectively achieved both objectives. 
Austin had a simpler republican alternative in mind that would render 
professional lawyers superfluous. In lieu of the impenetrable complexity and confusion 
introduced by the lawyers and their laws, Austin proposed a regime predicated on 
“fundamental principles of law”—a “system of laws of OUR OWN, dictated by genuine 
principles of Republicanism, and made easy to be understood by every individual in the 
community.”87 But of what did such “fundamental principles of law” consist? By all 
appearances Austin used this phrase to refer to basic “principles of right and wrong” as 
ascertained by a common moral sense universally possessed.88 The phrase “fundamental 
principles of law,” in other words, served as a proxy for individual conscience and 
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common-sense judgment. The legal profession “is no way essential to this knowledge.”89 
“Zenas” and his brethren could cite all they wanted to provisions in the constitution or the 
common law requiring lawyerly exposition. The determination of right and wrong, 
however, involved no “mysteries” for the lawyers to expound or elucidate. The trial by 
jury, Austin maintained, rested on this very proposition. If the “fundamental principles of 
law” did not stand “level with the common understanding,” he wrote, then the “trial by 
jury, which consists of twelve men taken indiscriminately from the people, is the greatest 
absurdity in nature.”90 
Austin’s elevation of common sense over common law, fundamental principles of 
law over independent legal discretion, resonated with Scottish ethical philosophy, which 
had proven quite influential among members of the revolutionary generation.91 Against 
Locke’s suggestion that all men begin as blank slates, Scottish philosophers such as 
Francis Hutcheson had argued that man had an innate moral sense that pronounced 
immediately on the character of observed actions, approving virtue and disapproving 
vice. Hutcheson’s fellow Scot, Thomas Reid, coined the phrase “common sense,” which 
Thomas Paine later employed as the title of his influential revolutionary pamphlet. For 
Reid, certain basic aspects and relations among things in the world did not fall within the 
realm of reason or philosophy, let alone law books; instead, simple common sense, 
possessed by everyone, perceived truth or commanded belief by an instantaneous, 
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instinctive, and irresistible impulse.92 Reid, writes one historian, thus “democratized the 
intellect by insisting that the ordinary man could be as certain of his judgments as the 
philosopher was.”93 A comparable egalitarian epistemology marked Austin’s conception 
of so-called “fundamental principles of law,” which he considered an integral part of 
every individual’s moral constitution. 
Yet if the Austinites thus had a certain faith in the common man’s moral compass 
and his natural inclination to conform to it without legal sanction or coercion, the lawyers 
took a more pessimistic view of human nature, which they employed to justify a system 
of coercive legal authority operated by lawyers and judges. James Sullivan mocked 
Austin’s ideal of legal simplicity. One could easily fantasize about a primitive state of 
nature, where simple common virtue sufficed to resolve disputes among men. If men 
were “angels,” Sullivan wrote, then “neither laws nor government would be necessary.”94  
But reality, not fantasy, should guide men’s reasoning on such issues. Experience 
showed that while conscience might point men to justice, their “inherent passions” and 
“proneness to ambition and avarice” invariably prevented “voluntary submission” to it.95 
Thus “men possessing separate property have found it necessary to establish government 
for the preservation of it.” “[C]oercive power,” Sullivan declared, “must be lodged 
somewhere to compel justice.”96 Sullivan thereupon set forth a very specific definition of 
law in response to Austin that made coercion its sine qua non: “Laws are both a rule of 
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right and a grant of power to certain persons to compel men to do justice conformably to 
that rule, and sanctions, or pains and penalties, are everywhere found to be necessary to 
induce submission to the one, and obedience to the other.”97 
The lawyers further supported their arguments against legal simplicity with 
reference to history. History, they believed, showed that simple justice systems along the 
lines invoked by Austin came with undesirable concomitants. Far from promoting liberty, 
as Austin suggested, the simplest justice systems usually constituted “the work of a 
despot.”98 Blackstone had made the same argument.99 Formalistic legal complexity, the 
line of thinking went, increased in “exact proportion to the quantity of freedoms enjoyed 
by the subject.”100 Signaling an important post-Revolutionary intellectual shift among 
American lawyers that would crystallize in the aftermath of Shays’s Rebellion, lawyers 
facing the Austinian challenge used the terms “freedom” and “liberty” to refer primarily 
to private property and specifically contracts. The purchase, ownership, and transfer of 
property and credit through such contracts necessitated a profusion of laws to correspond 
to the complexity of the transactions themselves. These correlative processes, coupled 
with “the imperfection of language,” meant that many laws would escape the intellectual 
grasp of “illiterate men.”101 This fact, in turn, necessitated legal professionals who, 
through long study, could cultivate an understanding of common law doctrine.  
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In light of these practical realities, if no set of men “made a profession in the 
knowing of the law,” Sullivan queried, how would the “poor man, the weak man, the 
widow, the orphan” defend themselves against “the opulent, the cunning and the 
strong”?102 Whatever label society attached to them, the lawyers concluded, “[a]dvocates 
exist naturally in free governments.”103 Every link in this artful argument—that liberty in 
a complex society required complex laws and therefore professional lawyers to make 
sense of them—came from Blackstone’s Commentaries.104 
For his part, Austin deemed the lawyers’ assertion that freedom and property 
somehow required a complex and confusing common law legal regime outside the 
people’s control or comprehension almost too fanciful to dignify a response, the clever 
argument of a lawyer defending his own, not the truth. Lawyers in particular, rather than 
society generally, produced legal complexity, and they did so to serve their own interests 
not the people’s.105 Lawyers and their prolix laws, furthermore, did not secure person and 
property but rather, as Sullivan’s own emphasis on coercion conceded, endangered both 
through arrests, imprisonments, executions, replevin actions, foreclosures, extortionate 
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fees, and court costs produced or facilitated by the lawyers.106 Finally, the Austinites 
conceived liberty in much broader terms than the lawyers, to encompass not only 
property and contract rights, but rights to conscience, community and, most importantly, 
to personal participation in the judicial system.  
III. The Irrelevance of Class 
For whom, and to whom, did Austin purport to speak? Austin claimed to 
represent a very broad swath of post-Revolutionary society—pretty much everyone 
except the lawyers. He characterized the lawyers’ pernicious practices as a “matter of 
general complaint,” a threat to “every individual in the community.” References to the 
“people” and the “publick” at large pervade Austin’s and his supporters’ writings.107 All 
saw themselves as speaking both to and for the “people.”108  
By the same token, Austin certainly empathized with the many poor or financially 
strapped farmers sued on their mortgages and other debts. “How many debtors now 
languish in prison,” he wrote, “whose misfortunes are increased by Court 
impositions?”109 Court costs and the bar associations’ self-legislated fee structures put 
men of lesser means at a distinct disadvantage in litigation matters. “Can the poor (who 
cannot pay any of this ‘order’),” Austin queried, “receive the equal advantage with the 
rich, when such a body of men exist, who stand ready to speak on any subject and like 
mercenary troops can be hired to support any cause for the consideration of a large 
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reward?” Clearly, as it stood, the rich fellow could overpower the poor one not by the 
soundness of his argument or the justice of his demands, but “by the greatness of his gifts 
to lawyers.”110 In a justice system cleansed of lawyers and their confusing laws, Austin 
concluded, rich and poor alike might stand on a level playing field while “appealing to 
the JUSTICE of their country.”111 
To the extent the lawyer-driven legal process disproportionately harmed poor 
debtors as an economic matter, however, this had important constitutional ramifications. 
Reducing “the Lower orders of the people . . . to absolute poverty and slavery,” Shaysite 
William Whiting later declared, would “sap the foundation of our republican 
government.”112 Although he sometimes appealed to debtors and the poor, moreover, 
Austin himself, who co-owned a successful rope-making business, identified as a 
“mechanic”—albeit one quite unafraid to rock the boat within the community113—and 
merchant.114 Indeed, Austin directed considerable energy into protecting the interests of 
merchants and creditors from law and lawyers—an important aspect of his writings that 
historians have often overlooked and which challenges the historiographical tendency to 
link the Massachusetts uprisings in 1786 to class struggle.115 As we shall discuss below, 
Austin felt that the lawyers wrongly brought the coercion of law to bear on innocent and 
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well-intentioned creditors in unique ways. The “order” had exploited “every accidental 
circumstance which an unprincipled person [i.e., debtor] might have, by the lenity and 
indulgence of an honest creditor,” and stood ready “to strike up a bargain (after 
rendering the property in a precarious state) to throw an honest man out of three quarters 
of his property.”116 
As a class, particularly vis-à-vis farmers, merchants generally acted as creditors. 
At the same time, the record suggests that we ought to exercise caution in drawing bright-
line distinctions between debtor and creditor classes in post-Revolutionary 
Massachusetts. In Worcester county (one of the busiest counties in the state117), for 
example, parties often found themselves in webs of litigation wherein a debtor in one 
case might sue as a creditor in others. Recent scholarship demonstrates that 
Massachusetts litigants sued on debts did not necessarily constitute a “weak yeomanry” 
but rather a “special class” of litigants caught between their own creditors and debtors, 
often quite solvent on paper though without sufficient specie or other tangible valuables 
to pay accounts.118 The transformation of debt structures in the 1760s from book accounts 
to promissory notes, which by the 1780s traded at a “dazzling and confusing rate,” meant 
that legal relations became increasingly impersonal as litigation on these notes 
multiplied.119 Debtor-defendants short on cash benefited from delay, as it gave them time 
to seek funds and put off the payment of court costs due at the conclusion of a case. 
During the pendency of a case, costs and fees remained manageable for many defendants, 
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who sat on the sidelines and routinely took default judgments. Evidence suggests that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers would often pay the appeal bond to keep the case alive, for payment of 
their own fees depended on obtaining some recovery.120  
It appears, then, that lawyers and debtors had something of a “symbiotic 
relationship” based on a shared interest in prolonging the appeals process.121 The legal 
system about which Austin complained actually tended to benefit debtors as much as 
creditors, particularly the debtors with wherewithal who sued as creditors in other cases 
and thus, with their lawyers’ help, might play the procedural peculiarities in one case off 
the other. Because of such litigation shenanigans, many creditors preferred to stay out of 
court.122 
Bay State lawyers played on both sides of credit transactions, primarily with a 
mind toward getting their own bills paid. But Austin maintained that aggressive lawyers 
representing clients who indisputably owed money or property had engaged in 
particularly objectionable tactics. He voiced specific concerns about lawyers’ use of 
replevin procedures, “arbitrarily adopted, so as to render futile all attachment 
whatever.”123 Even after a “legal seizure” based on undisputed debt and where the 
creditor attached “the identical parcel of goods for which the person was indebted,” the 
“creditor stands exposed . . . to have his doors burst open and the property torn from his 
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possession without sufficient security.”124 In the lawyers’ hands the laws thus did not 
suffice to “protect a creditor in his legal demands,” and the replevin procedures “tend[ed] 
to increase greatly the influence and authority of the lawyers.”125  
The lawyers may very well have felt less compunction about employing the 
replevin procedures against foreign creditors than American ones. Emphasizing that 
Americans remained essentially a “commercial people,” Austin worried that the lawyers’ 
coercive property seizures would harm the nation’s “commercial reputation” and 
“mercantile character,” souring transatlantic trade relations to the detriment of all.126 The 
“mercantile part of the community,” he emphasized, “are much interested in this 
particular.”127 
Yet Austin’s sympathies with mercantile interests extended well beyond his 
opposition to abusive replevins. Discussed further below, his reform proposals seemed to 
have drawn on the arbitration procedures commonly adopted by colonial merchants in the 
eighteenth century, of which Austin must have had some awareness. 128  Austin 
strenuously warned against placing mercantile disputes in “the hands of lawyers,” whom 
he deemed “unacquainted with the customs of merchants.”129 Neither lawyers nor judges 
possessed the competence to resolve merchant accounts. Rather a “body of merchants are 
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ever considered the most eligible to settle commercial disputes.” 130  “[H]ow many 
disputed accounts” tied up in the courts, Austin asked, could have been promptly “settled 
by three merchants who are acquainted with mercantile concerns”?131 Courts and lawyers 
served only to “throw the [merchants’] most simple demands into confusion.”132 Austin 
aimed, moreover, to extend the mercantile model of employing referees intimately 
familiar with community-based customs and usages to other sub-communities, such as 
farmers who could also “have most of theirs settled in this manner.”133 
IV. A Post-Revolutionary Vision for Reform 
As his commentary on mercantile dispute resolution suggests, Austin did not 
confine his disquisitions to merely knocking down the lawyers. He also had an 
affirmative alternative vision for reform parts of which we have touched upon in the 
foregoing analysis, but which we shall now consider in detail. Having digested a number 
of the responses offered by adherents and opponents alike, Austin laid out for readers on 
April 20, 1786 a multi-pronged proposal for an alternative republicanized “judiciary 
mode.”  
First, as indicated above, Austin proposed a method for resolving civil disputes 
that drew on eighteenth-century mercantile traditions; namely, referring disputes to 
arbitrators or “referees” mutually agreed upon by the parties, rather than filing suit in the 
courts. The referees’ decision, when unanimous, would have a final and binding effect 
with no further appeals except when “new evidence” arose, in which case the parties 
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would become entitled to a second hearing before the same referees. The logic of the 
reference—by agreement of both parties—rendered coercive enforcement unnecessary.134  
Second, Austin advocated substantive reforms in the law itself. Specifically, he 
contended that plain equitable principles derived from common sense should totally 
supplant the common law and all other laws in the British codes. Since everyone could 
intuitively understand and apply such principles, their implementation would render 
professional lawyers unnecessary and irrelevant.  
Third, and consequently, all disputants could and should plead their own cases to 
the jury or referees “without the intervention of the ‘order’ of lawyers.”  
Fourth, if either party wished to enlist an advocate’s assistance, they should have 
the privilege of employing anyone they choose. Austin would have abolished all fees paid 
to such advocates by the parties themselves. Instead, the advocate would receive, at most, 
a “small fee” paid by the government. “The fees should be so small,” Austin wrote, “as 
not to encourage an ‘order’ of men to pursue the business merely for the profit, as we 
would rather encourage every person . . . to give his plea in person or writing.” 
Finally, to correspond to the state prosecutor and to put the parties to criminal 
proceedings on genuinely equal footing, Austin proposed the creation of an “Advocate 
General” paid by the government to represent indicted defendants.135  
All these reforms sought to enable the people themselves personally to participate 
in the judicial process on equal footing without the interference of aristocratic legal 
professionals. If implemented, Austin argued, these egalitarian reforms would result in 
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the legal profession’s abolition not by making the practice of law itself illegal or 
otherwise by expressly banning lawyers, but by transforming the state’s “judiciary mode” 
and legal culture within which the lawyers thrived. The plan would essentially starve the 
lawyers out of existence.  
In early essays, Austin, ever zealous to eliminate the lawyers in particular, found 
himself suggesting that the judges might alone suffice to perform the function of 
superintending any litigation that ended up in the courts. This has led one modern 
commentator to conclude that Austin “was anti-lawyer and pro-judiciary.”136 Austin’s 
support for the total eradication of Common Pleas by itself renders this claim 
problematic. As do the Austinites’ fears about conspiracies between bench and bar, and 
the exercise of independent legal discretion by judges and lawyers alike. Yet the lawyers 
in 1786 initially seized upon this claim to expose Austin to rebuttal on two fronts.  
First, the lawyers played to the people’s historical fears of the judges by 
suggesting that investing the judges with more power would threaten the people’s 
liberties. Juries, of course, might constrain the judges in appropriate circumstances. Still, 
the lawyers contended that skillful legal advocates functioned as a necessary check on the 
judges over and above any jural check.137 This argument had a certain delicacy for it 
seemed to concede that no other constitutional checks applied to the judges—a 
proposition that, as we have seen in Chapter 2, found some support in the Massachusetts 
constitution but that the lawyers tended to deemphasize. It also failed to address the 
growing kinship between judges and lawyers in Massachusetts that at least problematized 
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this purported check. Second, the lawyers argued that a large body of judges would 
produce “all the inconveniences of a professional order.”138  
Austin thereupon backed off his earlier claims with respect to the judges. “[I]f the 
decisions by references were binding,” he now pressed, “we should not have so great a 
number of cases before the Judges, as this mode would keep out of our Courts, the 
greatest part of our actions.”139 Austin does seem to have imagined judges playing some 
role in criminal cases prosecuted by the government. Yet, in these matters in particular, 
the jury reigned supreme over the judges, who Austin relegated to the mechanical role of 
“recit[ing]” the evidence to jurymen. 140  Assuming the implementation of Austin’s 
substantive reforms, moreover, neither judges nor the advocates could constitute 
themselves into a distinct order with a monopoly on legal knowledge. In sum, Austin’s 
ideal contemplated a “judiciary mode” that could sustain itself without the need for 
advocates or judges trained in the common law.     
The lawyers did not expressly object to establishing an advocate general for 
defendants in criminal matters—so long, that is, as defendants could also choose to retain 
a private attorney if they could afford one. Otherwise, Austin’s opponents objected to 
each and every one of his reform proposals. Over and above the obvious fact that the 
reforms attacked the lawyers’ very existence, livelihood, and legitimacy, we have already 
touched on a few of the more specific reasons why. To Austin’s proposal to replace the 
common law with codified common sense, the lawyers argued it would put property and 
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contracts at risk; that it would more likely lead to despotism than republicanism; and that 
the “infinitude of private contracts” in fact made a complex common law legal regime 
necessary for the protection of legal rights.141 As we have seen, Austin articulated 
respectable rebuttals to each point.  
To Austin’s assertion that the people should represent themselves in court, the 
lawyers answered that this privilege already existed by law. With considerable historical 
evidence on his side, however, Austin responded that the bar association rules and 
“certain modes of practice” had “in effect destroyed this privilege.”142 The common law’s 
substantive and procedural complexities, as the Austinites viewed it, essentially 
precluded ordinary people from speaking for themselves in court because only the 
lawyers and judges understood the common law in the first instance.  
To Austin’s proposal to abolish private attorneys’ fees and institute intentionally 
meager government-paid fees, the lawyers argued that litigation “vehemence” more 
likely arose from the “human constitution” than “pecuniary stimulus” so that “law-craft” 
wound endure with or without fees. The claim seemed a bit disingenuous and the lawyers 
did not press it. Some argued instead that Austin’s fee proposal would “vulgarize” the 
profession and create more “pettifoggers and scriveners.”143 Austin did not dignify these 
speculative assertions with a response. 
The lawyers had a number of responses to Austin’s proposal that party-chosen 
arbitrators rather than courts decide disputes. First, they again argued that nothing in the 
                                                
141 A Twig of the Branch, Independent Chronicle, Apr. 27, 1786, 2. 
142 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Apr. 20, 1786, 1.  
143 A Twig of the Branch, Independent Chronicle, May 4, 1786, 1. 
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law precluded the parties from pursuing arbitration. One difference between the 
Austinites and the lawyers, however, lay in the degree of finality accorded the referees’ 
decisions. Austin would have made reference decisions final and binding, where the 
lawyers would have permitted appeals to the courts. Yet even without an appeal, the 
lawyers suggested that references could never establish acceptable law and order for the 
primary reason that no coercive sanction backed the referees’ decision. Neither of the 
parties could “compel . . . specific performance of the award,” which required a writ of 
execution.144    
The lawyers also asserted that making reference decisions final and binding on the 
parties would deprive the people of their “most sacred right”: a trial by jury.145 
Massachusetts lawyers had employed this line of argument in response to other attempts 
by reformers in the 1780s to adopt modes of dispute resolution outside the courts. Indeed, 
we cannot understand the ascendancy of the state judiciaries in the post-Revolutionary 
years without closely attending to the ways in which judges and lawyers angled to 
increase their own power under the banner of protecting jury trials.146 For his part, Austin 
                                                
144 A Twig of the Branch, Independent Chronicle, May 4, 1786, 1. It bears noting here that the 1787 
arbitration act passed by the legislature in response to the Austinite controversy substantially 
accommodated the lawyers on all the foregoing fronts. Specifically, proceedings under the act would take 
place under the close supervision of judges on the Court of Common Pleas at both the initiation and 
decision stages and, in this connection, required the parties to pay court costs to a justice of the peace, 
Common Pleas judges, and the clerk. As well, nothing in the act prevented the parties from appealing to the 
Court of Common Pleas and beyond to enforce or overturn the award through ordinary legal processes. 
Mass., Acts and Laws 1786-1787, 55-57 (July 7, 1786, chap. 20).  
145 A Twig of the Branch, Independent Chronicle, May 4, 1786, 1. 
146 The Suffolk County Bar Association unanimously pronounced unconstitutional 1784’s Four Pound Act 
(enlarging the civil jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace from the traditional forty shillings to four pounds) 
for the same reason. March 20, 1784  entry, in “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 158. The legislature 
passed the act after Samuel Ely’s rebellion in response to westerners’ complaints about the expense, 
inefficiency, and inconvenience of common pleas proceedings and to westerners’ preference for simplified 
and localized dispute resolution unadulterated by the trickery of professional lawyers. The act provided for 
appeals to Common Pleas with a jury. Mass., Acts and Laws 1782-1783, 605-609 (Mar. 11, 1784, chap. 42 
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denied ever having “disputed” the trial by jury or urged “compulsory references.”147 The 
lawyers’ objection in this regard rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of Austin’s 
proposal. A decision by referees did not, according to the Austinites, replace or otherwise 
stand in tension with a decision by a jury, but rather proceeded on the selfsame model. 
Neither Austin nor his followers clearly distinguished between arbitration referees and 
juries as a functional matter. Thus even as Austin repeatedly proposed binding reference 
procedures, “Old Rock” could claim that “[i]t is manifestly the aim of that celebrated 
writer [Honestus]” to have all disputes “equitably decided by that glorious tribunal, that 
grandest and best birthright of Americans, a jury.” 148  
At least one difference, however, did distinguish juries from referees. Since juries 
operated within courts, the legal profession and judges had occasion to manipulate, 
perplex, and control them; and, according to Austin, the lawyers and judges aggressively 
                                                                                                                                            
[1783]). The Suffolk lawyers nevertheless resolved that “each gentleman of the bar shall use his utmost 
endeavor to obtain a determination of the Supreme Judicial Court whether the law be agreeable to the 
constitution or not.” “Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar,” 158. Here, however, neither the lawyers’ 
maneuvering in the legislature nor in the Supreme Judicial Court produced their desired result. Ibid. 
Clearly, repeal or invalidation of the act would have upset western debtors, but would not apparently have 
benefited creditors in any meaningful way. Instead, the primary benefit would have redounded to the 
lawyers as such whom disputants in proceedings before justices of the peace rarely if ever retained. A few 
years earlier, however, in the first recorded case of judicial review by an American court, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court invalidated a statute authorizing seizure of loyalist property and requiring a six-person jury 
to determine whether the subject property originally belonged to loyalists. Holmes v. Watson (1780), 
discussed in State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, 444 (1802). Fundamental law (i.e., the common law), 
according to the Holmes court, required twelve jurors. Ibid. In the 1786-87 period, New Hampshire courts 
of common pleas invalidated a statute similar to the Massachusetts act, but which increased the jurisdiction 
of justices of the peace in debt and trespass actions to ten pounds, on which see Hamburger, “Law and 
Judicial Duty,” 34-35, and Treanor, “Judicial Review before Marbury,” 475-476. 
147 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, May 18, 1786, 1. 
148 Old Rock, Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1786, 2. These remarks seem to jibe with the findings of 
recent historical scholarship, which suggest a more experimental approach to jury composition in the 
eighteenth century, including more frequent use of merchant and “struck” juries. See Oldham, Trial by 
Jury, 17-24. 
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exploited every opportunity to do so.149 By arbitral references, on the other hand, Austin 
intended to remove cases from the reach of lawyers and common law doctrine, and 
instead tether dispute resolution to the common moral sense of neighbors and vocational 
kinsmen. The reference mechanism under Austin’s plan did not deprive the people of 
their right to trial by jury. It rather aimed to recover and distill the right’s true egalitarian 
essence, unadulterated by the cumbersome legal machinery constructed by professional 
lawyers and embodied in the common law.150  
V. Law’s Revolution 
Austin’s final essay installment assailing the Massachusetts lawyers came on June 
15, 1786. Shortly thereafter, he left the country on an extended visit to England and 
Europe.151 In August, Shays’s Rebellion broke out and commentators in the papers 
immediately began blaming none other than Honestus—that “high and mighty promoter 
of disorders”—for inciting the uprising.152 Austin’s essays, wrote one commentator, had 
“introduced” the disorder “against the sacred constitution of this State.” The writer 
                                                
149 See Honestus, Independent Chronicle, May 18, 1786, 1, arguing that professional lawyers’ legal 
arguments confused and perplexed juries. 
150 Austin’s Jeffersonian kinsman Jesse Higgins would later similarly conceive juries in the Saxon tradition. 
Higgins, Sampson Against the Philistines (1805), 5-12.  
151 It is unclear when precisely Austin left the country. The possibility exists that he left after the uprisings 
began in anticipation that he would be blamed. The timing of his travels, which coincide almost perfectly 
with the most intense period of rebellion (returning right after Governor Bowdoin dispersed the rebels), 
does seem conspicuous in this regard. See Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Jan. 11, 1787, 2. 
152 Markwell, Massachusetts Centinel, Sept. 9, 1786, 2. Indeed, months before open rebellion broke out, 
Austin’s opponents worried about the inflammatory impact of his essays. Viewing Massachusetts in a 
vulnerable condition, “in a state of political fever,” “Lelius” accused Austin of “blow[ing] up the coals of 
dissention” and “raising a civil war in the heart of our distracted Commonwealth,” when the duty of “every 
honest citizen” under these precarious circumstances was to “calm the minds of the Publick, to promote 
industry and honesty, to pay off their own private debts.” The writer feared a coming “anarchy.” Lelius, 
Massachusetts Centinel, May 10, 1786, 2. 
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likened Honestus to “Satan.”153 Opponents imagined Austin in England celebrating the 
“overthrow of civil liberty” with loyalist defectors.154  
Austin’s absence surely enabled these damning perceptions to grow unabated in 
the final months of 1786. But when Austin arrived home at the turn of the year, he began 
publishing essays in his own defense, denouncing the Shaysites for taking up arms and 
disclaiming any role in causing them to do so. He also refused to retract any of his 
previous contentions as to the legal system and profession.155 The “people in general,” he 
maintained, had approved the movement to abolish lawyers and the common law, and 
neither Austin nor his supporters had ever advocated doing so by anything but peaceable 
means.156 
To say that the Ausinites never expressly advocated armed rebellion, however, 
does not conclude the question of whether the Austinites inspired the Shaysites to take up 
arms or to stand on certain grievances that factored into their decision to do so. The 
Massachusetts rebellion in 1786 had many causes, and we do history no favors by trying 
to lay the episode at the doorstep of one man or one set of grievances. But Austin’s 
widely disseminated writings did give expression to a configuration of attitudes toward 
the law and inherited legal institutions shared by many others in Massachusetts in 1786. 
In the fall of 1786, moreover, the Shaysites continued to demand the abolition or close 
regulation of lawyers and continued to extol Honestus.157 Equally important, the lawyers 
                                                
153 “Of Satan and Honestus,” Massachusetts Centinel, Jan. 20, 1787, 4; see also Suffolk, Independent 
Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1787, 1. 
154 Markwell, Massachusetts Centinel, Sept. 9, 1786, 2. 
155 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Mar. 8, 1787, 2; Jan. 25, 1787, 2; Jan. 11, 1787, 2. 
156 Ibid., July 31, 1787, 2. 
157 See Chapter 3, Introduction.  
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experiencing the situation in 1786 did not clearly distinguish between the Austinites and 
the Shaysites. They viewed the events of 1786 as one continuous rebellion against law 
and courts that threatened to rend the society asunder.158  
Unfortunately the major monographs on Shays’s Rebellion either ignore or give 
short shrift to the revealing connections between the Austinites and the Shaysites.159 The 
prevailing explanations for the rebellion instead rest chiefly on materialistic premises: 
crushing debt, taxes, and/or court costs, together with the scarcity of money, primarily 
fueled the rural discontent leading to the rebellion. Austin’s involvement suggests deeper 
ideological causes arising directly out of the revolutionary experience for which 
historians have failed to account: namely, an egalitarian hostility to lawyers understood 
as unrepublican aristocracies with a professional mission to exclude the people 
themselves from direct participation in the judicial process and from comprehending the 
law that applied to them.160 
                                                
158 See Adams, Life in a New England Town, 73-74; Parsons, Memoir, 162; Ames, Works, 13. During the 
contentious debates over the proposed federal Constitution in 1788, one writer, quite possibly James 
Sullivan himself, referred to Austin’s anti-lawyer essays as “treasonable letters [] sent to [your] brother, 
Daniel Shays.” Junius, Massachusetts Gazette, Jan. 4, 1788, in DHRC, 5:612. Austin, on this view, had 
“cause[ed]” the Shaysites to “plunge the dagger of rebellion into the breast of your country.” Ibid. On the 
eve of constitutional reform, the lawyers saw Austin as the “principal abbetor of the late insurrection in the 
western counties.” Ibid., 613  
159 The most recent interpretation is Richards, Shays’s Rebellion, which emphasizes burdensome taxes 
imposed by a government bond-holding elite and, correlatively, the bicameral structure of the legislature. 
Austin does not get so much as an index entry in Richards’s study. Nor does he receive any mention in 
Christian Fritz’s recent examination of the rebellion. Fritz, American Sovereigns, 80-116; see also ibid., 84-
89, discussing economic grievances; Brooke, Heart of the Commonwealth, 193, noting the causes of 
rebellion “lay in a spiraling crisis of the economy.” For the traditional class-based interpretation, see 
Szatmary, Shays’s Rebellion. Szatmary does mention Austin and hostilities toward lawyers among western 
farmers. Ibid., 42-43. One short article points out that “hatred against lawyers” played a major role in the 
rebellion. Matz, “Lawyers and Shays’ Rebellion,” 7-8. William Nelson, who recognizes the link, does not 
seriously investigate its implications, and incorrectly suggests that only “agrarian debtors” took issue with 
the legal profession. Nelson, Americanization, 69, 5.  
160 William Nelson vaguely asserts that the Shaysites rebelled based on the notion that “access to justice 
was one of the rights of man for which the War for Independence had been fought,” but elaborates no 
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To be sure, the Massachusetts government’s response to the Austinites and 
Shaysites in the fall of 1786 had repressive dimensions—including military action and 
the controversial suspension of habeas corpus—and many established political and 
military elites under governor Bowdoin’s leadership refused to give any credence to the 
rebels’ grievances. The people’s representatives as a whole, however, felt it necessary to 
address those grievances. In November 1786, the legislature passed laws suspending debt 
collection actions for eight months, which it extended in 1787.161 In early 1787, it passed 
legislation lowering all court-related costs and attorneys’ fees, the latter reduced to levels 
that on their face approximated those in the old 1701 act, but in fact felt much lower due 
to inflation.162 The rebels even made an impression on the bar. A few Massachusetts 
barristers converged with the rebels around the shared goal of abolishing the courts of 
common pleas.163  
Finally, in what one historian has called the “Revolution of 1787,” a political 
coalition that had formed loosely around Shaysite platforms sent disciplinarian governor 
                                                                                                                                            
further on the ideological component and otherwise spotlights class and economic factors. Nelson, 
Americanization, 5, 69-71. 
161 Mass., Acts and Laws 1786-87, 113-16 (Nov. 15, 1786, chap. 45); ibid., 560 (June 30, 1787, chap. 6). 
162 Ibid., 226-38 (Feb. 28, 1787, chap. 73 [1786]). This reduction posed a threat to the bar associations’ 
minimum fees schedules criticized by the Austinites. The lawyers successfully opposed subsequent 
legislative attempts to reduce attorneys’ fees and court costs even further. Gawalt, Promise of Power, 65.   
163 Christopher Gore to Rufus King, June 28, 1787, in King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 
1:226-27. Theophilus Parsons introduced a bill for these purposes, but it did not pass. Both lawyers and the 
rebels advocated the courts’ abolition to make justice cheaper and speedier. Notably, however, the lawyers 
would have transferred the jurisdiction of common pleas to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Shaysites, on 
the other hand, would have transferred jurisdiction to justices of the peace and, if disagreements existed as 
to the JP’s decision, then to mutually agreed-upon referees. If the referees found liability, execution would 
be delayed until the next sitting of the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court could hear 
appeals (with a full jury trial) from the referees’ damages award, but not from awards in favor of the 
defendant. See William Whiting, “Some Remarks on the Conduct of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth 
. . .” [Dec. 1786], William Whiting Papers, Ms. N-442, Massachusetts Historical Society. In contrast to the 
lawyers’ proposal, then, the rebels’ proposal would have squeezed lawyers out of the process until the very 
end.      
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James Bowdoin packing and otherwise won substantial victories in the 1787 elections.164 
None other than Benjamin Austin ran within this coalition and, one year after his 
newspaper attacks on the Bay State legal profession, notwithstanding the widespread 
perception that he had instigated Shays’s Rebellion, attracted enough popular support in 
Suffolk county to unseat an incumbent and become a state senator!  
In the short-term, these electoral victories, together with the state legislature’s 
substantial conciliatory measures, apparently offered enough succor to the Austinites to 
quiet them for the moment. 165  In the long-term, however, Austin and the post-
Revolutionary movement for which he spoke helped inaugurate a dissenting tradition 
within American legal culture that would continue to find articulate exponents in the 
decades to come.166  
Writing almost a half-century after the Austinite controversy, Tocqueville 
famously depicted American lawyers as the “connecting link between the great classes of 
                                                
164 Hall, Politics without Parties, 227. 
165 As well, the proposed Constitution of 1787 and the divisive ratification debates in Massachusetts 
probably operated to marginalize issues regarding the lawyers. It bears noting, however, that while Austin 
himself did not appear at the state ratification convention, a few of his brethren did. See also White, 
Debates and Proceedings of the Convention of 1788, 168, for references to the “language against the 
gentleman of the law” at the convention. One member of the convention, Amos Singletary a town justice 
from Sutton, expressed great concern that “these lawyers” angled make themselves “managers of this 
constitution” and thereby arrogate power to themselves to the detriment of the people. Ibid., 203. Austin 
himself published essays opposing the new Constitution in part because he believed the frame of 
government would give “undue influence to a particular profession . . . This party-influence is very evident 
in the powers vested in the Supreme Judicial.” Candidus, Independent Chronicle, Dec. 6, 1787, in Storing, 
Complete Anti-Federalist, 4:129.  
166 See the dissertation’s Epilogue. One historian has concluded that Austin’s 1786 attacks on lawyers and 
the common law paved the way for the eventual abolition of common law pleading in Massachusetts. 
Nelson, Americanization, 72. After ratification, John Gardiner would go on to introduce major law reform 
legislation in Massachusetts, parts of which resonated with Austin’s proposals. Gawalt, Promise of Power, 
83; McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 189-92. Nineteenth-century Bay State lawyers acknowledged that 
Austin’s critiques became “probably instrumental in introducing simple and economical methods of 
procedure into the practice of law in Massachusetts, which have served as an example to other states.” 
Amory, Life of Sullivan, 1:189. For other reform movements and successes in the same vein during the 
Jeffersonian period, see Ellis, Jeffersonian Crisis, 155-56, 183, 229 (Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and 
Massachusetts).  
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society.”167 They “belong to the people by birth and interest,” he wrote, “and to the 
aristocracy by habit and taste.”168 Tocqueville’s comments suggest that early American 
lawyers, while skeptical of democracy, also labored under divided loyalties. The history 
of the Massachusetts legal profession in the eighteenth century bears the point out. On the 
eve of the imperial crisis, the profession stood as one of the most Anglicized and 
aristocratic-leaning classes of men in colonial America. The Revolution split the 
profession into two camps—patriots and loyalists. But, as we have seen, even those 
lawyers who turned toward whiggery could only go so far. James Otis’s early lunges and 
reversals in response to the Stamp Act crisis provide a revealing glimpse into the conflict-
ridden mind of the Massachusetts lawyer in the crucible of imperial resistance.169  
To be sure, the profession would become more uniformly Americanized in the 
decades after Independence, jettisoning titles and ranks, and opening its folds to new 
entrants in ways that the New England barristers of yore had repudiated. Yet in 1786, 
even as they eagerly claimed credit for American independence, Austin’s lawyer 
opponents retained a dependence on English legal culture more in common with their 
eighteenth-century provincial predecessors than their nineteenth-century Americanized 
descendants. If in 1776 the lawyers called themselves whigs and then patriots, by 1786 a 
Tory’s jurisprudence had begun to repossess them.170 If Lockean rights and liberties 
adorned the their rhetoric, the spirit of Hobbes had infiltrated their logic. Given man’s 
“proneness to ambition and avarice,” as Sullivan argued, “coercive power must be lodged 
                                                
167 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:352. 
168 Ibid. 
169 See Samuelson, “Constitutional Sanity of Otis.” 
170 By which I mean Blackstone.  
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somewhere to compel justice.”171 As it happened, then, the American Revolution divided 
not only the American legal profession’s constituency, but the American legal mind 
itself. In the spring of 1786, the bar’s divided consciousness displayed itself for all to 
see—not primarily in courthouses or law offices, but in the Boston newspapers. 
The Austinites, of course, recognized no genuine divisions in the American legal 
mind—only hypocrisy. The lawyers might talk of liberty. They proceeded, however, to 
confine it to property rights rather than political ones; and by declaring law the guardian 
of liberty arrogated to themselves considerable independent power to expound and protect 
it. Consequently, the lawyers’ liberty operated against the people, not in favor of them. 
The lawyers’ republicanized vocabulary belied an underlying mission to perpetuate their 
professional monopoly on the law and ultimately thereby subvert republican values. 
Years later Tocqueville would observe a similar insidious tendency in the legal 
profession. Through the courts, the Frenchman wrote, the lawyers, even as they 
“belonged to the people,” also “controlled democracy” and, acting “imperceptibly” upon 
the legal system, finally “fashioned it to suit [their] own purposes.”172 The profession’s 
capacity to exert legal power seemingly independent of the people themselves led the 
Austinites to conclude that it had grown into an aristocracy that, if not nipped in the bud, 
would eventually destroy the people’s liberties under the guise of protecting them.173 
As a potent early expression of the anti-aristocratic idea, Austin’s 1786 essays 
shed critical light on the origins of an ideological tradition that would shape American 
                                                
171 Zenas, Independent Chronicle, Apr. 27, 1786, 1. 
172 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1:358. 
173 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Mar. 9, 1786, 2. 
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politics straight through the Jacksonian period.174 Twenty years earlier, Austin’s anti-
aristocratic ideology would have carried little appeal. But by the mid-1780s, when Austin 
wrote, a resistance to all things “aristocratical” reached deep into the catacombs of the 
American mind. 175  That lawyers offended this new egalitarian sensibility tells us 
something important about the sensibility itself. For Austin’s anti-aristocratic critique of 
lawyers extended far beyond robes, wigs, or other cultural conceits.  
The legal profession represented, above all, an aristocracy of knowledge.176 In this 
regard, the Austinite controversy fits within a larger post-Revolutionary revolt against the 
professions appreciated by historians, including medicine and the ministry. 177  The 
controversy also provides one manifestation of an “anti-intellectualism” that extended 
into post-Revolutionary culture and politics.178 The lawyers, however, had struck a 
deeper nerve than either of these characterizations suggests, for they had purported to 
monopolize a field of knowledge that many Americans in Massachusetts and elsewhere 
felt integral to their identity after the Revolution. 
Conclusion 
Historians have long observed that a certain legalism pervaded the rhetoric that 
                                                
174 For an insightful analysis of how the Jacksonian politicians, particularly Van Buren, employed the 
language of aristocracy to describe the Whig opposition, see Leonard, Invention of Party Politics, 177-92. 
175 Wood, Radicalism, 8, 241-42. 
176 For a valuable work that views the “American revolution in the law” as an epistemological revolution, 
see Stimson, American Revolution in the Law. 
177 See Hatch, Democratization of American Christianity, 27-30. At least one of Austin’s followers threw in 
a critique of doctors and ministers for good measure, both of whom this writer also considered knowledge 
monopolists. See Cousin German to Honestus, Independent Chronicle, Mar. 30, 1786, 2  For the resistance 
to professionalism generally in the new republic, see Calhoun, Professional Lives in America. 
178 See Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. Austin, however, does not get so much as an 
index entry in Hofstadter’s otherwise masterful volume. 
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surrounded the American Revolution.179 The Revolution, if we take Thomas Paine’s 
word for it, had made law America’s “king.”180 And yet early in its reign, according to 
the Austinites, America’s new monarch had become something of a tyrant. The 
emergence of this perception stands as one of the most fascinating and historically 
seminal intellectual events to occur in post-Revolutionary America. In part, this chapter 
and the last have concerned themselves with explaining how and why it happened. 
Certainly, the lawyers themselves had much to do with creating the perceived equation of 
law with tyranny. These “pernicious practitioners” had “warp[ed] the laws to answer 
[their] particular purposes,” introducing a “multiplicity of needless and almost 
unintelligible words” and “mystical phrases.”181 But, as we have seen, one key to 
understanding Austin’s larger significance lies in the recognition that the Austinites did 
not clearly distinguish between the lawyers and the law on which they relied: the 
common law. The one could not exist without the other. The common law not only made 
the lawyers’ epistemological monopoly possible; it embodied the monopoly. The 
Austinites wanted nothing to do with its aristocratic “artificial reason,” for it made a 
mockery of republican common sense. 
                                                
179 For a recent example of scholarship in this vein, see Wilf, Law’s Imagined Republic (2010). The most 
prolific historical proponent of revolutionary-era legalism, however, is John Philip Reid. E.g., Reid, “The 
Rule of Law,” 632, asserting that “the legal aspects of the American Revolution could be told under the 
title In Defense of the Rule of Law”; Reid, “The Irrelevance of the Declaration,” 88, arguing that the 
Declaration of Independence rested not on abstract natural law but “peculiarly English constitutional 
dogmas”; see also Reid, In a Defiant Stance on legalism in Massachusetts during the Stamp Act 
controversies.    
180 Stephen Wilf, Laura Edwards, and Robert Ferguson, among others, place Paine’s statement that in 
America “the law is king” front and center in their studies of this topic and by all appearances accept 
Paine’s statement as unassailable. See Wilf, Law’s Imagined Republic, 2; Edwards, The People and Their 
Peace, 66; Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture, 11, 16, interpreting Paine’s Common Sense as a 
“demand for a country defined entirely by law.” 
181 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, May 18, 1786, 1; May 11, 1786, 1; Apr. 13, 1786, 1. 
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In evaluating the implications of Austin’s ideas in their own time, however, we 
cannot ignore the views espoused by the common law’s defenders—the lawyers who rose 
up against Honestus in the spring of ’86. Indeed, we learn something important about the 
Austinites’ larger historical significance by listening closely to their adversaries. And, as 
we have seen, the lawyers of ’86 believed that Austin and the movement he spearheaded 
represented not merely a popular repudiation of the legal profession or the common law 
but an underlying hostility to “the Law itself.”182  
What can we make of this claim? Austin himself seems to have denied it. He 
advocated establishing an alternative justice system governed by so-called “fundamental 
principles of law,” level with ordinary understanding, elsewhere called common sense or 
“right and wrong.” He described this alternative regime as a “judiciary mode” and 
vigorously defended the people’s right to “appeal with safety to the laws of their 
country.”183  
Here, however, the lawyers could claim with some plausibility that the 
implications of Austin’s critique belied his rearguard appeals to the law. Surely the 
justice system Austin imagined—bereft of common law coercion, courts, and lawyers, 
relying only on the common moral sense of “right and wrong” and perhaps a shifting 
pluralistic overlay of unwritten community-specific customs—looked little like any legal 
system that post-Revolutionary Americans had known. And surely if by “law itself” we 
mean the lawyers’ law, the kind of law that required lawyers, then without question the 
                                                
182 Caleb Strong to Nathan Dane, June 24, 1786, in Sibley’s Harvard Graduates, 16:96 (emphasis added); 
see also A Lawyer, Massachusetts Centinel, Apr. 26, 1786, 1. 
183 Honestus, Independent Chronicle, June 1, 1786, 2; Mar. 23, 1786, 1. 
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Austinites wanted to abolish it. Likewise, if by law we mean unwritten common law rules 
inherited from England, inscrutable to the ordinary individual, and backed by coercive 
writs of process and execution in the manner described by James Sullivan in 1786, then 
the Austinites also wanted to abolish it.  
Yet assuming arguendo that Austin did in fact harbor hostility to the law or legal 
systems as such, whence did it derive? The foregoing analysis has suggested a few 
intellectual sources: anti-aristocratic ideology, Scottish common sense epistemology, a 
custom-based (rather than rule-based) ethic, a nativistic rejection of the English legal 
heritage, and a pragmatic assessment of how lawyers and legal coercion adversely 
affected the interests of ordinary people. Yet at the root of all these factors lay a more 
critical ideological wellspring born out of the Revolution from which the antilegalistic 
spirit of ’86 ultimately flowed: the idea that all governmental power, including judicial 
power, had devolved upon the people themselves during the Revolution and, in 
significant respects, remained with them notwithstanding the establishment of the new 
state governments. Or, in the words of the provision in the Massachusetts constitution to 
which the Austinites cited, the men chosen by the people to govern, “are their substitutes 
and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.”184  
For most people, annual elections and legislative instruction rights rendered 
legislators and other elected officials acceptably accountable to the people as a 
constitutional matter. The Massachusetts judges, to be sure, possessed measurably greater 
constitutional independence than judges in the other states and, as we have seen in 
                                                
184 Mass Const. of 1780, Part 1 (Declaration of Rights), art. V. 
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Chapter 2, this alone made for an uncertain constitutional settlement in 1780. The 
lawyers, however, operated in a different sphere altogether—both within and without the 
government, exerting overwhelming control over the judicial process and, with their 
artful constructions of statutes and unwritten common law rules, over the law itself, yet 
lacking any appreciable institutional accountability to the people.  
Most importantly, the lawyers’ participation in the judicial coercion of individuals 
reified a distinction between ruler and ruled that the ideology of the American Revolution 
had collapsed and Americans abhorred. From the Austinites’ perspective, the lawyers had 
inserted themselves between the people and the law and, in so doing, displaced the people 
from their law. In each and every reform they proposed, the Austinites sought to take 
back the law and judicial process from the lawyers so that the people—in juries, 
reference panels, pro per participation, and through common sense—might once again 
hold the law in their own hands as they did during the American Revolution.  
These reforms, however, posed a mortal threat to the lawyers’ whole enterprise. 
The Austinian challenge accordingly forced post-Revolutionary legal establishmentarians 
to articulate new and revealing defenses of the law in a republican society. From the 
perspective of law’s defenders in 1786, the Austinite vision for reform rested upon a 
jurisprudential fallacy. The law required a coercive judicial authority to compel 
obedience. In this regard and others, if the lawyers of ’76 had felt compelled momentarily 
to reject Blackstone and instead embrace Locke in order to justify increasing resistance 
and ultimately revolution, the lawyers of ’86—Caleb Strong, John Quincy Adams, James 
Sullivan, and many others—began to find certain fundamental principles of law and 
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government enunciated in the Commentaries quite germane and useful.185 For Blackstone 
the idea of the people ruling themselves in the manner proposed by the Austinites stood 
diametrically opposed to law itself. “[T]his devolution of power, to the people at large,” 
he wrote in reference to Locke, “repeals all positive laws whatsoever before enacted.”186 
No human laws could withstand this “devolution” for it would ipso facto “destroy all 
law” and “render all legal provisions invalid.”187 By all appearances, the lawyers of ’86 
concurred.  
Yet beyond the lawyers’ revealing attitudes toward coercion and beyond their 
resurrection of Blackstone and Hobbes over Locke, one last feature of the professional 
legal mind confronted by the Austinian challenge on the eve of federal constitutional 
reform in 1786 merits our attention in closing. It relates to the emerging distinction 
between ordinary and fundamental law, and evolving conceptions of the latter among the 
lawyers. 188  The distinction received its first influential modern articulation in the 
seventeenth century, when Sir Edward Coke suggested that unwritten common law rights 
dating from time immemorial would trump parliamentary enactments in cases of 
conflict.189 As we have seen in Chapter 2, the American Revolution gave birth to a new 
conception of fundamental law based on written constitutions sanctioned by the people’s 
explicit consent given in special conventions. As we have also seen, in 1786 both the 
lawyers and the Austinites cited to the Massachusetts constitution in support of their 
                                                
185 For the earlier rejection of Blackstone in favor of Locke, see Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and 
Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament (1774), in Wilson, Works, 2:721-746.  
186 Blackstone, Commentaries, 1:157.  
187 Ibid. 
188 On the emergence of a distinction between fundamental law and ordinary law, see Wood, Creation of 
the American Republic, 306-10; Rakove, “Original Justifications for Judicial Independence,” 1067. 
189 Thomas Bonham v. College of Physicians, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (Winter 1610).  
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respective positions. Significantly, however, it played no real part in Austin’s discussion 
of “fundamental principles of law.” Rather, as we have seen, Austin equated fundamental 
principles of law with common sense equitable principles comprehended by all and 
indeed, unlike the lawyers, did not distinguish between fundamental law and ordinary 
law.  
The lawyers displayed a commitment to the constitution of 1780 as fundamental 
law completely lacking in the Austinites, particularly insofar as they regarded the 
constitution as practically unamendable and suggested that it constituted a special class of 
law that required a cadre of learned lawyers to expound and enforce it. Yet they also 
began increasingly to embrace an alternative conception of fundamental law that found, 
at best, inexplicit expression in the Massachusetts constitution itself.  
The rage for paper money and debtor-friendly legislation, while never completely 
successful during the 1780s in Massachusetts (even if wildly so just to the south in Rhode 
Island), nevertheless deeply affected the lawyers. They considered paper money and stay 
laws on the one hand, and acts against lawyers on the other, as legislation cut from the 
same cloth. The constitution of 1780 prohibited neither expressly. Yet as we have seen, 
from the lawyers’ perspective in 1786, both constituted “acts . . . against law.”190 Both 
evinced a “disposition unfriendly to law itself.” We may now put an even finer point on 
what the lawyers meant by the term “law itself” here. Surely, they meant constituted 
judicial authority, coercive sanctions, and a professional cadre of legal expositors. And 
surely they placed emphasis on provisions in the state’s written constitution as 
                                                
190 King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 1:138. 
 162 
fundamental governing tenets. Yet by 1786, the lawyers had trained their sights on 
another source of fundamental law capable of invalidating paper money, localized dispute 
resolution mechanisms, and possibly even anti-lawyer legislation, where the 
Massachusetts constitution could not: the common law.  
By which I mean the common law of property and contract, including associated 
jury trial rights. The shift had a number of important constitutional implications because 
the lawyers and judges claimed the common law as their exclusive domain. If common 
law rights reigned supreme over conscience, ordinary legislation, and perhaps even over 
written constitutions themselves, and if it naturally fell to the judges to determine those 
rights in the ordinary course of judicial business, then a judicial duty to enforce those 
rights notwithstanding legislation to the contrary might also devolve on the judges. And, 
in the volatile legislative environment of the 1780s, in which popular debtor interests 
angled for power with little regard for the common law, the judges might find themselves 
having to discharge such a duty routinely. In a few cases in the 1780s, state judges did in 
fact do so.191  
As the Shaysites convulsed Massachusetts, the Rhode Island Superior Court of 
Judicature heard the controversial Trevett v. Weeden. The case concerned a state law 
imposing penalties on creditors who refused to accept the state’s paper money as legal 
tender and providing for summary actions to recover penalties without a jury trial. John 
Trevett brought a penalty action against his butcher whose energetic lawyer, James 
Varnum, argued at length that the judges should ignore the statute because it violated 
                                                
191 Treanor, “Judicial Review Before Marbury,” 474-96. 
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fundamental rights to a jury trial as embodied in the common law.192 Rhode Island did 
not at this point have a written constitution, let alone one guaranteeing jury trial or 
property rights. Nevertheless, in view of the state’s “legal constitution” and “fundamental 
laws,” the court ruled in favor of Weeden and dismissed the whole case.193  
Controversy ensued. The popularly controlled Rhode Island legislature did not 
accept the court’s authority to nullify its acts. When summoned before the assembly to 
justify the decision, the judges would impart no additional detail as to their rationale, 
except to confirm their own final jurisdiction over the case in no uncertain terms: “The 
Supreme Judiciary of the State were not accountable to the General Assembly or to any 
other power on earth, for their judgments.”194  
Judicial supremacy over legislation so conceived presented whole new 
possibilities for the professional lawyers to exercise control over a people prejudiced 
against an aristocratic elite by the American Revolution. The events in Massachusetts in 
1786-87 could not but have augmented the sense of urgency among the lawyers with 
respect to pursuing such possibilities. The political revolution in Massachusetts’ 
government in favor of the Shaysites in 1787 raised the specter of more acts against 
                                                
192 See Varnum, The Case, Trevett against Weeden. For references to the common law in particular, see 
ibid., 6, 11, 17, 30. 
193 Ibid., 11, 45. See also Providence Gazetter and Country Journal, Oct. 7, 1786, 1, reporting the judges’ 
decision. The specific grounds for the court’s refusal to take cognizance of the statute remain unclear. The 
judges may have had common law jury trial rights in mind or perhaps the underlying contract/property 
rights, or perhaps both. Note, however, that the court dismissed the case entirely, rather than letting it go 
forward with a jury trial, which would have been the appropriate response had jury trial rights formed the 
exclusive basis for the court’s decision. Nothing in the record suggests that Varnum actually demanded a 
jury trial for his client. His argument rested on the purely formal proposition that the statute under which 
plaintiff sued violated common right and reason, and therefore that plaintiff could not rely on it. In addition 
to jury trial rights, Varnum mentioned the underlying property and contract violations at oral argument. 
Varnum, The Case, Trevett against Weeden, 30.      
194 Arnold, History of Rhode Island, 528.    
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lawyers, more transferals of jurisdiction outside the common law courts, more paper 
money, and more stay legislation.   
Yet notwithstanding Trevett v. Weeden and some encouraging signs from the New 
Hampshire courts of common pleas, the lawyers knew well that they could only place so 
much reliance in the state judges to invalidate misguided popular legislation. The state 
legislatures remained poised summarily to remove the offending judges and to prevent 
the courts from enforcing their nullifications by obstructing their writ processes.195 
Controversies surrounding the Treaty of Peace, moreover, added another dimension to 
the problem of legislative contract impediments that greatly disturbed the lawyers serving 
in or for the Continental Congress. War confiscations and sequestrations in the states 
violated Article IV of the treaty (securing pre-war British contracts) and the southern 
governments (including their courts) would not relent. Here the state governments 
threatened not only common law rights, but the authority of the Continental Congress and 
its negotiated peace. Federal remedies recommended themselves.  
 
 
                                                
195 The Rhode Island legislature later removed four of the five judges that decided Trevett. Bilder, 
Transatlantic Constitution, 190-91. The Massachusetts constitution permitted the legislature to do the 
same, and the lawyers in 1787 had every reason to believe it would do so if the Bay State judges attempted 
to thwart the popular will as the judges in Trevett v. Weeden had. In the 1786-87 period, New Hampshire 
courts of common pleas invalidated a statute similar to the Massachusetts Four Pound Act, but which 
increased the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in debt and trespass actions to ten pounds, rather than 
four. See Hamburger, “Law and Judicial Duty,” 34-35; see also note 146 above, discussing Massachusetts 
lawyers’ views on the Four Pound Act. For scholarship emphasizing judicial review’s uncertain status and 
future in the 1780s, see Kramer, The People Themselves, 35-72.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
COERCION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING  
 
*  *  * 
Did the Federalists wage a counterrevolution in 1787? The idea that the 
movement for constitutional reform in 1787 had counterrevolutionary dimensions dates 
straight back to the Antifederalists, who often accused their counterparts of betraying the 
spirit of ‘76’s republican promise. In the constitutional historiography, scholars trace the 
idea to Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United 
States, wherein Beard depicted the nation’s constitutional founding as an economic 
counterrevolution waged by and on behalf of protocapitalist creditors and public 
securities holders. 1  Beard’s critics over the years have challenged him either by 
purporting to show that the Federalists in fact sought to secure the Revolution’s gains,2 or 
by discrediting An Economic Interpretation’s evidentiary basis.3 The former approach 
severs the Federalists’ democratic rhetoric from its historical and discursive contexts, 
                                                
1 Beard, Economic Interpretation. 
2 E.g., Ackerman, We the People, 1:200-229; Amar, America’s Constitution, 279, 309. For influential 
works in the late fifties and early sixties rejecting the counterrevolution thesis, see Diamond, “Democracy 
and the Federalist,” and Arendt, On Revolution, 140-141. By 1966, Clinton Rossiter could describe the 
Constitution as the “last formal act of the Revolution” that “placed the stamp of irrevocable legitimacy on 
the [] great legacies of 1776.” Rossiter, 1787, 261. 
3 E.g., McDonald, We the People, 40 n.6, 69 n.83. For another influential mid-century critique of An 
Economic Interpretation, see Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution. 
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while the latter sidesteps the question of whether some kind of alternative, non-economic 
revolt against the revolutionary heritage occurred in 1787. Recent scholarship taking the 
position that a counterrevolution did in fact take place adopts Beard’s materialist 
premises and thereby commits the same reductionist sins.4 Yet, to the other extreme, one 
work has so far enlarged the concept of a counterrevolution as to place within its 
historical ambit virtually every post-Revolutionary American who at one time or another 
preferred order to liberty, or who opposed equal rights for women or blacks.5   
Part II of this dissertation contends that a counterrevolution did occur in 1787, but 
that neither economic interests nor changing political ideologies after the Revolution 
fundamentally impelled its leading figures. Nor, as Gordon Wood asserts, did it consist in 
a sociological counterrevolution of aristocracy against democracy.6 Rather, at the heart of 
the American counterrevolution lay a constitutional jurisprudence predicated on a single 
cardinal principle with intellectual origins in the antilawyer controversies examined in 
Part I: “It is essential to the idea of law that it be attended with a sanction.”7 Part II 
contends that everything structurally significant about the Constitution of 1787 in its own 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Holton, Unruly Americans, 22-23, affirming the explanatory power of Beard’s findings that 
bondholders and private creditors stood as the Constitution’s “most avid supporters” in 1787 and finding 
“chiefly economic” motives lurking behind the ideological goals invoked by key opinion leaders. For other 
works that invoke the theme of counterrevolution with attention to class struggle, see Bouton, Taming 
Democracy, and Slaughter, Whiskey Rebellion.     
5 Tise, American Counterrevolution, xlvii, arguing that in the two and a half decades after Independence 
nearly every American, including the Jeffersonian Republicans, came to “reject[] the very principles and 
ideals of their Revolution,” including equal rights for women, blacks and immigrants, and the abolition of 
slavery. For a more discerning analysis illuminating the Constitution’s counterrevolutionary dimensions, 
see Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology, 60-98. David Hendrickson’s recent study remains neutral on the 
question. Hendrickson, Peace Pact. Nor does Max Edling’s otherwise suggestive book frame its argument 
in these specific terms. Edling, Revolution in Favor of Government. Edling in fact takes pains to show how 
the Federalists accommodated anti-statist currents in American society. Ibid., 9, 57, 219 
6 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 484-485.  
7 The Federalist No. 15, 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (italic added). 
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time grew out of this singular conception of the law. The framers’ antecedent 
commitment to the coercive principle, above all others, best explains why they pursued 
reconstitution in 1787 and why they made certain choices and not others in establishing 
and administering the first federal government in the decade after ratification.  
Two initial questions arise which the present chapter pursues: First, in what 
specific sense did the framers’ commitment to the coercive principle mark a shift in 
attitudes toward the law after the Revolution? Second, why did the framers embrace this 
conception of the law?  
I. From Consent to Coercion 
The American Revolution produced a constitutional discourse that made the 
consent of the governed its essential ingredient and government by coercion ipso facto 
illegitimate and unrepublican.8 The Coercive Acts marked an important moment in the 
development of these attitudes. The colonists’ experiences with these laws strengthened 
an existing link between the term coercion and standing military force, and forged new 
links between, on the one hand, coercion and, on the other, magisterial independence and 
the usurpation of self-government. In all events, the episode made coercion tantamount 
with illegitimacy.9  
But the Coercive Acts also forced Americans to elaborate an alternative mode of 
governance that excluded coercion: government by consent. For these purposes they used 
the principles that revolutionary leaders had articulated in the imperial struggle and 
                                                
8 As used herein, the term discourse means a common set of questions asked about the nature and function 
of government. This tracks intellectual historian David Hollinger’s influential definition of the term. 
Hollinger, “Historians and the Discourse of Intellectuals.”  
9 See Ammerman, In the Common Cause.  
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applied them to the question of who would rule at home. In Massachusetts and other 
states the consent principle produced a revolution against independent judicial power.10 
Ultimately the American discourse of popular consent incorporated a logic of self-
government that collapsed the distinction between ruler and ruled and linked self-
government to localism.11 It thus rendered coercion something of a contradiction in 
terms, for the people could not logically force themselves to comply with laws they 
themselves made.12 Nor could they feel coerced by an agreed-upon local arbitrator’s 
award, or by an annually elected town official’s decision, or even by a local jury’s verdict 
provided that no professional lawyers participated in the matter. Herein lay the American 
Revolution’s essential legal ideal: law without force.  
This ideal, however, had the effect of virtually immobilizing the state 
magistracies in the 1780s.13 At the continental level, it ultimately became a caricature of 
itself with the concept of a requisition.14  Responding to the total collapse of continental 
requisitions on the eve of reform, the Federalists of 1787 introduced a jurisprudence that 
sharply distinguished between law, which they wholeheartedly advocated, and 
requisition, whose consent-based rationale the Federalists summarily rejected as the 
                                                
10 See Chapter 2.  
11 For recent scholarship identifying “localized law” as the Revolution’s primary legal legacy, see Edwards, 
The People and their Peace, 3, 41, 65; Tomlins, “Republican Law,” 546-550.   
12 “[I]n free governments and equal representations,” wrote one South Carolina author in 1783, “the levy of 
taxes, or other State transactions, do not imply compulsion; for how can that be compulsion, which reason 
has suggested, his delegate advised, and his self permitted.” [Anonymous], Rudiments of Law and 
Government, Deduced from the Law of Nature (Charleston, 1783), in Lutz and Hyneman, American 
Political Writing, 1:575. 
13 On the failing state magistracies, see Brown, Redeeming the Republic.  
14 Americans in the 1780s specifically linked the requisition mechanism to the Revolution. See, for 
example, Patrick Henry’s comments to this effect at the Virginia ratifying convention, in DHRC, 9:1063-
1064. 
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“parent of anarchy.” 15  Invoking London’s coercive tactics in the 1770s, the 
Antifederalists continued to extol the requisition concept as the spirit of ‘76’s legal ideal. 
According to one well-known “child of the revolution,”  
[Americans] must recollect with gratitude the glorious effects of requisitions. 
It is an idea that must be grateful to every American. An English army was 
sent to compel us to pay money contrary to our consent—to force us by 
arbitrary and tyrannical coercion to satisfy their unbounded demands. We 
wished to pay with our own consent. Rather than pay against our consent, we 
engaged in that bloody contest, which terminated so gloriously. By 
requisitions we pay with our own consent . . . .16 
The discourse of consent’s canonical expressions appeared in Locke and, on the 
American side, in the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation, the 
former linking the consent principle to sovereign individuals, the latter to sovereign 
states.17 The question of how to create and sustain governments predicated on the consent 
of the governed engrossed all the American state constitution makers in and after 1776.18 
The state constitutions’ provisions for annual election of both governors and legislators, a 
judiciary subject to popular controls, and for the right of constituents to instruct their 
                                                
15 See The Federalist No. 16, 150 (Alexander Hamilton). 
16 DHRC, 9:1063-64 (Patrick Henry at Virginia ratifying convention). 
17 See Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776), noting inalienable rights belonging to individuals 
and asserting that “to secure these rights, Governments are instituted . . . deriving their just powers from the 
Consent of the Governed”); see also Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II, providing that “[e]ach state 
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not 
by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.” The Continental 
Congress lacked power to impose an obligation on a non-consenting state.  
18 For an analysis of how the state constitutions enacted in the 1770s and early 1780s made the direct and 
continuing consent of the people their guiding ideal, see Lutz, “Theory of Consent in the Early State 
Constitutions”; Lutz, Popular Consent and Popular Control.   
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representatives, formed the sacred core of the consent-based constitutional vision at the 
state level.19   
Yet if Americans in the age of Independence came to equate coercion with anti-
republicanism and illegitimacy, the Federalists of 1787 wholeheartedly threw themselves 
behind the “coercive principle” in government—sometimes expressed as the need for a 
“sanction” in the laws and in euphemisms such as “energy” and “efficiency.”20 The term 
coercion, now imbued with a positive valence and with perceived constitutional 
necessity, entered into constitutional discourse in 1787 to an extent never before seen.21  
                                                
19 Of the ten state constitutions enacted in 1776, only South Carolina deviated from annual elections in the 
lower house, adopting biannual elections. (In 1778, it enacted a new constitution that reverted to the annual 
election standard and, in 1790 backtracked to biannual elections). Of those constitutions enacted in 1776 
that incorporated a senate, four deviated from the standard in the upper house. Only South Carolina and 
Delaware deviated from the standard as to the governor. The New York constitution of 1777 adopted 
annual elections in the lower house, but four-year terms in the upper house and three-year terms for the 
governor. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780, as we saw in chapter 2, adopted annual elections across 
the board. See Lutz, “Theory of Consent in the Early State Constitutions,” 22, 30. See also Casper, 
Separating Power, 136, noting political controls over judges in most state constitutions. The early state 
constitutions are reproduced in Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions.  
20 E.g., Hamilton to Washington, July 3, 1787, in Farrand, Records, 53-54, observing that the tide had 
turned from “the supposed repugnancy of the people to an efficient constitution” and that even if people did 
not accept Hamilton’s plan, they would probably take one “equally energetic”); Washington to David 
Humphreys, Oct. 10, 1787, in ibid., 3:107, noting in the Articles a “the weakness and impropriety of a 
government, founded on mistaken principles . . . destitute of that force and energy, without which, no 
government can exist.” “Anarchy,” wrote James Sullivan, “with her haggard cheeks and extended jaws, 
stands ready, and all allow that unless some efficient form of government is adopted she will soon swallow 
us.” Cassius IV [James Sullivan], Nov. 23, 1787, in Ford, Essays, 15. The Antifederalists tended to equate 
“energy” with tyranny. E.g., Candidus, Independent Chronicle (Boston), Dec. 6, 1787, 1. For uses of the 
term in both its partisan and derogatory senses, see, for example, statements made by delegates to the 
Virginia ratifying convention. Elliot, Debates, 3: 83, 131, 197, 198, 214, 217, 224, 228, 232, 238, 245, 437, 
446, 470, 543. 
21 Military historians have appreciated the principle’s historical significance. “With few exceptions,” writes 
one, “the convention delegates accepted the premise that the new national government would possess a 
coercive power that the Confederation had lacked and that it must be capable of exercising this power in its 
own right without having to rely on the states.” Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic 
Disorders, 7. “A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Government,” James 
Madison wrote but a few days before leaving for Philadelphia. Madison, Writings, 2:363. For laws under 
the new government to function properly, Madison wrote, “a right of coercion should be expressly 
declared.” Ibid., 348. Washington similarly opined that “any system without the means of coercion in the 
Sovereign” would probably fail. Washington to Madison, Mar. 31, 1787, in Washington, Papers, 5:115. 
See also John Jay to Thomas Jefferson, July 14, 1786, in Jay, Life of Jay, 2:189, noting that government 
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In tandem, the Federalists began to formulate a vision for constitutional reform 
that would relegate the principle of consent to a secondary concern, making it less 
complete, less frequent, and less direct.22 Ultimately, the Constitution limited direct 
election to House members, completely dispensed with annual elections, failed to 
memorialize any popular right to instruct representatives, and created an unelected 
judicial branch whose officials would serve for life on good behavior with salary 
guarantees.   
 Tellingly, the Federalists rarely used the specific term consent with reference to 
the people’s role in the constitutional order.23 For inspiration, leading Federalists turned 
                                                                                                                                            
under the Articles had failed because it possessed “no power of coercion without which no government can 
possibly attain the most salutary and constitutional objects.” Statements to this effect continued during the 
ratification debates. At the opening of the Connecticut ratifying convention, Oliver Ellsworth told attendees 
that a single foundational flaw in the confederation necessitated the new Constitution: “The present 
[system] is merely advisory. It has no coercive power.” DHRC, 15:272. Virginia’s Francis Corbin argued 
that “Coercion is necessary in every government” and “more necessary in federal governments than any 
other, because of the natural imbecility of such governments.” Ibid., 9:1009. Edmund Randolph described 
coercion as the new government’s “indispensable ingredient”: “[n]o government can be stable, which hangs 
on human inclination alone, unbiased by [] coercion.” Randolph, “Letter on the Federal Constitution,” Oct. 
10, 1787, in Ford, Pamphlets, 266, 263. According to South Carolina’s John Rutledge, “if a spirit of 
resistance should appear, surely it ought to be in the power of government to compel a coercion in the 
people.” Elliot, Debates, 4:299. In Massachusetts, Samuel Stillman argued that “[t]he very term, 
government, implies a supreme, controuling power somewhere; a power to coerce, whenever coercion shall 
be necessary: of which necessity government must be the judge.” DHRC, 6:1457. Also in Massachusetts, 
James Bowdoin echoed the views of many Federalists when he observed that when the Confederation was 
formed there prevailed “such a spirit of union, and mutual defence, that a mere requisition or 
recommendation of Congress was sufficient to procure the needful aids, without any power of coercion.” 
Now, however, circumstances had changed, necessitating coercive power. DHRC, 6:1317-18. In 
Philadelphia, one Federalist stated: “But let us be under one vigorous government, established on liberal 
principles; possessed of coercion and energy sufficient to pervade and invigorate the whole.” Philadelphia 
Independent Gazeteer, June 26, 1788, in ibid., 13:146; see also Philadelphia Federal Gazette, Apr. 8, 1788, 
in ibid., 14:252, noting that “the apprehension of a coercive and energetic power in the new system appears 
terrible in the eyes of men who have been accustomed to trample upon the authority of the general 
government and the laws of their own state.”    
22 Lutz, “Theory of Consent in the Early State Constitutions,” 42. The proposition contradicts Gordon 
Wood’s suggestion that the Constitution moved toward rather than away from a vision of consent-based 
government. Cf. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 602, 612.    
23 Publius referred from time to time to the “consent” of the states, but only two times to the “consent” of 
the people, with both references coming from Hamilton and referring to the ratification mechanism. In The 
Federalist series’ closing essay, Hamilton referred to a government based on “the voluntary consent of a 
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away from John Locke and toward David Hume, who had famously argued that 
government based on personal consent of its citizens could not exist as anything other 
than a fiction.24 Only when a government “could employ force to reduce the refractory 
and disobedient,” Hume believed, did an authentic “state of civil government” exist.25 
Yet while historians have recognized pieces of the Humean influence, the felt necessity 
of coercion structured the discourse of reform in and after 1787 in ways that modern 
scholars have completely overlooked.26  
The question that occupied the minds of delegates to the Federal Convention, in 
short, asked not how to create a federal government predicated on the consent of the 
governed, let alone how to restrain the federal government, but rather how to establish a 
system of coercive federal power minimally consistent with what they called “republican 
principles.”27 Just how they answered this question shall receive sustained attention 
below and in subsequent chapters. We must first, however, attend to a prior question of 
                                                                                                                                            
whole people” as a “prodigy,” though this statement seemed to function more as an aspirational expression 
than a description of fact or a fundamental requirement for just government. The Federalist No. 85, 487 
(Alexander Hamilton); see also The Federalist No. 22, 184 (Alexander Hamilton), noting that “[t]he fabric 
of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people.” One could argue, of 
course, that the concept of consent, expansively defined, underlay Article VII and perhaps Article V. 
Publius’s (particularly Madison’s) reluctance to use the word, however, cannot be altogether ignored. See 
Lutz, “Consent,” 639, arguing that “[c]onsent tended to become so active, direct, and continuous after 1776 
that some, such as James Madison, feared American institutions would be undermined by the very consent 
theory upon which they were built.”  
24 Hume, Political Essays, 43-60. On Hume’s influence on both Hamilton and Madison, see Elkins and 
McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 86-87, 258-61. For the seminal historical study discussing Hume’s influence 
on Madison, see Adair, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science.” 
25 Hume, Political Essays, 45. 
26 The one piece of scholarship I have found that recognizes this principle’s importance in 1787 is a chapter 
in a 1833 dissertation by Albert Bushnell Hart, one of America’s first professional historians. The relevant 
chapter appears in Hart, Coercive Powers. 
 More recently, Bradford R. Clark has also appreciated it, but arrives at conclusions to which this 
dissertation takes exception. See Clark, “Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union”; cf. Chapter 
10, Section II. 
27 The Federalist No. 39, 254 (James Madison). 
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utmost importance: Why did the Federalists embrace a coercion-centered 
constitutionalism in the first place?  
II. From Sociology to Jurisprudence 
The felt necessity of coercion in 1787 corresponded to an oft-expressed 
perception of “anarchy” under the Articles of Confederation—a pervasive sense of total 
disorder and disarrangement both in the union and within the states.28 From a continental 
or federal vantage point, the perception of anarchy arose in response to one essential flaw 
in the Articles of Confederation: the Continental Congress’s want of enforcement 
                                                
28 E.g., Elbridge Gerry to James Monroe, Jun. 11, 1787, in Farrand, Records, 3:45, noting that “such an 
anarchy as now exists cannot last long. Gentlemen seem to be impressed with the Necessity of establishing 
some efficient System, & I hope it will secure Us against domestic as well as foreign Invasions”; Edward 
Carrington to Jefferson, June 9, 1787, ibid., 3:38, noting that the “people are disposed to be governed” and 
“if a work of wisdom is prepared for them, they will not reject it to commit themselves to the dubious issue 
of Anarchy”; George Washington to Charles Carter, Virginia Herald (Fredricksburg), Dec. 27, 1787, in 
Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 1:612, stating “[m]y decided Opinion on the Matter is, that there is no 
Alternative between the Adoption of it and Anarchy”; Henry Knox to John Sullivan, Jan. 19, 1788, in ibid., 
2:57, emphasizing that “something must be done speedily or we shall be involved in all the horrors of 
anarchy”; Cassius IV [James Sullivan], Nov. 23, 1787, in Ford, Essays, 15, stating that “[a]narchy, with her 
haggard cheeks and extended jaws, stands ready, and all allow that unless some efficient form of 
government is adopted she will soon swallow us”; [Hugh Williamson], “Remarks,” in Ford, Essays, 406, 
asserting that “if there is any man . . . who wishes to see us . . . oppressed by anarchy at home . . . then this 
government is not for him”; A Landholder VI [Oliver Ellsworth], Connecticut Courant, Dec. 10, 1787, in 
ibid., 161, 165, observing that “[t]he danger of the constitution is not aristocracy or monarchy, but 
anarchy.” On the Federal Convention’s opening day, Edmund Randolph highlighted “the prospect of 
anarchy from the laxity of government every where.” Farrand, Records, 1:19. Some equated anarchy with a 
state of nature in which Americans insisted they had retained all of their natural rights. See, e.g., Nicholas 
Gilman to Joseph Gilman, July 31, 1787, Philadelphia, in Farrand, Records, 3:66, observing “[g]reat 
wisdom & prudence as well as liberallity of Sentiment & a readiness to surrender natural rights & 
privileges for the good of the nation appears in the southern delegates in general and I most devoutly wish 
that the same spirit may pervade the whole Country that the people by absurdly endeavoring to retain all 
their natural rights may not be involved in Calamitous factions which would end but with the loss of all.” 
Jefferson thought these claims exaggerated and calculated to justify excessive military authority in the 
federal government. See Jefferson to William Stephens Smith, Nov. 13, 1787 (Paris), in Jefferson, 
Writings, 4:465-67, stating that the British ministry had hired its press to spread “lies about our being in 
anarchy” and “we have believed them.” So, too, did many Antifederalists. E.g., Candidus, Independent 
Chronicle (Boston), Dec. 6, 1787, in Storing, Complete Anti-Federalist, 4:125, repudiating the Federalists’ 
claim that “anarchy and civil war will ensue [] [if] we reject the proposed Constitution.”       
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powers.29 The problem held greatest significance in the sphere of revenue. Congress 
could propound its monetary requisitions on the states, but lacked power to administer 
sanctions for non-compliance. Beginning in 1780, the states began to fall further and 
further behind on their assigned quotas, for which Congress required payment in specie. 
Retiring their own war debts naturally took precedence over continental requisitions for 
the states. Yet satisfying either obligation required money, which in turn required 
taxation. From 1780 to 1785, most of the state legislatures passed fairly aggressive 
taxation programs on paper. Collecting those taxes presented another matter altogether, 
particularly in the backcountry where specie had become scarce. By mid-decade, the state 
governments had proven themselves either unable or unwilling to collect specie taxes in 
the face of rural resistance. Instead of pursuing coercive distraint and sale procedures, 
most passed paper money and other tax relief legislation.30 At the same time, the states 
rejected all attempts by nationalist-oriented congressional delegates to amend the Articles 
to establish a federal tax collection mechanism. By 1786 the union careened toward 
default on its loans from foreign creditors. On the eve of the Federal Convention, the lack 
of dependable revenue had brought Congress’s proceedings and other funded activities to 
                                                
29 See note 21. See also A Landholder III [Oliver Ellsworth], Connecticut Courant, Nov. 19, 1787, in Ford, 
Essays, 147, noting that the “American experience in our present deranged state” has demonstrated a “great 
truth”—“[a] government capable of controlling the whole, and bringing its force to a point, is one of the 
prerequisites for national liberty.” Americans did not want “resources,” Ellsworth continued, but rather a 
“civil constitution which may draw them out and point their force.” Ibid. In a November 29, 1787 speech 
before the Maryland House of Delegates, James McHenry observed that the Journals of Congress seemed 
“nothing more than a History of expedients, without power to give them efficacy or carry them into 
Execution.” The Confederation Congress had no power to prevent “perversion of National Justice and 
violation of private Contracts” and  “no means to defend themselves against the most direct encroachments 
. . . the Legislature be treated with insult and derision and there is no power, no force to carry their laws 
into execution, or to punish the Offenders who oppose them . . . if a state offends it cannot punish.” 
Farrand, Records, 3:144-45. For further commentary to this effect, see Henry Knox to John Sullivan, Jan. 
19, 1788 (New York), in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 2:57.   
30 See Brown, Redeeming the Republic. 
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a virtual halt. This left the federal government unable to respond to Shays’s Rebellion 
and too weak to effectively assert its property claims against Native Americans, the 
states, and squatters on the frontiers.31 
The Continental Congress’s want of enforcement powers also posed a threat to the 
international peace. The Treaty of Peace imposed a number of internal obligations 
favorable to British creditors and property holders with which the state legislatures, 
courts, and local juries refused to comply in the 1780s. Without either a judicial arm or a 
credible military arm, Congress could do nothing but merely recommend that the states 
repeal the offensive legislation.32  
The Articles of Confederation did permit Congress to establish appellate 
jurisdiction over the state courts in one narrow area: prize cases.33 Yet when Congress did 
finally act on its authority to create a court of appeal for this limited purpose, the state 
judiciaries refused to recognize its power to revise their judgments and paid no attention 
to its decrees. The federal prize judges doubted whether they possessed authority to 
punish these obvious contempts and, wanting a subordinate official to carry their orders 
in effect, declined the challenge in any case. Congress looked on, powerless to help.34   
These and other experiences at the continental level forced rising reformers, 
nationalists and moderates alike, to come to terms with the one essential flaw in the union 
                                                
31 See Ablavsky, “Savage Constitution,” 1018-35. 
32 See Chapter 9, Section III.  
33 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX. Congress also had power to “appoint” existing state courts to 
try sea crimes, though lacked power to define those crimes. The Articles also provided for an creation of an 
ad hoc  committee to arbitrate territorial conflicts between two or more states. Ibid.   
34 The records of the federal Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture are in “The Revolutionary War Prize 
Cases: Records of the Court of Appeal in Cases of Capture, 1776-1787,” M162, National Archives, 
Waltham. Two notable cases are discussed below—the first in Chapter 9, Section I, the second in Chapter 
10, Section III. For key secondary literature on Confederation-era appellate prize jurisdiction, see 
Bourguignon, First Federal Court, and Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 143-195.     
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that required immediate rectification: the want of coercive power. Yet we cannot fully 
understand the coercion problem in 1787 without also understanding its relationship to 
the broader social changes unleashed by the American Revolution. American society in 
the late colonial period congealed around a common core: the British monarchy. 
Although the colonies possessed an unusually high percentage of freeholder inhabitants, 
the late colonial social structure rested essentially on a hierarchy of ranks and 
dependencies flowing directly and indirectly from monarchial influence. The colonial 
governments did not in the ordinary course exercise the kinds of coercive powers that we 
associate with a modern state. Deference to royal magistrates perceived as social 
superiors sufficed to produce order and obedience in the ordinary course, thus obviating 
the need for governmental coercion.35    
The break from the monarchy in and after 1774, however, destroyed the old social 
adhesives at their taproot. At the same time, the American Revolution spawned an 
alternative and radical sociology of individual equality and independence that waged war 
on deference, dependency, and social ranks. Some in the older generation, to be sure, 
clung to old habits in the years after Independence. Conservatives hoped that social 
affections—love, respect, and patriotism—might preserve some of the basic social 
distinctions between gentry and commoners, masters and servants, and men and women. 
Radical egalitarians such as Benjamin Austin hoped those same affections, operating 
through the faculty of common sense universally possessed, might bind together a new 
social order of fundamentally equal individuals. 
                                                
35  The above paragraph tracks the basic argument in Gordon Wood, Radicalism of the American 
Revolution. 
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Historians have argued that the early state constitutions reflected the older 
republican vision of a mixed government embodying distinct social orders.36 The formal 
separation of powers and, especially, bicameral legislatures in most of the early 
constitutions did recall the older distinctions. In substance, however, Americans had 
neither the tiered social structure nor the deferential respect for social superiors that had 
traditionally undergirded and legitimated the “mixed” frame of government. To be sure, 
the revolutionary gentry groped for ways to constitutionalize basic social distinctions in 
their newly monarchless societies. The only reasonable basis they found lay in property 
ownership and some of the early constitutions incorporated modest property requirements 
for holding elective office.37 In most of these cases, eligibility for election to the upper 
house required greater property holdings than required for election to the lower house, 
and gubernatorial eligibility required still greater holdings that required for the upper 
house. Varying the extent of the electoral constituencies in the lower houses as compared 
to the senators and the governors also gave some social substance to the formal 
constitutional distinctions.38   
In many other respects, however, the state constitutions reflected the egalitarian 
social vision produced by the Revolution. Pennsylvania and Georgia created unicameral 
                                                
36 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 202.  
37 New Hampshire, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Massachusetts enacted property requirements 
for all elected offices. By legislation, South Carolina enacted such requirements for its council (upper 
house) and governor, but for general assembly members required only that they be clear of debt. Virginia 
and New Jersey required property for both lower and upper house members, but not for the governor. 
Georgia required property only for house members (it had no upper house), and New York only for 
senators. The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 and the Vermont constitution of 1777 contained no such 
requirements. Nor did either Rhode Island or Connecticut include any property requirements for elective 
office when they revised their charters in 1776. See Lutz, “Theory of Consent in the Early State 
Constitutions,” 28. 
38 See, e.g., Mass. Const. of 1780.  
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legislatures. Pennsylvania declined to create a unitary executive. Many of the early state 
constitutions contained express declarations of rights placed at the document’s head 
evincing highly egalitarian ideals.39 All banned the community from granting separate 
emoluments or privileges except in consideration of public service. Most provided for 
broad popular suffrage rights that applied equally to both legislative chambers, and, in 
many states, the governorship.40 Like the English constitutions, the state constitutions 
made the legislatures supreme. Unlike Parliament, however, the state legislatures’ 
supremacy came at the expense of a respectable magistracy and, in most cases, faced no 
veto from the executive. In all cases the people ultimately controlled the legislative power 
and every part thereof. Consequently, whereas prior to Independence, elite legislators, 
appointees, and placemen sparred amongst themselves with little intrusion from the 
electorate, after 1776 representatives encountered an electorate far more interested, 
active, and demanding than before.   
Even as some imposed small property requirements for holding elective office, 
moreover, the state constitutions dramatically increased the size of the legislatures, in 
some instances doubling or even tripling it. At the same time, new men began entering 
these capacious assemblies, men who would never have been considered for such office 
under the old social order, men seen by the revolutionary gentry as crude, impolitic, 
                                                
39 This included North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Vermont, and Massachusetts. The first 
provision in the Virginia, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Massachusetts constitutions declared all men free 
and equal    
40 In six of the state constitutions enacted from 1776 to 1780, a modest property requirement applied to 
voting for legislators and the governor; in one of these, Georgia, six-months residency could substitute for 
the property requirement. In only one state, New York (1777), did the property requirement differ as 
between voting for members of the lower and upper houses. See Lutz, “Theory of Consent in the Early 
State Constitutions,” 26. In one state (Maryland), designated electors (as opposed to the people) selected 
the upper house. In eight, the legislature elected the governor, in most cases annually. Ibid., 22.    
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narrow-minded, and dangerous.41 In Massachusetts and elsewhere, the established gentry 
managed to retain legislative power in the early 1780s but found themselves increasingly 
under siege from below, not only from within the statehouses, but in the press, town 
politics, and county convention activity.42 The popular insurgencies soon gained the 
upper hand and by 1787, in effect, the many had begun to rule the few on a substantial 
scale for the first time in American history, perhaps even world history.  
The result? A profusion of debtor-friendly, tax-averse, nativistic legislation that 
threatened or destroyed common law contract and property rights, immobilized specie tax 
collection, and violated the peace. Only in Massachusetts, where commercial-
cosmopolitan interests maintained significance influence on the General Court, did the 
friends of order manage to fight back these perceived legislative vices in the period from 
1780 to 1786. Yet if the Massachusetts example held out any hope, Shays’s rebellion and 
the Shaysite sweep of the state government thereafter destroyed it.  
 Herein lay the “excesses of democracy” derided by the Federalists and so often 
equated with anarchy itself in 1787.43 Historians have characterized these so-called 
excesses as essentially social phenomena—a product of the egalitarian social forces 
unleashed by the Revolution.44 The Federalists, on this view, reacted as much to the 
underlying social forces as to the pernicious legislation they spawned and, in opposition, 
                                                
41 Main, “Government by the People.”   
42 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
43 One writer warned against “lawless democracy.” Daily Advertiser (New York), Sept 24, 1787, in Bailyn, 
Debate on the Constitution, 1:12.  Benjamin Rush compared democracy to the “‘devil’s own government’” 
and to a “volcano that contained within its bowls the fiery materials of its own destruction.” The 
experiences of the states had “justified” these depictions. Benjamin Rush to D. Ramsey, Columbian Herald 
(Charleston), Apr. 19, 1788, in ibid., 2:417.   
44 See Wood, Creation, 396-423; Wood, Radicalism, 250-251.  
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advanced an alternative sociology that distinguished between an enlightened few capable 
of disinterested governance and the self-interested masses. The struggle over the 
Constitution of 1787 here becomes, at its core, “a social one . . . between aristocracy and 
democracy.”45   
Insofar as it asserts that the Federalists attempted to defend and institutionalize an 
“aristocratic” social order, this interpretation raises a number of difficulties. In the first 
place, the interpretation relies almost exclusively on language employed by the 
Antifederalists. If anything, it proves that the Constitution’s opponents, and not its 
supporters, viewed the debates in these sociological terms.46 Equally important, the 
Constitution itself does not support the sociological interpretation and, in significant 
respects, contradicts it. The document, for example, expressly prohibited the federal 
government from conferring titles of nobility and, unlike the state constitutions, imposed 
no prerequisites for holding elective office other than socially neutral age, citizenship 
and, for the President, birthplace requirements. “The door ought to be equally open to 
all,” Publius wrote, “and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see 
examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State 
legislation.”47 Nor did the framers design the federal Senate to embody any superior 
social order or rank, but to represent the states as political entities.   
In The Federalist No. 10, James Madison famously argued that representation 
over an extended sphere might “refine and enlarge” the views of legislators so as to 
                                                
45 Wood, Creation, 484-485. 
46 Ibid., 483-499.  
47 The Federalist No. 36, 236 (A. Hamilton). 
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render them less narrow-minded, and more disinterested, than their counterparts in the 
states.48 Based on Madison’s praise for disinterestedness in governance, historians have 
concluded that the Federalists represented aristocratic social sensibilities.49 According to 
Madison’s own analysis, however, disinterested representation did not depend on any 
preexisting superior social rank or ability but rather would flow from the size and 
geographical range of the representatives’ respective constituencies. In any case, 
Madison’s arguments had a purely polemical purpose: to disprove the Antifederalists’ 
assertion that republics could only exist in small units. In any case, Madison knew very 
well that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”50 And if Madison 
really expected that elections under the Constitution would produce only disinterested 
representatives, then he would not have advocated so vigorously for divided powers in 
The Federalist No. 51.  
But if the Federalists embraced an ideal of disinterestedness, and most did, this 
did not make them social aristocrats as historians have suggested.51 Disinterestedness in 
the eighteenth-century did not in fact constitute an aristocratic ideal so much as a 
jurisprudential one.52 Madison himself acknowledged this when in The Federalist No. 10 
he described ideal legislation as “so many judicial determinations” and argued that as 
                                                
48 The Federalist No. 10, 126 (J. Madison). 
49 See Wood, Creation, 505. 
50 Ibid., 125. 
51 Acknowledging that Americans had no hereditary aristocracy, and distancing himself from the claim that 
the framers created the Constitution to protect property interests, Gordon Wood makes “disinterestedness” 
the defining attribute of “aristocracy” as that term applied to the Federalists. Wood, Creation, 615; see also 
Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution.”     
52 Stimson, American Revolution in the Law, 119. This principle of jurisprudence had historical origins in 
the monarchy’s role within the “mixed” or balanced English constitution, which served to hold the balance 
between the lords and commons. Common law judicial courts, moreover, began as the king’s courts, with 
the judges acting as the king’s agents and proxies.  
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between competing factions, “[j]ustice ought to hold the balance between them.”53 At the 
root of Madison’s well-known theory of representation over an extended sphere lay an 
essentially a legal principle: “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause.”54  
The concept of disinterested justice animated virtually all the Federalists’ 
arguments during ratification.55 The consummate New York lawyer Alexander Hamilton 
linked the ideal specifically to the legal profession. In The Federalist No. 35, Hamilton 
contended that although the landed interest and merchantile interest formed distinct 
occupational groups entitled to separate representation in the legislature, only the “man of 
the learned profession” (also, according to Hamilton, entitled to separate representation in 
the legislature) would “feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of 
industry” and “be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them.”56  
To the extent that the Federalists occupied a single social position or rank in 
1787—a very questionable proposition—they did not create the Constitution to preserve 
it. From their perspective, the Revolution’s egalitarian sociology and the democratic 
excesses that it produced threatened neither aristocracy nor elite rule. Rather, it 
threatened the jurisprudential ideal of disinterestedness in governance and, equally 
important, the professionalism that sustained it. Herein lay a key link between Parts I and 
II of the dissertation for, as we have seen, legal professionalism had come under 
                                                
53 The Federalist No. 10, 124-25 (J. Madison).  
54 Ibid., 124. 
55 See Kramnick, “Editor’s Introduction,” 55, citing documents and observing that for the Federalists “[t]he 
end of government itself, of civil society, was justice.” As we shall see, however, the Federalists’ true 
innovation lay not in championing the legal concept of justice, but in creating a Constitution that would 
“establish” or, in the words of Benjamin Austin’s adversary James Sullivan, “compel” justice. U.S. 
Constitution, preamble; Zenas, Indepependent Chronicle (Boston), Apr. 27, 1786, 1.     
56 The Federalist No. 35, 234 (A. Hamilton). 
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unprecedented siege on the eve of reform. The Austinites extended the Revolution’s 
egalitarian social theory into a comprehensive attack on lawyers and, indeed, endeavored 
to abolish the legal profession altogether on American shores. Many Americans fully 
endorsed this agenda. The experience had a profound effect on the lawyers in 
Massachusetts and elsewhere.57 To the extent that the Confederation period’s “vices” and 
“excesses” disproportionately threatened a distinct group of people within American 
society, it did not threaten merchants or large landholders or “creditors,” let alone 
ministers or farmers. It threatened the lawyers.  
At the same time, the antilawyer movement united the lawyers around a common 
existential threat. So united, they rallied around the movement to suppress the Shaysites, 
effectively laying the armed rebellion at Benjamin Austin’s doorstep. 58  Thereafter 
lawyers as a group dominated the process of framing the Constitution, the ratification 
debates, and federal statecraft in the decade after ratification.59 American lawyers, in 
short, waged their decisive counterattack against post-Revolutionary antiprofessionalism 
with the Constitution of 1787, the debate over which “provided political bonds to 
reinforce professional ties” and which the lawyers hoped would render the legal 
profession indispensible within the constitutional order.60 The Antifederalists keenly 
                                                
57 See Chapters 3 and 4.  
58 McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 182. 
59 Lawyers overwhelmingly supported the Constitution and would become the single largest and most 
influential professional contingent at the Federal Convention and during the ratification debates. See Beard, 
Economic Interpretation, 149, noting that “[a] majority of the members [of the Federal Convention] were 
lawyers by profession.” Thirty-one of the fifty-five members of the Federal Convention called themselves 
lawyers, and four of the five members on the Committee of Detail that drafted most of the Constitution. See 
Ferguson, Law and Letters, 10.  
60 McKirdy, “Lawyers in Crisis,” 182.      
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perceived the specifically vocational dimension of the movement for the new 
Constitution.61  
Let us state the argument in clear terms: The Constitution is, in part, a product of 
professional reaction—professional reaction not only to the assault on contracts, 
property, and the peace, but professional reaction to the assault on the lawyers 
themselves! Yet the antilawyer controversies did more than galvanize the legal profession 
to preserve itself through the Constitution. The controversies united the profession around 
a particular definition of law, a socially neutral definition of law that made coercion its 
sine qua non. The lawyers of 1786 thus declined to answer the egalitarian sociology that 
shaped Benjamin Austin’s attack on their existence with an alternative sociology, 
“aristocratic” or otherwise. Rather, without quite appreciating the significance what they 
had done when they did it, they initiated a momentous shift in the terms of debate within 
American constitutional culture that in significant respects made the Constitution 
possible. They answered sociological assertion with jurisprudential principle, with a 
constitutionalism predicated not on a theory about the nature of the society, but on a 
                                                
61 “Beware of the lawyers,” recollected one New York Antifederalist editor. “Of the men who framed the 
monarchial, tyrannical, diabolical system of slavery, the New Constitution, one half were lawyers . . . to 
whose wicked arts we may chiefly attribute the adoption of the abominable system.” A True Antifederalist 
and No Lawyer, Daily Advertiser (N.Y.), Mar. 4, 1789, 2. For references to the “language against the 
gentleman of the law” at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, see White, Debates and Proceedings of 
the Convention of 1788, 168. One member of the Massachusetts convention, Amos Singletary a town 
justice from Sutton, expressed great concern that “these lawyers” angled make themselves “managers of 
this constitution” and thereby arrogate power to themselves to the detriment of the people. Ibid., 203.  For 
other examples of Antifederalist commentary suggesting not only hostility toward lawyers as a class but an 
acute awareness of the legal profession’s special interest in the Constitution, see Storing, Complete Anti-
Federalist, 3:56 (“Montezuma”), 60 (“A Democratic Federalist”), 205 (“Aristocrotis”); ibid., 6:85 (“A 
Countryman”). See also Warren, History of the American Bar, 218, noting that the Antifederalists 
bemoaned the Constitution as “‘the work of lawyers.’” For an insightful essay that distinguishes between 
the so-called “lawyer’s constitution” and the “people’s constitution” in and after 1787, see Cornell, 
“People’s Constitution.” 
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particular definition of law. In responding to ratification’s opponents, the Federalist 
lawyers of 1787 performed the same pivot and, critically, embraced the same definition 
of law.  
In discursive context, of course, the pivot from sociology to jurisprudence 
operated to deflect charges of aristocracy. Yet deeper motivations existed. Sociology had 
failed as an organizing principle of government in the Revolution’s wake. Without either 
common love for a monarch or dependable deference amongst the middling and lowers 
classes, hierarchicalism had no real future on American shores. At the same time, the 
egalitarianism that shaped the state constitutions purported to endow ordinary people 
with so much control over government as to collapse the distinction between ruler and 
ruled. This, too, had proven unworkable. Finally, the 1780s exposed the hope of holding 
the society together by benevolence, affection, virtue, and/or voluntarism as a pipe 
dream.62   
But neither the lawyers of ‘86 nor the lawyers calling themselves Federalists in 
1787 sought, in response, to bind together the dearranged society born out of the 
American Revolution by altering it or reordering it, let alone restoring it to its 
prerevolutionary form. They assumed the inevitability of the society developing along 
                                                
62 See Wood, Radicalism, 229, 243-253. Americans, Henry Knox wrote in October 1786, had hitherto 
assumed the “the mildness of our government and the virtue of the people were so correspondent, that we 
were not as other nations requiring brutal force to support the laws.” The Bay State rebellions had 
disabused Knox and other “men of reflection, & principle” of this notion. Henry Knox to George 
Washington, Oct. 23, 1786, in Washington, Papers, 4:300-01 (emphasis added). On the decline of virtue, 
see Wood, Creation, 415-420, 606-611; Pole, Political Representation in England and America, 531; 
Pocock, “Virtue, and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century”; see also Benjamin Franklin to Charles Carroll, 
May 25, 1789, in Franklin, Works, 10:392. Men such as Benjamin Austin clung to the dream of affective 
voluntarism during the ratification debates. “[C]oertion with some persons seems the principal object,” 
Austin observed, “but I believe we have more to expect from the affections of the people.” Candidus, 
Independent Chronicle (Boston), Dec. 6, 1787, in Storing, Complete Anti-Federalist, 4:128. 
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individualistic and egalitarian lines. They assumed virtue’s dim future on American 
shores.63 The lawyers, in other words, took a socially disinterested approach in framing 
the Constitution. They answered sociology with jurisprudence. And, strictly speaking, 
jurisprudence did not purport directly to tie members of the society to one another at all. 
To be sure, that contracts served as essential social bonds and that the government must 
honor, enforce, and encourage legitimate contracts on common law and commercial 
principles represented core tenets for the lawyers of ’86 and the Federalists alike. On the 
eve of reform, however, the lawyers otherwise abandoned the sociological inquiry of how 
to bind members of the society to one another. Their core, and far more modest, objective 
lay in binding members of the society to the federal state while at the same time 
preserving a meaningful separation between the federal state and the society. This they 
saw as the only workable constitutional remedy for revolutionary egalitarianism’s 
pernicious effects. And how did they purport to implement it?  
One might argue the democratic case: The framers sought to inspire voluntary 
obedience through popular ratification and/or representation in the government. While 
these mechanisms of popular participation presented superficial appeal in this regard, 
however, neither in fact served the purpose. The ratification mechanism would at most 
                                                
63 The evidence of the perceived decline in virtue is plentiful (see note 62); the evidence that the Federalists 
sought to restore virtue in 1787 is virtually non-existent. Cf. The Federalist No. 8, 118 (A. Hamilton), 
noting that “[t]he industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and 
devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with [self-sacrificial political 
virtue]”; The Federalist No. 10, 124 (J. Madison), asserting that the “latent causes of faction are [] sown 
into the nature of man.” As Benjamin Franklin put it soon after the Constitution went into effect, “We have 
been guarding against an evil that the old States are most liable to, excess of power in the rulers, but our 
present danger seems to be defect of obedience in the subjects.” Benjamin Franklin to Charles Carroll, May 
25, 1789, in Franklin, Works, 10:392. No one seriously believed that the Constitution would solve the 
problem of disobedience by restoring virtue in the people.     
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create attachments between the people and the Constitution, not between the people and 
the actual federal government. The act of ratification, moreover, would constitute a one-
time event effectuated not by the people themselves but specially elected deputies.64 In 
addition, it bears emphasis that the Federalists sought vigorously to confine the state 
ratifying conventions to voting aye or nay on the proposed Constitution so as to prevent 
the delegates from making any substantive contributions to the Constitution.65 In the end, 
ratification would represent, at most, an extraordinary act of judgment by the people’s 
special delegates, in many states by bare majority, rather than the people’s will.66 For the 
many state delegates and citizens opposed to the document, and for those Americans who 
                                                
64 The Federalist No. 39, 256 (James Madison). Article V erected a high bar on amending the Constitution 
and seemed to Antifederalists like an impossible constitutional labyrinth that would more likely produce 
violence and war than responsive constitutional change. See Old Whig, Independent Gazetteer 
(Philadelphia), Oct. 12, 1787, in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 1:122-26. Madison pressed the claim 
that once the Constitution had become operative, frequent appeals to the people, by implying some serious 
“defect in the government,” would “in great measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time 
bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the 
requisite stability.” The Federalist No. 49, 313-14. (The comment responded to Jefferson’s suggestion that 
frequent appeals to the people would be healthy and rejuvenative. Ibid., 313.) These assertions, according 
to Madison’s foremost historical commentator, confirmed his view that “no extraordinary appeal to public 
opinion to resolve constitutional disputes should ever be attempted.” Rakove, “Super-Legality of the 
Constitution,” 1955 (emphasis omitted).   
65 Even a few reformers saw this as unfair. Edmund Randolph, for example, who did not otherwise object 
to the Constitution’s substance, withheld his signature from the Constitution for this reason. See E. 
Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, Richmond, Oct. 10, 1787, in Farrand, 
Records, 3:126-27. James Madison objected to Randolph’s openness to a second convention because it 
would “strike[] at the confidence in the first” and “give opportunities to designing men which it might be 
impossible to counteract.” James Madison to Edmund Randolph, Jan. 10, 1788, New York, in Bailyn, 
Debate on the Constitution, 1:744, 746.  
66 As Madison put it, certain rare and exceptional occasions might justify a “the decision of the people.” 
The Federalist No. 49, 313 (James Madison) (emphasis added). At the Federal Convention, Madison 
suggested that the “unreflecting multitude” knew that something was wrong under the Articles, but could 
neither articulate the problem nor propose a solution; the multitude had no “will” on the question. Farrand, 
Records, 1:215.    
  
 189 
otherwise felt they needed more time to understand it and its implications, ratification felt 
less like an act of consent than an act of force.67 
 Nor did the Federalists’ theory of representation seem designed to cultivate 
strong attachments to the federal state, but rather to remove the federal government from 
the people and, in some measure, to restore the prerevolutionary systems of the states at 
the federal level.68 The people, said Roger Sherman at the Federal Convention, “should 
have as little to do as may be about the Government.”69 James Madison contended that 
representation across an extended sphere would result in the “total exclusion of the 
people in their collective capacity” from any share in the federal government.70 Finally, 
the Federalists themselves emphasized that any strong, affective attachments to 
                                                
67 One commentator thought the Federalists “bent upon forcing [] [the Constituttion] on their countrymen 
without giving them time to know what they are doing.” Old Whig, Indep. Gazetteer (Philadelphia), Oct. 
12, 1787, in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 1:126. Another excoriated the Federalists’ attempts to 
“force it through in its present form.” Agrippa [James Winthrop], Mass Gazette, Nov. 30, 1787, in ibid., 
1:445 (emphasis added). Edmund Randolph could not disagree with these allegations of force. See E. 
Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, Richmond, Oct. 10, 1787, in Farrand, 
Records, 3:126-27. The stark ultimatum reformers presented to the public had a coercive quality to it. As 
George Washington put it, “there is no Alternative between the Adoption of it and Anarchy.” George 
Washington to Charles Carter, Virginia Herald (Fredricksburg), Dec. 27, 1787, in Bailyn, Debate on the 
Constitution, 1:612. See also Candidus, Independent Chronicle (Boston), Dec. 6, 1787, in Storing, 
Complete Anti-Federalist, 4:125, noting Federalists’ claims “that the present Constitution, is the only one 
that can ever be adopted; and that if we reject this, the consequences will be fatal to this country. These 
dreadful apprehensions seem to preclude every candid enquiry on the subject: For if we must comply. 
without even a lisp of hesitation, it is needless to offer it to the people, for their consideration.”  
68 The Federalist No. 17, 157 (A. Hamilton), noting that the national government’s operations would “fall[] 
less immediately under the observation of the [] citizens” than the state governments.    
69 Farrand, Records, 1:48. “One thing is calculated to alarm our fears on this head,” stated one writer. “I 
mean the fashionable language which now prevails so much and is so frequent in the mouths of some who 
formerly held very different opinions;—that common people have no business to trouble themselves about 
government.” An Old Whig, Independent Gazetteer (Philadelphia), in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 
1:124-125.  
70 The Federalist No. 63, 373 (James Madison). 
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government within the union resulting from representation or otherwise would continue 
to run to the state governments.71   
But if neither ratification nor representation would accomplish the task, then what 
would? From the lawyers’ standpoint, at least one meaningful option remained: 
government by force—to attach the members of the union to the federal state through the 
credible threat of coercion. Strange as it may sound to the libertarian-minded 
constitutional historian, this is the option the Federalists pursued in 1787.  
III.  The Constitutional Structure of Coercion 
But what did the Federalists mean by the term coercion? In the months leading up 
to the Federal Convention, rising reformers employed it primarily to refer to military 
force exerted by a national standing military establishment.72 At the Federal Convention 
in 1787 both the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan contained express “force clauses” 
authorizing the federal government to use military force against recalcitrant states. The 
Constitution reported out of the Federal Convention completely transformed the nature of 
the union in this respect. Although the framers ultimately chose to leave out an express 
“force clause” authorizing military action against the states, the Constitution vested the 
new federal government with the power to keep peacetime standing armies unlimited in 
                                                
71 The Federalist No. 17, 157-58 (A. Hamilton). Madison observed that “[m]any considerations . . . seem to 
place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of 
their respective States.” The Federalist No. 63, 297 (J. Madison).  
72 As Henry Knox put it in his “rude sketch” of the new government in January 1787: “The laws passed by 
the general governmt to be obeyed by the local governments, and if necessary to be enforced by a body of 
armed men to be kept for the purposes which should be designated.” Henry Knox to George Washington, 
Jan. 14, 1787, in Washington, Papers, 4:522-23.  
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size and to commandeer any or all the state militia for purposes of responding to internal 
disobedience, with no prohibition on using military force against insubordinate states.73 
Constitutional historians have managed to completely ignore 1787’s critical 
military innovations. Libertarian-minded scholars go nowhere near them. Military 
historians, on the other hand, have acknowledged and indeed highlighted the Federalists’ 
considerable constitutional innovations in the sphere of military power.74 On the coercion 
question generally, however, military scholars have actually done more to obfuscate than 
to clarify original understandings. First, they too narrowly define the term “coercion” in 
its eighteenth-century context to mean military force alone—in particular, standing 
armies internally employed.75 Every function of government save for military repression, 
on this false view, becomes something other than coercive. Second, military historians 
fail to investigate a critical, indeed central difficulty facing the Federalists in 1787: how 
to reconcile coercion with republicanism? Finally, the military literature overlooks the 
abiding problem of states versus individuals as objects of coercion within the 
constitutional order. 
Certainly the states presented unique difficulties from a federal perspective. Those 
few constitutional scholars who have studied this issue through the prism of coercion 
have concluded that the Constitution resolved the difficulty of coercing sovereign states 
(which the Federalists equated with war) by redirecting the federal government’s 
authority from states to individuals. Scholars have pressed these claims in the specific 
                                                
73 See Chapter 6.  
74 See Kohn, Eagle and Sword; Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces. See also Edling, A Revolution in 
Favor of Government, 73-148. 
75 Constitutional historians have also done this. E.g., Rakove, Original Meanings, 233. 
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areas of taxation and state suability in the federal courts.76 Prevailing scholarship in this 
vein, however, deems its work done upon finding no direct coercive power over the states 
according to original understandings—itself a proposition that encounters contradictions 
in the evidence—without seriously considering precisely how and for what purposes 
federal coercion would operate on individuals or, equally important, how the federal 
government might reach the states in relevant respects through individuals.  
The balance of this dissertation recovers an unappreciated constitutional structure 
of coercion in 1787 that rested, first, on a distinction between militaristic and non-
militaristic coercion. To be sure, the credible threat of overawing military force in the 
face of internal threats served an indispensable function within this structure of coercion. 
Its constitutional significance in the American context cannot be overestimated. The 
military threat would lurk in the back of every federal law, judgment, writ, order, decree, 
or command. Yet, decidedly, it would serve only as a sanction of last resort. Even as the 
Federalists proposed a substantial enlargement of military power, none preferred the 
actual use of it. All hoped that its threat would suffice to obviate its execution. Shifting 
the object of power from states to individuals would surely minimize the risk of 
triggering military action, for individuals (at least when acting alone or in small groups) 
could not wage military action on the federal government as the sovereign states might. 
Yet as the events in Massachusetts’ made eminently clear, intrastate rebellions did occur, 
probably would again occur and, if taken too far, might necessitate federal military 
action. In accommodation to inherited republican antipathies, the Federalists early agreed 
                                                
76 See Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States; Clark, “Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the 
Union.” 
  
 193 
to use only the existing state militias in such circumstances, rather than federal regulars. 
To accomplish this, however, the Constitution vested the federal government with broad 
coercive powers over the state militias themselves, defined simply as able-bodied men 
within a certain age range residing in a particular state. And, incidentally, the 
presumption in favor of employing those militia in domestic disturbances that seemed to 
prevail at ratification had within a few short years disappeared.77      
Yet, important as they are, to focus too intently on the Constitution’s military 
dimensions threatens to distract us from a central priority principle on which the 
constitutional structure of coercion rested. For the Federalists sought, above all, to devise 
a system by which to bring federal coercion to bear on individuals under appropriate 
circumstances without resorting to military force. Herein lies one of the dissertation’s 
linchpins: The concept of coercion embraced by the Federalists ranged far wider than the 
prevailing historiography recognizes. The Federalists in fact reconceptualized coercion 
under the Constitution in non-militaristic terms and, in so doing, endeavored to moderate 
its harshest perceived rigors while fine tuning its scope of action. Over the course of the 
Federal Convention and ratification debates, in short, a conception of federal coercion 
that contemplated primarily military force yielded to the constitutionalization of coercion 
by other means. 
A distinction that Hamilton introduced during his June 18 speech at the Federal 
Convention marked an important moment in this conceptual turn. There, having declared 
coercion generally one of the “great & essential principles necessary for the support of 
                                                
77 See Chapter 7.  
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Government,” Hamilton distinguished between the “coercion of law” and the “coercion 
of arms.”78 Under the Articles, he remarked, the “[f]irst does not exist” while “the last is 
useless.”79 Although much of Hamilton’s Anglophilic disquisition met with eye rolls in 
Philadelphia, the basic distinction he drew would prove influential and, in my estimation, 
paradigmatic.80   
Yet, so articulated, it also proved somewhat misleading. For in all its forms, the 
exercise of coercion under the Constitution would proceed only under color of law. This 
purported legalization of coercion marked one of the Constitution’s greatest if oft-
overlooked innovations in its own time. And, here again, by emphasizing it the 
Federalists endeavored to endow coercion with a measure of republican legitimacy. As 
the supreme lawmaking body within the union, Congress would of course play an 
important role within the constitutional structure of coercion in this regard. Over and 
above its military provisions, three specific provisions in Article I held special relevancy 
here—the power not only to lay but “to collect” taxes; the power to establish inferior 
federal courts; and, most important, the power to make laws “necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” any and all of the other powers set forth in the Constitution.81  
It merits emphasis, however, that Congress itself possessed no coercive power 
whatsoever under the new framework, no internal means to execute and enforce the laws 
                                                
78  Farrand, Records, 1:284. Madison’s notes of Hamilton’s speech spell coercion with a “t” (i.e., 
“coertion”), an alternative eighteenth-century spelling that I have corrected here. See also ibid., 1:296 
(Robert Yates’ notes), recording Hamilton’s distinction between “the coercion of law and the coercion of 
arms.” 
79 Hamilton, Works, 1:372 (emphasis in original).  
80 Thereafter a number of other Federalists employed it. See, e.g., DHRC, 15:275 (Oliver Ellsworth, Ct.); 
ibid., 15:249 (William Samuel Johnson, Ct.). See also North Carolinian William Davie’s distinction 
between “coercion by force” and “coercion through the judiciary,” in Elliot, Debates, 4:155.  
81 U.S. Constitution art. 1, sec. 8, cls. 1, 9, 18.  
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it enacted. During the Federal Convention James Madison likened Congress to “a mere 
trunk of a body without arms or legs to act or move.”82  Although congressional 
enactments would endow coercion with a measure of republican legitimacy, coercion 
itself would take place not in legislation but in the administration of government. The 
critical task of administration, in turn, would devolve on the Article II executive 
department and the Article III judiciary. 
Most constitutional historians embrace the libertarian interpretation of the 
separation of powers: that the framers divided power within the federal government to 
protect liberty and prevent tyranny—in short, as a mechanism by which to “oblige [the 
federal government] to control itself.” 83  This rationale found expression in James 
Madison’s essays in The Federalist, in which Madison had good reason to accentuate 
those dimensions of the Constitution that might allay the Antifederalists’ fears of 
consolidation and coercion. Perhaps Madison’s writings drew a few undecided 
Americans closer to voting in favor of ratification.84 The libertarian reading, however, 
obscures the stronger historical motivation for separating powers among the Federalists, 
including Madison.  
The executive and judicial powers represented the functions of government most 
repugnant to revolutionary sensibilities because they had traditionally eluded popular 
control and, insofar as they touched the people directly, reified a distinction between ruler 
and ruled that the Revolution rejected. Accordingly, although the state constitutions 
                                                
82 Farrand, Records, 1:124. 
83 The Federalist No. 47, No. 51, 303, 321 (James Madison). See also Wood, Creation, 547-53; Rakove, 
Original Meanings, 53, 280-82.   
84 For an interpretation that questions whether Madison’s canonical essays in The Federalist had any 
substantial influence in their own time, see Kramer, “Madison’s Audience.”   
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nominally separated these powers, the states governments revolved around the 
omnipotent annually elected legislature which itself often engaged in both executive and 
judicial functions.85 Local juries dominated the state judicatories. Outside taxation most 
state legislation during the critical period required no direct administration at all. And, 
even in the sphere of taxation, the legislatures farmed out the collection process to locally 
elected town officials.86 The state governments, in short, lacked efficient, independent 
magistracies. The collapse of state specie taxation, the Shaysites’ successful obstruction 
of the courts in Massachusetts (and their subsequent electoral vindication), and the jury-
dominated state courts’ refusal to enforce the terms of the peace, all provided salient 
examples of the states’ woeful administrative failures on the eve of reform.  
At the same time, the Articles of Confederation embodied revolutionary 
sensibilities by ceding domestic sovereignty to the state legislatures and by creating a 
federal government that, for all intents and purposes, possessed only legislative power—
and strictly limited at that. Other than foreign consuls the Continental Congress could 
boast no magistrates whatsoever. Although under the exigencies of the revolutionary war 
the Continental Congress attempted to delegate executive (primarily military and fiscal) 
and, to a lesser degree, judicial responsibilities to committees, outside boards, and later 
individual secretaries, the non-military appointees enjoyed no independent powers—and 
certainly no powers of coercion. Because the appointees operated from within Congress, 
they suffered from the same weaknesses as Congress, including slowness and a crippling 
                                                
85 See Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 98-99.  
86 See Brown, Redeeming the Republic, pt. II.   
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diffusion of responsibility. After the war, most appointees happily resigned whereupon 
Congress abolished their offices.   
Throughout the 1780s, however, and culminating in 1787, a large cohort of 
influential voices—including Washington, Hamilton, Adams, Adams, Madison, and even 
Thomas Jefferson—converged around a common desire for greater administrative 
efficiency and, toward this end, for independent, accountable constitutional officials with 
appointive powers, charged with executing and enforcing federal authority. Men such as 
Washington and Hamilton angled for greater standing military power. Congress 
established a superintendent of national finance to address the country’s pressing fiscal 
problems. All the rising nationalist-oriented reformers participated in efforts to establish 
federal administrative control over collection of a federal impost. In all cases, these men 
failed over and again. Yet in their failures, and in their perceptions of the state 
governments’ magisterial weaknesses, lay the true origins of the separation of powers 
under the Constitution—not in a concern to preserve liberty or restrain the federal 
government, but in the desire for a forceful, centralized administrative apparatus 
operationally distinct from and, in critical respects, supreme over both the federal and 
state legislatures once created.87  
Historian Max Edling has recently called 1787 a “revolution in favor of 
government.”88 A “revolution in favor of the magistracy” puts a finer point on the matter. 
But a “revolution in favor of administration” gets the matter just about right. The 
                                                
87 See Fisher, “Efficiency Side of Separated Powers.” See also White, “Recovering Coterminous Power 
Theory.” 
88 Edling, Revolution in Favor Government. 
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Federalists laid great emphasis on the necessity of federal administration during the 
ratification debates.89 While libertarian biases have generally crowded out administration 
as a distinct topic for inquiry in constitutional history, new scholarship in the area of tax 
collection in the federal customs houses in the 1790s does something to rectify the 
oversight.90 Regrettably, however, this emerging scholarship gets the history totally 
wrong. It argues that the Federalists and their appointees in the customhouses did all they 
could to avoid coercing the merchants, that the principle of accommodation prevailed 
over coercion in the decades after ratification. In sum, these scholars contend that the 
Federalist tax administrators adopted essentially the same lax administrative approaches 
adopted by the separate state customs regimes in the 1780s, but that, in contrast to the 
state regimes (yet for reasons never adequately explained in this scholarship), those 
accommodationist policies enabled the federal collection regime to thrive in the 1790s.    
In addition to tracing the historical origins of the Article I taxation clause, Chapter 
7 refutes the accommodationist interpretation of how the Federalists implemented the 
taxation power in early federal customs collection. Minor accommodations to the 
merchants did occur and, on the margins, this may very well have preserved amicability 
between the collectors and the merchants so as to encourage future compliance. 
Accommodation, however, cannot finally explain the federal collection regime’s 
immense successes in the 1790s for the simple reason that accommodationist practices 
under the state regimes in the 1780s failed to accomplish this result. Accommodation 
                                                
89 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 68, No. 70, 395, 402  
90 Rao, National Duties; Rao, “Creation of the American State”; Mashaw, Creating the Administrative 
Constitution; Dalzell, “Taxation with Representation”; Dalzell, “Prudence and the Golden Egg.” 
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does not explain why the federal collectors collected nearly six times more duties in the 
period from 1792 to 1795 than the combined state regimes did in the 1785-1788. The 
federal regime’s increased geographical coverage, higher tax rates, and rising commercial 
activity account for the difference to a far greater extent than accommodationist practices 
do. Chapter 7 contends, however, that ultimately one factor and one factor alone made 
federal customs collection work and enabled it to thrive where the state regimes had 
failed: the credible threat of coercive sanctions.          
Implicitly, such sanctions included military coercion. Yet in the critical and 
delicate sphere of revenue collection, two other modes of coercion by other means would 
apply in the first instance to prevent resort to military action while ensuring compliance 
with the revenue. First, the port officials themselves wielded significant and independent 
coercive powers, including search, seizure, and detention powers, all of which the 
collectors put to good use in the 1790s. Unlike the traditional “magistrate” (a salaried 
executive/royal agent), moreover, the federal collectors received their compensation by 
transaction fees, bounties, and commissions on customs receipts. This structured the 
relationship between the collector and the taxpayers on relatively adversarial terms and 
gave port officials ample motivation to pursue collections and punish violations with 
energy and vigor.91 
At the same time, early legislation required the collectors to go through certain 
prescribed institutional channels in their enforcement and bounty collection efforts. 
Although the collectors possessed their own coercive policing powers, to recover 
                                                
91 See Parillo, Against the Profit Motive, 221-54. 
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statutory penalties, unpaid customs bonds, and to consummate forfeitures and seizures 
the first Congress required that the collectors obtain court orders in federal district courts 
established primarily for this purpose. Here, however, the accent on tax collection in 
particular threatens to obscure the larger constitutional point. For with respect to 
enforcing federal law through coercion by other means, all roads—even those outside 
taxation and even those involving military intervention—led ultimately to what one 
Federalist called “coercion through the judiciary.”92 The federal government’s powers of 
coercion by other means, in other words, would receive its stamp of constitutional finality 
in the federal courts. To proceed under color of  law required it.    
Probably because it conforms to modern conceptions of judicial power, 
constitutional scholars more often describe the federal judiciary in its original conception 
as the federal government’s monitor than its administrative arm—not as an administrator 
of governmental power, let alone an instrumentality of state coercion, but as the guardian 
of individual rights against government power. To the extent historically minded scholars 
have attempted to place the judiciary within the administrative context, they have 
reinforced this understanding by focusing primarily on the development of what we now 
call administrative law—that is, judicial review of federal administrators.93  
The prevailing historical approaches to early national administration ignore the 
Federalists’ most frequently stated rationale for the Article III judicial power, reiterated 
over and again during the Federal Convention and ratification debates, and given 
                                                
92 See statements of William R. Davie at the North Carolina ratifying convention, in Elliot, Debates, 
4:155. 
93 Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution, 65-79. 
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concrete expression in the early 1790s: The “controlling power of the Judiciary of the 
United States,” declared the North Carolinian Federalist lawyer William R. Davie, 
existed for one reason above all others:  “to enforce obedience to the [law].”94 In 
highlighting the courts’ central role in the Federalists’ solution to the problem of 
coercion, Chapters 8, 9, and 10 recover this lost characterization of judicial power under 
the Constitution.  
The distinction between legislative power and administrative coercion makes 
possible a more nuanced historical approach to the problem of states versus individuals as 
objects of coercion within the constitutional order. Certainly one of the Constitution’s 
main objectives lay in extending the objects of federal authority from states to 
individuals. The federal government’s powers of coercion in all its forms would certainly 
reach the latter and this marked one of the Constitution’s major structural innovations 
vis-à-vis its predecessor. But did the Constitution vest the federal government with 
coercive power over the states as well? Constitutional historians have tended to answer 
no and the Supreme Court has followed. On this view, as part of the fundamental “nature 
of the union,” the Constitution limited the federal government’s coercive powers to 
individuals alone.95  
The conventional interpretation finds no support whatsoever in the Constitution of 
1787’s text, scant support in the ratification debates, and otherwise misconstrues original 
understandings. Above all, it fails to distinguish between legislative power and judicial 
                                                
94 William R. Davie at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 29, 1788, in Bailyn, Debate on the 
Constitution, 2:893. 
95 See Clark, “Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union.” The modern Supreme Court adopts the 
same view. For the most significant articulations, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
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coercion. Even if the Federalists intended to prevent Congress from making the states 
direct objects of federal legislation, they did not mean to disable the judiciary from 
bringing the coercion of law to bear on the states. Indeed, enforcement of the federal 
government’s legal supremacy required application of judicial coercion to the states. 
Chapter 10 offers an interpretation of original understandings surrounding the Supremacy 
Clause, Article III Section 2, and judicial review of state law, that illustrate this critical 
point.  
Conclusion and Segue 
The American Revolution produced a constitutional discourse that made the 
consent of the governed its essential ingredient and government by coercion ipso facto 
illegitimate and unrepublican. At the same time, the Revolution unleashed an egalitarian 
sociology predicated on an absolute equality of mind, ability, and opportunity among 
individuals. In addition to producing hostilities toward independent judicial power, the 
principle of consent produced a continental government that lacked internal enforcement 
powers, state constitutions that nearly collapsed the distinction between government and 
society, and state governments that lacked effective magistracies. The principle of 
equality, meanwhile, produced a revolution against professional lawyers and the common 
law. So employed both principles posed special threats to legal professionalism as such 
and, critically, both advanced upon a single shared legal ideal—the American 
Revolution’s distinctive (if underappreciated) legal legacy: law without force. Fearing 
anarchy and seeking to secure their own place within the constitutional order, American 
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lawyers calling themselves Federalists waged a constitutional counterrevolution against 
this conception of law in 1787. 
The Federalists united around a conception of the law that made coercion its sine 
qua non. Out of this core principle grew a constitutional structure of coercion, embodied 
in the Constitution of 1787, that included military, magisterial, and judicial sanctions and 
that would operate in accordance with a priority scheme that partially accommodated the 
inherited republican aversion to the deployment of military force in domestic affairs. In 
all its forms, however, the exercise of coercion under the Constitution would proceed 
only under color of law. Consequently, all roads within the constitutional structure of 
coercion led ultimately to what the North Carolinian Federalist lawyer William R. Davie 
called “coercion through the judiciary.”   
The balance of Part II probes deeper into the constitutional structure of coercion’s 
historical causes, character, and consequences within the framework adumbrated above. 
The analysis, to be sure, joins dozens of monographical scholarly works that purport to 
explain why the framers created the Constitution and what its provisions meant in their 
eighteenth-century historical context. Far fewer studies, however, have inquired into the 
evolution of constitutional meanings in the 1790s and those that do tend to move in 
libertarian (i.e., Jeffersonian) directions.96 In our case, the 1790s shall hold special 
relevancy for two reasons.  
First, early legislation and administration provide evidence of original 
understandings of and motivations for the Constitution itself, since many of the same men 
                                                
96 See, e.g., Banning, Sacred Fire of Liberty; Kramer, The People Themselves; Barnett, Restoring the Lost 
Constitution.  
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who framed or supported the Constitution during ratification populated the federal 
government in the decade after ratification. As a party, lest we forget, the Federalists held 
the presidency, the federal judiciary, and the Senate throughout the 1790s; and majorities 
in the House for most of the 1790s. Even so, early legislation and administrative practices 
also reflect important areas of consensus as between the Federalists and their political 
opponents that further elucidate original meanings. Second, to argue, as the dissertation 
does, that the framers created the Constitution to address the problem of coercion in 
American society begs the question of how. To be sure, the drafting history and 
commentary surrounding the Constitution itself during the ratification debates shed light 
on the question. Only an examination of early Federalist legislation and administration, 
however, can supply a complete answer.  
Such an examination, however, raises a third issue that animates portions of Part 
II’s analysis. Certainly the Federalists had to deal with growing political opposition 
during the seminal decade after ratification. Indeed, no sooner had ratification occurred 
than a few notables who had vigorously supported ratification (including James Madison) 
defected to the anti-administration faction and, then, to the Republican party. To what 
extent prior to 1800 did loyal Federalists compromise their original vision in the thicket 
of national politics? Prevailing scholarship asserts that substantial compromises did 
occur. Based on an original interpretation of just what the Federalists endeavored to do in 
1787, the dissertation shows otherwise.     
The structure of the dissertation’s remaining chapters tracks the originally 
understood structure of coercion itself. Accordingly, Chapter 6 investigates the origins 
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and early implementation of the military sanction; Chapter 7 tax collection and related 
magisterial sanctions; and Chapters 8, 9, and 10 the all-important judicial sanction.    
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE COERCION OF ARMS 
 
*   *   * 
Eighteenth-century radical whig ideology saw standing armies as an inherent 
threat to liberty and the epitome of government by coercion. During the imperial struggle, 
Americans employed this ideology to mount a vigorous challenge to British regulars 
stationed in the colonies.1 Even as the Revolution required unprecedented American 
military mobilization, principled opposition to standing military establishments as such 
persisted beyond the war. Plainly, however, the Constitution of 1787 reflected a different 
set of attitudes and presumptions on this score. In language admitting of little limitation, 
the document empowered the new federal government “to raise and support” a peacetime 
military establishment unlimited in size and, expressly, to employ military force to 
“suppress Insurrections” and “execute the Laws of the Union.” Why did a society that 
had, only a few years prior, united in opposition to permanent military establishments on 
principle, ratify a Constitution that authorized a permanent military establishment poised 
to act in internal affairs? 
I. From Revolution to Reform 
The American Revolution required Americans to take up arms despite their 
ideological aversion to military force. Initially they found ways to reconcile the two 
                                                
1 See Reid, In Defiance of the Law.  
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considerations. At the beginning of the war, Americans viewed themselves in a state of 
“rage militaire.”2 Citizen militias, initially without any meaningful hierarchical command 
structure, spontaneously rose up to defend their liberties and, much to everyone’s 
surprise, it worked. Early successes at Lexington, Concord, and Boston suggested that the 
ragtag Americans had Providence in their corner. The enemy, on the other hand, had 
adopted a contrary organizational paradigm: the professional army. By the close of King 
George’s War in 1748, American provincials had already come to resent British regulars 
for their condescension and elitism.3 The Revolution exacerbated these preexisting 
hostilities. American militiamen in the rank-and-file came to view the British military 
model as aristocratic and anti-republican.4   
In the initial wave of revolutionary enthusiasm, many Americans believed the war 
would be brief and the sacrifices minimal. Voluntarism prevailed. Enlistments soared. 
Yet as the war continued, defeats attributable to a want of organization and discipline 
challenged the native idealism. American democrats, Washington soon lamented, made 
terrible soldiers. At the same time, the flow of recruits slowed. Now most came from the 
lower classes. Commissioned officers ultimately became convinced that winning the war 
would require creating the very institution that the Spirit of '76 abhorred—a professional 
army. The Americans would have to fight fire with fire. The officers thereupon moved 
toward greater hierarchy, discipline, and efficiency. As victory approached, the officers 
                                                
2 Except where otherwise noted, the following discussion up to 1783 tracks Royster, A Revolutionary 
People at War. See also Middlekauff, Glorious Cause; Shy, A People Numerous and Armed.  
3 Leach, Roots of Conflict. 
4 Royster, A Revolutionary People at War, 35-38, 66-69. 
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began to feel a sense of professional pride, developing something like a class 
consciousness.  
Yet by the closing stages of the war a narrative of the Revolution had taken hold 
among lay commentators that attributed American successes to a spontaneous rage 
militaire among the people in general, rather than Continental Army’s professional drill 
and discipline. Amid rumors of war profiteering, and as Congress and the states failed to 
provide sufficient material support, the officers came to harbor greater resentments 
toward both unenlisted Americans and the continental government itself. With the 
Newburgh Conspiracy, the Continental Army’s sense of alienation from the society at 
large reached its culmination. Washington managed to nip the conspiracy in the bud and 
Congress soon thereafter took action to see that the officers received some of their back 
pay. Resentment and a sense of alienation among the officers, however, persisted.5  
When the war ended, the Continental Army promptly disbanded. The early bids 
by nationalists in the Confederation Congress to set up a peacetime military 
establishment to occupy garrisons and other fortifications on the frontier met with enough 
opposition from the states to render exponents, including Washington and Hamilton, 
reluctant to persist with the matter.6 In addition, a constitutional question existed. 
Although the Articles of Confederation permitted Congress to raise an army and navy, it 
did not expressly grant any authority to do so in the absence of a war. Complicating 
matters further, the sovereign states retained exclusive authority over their respective 
                                                
5 Ibid., 333-41. 
6 Madison, Writings, 1:478. 
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militias.7 “The power of raising armies by the most obvious construction of the articles of 
Confederation,” Hamilton wrote, “is merely a power of making requisitions on the states 
for quotas of men.”8 This, in effect, required the states to consent and, after the 
Revolution, they would not. Indeed, even during the Revolution, many states failed to 
satisfy requisitions.9  
Washington’s retirement in 1783 left the Confederation with no acting 
commander-in-chief. A residual officer corps did remain, all of whom would 
enthusiastically embrace constitutional reform in 1787. Yet under the Articles, without an 
enforceable constitutional funding mechanism to pay soldiers Congress could neither 
raise nor maintain a cohesive professional military establishment. By mid-decade, this 
caused great alarm among nationalist officers and officials. They feared that a pan-Indian 
military alliance had taken root in the North; that a major war with the natives would 
even sooner occur in the South; and that, in both these scenarios, the natives might easily 
form alliances with Britain or Spain.10 In addition, self-interested state governments, 
particularly New York in the North, and Georgia and North Carolina in the South, 
threatened to undermine and weaken, if not defeat, coordinated national military action in 
Indian affairs.11 Even if the Continental Congress did have sufficient funding, personnel, 
and state cooperation, however, the officers had to face the substantial cultural-
ideological opposition inherited from the imperial struggle to standing military forces as 
such and to the officer class’s aristocratic conceits as evidenced by their formation of 
                                                
7 See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX. 
8 The Federalist No. 22, 178 (Alexander Hamilton).  
9 See Chapter 7. 
10 Ablavsky, “Savage Constitution,” 1026, 1031-32. 
11 Ibid., 1020-22, 1027, 1029.  
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hereditary societies in the post-war years.12 By the mid-1780s, many in the revolutionary 
officer corps had lost hope in creating a military establishment under the Articles of 
Confederation adequate to the country’s needs in either peacetime or war.13  
Shays’s Rebellion, however, transformed attitudes toward standing armies and 
gave many of the same nationalists whose claims rang hollow at earlier points in time 
new credibility and appeal. To be sure, Americans in the 1780s could not vigorously 
object to raising military forces for the purposes of defending against foreign enemies, 
save for the revenue it required. Standing armies, however, raised the disturbing specter 
of the government using force against the states or the people themselves—this in a 
society in which permanent law enforcement agencies had hitherto scarcely existed.  
The uprisings in Massachusetts altered the calculus. The state government 
struggled to contain the crisis and, in the end, could only do so by “condescended[ing] to 
treat the complaints of the malcontents with much respect.”14 Governor Bowdoin and his 
cronies failed effectively to mobilize the state militia in the west to protect the courts and, 
for over four months, the rebels advanced virtually unimpeded.15 With the state treasury 
depleted and the legislature adjourned, in January 1787 Bowdoin unilaterally hired a 
private army funded by loans from reluctant Boston businessmen. The backcountry still 
refused to supply requested troops. Under Benjamin Lincoln’s command, Bowdoin’s 
private army waged a surprise attack on the Shaysites at Petersham that commentators 
                                                
12 See Myers, Liberty Without Anarchy; Davies, “Society of the Cincinnati in New England.” 
13 Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 53.   
14 John Jay to William Carmichael, Jan. 4, 1787, in Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, 3:225.   
15 See Richards, Shays’s Rebellion, 15-18. 
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later celebrated as the “triumph” that ended the rebellion.16 In fact, Shays himself and 
most of the rank and file escaped Petersham and the state government thereafter 
experienced great difficulty securing cooperation from other states to apprehend the 
fugitives.17  Stationed in Pittsfield thereafter, Lincoln’s command had shrunk to merely 
thirty men by late February due to the expiration of the January enlistments. While 
Lincoln tried in vain to secure more troops, nearly one hundred rebels re-entered 
Massachusetts from New York and pillaged the town of Stockbridge. In April, the rebels 
very nearly captured Benjamin Lincoln himself in New Lebanon.18  
Most significant, the Continental Congress proved itself powerless to act in the 
face of the crisis. Congress attempted to raise a modest force of New England militiamen 
on the pretext of Indian conflict, but even then received scant enlistments.19 Because it 
had no wherewithal to pay and equip the soldiers, Congress tried to borrow $500,000 
through 6% bond issuances. Not a single subscriber came forward, however, in part 
because all but one of the states refused to vote tax funds to repay the loans.20 Rufus King 
posited that without congressional intervention the Shaysites would vanquish the General 
Court in Boston with ease and, indeed, “every other government would eventually be 
                                                
16 Ibid., 23-26, 31-32.  
17 Ibid., 31; Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces, 6. 
18 Richards, Shays’s Rebellion, 34-36. 
19 See Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 74. 
20 Journals of the Continental Congress, 31:893-96; ibid., 33:33-34. See also Richard Brown, Redeeming 
the Republic, 25-26. 
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swept away.”21 Yet not only did Congress prove unable to assist the constituted state 
authorities. It could not even protect its own arsenal in Springfield.22  
The crisis accordingly had momentous federal implications. In February, with 
fugitives fanning out across the state borders in various directions, Bowdoin made the 
dire prediction that “Civil War” in Massachusetts “may extend not only to the 
neighboring States, but even to the whole Confederacy.”23 Equally significant from the 
perspective of nationalist-oriented onlookers, however, Bowdoin himself never consulted 
Congress before raising his own troops, nor before ordering state officers to seize the 
federal arsenal at Springfield. Nationalists feared that “the most powerful member of the 
union” had exploited the crisis to undertake a project of militarization that presented 
serious threats to the union as a whole.24 If Bowdoin had secured George Clinton’s 
cooperation and ordered his private army to march on and disband Congress itself, he 
might very well have succeeded. 
“[H]ere is felt,” wrote congressman Edward Carrington, “the imbecility, the 
futility, the nothingness of the federal powers.”25 Even as the rebellion in Massachusetts 
eventually fizzled out, the experience did much to discredit the state governments’ 
capacity to fend off armed insurgencies by calling out their own militia for, as it 
happened in western Massachusetts, the militiamen themselves might wage the rebellion 
                                                
21 Rufus King, Address to the Massachusetts House, Oct. 11, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of Members of the 
Continental Congress, 8:481. 
22 Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 75. Although William Shepard’s men effectively defended the arsenal from an 
attack in late January, the Shaysites issued veiled threats to return. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion, 29-30. 
23 Bowdoin Speech to General Court, Feb. 1787, quoted in Onuf, Origins of the Federal Republic, 185. 
24 Farrand, Records, 1:316 (statements of J. Madison); see also Madison, Writings, 2:362, arguing in April 
1787 that the “troops raised and to be kept up by Massachusetts” improperly encroached upon the federal 
authority.  
25 Edward Carrington to the Governor of Virginia, Dec. 8, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of Members of the 
Continental Congress, 8:518. 
  
 213 
in the first instance.26 Suddenly, with a sense of immediacy altogether lacking before, 
rising reformers perceived a new reason for the creation of a strong, centralized 
professional military establishment with supreme authority over the state militias: to 
suppress internal threats and rebellions.27 The felt necessity of preventing domestic 
disorder epitomized by Shays’s Rebellion, observes one military historian, thus “acted as 
an effective counterbalance to the fears of the use of federal military force in domestic 
emergencies.”28        
The Constitution would ultimately include some very evocative language 
concretizing the specter of internal threat felt by the framers in the wake of Shays’s 
Rebellion. The Preamble lists among the Constitution’s overarching purposes to “insure 
domestic Tranquility” and to “provide for the common defense.”29 Elsewhere the federal 
                                                
26 Ibid.  
27 See, e.g., James McHenry before the MD House of Delegates, Nov. 29, 1787, in Farrand, Records, 3:144, 
advocating “sufficient provision for internal defence”; Elbridge Gerry to James Monroe, Jun. 11, 1787, in 
ibid., 3:45, noting that “Gentlemen seem to be impressed with the Necessity of establishing some efficient 
System, & I hope it will secure Us against domestic as well as foreign Invasions.” At the Federal 
Convention, Edmund Randolph highlighted this special “defect[]” of the Confederation: the federal 
government could not put down a rebellion in any of the states “not having constitutional power Nor means 
to interpose according to the exigency.”  Ibid., 1:19. Charles Coatesworth Pinckney expressed “scanty 
faith” in the militias and emphasized the need for a “real military force . . . The United States has been 
making an experiment without it, and we see the consequences in their rapid approaches to anarchy.” Ibid., 
2:332. New Hampshire’s John Langdon noted that the “apprehension of a national force will have a 
salutary effect in preventing insurrection.” Ibid., 2:317. Comparable commentary continued during the 
ratification debates. See, e.g., James Iredell at North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 26, 1788, in 
Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 2:864-65, citing “insurrection[s] like that lately in Massachusetts” as a 
reason for the necessity of a standing army; [Hugh Williamson], “Remarks,” in Ford, Essays, 403, 
observing problem of “internal commotion”; The Federalist No. 28, 204-05 (Alexander Hamilton), noting 
the special problem of “seditions,” “insurrections and rebellions” and arguing that the militia alone, even if 
sufficiently nationalized, could never suffice to “maintain the just authority of the laws” in the face of these 
internal threats. 
28 Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces, 7. Having reviewed the Constitution’s military provisions, 
Thomas Jefferson concluded that “[o]ur Convention has been too much impressed by the insurrection in 
Massachusetts: and in the spur of the moment they are setting up a kite to keep the henyard in order.” 
Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith, Nov. 13, 1787 (Paris), in Jefferson, Writings, 4:467. 
Jefferson hoped for amendments to preserve the spirit of rebellion in the people. 
29 U.S. Const. preamble.  
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government received express authority to “suppress Insurrections” and to help put down 
“domestic Violence.”30 Yet if the Massachusetts tumults demonstrated that the people 
themselves presented a substantial threat to established authority structures which 
government needed adequate constitutional resources to meet, the whole experience 
under the Articles also showed that the states as political entities posed an equal threat 
vis-à-vis the union. In formulating a new system of government, the delegates to the 
Federal Convention would have to frame a system of government capable of dealing with 
both threats.     
II. The Federal Convention 
 Both the major plans introduced in the Federal Convention’s opening weeks 
included provisions giving the new government authority to raise and employ military 
force against individuals and states. The Virginia Plan proposed to provide the legislature 
with the power “to call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing 
to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.”31 This clause came right after provisions 
giving Congress broad legislative power, including an unqualified negative on state 
laws.32 Initial debates on the issue of coercion revolved around the propriety of including 
a force clause in the Constitution. Barely two days after Edmund Randolph laid out the 
Virginia Plan, its drafter, 36-year old James Madison, expressed deep misgivings about 
the “use of force . . . when applied to a people collectively and not individually” since it 
                                                
30 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 15; art. IV, sec. 4. 
31 Farrand, Records, 1:21 (Randolph resolution No. 6). The Pinckney Plan also included broad provisions 
for a standing military, presumably for use against both states and individuals under appropriate 
circumstances. Ibid., 3:106, 116.  
32 Ibid., 1:21. 
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would “look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment.”33 Hoping 
to frame a system that would “render this recourse unnecessary,” Madison successfully 
moved to postpone the force clause, championing in its stead an unlimited congressional 
veto over bills passed by the state legislatures, which Madison conceptually opposed to 
coercion.34  
For a time small state advocates continued to endorse express constitutional 
provisions authorizing military action against the states to enforce the union’s directives, 
even as a few felt inclined to retain the Articles of Confederation’s basic power structure. 
Thus, in the event that “any State, or any body of men in any State” resisted duly enacted 
federal acts and treaties, the New Jersey Plan authorized the “federal [plural] Executive” 
to “call forth ye power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be 
necessary to enforce and compel an obedience.”35 For the reasons suggested in Madison’s 
earlier comments, the Virginians criticized the provision.36   
The rhetoric against “coercion” employed by the Virginians in the early debates in 
Philadelphia has served as a source of confusion in constitutional scholarship.37 To be 
clear, this rhetoric specifically targeted (i) military coercion (ii) executed on the states as 
political entities. Leading delegates equated this with civil war and, with Madison, the 
                                                
33 He characterized the veto as the “mildest” alternative to coercive measures. Ibid.,1:54.  
34 Ibid., 1:54, 164-65. 
35 Ibid., 245. The New Jersey Plan, however, would have also required consent by a certain number of 
states before the legislature could enact laws. Ibid., 1:243-44.  
36 Ibid., 1:256, 320. So, too, did other Federalists. Writing as the “Landholder” in Connecticut, Oliver 
Ellsworth described Luther Martin’s positions at the Federal Convention as follows: “You espoused the 
tyrannic principles, that where a State refused to comply with a requisition of Congress for money, that an 
army should be marched into its bowels to fall indiscriminately upon the property of the innocent and the 
guilty, instead of having it collected as the Constitution proposed, by the mild and equal operation of laws.” 
The Landholder No. 10, in Farrand, Records, 3:272. 
37 See, e.g., Clark, “Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union,” 1853, suggesting that leading 
framers categorically opposed coercive power against the states as part of the “nature of the union.” 
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lion’s share disfavored it. Consequently, the set of resolves approved by the convention 
and passed on to the Committee of Detail on July 26 contained no force clause.38  
The decision to leave out the force clause, however, soon proved more a linguistic 
tactic than a constitutional commitment. For the delegates proceeded to frame and 
approve provisions for the proposed Constitution giving the federal government vastly 
increased standing military power, unlimited in size, with no prohibition on using it 
against recalcitrant states. Thus even as influential delegates criticized the force clause 
and a few evinced the old whig antipathies for standing armies, the convention began to 
insinuate into the Constitution authority for a substantial peacetime military 
establishment.  
The first step in this direction lay in the framing of the Guarantee Clause, which 
guaranteed to each state a “Republican” government and pledged federal military 
assistance to requesting states against “domestic Violence”—in its time, a clear reference 
to Shays’s Rebellion and, perhaps, the specter of slave rebellions in the south.39 Even as it 
laid the groundwork for greater federal military authority, however, the Guarantee Clause 
did not purport to apply to the states except insofar as the federal government might 
employ other states’ militias in the defense of the state requesting assistance—a 
possibility that the delegates had not yet clearly articulated at the Federal Convention.40    
                                                
38 Farrand, Records, 2:129-33; Tansill, Documents, 465-69. The Committee of Detail, however, later 
temporarily resurrected a force clause with stronger language than the one Madison and others had earlier 
shot down. Ibid., 2:157-58; see below note 41. 
39 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. 
40 Farrand, Records, 2:47-49.  
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The Committee of Detail, however, enlarged the military commitment.41  In 
addition to retaining military guarantees in favor of the state governments under the 
Guarantee Clause, the Committee on August 6 reported broad provisions authorizing 
Congress to “raise armies” and “call forth” the state militias to execute the laws of the 
union, enforce treaties, and suppress insurrections.42 The Committee’s draft also provided 
for a unitary executive to serve as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and the militia of the Several States.”43 With phraseological adjustments, 
most of these provisions became part of the United States Constitution with relatively 
little debate in Philadelphia.44  
Elbridge Gerry’s August 18 motion to limit the peacetime military 
establishment’s size met with unanimous defeat.45 Very significantly, the delegates 
rejected an attempt on August 30 to replace the phrase “domestic Violence” found in the 
Guarantee Clause with the term “insurrection” found in the Article I militia clauses, 
which would have linked the two clauses and created a colorable argument in favor of 
limiting exercise of the Article I authority to the conditions set out in the Guarantee 
Clause requiring state requests for federal assistance. 46  Finally, George Mason’s 
                                                
41 Indeed, one of the Committee’s drafts included a force clause framed with stronger language than the 
Virginia Plan’s force clause: “If any State, or Body of Men, in any State, shall oppose or prevent the 
carrying into Execution, the Acts or Treaties of the United States; the Executive shall be authorized to 
enforce and compel Obedience by calling forth the powers of the United States.” Farrand, Records, 2:157-
58. Cf. ibid., 1:21 (Virginia Plan).  
42 Ibid., 2:182. 
43 Ibid., 2:185. 
44 Some debates occurred on the question of whether the federal government should possess power to 
subdue rebellions in the states in the absence of a request from the state government in question (Farrand, 
Records, 2:316-18, 466-67) and over the extent of state residual control over their militias. Ibid., 2:330-32.  
45 Farrand, Records, 2:330.  
46 Ibid., 2:459, 467. 
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eleventh-hour motion to insert aspirational language protecting the “liberties of the 
people” against standing armies in Article 1, section 8 encountered the same fate.47  
In all, it would appear that the revolutionary intellectual edifice that the American 
whigs had erected on the question of standing armies largely fell to the wayside among 
the Federalists in 1787. Near unanimity among the delegates regarding the necessities of 
quelling internal disturbances, defending the frontier, and protecting the continent from 
attacks by foreign nations essentially guaranteed this result. A two-year limitation on 
congressional military appropriations did make it in to Article I.48 Yet so long as 
Congress remained willing to fund professional armies, Article 1, section 8 permitted the 
government to keep standing armies for an indefinite time and in indefinite size 
independent of the state governments; and Article II gave the President, in his capacity as 
“Commander in Chief,” substantial discretionary authority over federal standing forces in 
the advancement of preambular ends and international obligations.49  
In practice, of course, the government’s ability to keep a standing peacetime 
military for these purposes would depend on funding, which in turn depended on the 
good credit of the United States and the taxation mechanism. As to taxation, the 
Federalists could have foreseen that it might face considerable popular checks on election 
day and, if history provided any indicator, through extra-legal resistance as well. Yet the 
                                                
47 Ibid., 2:617. Having read the proposed Constitution’s military provisions, Thomas Jefferson wrote to 
William Stephens Smith from Paris that “[o]ur Convention has been too much impressed by the 
insurrection in Massachusetts: and in the spur of the moment they are setting up a kite to keep the henyard 
in order.” Accordingly, Jefferson hoped for amendments to the military provisions prior to ratification so as 
to preserve and protect “the spirit of resistance” in the people. Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens 
Smith, Nov. 13, 1787 (Paris), in Jefferson, Writings, 4:467.   
48 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 12. 
49 U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2. 
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Constitution also gave the federal government another less costly option for purposes of 
employing military coercion against internal (and external) threats: commandeering the 
state militias. This option, however, raised a number of special difficulties during and 
after the Federal Convention.  
Since the states had historically claimed independent sovereign authority over 
their respective militias, considerable differences of opinion arose over the proper extent 
of the new federal government’s authority over them. Ad hoc military forces composed 
of citizen soldiers in the manner of militias could boast an intrinsic republican legitimacy 
that standing forces could not. Yet for good reason leading Federalists criticized the lack 
of uniformity, discipline and drill in the militias.50 Some envisaged virtually exclusive 
federal power over the militias. Regulating the militia, Madison stated, “did not seem in 
its nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities.” 51  
Enough opposition to exclusive federal control surfaced during the Convention, 
however, to produce final provisions that left a somewhat ambiguous residual of 
authority over the militias to the states, while vesting considerable coercive authority in 
the federal government over eligible militiamen and officers throughout the union. In 
addition to giving Congress the power to commandeer the state militias under the 
President’s leadership “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and 
repel Invasions,” Article I empowered federal legislators to dictate uniform laws for 
“organizing, arming, and disciplining” the militia, and to “govern[]” the militia when 
                                                
50 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 8, 113-118 (Alexander Hamilton).  
51 Farrand, Records, 2:332. 
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called out by the federal government.52 It further imposed upon the states an affirmative 
duty to carry out all such laws and regulations.  
The Constitution did leave to the states the appointment of officers and, 
presumably, the power to employ their respective militias in internal matters for purposes 
that did not conflict with either federal interests or the Constitution.53 But except for these 
latter concessions, by and large the Constitution’s provisions for military power marked a 
significant victory for the nationalists and military men on the delicate militia question. 
The Constitution all but guaranteed a dim future for the state militias as independent 
sovereign forces in the American union and motioned toward the creation of a significant 
professional military establishment that most Americans in 1776 could have never 
imagined.    
III. The Ratification Debates      
During the ratification debates, the Antifederalists raised many objections to the 
Constitution’s provisions for a national military establishment. Those steeped in the 
classical republican heritage programmatically opposed the creation of a peacetime 
standing army. For purposes of internal defense, most considered each state’s militia 
more than adequate to the task and some even considered the posse comitatus sufficient 
for these purposes.54 To some degree, these institutions effectuated the merger of ruler 
with ruled idealized within the discourse of consent. By very definition, Richard Henry 
Lee observed, neither the posse nor the militia could coerce the people because “[a] 
                                                
52 U.S Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16. 
53 U.S Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 16. 
54 Brutus No. 9, Nov. 29, 1787, in Storing, Complete Anti-Federalist, 2:386. 
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militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves.”55 “It is a capital 
circumstance in favor of liberty,” wrote another commentator, “that the people 
themselves are the military power of our country.”56  
For leading Federalists, however, the fact that the people themselves constituted 
the militias lay at the very core of the problem they sought to solve, the militias “being 
composed of the very objects of force.”57 Reformers contended that the public-regarding 
virtue required for a strong and dependable militia did not have a bright future in 
America. Already the people’s “industrious habits, absorbed in the pursuits of gain” had 
become “incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers.”58 The modern state 
required “disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens,” to address both 
internal and external foes.59 No reasonable person in 1787 could dispute, Hamilton wrote, 
that “there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted differently 
from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just 
authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to 
insurrections and rebellions.”60 
Yet even as the Antifederalists championed the militia over standing armies and 
even as few moderates raised serious objections to the Guarantee Clause (which 
redounded to the benefit of established state governments), the Constitution’s opponents 
                                                
55 Federal Farmer No. 18, Jan. 25, 1788, in ibid., 2:341.   
56 The Republican, Connecticut Courant (Hartford), Jan. 7, 1788, in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 
1:712.  
57 Edward Carrington to the Governor of Virginia, Dec. 8, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of Members of the 
Continental Congress, 8:518. 
58 The Federalist No. 8, 116 (Alexander Hamilton). 
59 Ibid. 
60 The Federalist No. 28, 205 (Alexander Hamilton); see also James Iredell at North Carolina Ratifying 
Convention, July 26, 1788, in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 865, defending necessity of a peacetime 
army. 
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also sharply criticized the militia clauses under Articles I and II.61 They interpreted the 
federal power over the militias as an assault on state sovereignty that, in authorizing 
Congress and the President to commandeer the state militias, stripped the state 
governments of their own powers of self-defense against insurrection and possibly the 
federal government itself.62  
The Antifederalists feared in particular Congress’s ability to call forth the state 
militias “to execute the laws of the Union,” which the Constitution distinguished from 
suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions.63 This seemed to open up a whole new 
sphere of military action that, among other things, threatened to usurp local law 
enforcement. During the Virginia ratification convention, Charles Clay suggested that 
under this provision the federal government could easily employ the militias to establish 
a “military government.”64 Clay preferred “the old, established custom of executing the 
laws”: the posse comitatus.65 But the posse, countered Madison, had jurisdiction only in 
its county and sometimes the extent of the “resistance to execution of the laws” required 
stronger modes of response. “[P]ublic force must be used when resistance to the laws 
requires it, otherwise society itself must be destroyed.”66 Madison and other leading 
Federalists pressed the rejoinder that the more authority the federal government had over 
the militias, the less likely the government would exercise its new plenary powers to 
                                                
61 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cls. 15, 16; art. II, sec. 2. 
62 Luther Martin argued that the militia clauses of Article I took from the states “the only defence and 
protection which the State can have for the security of their rights against arbitrary encroachments” and 
provided “the most convincing proof, the advocates of this system design the destruction of the State 
governments” Luther Martin, “The Genuine Information,” Nov. 29, 1787, in Farrand, Records, 3:208-09 
(speech delivered to the Maryland legislature).  
63 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 15. 
64 DHRC, 10:1274. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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create a standing peacetime establishment. Limiting federal control over the militias, the 
argument went, would give the government a “pretext for substituting a standing army.”67  
Most significantly, the Federalists demanded coercive federal power over the 
militias and, accordingly, rejected outright their adversaries’ proposals to require the 
federal government to obtain a state’s consent before commandeering its militia under 
Article I. A consent requirement in this context, argued Madison, would “destroy the 
general government and sacrifice particular states,” for “[t]he same principles and 
motives which produce disobedience to requisitions, will produce refusal in this case.”68 
Here, in times of necessity, the federal government had to possess unequivocal coercive 
power over both the states and their citizens. As to individuals, this would include the 
power to block access to the courts by suspending habeas corpus in cases of rebellion.69     
A number of the state ratification documents demanded necessity or 
supermajority limitations on peacetime standing armies. Virginia would have required a 
provision expressly investing each of the states with “the power to provide for 
organizing, arming and disciplining its own militia, whenever Congress shall omit or 
neglect to provide for the same.”70 Even after ratification, attempts to weaken Congress 
and the President’s control over the militias persisted. The issue reared its head during 
debates in the First Congress over initial amendments to the Constitution. The first ten 
amendments ultimately included three touching upon the military power structure. The 
Third Amendment prohibited non-consensual quartering and the Tenth left non-delegated 
                                                
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid. 
69 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 2. 
70  Tansill, Documents, 1032. This volume contains all the ratification documents. Ibid., 1009-59; see also 
Elliot, Debates, 1:319-337. 
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powers to the “States respectively, or to the people,” subject to Article I, Section 10 
prohibitions. As to the Tenth, half the states had proposed in their ratification documents 
that the amendment reserve to the states all powers not clearly or expressly delegated to 
the federal government. The final amendment, however, did not include either adverb, 
rendering its reservations into constitutional redundancies.71  
Yet the Second Amendment, which protected “the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms” as part of “a well-regulated Militia,” merits special attention. Read in its 
proper historical and constitutional contexts, the text of the amendment established 
neither a collective nor an individual right to bear arms as argued by previous scholars, 
but rather some combination of civic right and civic duty. Namely, it guaranteed a right 
to bear arms so that citizens could satisfy their legal and constitutional duty to take part in 
a well-regulated militia.72 That the militia legislation enacted by the First Congress 
imposed a statutory obligation on eligible militiamen to supply themselves with arms 
reinforces this reading.73 Even assuming the Second Amendment protected a state’s 
residual right to maintain a degree of control over its militia when not commandeered by 
the federal government, neither the Amendment’s text nor its spirit established a 
constitutional right of the states to employ their militias against the federal government 
as some scholars have suggested.74 The very act would have nullified the Supremacy 
Clause as applied to the federal government’s delegated power over the state militias. As 
to uses of federal power perceived as unconstitutional or illegitimate by states or the 
                                                
71 Bowling, “‘A Tub to the Whale,’” 229-30, 236. 
72 Cornell, Well-Regulated Militia, 2.  
73 Act of May 8, 1792, chap. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271. On the constitutional significance of this legislation, see 
Mazzone, “Federalism Unwritten.”  
74 See, e.g., Gardner, “Myth of State Autonomy,” 8. 
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people, the Constitution provided for national political checks (including elections and 
amendments), not state-based military ones. 75 The Second Amendment, in short, left 
Congress’s and the President’s power over the state militias and to raise standing armies 
untouched. This interpretation holds whether or not the Second Amendment, as originally 
understood, safeguarded an individual right of self-defense against unconstitutional or 
otherwise repugnant uses of federal military power.  
In sum, the Constitution’s military provisions introduced a triple threat of federal 
coercive power: the power to coerce eligible state militiamen into federal military 
service, to coerce the state governments into carrying out federal military policy and, of 
course, to coercively suppress those people or states involved in rebellions or 
insurrections or that otherwise resisted federal laws or efforts to execute them. In 
divesting the states of independent sovereign authority over their militias, moreover, the 
Constitution deprived the states of any constitutional mechanism of self-defense vis-à-vis 
federal power that none of the first ten amendments did anything to return.76    
IV. Standing Military Forces 
The early Congresses wasted no time enacting legislation to carry the 
Constitution’s military provisions into operation. In September 1789, at Washington’s 
request, Congress ratified the modest establishment created by the Continental Congress 
for purposes of defending the frontiers (save for the modes of appointment) and 
                                                
75 Both Hamilton and Madison hypothesized that in the unlikely case that a federal standing army waged 
war on the states for unconstitutional reasons, and all the states pooled their militia resources to repel the 
attack, then the states would probably prevail in fact. The Federalist No. 28, 207 (Alexander Hamilton); 
The Federalist No. 46, 301 (James Madison). Never, however, did Publius suggest that the states had 
authority under the United States Constitution to do so.   
76 See Barber, Fallacies of States’ Rights, 38.  
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authorized the President to call on the militias to protect frontiersmen from the “hostile 
incursions of the Indians.” 77  Worsening Indian relations along the Ohio River 
watershed’s northern length prompted additional legislation in 1790 that increased the 
number of troops and implied that the regulars would bear the primary burden on the 
frontiers, with assistance as necessary from the militiamen.78 A campaign against the 
Wabash Indians initiated shortly thereafter ended in failure, which knowledgeable 
officers attributed to the militia contingent’s inexperience and recalcitrance.79  
Additional legislation followed, providing for more regulars and for other 
voluntary troops categorized as “levies.”80 In 1791, a military campaign under the 
command of Arthur St. Clair produced the greatest defeat ever suffered by Americans at 
the hands of Indian tribes.81 A subsequent congressional investigation cleared St. Clair, 
blaming the debacle on the War Department’s haste, overconfidence, and 
mismanagement. With some justification, however, the officers once again passed the 
buck to the disorderly militiamen and levies.82  
From that point forward, Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox felt sure 
that nothing short of decisively crushing the Indians would settle the underlying land 
claims and that only an army of trained regulars could accomplish the result. Congress 
                                                
77 Act of September 29, 1789, chap. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 96.  
78 Act of April 30, 1790, chap. 10, 1 Stat. 119.  
79 Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 106-08. 
80 Act of March 3, 1791, chap. 28, §§ 8-11, 1 Stat. 223. The levied volunteers’ status fell somewhere 
between the regulars and the militia, unequipped and part-time but otherwise entitled to the same benefits 
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the levies in lieu of the militia. See also below note 93 discussing “volunteer” provisions of 1798 military 
legislation.  
81 Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 115-16. 
82 American State Papers: Military Affairs 1:36-39; see also Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 114, 120.  
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responded in 1792 with legislation authorizing an army of over five-thousand regulars for 
use against the Indians on the frontier, together with increases in pay, all enacted over 
vocal dissents from not only rising Republicans but also a few war-wary New England 
Federalists whose states had little stake in the Northwest conflicts.83 Together with the 
administration’s adoption of a legionary structure rather than a regimental one (in effect, 
creating four self-contained armies of about 1,200 men), an overhaul of military 
administration, and some new officers (including the appointment of “Mad Anthony” 
Wayne), this paved the way to a more efficient military establishment. In 1794, under 
General Wayne’s command, these new regiments would annihilate the Northwestern 
Indian confederacy once and for all, ending both Indian resistance and British influence 
in the Old Northwest, and reestablishing respect for the federal government among 
Indians and squatters alike.84  
Meanwhile, however, other problems had arisen. In the months preceding 
Wayne’s victory in the Old Northwest, Washington’s declared neutrality in the European 
wars encountered enforcement difficulties in the form of French-sympathizers fitting out 
French privateers in American ports and French-affiliated filibustering schemes in 
Spanish territories to the South. The Northwest Territory also required attention 
independent of the Indian conflicts to prevent shipments of arms and supplies on the Ohio 
River. 85 In all instances, the administration, with Congress’s ultimate blessing, geared up 
                                                
83 Act of March 5, 1792, chap. 9, 1 Stat. 241.  
84 See Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 124-27. Concluded on August 3, 1795, the Treaty of Greenville established 
a settlement tilted appreciably in favor of the U.S. See Treaty of Peace, in 7 Stat. 49. Effective February 29, 
1996, the controversial Jay Treaty with England put an additional legal stamp on the British withdrawal 
from the Northwest.    
85 Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces, 25-27. 
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for military responses. In 1793 and early 1794, Knox notified the applicable state and 
territorial governors that the federal government intended to call out their respective 
militias and those regulars in proximal frontier constabularies, for purposes of defeating 
these schemes.86  
All the while the administration lobbied Congress for more robust federal 
authority. Signed into law on June 5, 1794, the Neutrality Act delivered. If the 
administration had felt any need to operate through the state governors in calling out the 
militia in neutrality matters, the legislation obviated it. It empowered the President 
himself, “or such other person as he shall have empowered,” directly to call out national 
“land or naval forces” for purposes of seizing suspect ships and preventing expeditions 
into territories controlled by belligerents in the European wars.87 The specter of national 
military action raised by this legislation apparently proved enough to prevent any 
notorious conduct that might have triggered its actual use.88  
All the early efforts by the Washington administration to create a military 
establishment, whether to protect the frontiers or to enforce neutrality, produced fear and 
alarm in anti-militaristic Antifederalists and nascent Republicans, even as few could deny 
the need for frontier constabularies in appropriate areas.  Not surprisingly, after Wayne’s 
victory in 1796 House Republicans moved immediately to reduce the number of troops 
under the administration’s authority, restructure them into four regiments with eight 
                                                
86 Henry Knox to Gov. Isaac Shelby & Gov. Arthur St. Clair, Nov. 9, 1793, in American State Papers: 
Foreign Relations 1:458; Knox to Gen. Anthony Wayne, Mar. 31, 1794, in ibid., 458-49; Knox to Gov. of 
Ga., May 14, 1795, in ibid., 460.   
87 Act of June 5, 1794, chap. 50, §§ 7, 8, 1 Stat. 384. 
88 Until, that is, President Jefferson invoked them for authority to confront the Burr conspirators with 
military force. See Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces, 79-83. 
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companies each, and otherwise scale back the establishment for peacetime purposes.89 
The resulting legislation achieved these goals and, as such, marked something of a 
victory for Republicans.90 Yet the Federalists could also claim a success, for the 1796 
legislation created and legitimatized a standing army in the United States that, although 
fairly modest in the beginning, would serve as the model for peacetime military policy 
for the next one hundred years. In addition to the Commander-in-Chief, the War 
Department and an officer corps, the establishment’s main components would consist in 
frontier constabularies, artilleries and engineers to garrison coastal forts, and a small 
cavalry for patrol and communications.91  
Of course, the 1790s had more in store for the Federalists on the question of 
standing military forces. Declared neutrality in the European wars became a mere conceit 
in the Jay Treaty’s aftermath. Indeed, the nation’s first political parties grew, in part, out 
of opposing sympathies in the European conflicts. When war with France seemed 
imminent after the XYZ Affair, the Hamiltonians would again seek substantially to 
enlarge the nation’s military commitments. With Congress’s sanction, they achieved 
notable successes in this regard, including the creation of the first respectable national 
naval force.92 In addition to pre-clearing the President to raise a “provisional army” of 
10,000 regulars should he alone deem the county in “imminent danger” of invasion, the 
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centerpiece legislation authorized the President to “accept” unlimited “volunteers,” to 
serve whenever needed for the same pay and benefits as regulars, but armed, clothed, and 
equipped at their own expense.93 Alas, however, Hamiltonian advocates for militarization 
in and after 1798 let jingoistic impulses get the better of them, and the internecine 
conflicts between Hamilton and President Adams that followed led to the latter’s defeat 
in the presidential election in 1800 and the Federalist party’s demise.  
V. Federalizing the Militia 
To be sure, Indian affairs and neutrality enforcement in the early 1790s 
complicated the distinction between internal and external threats to national authority and 
security. Yet even with respect to the militarization preparatory for a war with France in 
the late 1790s, the chief bugaboo for anti-militaristic Republicans in Congress lay in the 
possibility that creating and employing national military forces to deal with external 
threats would lead to a peacetime establishment available for internal use against the 
people or states or, if English history served as an indicator, perhaps Congress itself. At 
the same time, the Constitution plainly contemplated the availability of federal forces to 
suppress domestic disturbances, whether incited by the likes of Daniel Shays, Citizen 
Genet, or perhaps slaves, and otherwise to “execute the Laws of the Union.”94 The 
federal government had to prepare for such exigencies through enabling legislation. As a 
political matter, however, it could not do so without offering some concessions to those 
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in Congress programmatically opposed to visible peacetime standing armies and who 
greatly feared a Federalist conspiracy to establish a military government at the federal 
level. Soon after ratification Congress determined that, notwithstanding the 
administration’s preferences, the militia called forth on an ad hoc basis, rather than 
standing forces, would serve as the federal government’s exclusive military means by 
which to quell internal resistance to federal laws not amenable to resolution by other 
means.   
The War Department’s initial militia plan, presented to Congress in late January 
1790, represented the unadulterated Federalist impulse and would have essentially 
nationalized the state militias. The plan divided all the militias into three classes—an 
“advanced corps” of men aged 18-20, a “main corps” of those 21 to 45, and a “reserved 
corps” of those 46-60—and adopted a legionary structure throughout. The advanced 
corps would undergo required military training before passing into the main corps, and 
the plan would have made a graduation certificate from the advanced corps a condition 
precedent for exercising the ordinary rights of a free citizen. Except for specifying 
exemptions from service and appointing officers (both left to the states), the federal 
government would assume nearly all the responsibility and expense for implementing the 
plan, including materiel, personnel, and salaried instructors. The plan estimated an annual 
expense of nearly $400,000 for administering the advanced corps alone.95  
Congress did not respond favorably. A House committee bill significantly 
softened the administration’s recommendations but it languished for months as other 
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issues beckoned Congress. During the next session, an early minority bid in the House to 
leave the composition of the militia to the states met defeat.96 After some contentious 
debates, Congress passed two pieces of militia legislation that represented a compromise 
between the competing interests.  
In prescribing the militia’s constituency en masse—free white males 18-45—the 
Uniform Militia Act of 1792 confirmed a shared understanding that the federal 
government had the same constitutional power over the militia that it had over post 
offices, the army and the navy—viz., to establish the militia rather than simply regulate 
the existing constituencies. 97 On the other hand, the states retained power independently 
to create exemptions from service without limitation.98 While it recommended certain 
organizational attributes and required certain officers to perform modest tasks, moreover, 
the legislation otherwise seems to have given the states ultimate discretion in arranging 
their respective militias.99 Congress rejected the administration’s efforts to create a select 
federal corps of militiamen. Beyond a requirement that the state train their soldiers in 
accordance with Baron Steuben’s revolutionary war manual, legislators declined to 
mandate any standardized training whatsoever.100 To reduce federal expenditures and 
thereby cabin federal power, the law imposed a duty on all enrolled militiamen to arm, 
equip, and uniform themselves.101       
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The questions of how and when the federal government might employ the militias 
so constituted produced even more vigorous debate. A House committee bill that closely 
tracked the language of the Constitution, authorizing the president to call out the militia 
to “execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions,” drew a 
number of objections.102 Representative Livermore, for example, wanted provisions that 
limited the President’s discretion to precise scenarios. 103  Representative Baldwin 
excoriated the “dangerous principle” underlying the bill for it insinuated that the federal 
government had an independent power to suppress insurrections within the states: “the 
states individually certainly possess this power; they can suppress insurrections, and will 
do it.”104 Representative Page took the position that, notwithstanding the Constitution, the 
federal military should possess no power whatsoever merely to “execute the laws,” a 
power whose broadness and “dangerous” potential shocked a number of congressman. 
Any law that the people collectively resisted, Page urged, probably warranted the 
opposition. “Mild and equitable laws,” he argued, “will not be resisted.”105  
Like the Uniform Militia Act, the Calling Forth Act of 1792 ultimately struck a 
compromise between the competing interests. In the final analysis, however, it failed to 
nationalize the militias, even as it set precedent for the legality of employing military 
forces in domestic disturbances on which future presidents would rely.106 In the case of 
foreign or Indian invasions, or where a state government requested federal assistance 
under the Guarantee Clause to suppress an insurrection, the President received broad 
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discretion to call forth any or all of the state militias as he saw fit to deal with the 
threat.107  
With respect to domestic opposition to federal laws or the execution thereof, 
however, the act imposed special restraints on the President’s employment of the militias 
and, in some measure, memorialized a presumption against the use of military coercion 
altogether. Before the President could act, a federal judge had to certify the existence of 
“combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings” or by federal marshals, the latter of which the legislation purported to invest 
with the same power to execute federal laws that the state sheriffs had to execute state 
laws, including the power to call out the posse comitatus in particular counties.108 Once 
the President received this certification from a federal judge attesting to all the foregoing 
facts, he still had to demand dispersal within a prescribed time by proclamation before 
proceeding with military force.109 Even then, he could only call out the militia of the state 
“where such combinations may happen.”110 If that state’s militia did not respond or 
otherwise proved inadequate to the task, the President presumably had to request 
congressional authorization to call out the militias from one or more other states, unless 
Congress “be not in session,” in which case he could employ the other states’ militias on 
a temporary basis only.111 The act prevented the President from compelling an individual 
to serve for more than three months in a year but provided that the federal government 
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pay militiamen the same amount it paid regulars for the term of federal service.112 
Finally, militiamen that disobeyed the President’s orders faced fines as adjudicated by 
court martial composed of state-appointed militia officers.113 Neither the Uniform Militia 
Act nor the Calling Forth Act imposed any fines or punishments on the states as such for 
failure to comply with the militia laws.              
The Whiskey Rebellion provided the first opportunity for the federal government 
to employ the Calling Forth Act’s provisions respecting domestic insurrections in a state 
whose political establishment did not affirmatively seek federal assistance under the 
Guarantee Clause. 114  From the outset of resistance to the whiskey excise, the 
administration proceeded haltingly and cautiously. Behind this outward caution lay not 
only Washington’s scrupulous regard for public opinion but conflicts of opinion within 
the administration itself over the propriety of using of force, ranging from Hamilton’s 
visionary militarism to Knox’s qualified moralism and Adams’ retained whiggism.115 
After the attack on Inspector Neville’s residence in 1794, however, everyone in the 
administration recognized the necessity of a military response. Yet even after it had 
decided to use force, the administration carefully observed all the legal requirements set 
forth in the militia legislation before proceeding. The judge asked to make the required 
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certification to the President, James Wilson, moved hesitantly and his attention to the 
proper authentication of affidavits illuminated evidentiary questions that the 
administration had not fully considered. 116  For obvious reasons, moreover, the 
administration could not safely employ the militia most proximal to the disturbances in 
western Pennsylvania and soon determined to call out units from Virginia, Maryland, and 
New Jersey, together with a rag-tag Philadelphia contingent. Complicating matters 
further, Washington felt compelled to work closely with the Pennsylvania state 
government and to issue requests to the state governors to call out their respective militia 
rather than doing it directly. 117  The Pennsylvania officials resisted and the other 
governors responded at their own pace. Able-bodied militia members in all the subject 
states delayed in coming forth and, when they did, it became clear that some had failed to 
equip themselves as per the Militia Acts.118 
On September 24, 1794, however, federal commissioners reported to the 
President that enough resistance to the excise remained in the fourth survey to warrant a 
“more competent force” than the civil authorities could provide.119 In the end, the 
administration, working with the state governors, managed to call together a substantial 
ad hoc army that, with surprising espirit de corps, marched into western Pennsylvania to 
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encounter no opposition or resistance whatsoever.120 The rebellion fizzled out before any 
man in the federal army could fire a shot.  
Why? Offers of amnesty, a turn in public opinion in favor of the administration, 
and general entropy among the rebels conspired to help facilitate the result. No less 
significant, the federal government’s show, if not actual use, of military force caused the 
remaining rebels to surrender. Historians have long observed that the rebellion’s 
dissolution represents a milestone in the establishment of federal authority under the 
Constitution. True enough. They have not accorded proper significance to how the federal 
government effected this result. For all its caution and temporizing, the administration’s 
response to the Whiskey Rebellion ultimately succeeded in transforming a paper 
invocation of military coercion for domestic purposes into a credible threat of 
overwhelming military force to execute national laws when threatened by domestic 
resistance irresolvable by other means. The episode therefore established in practice a 
foundational principle on which the entire constitutional structure of coercion rested.    
To say, however, that the Whiskey Rebellion’s termination vindicated the Militia 
Acts of 1792 would go too far. If anything, the episode suggested that the Calling Forth 
Act burdened the President with too many legal requirements and confirmed that calling 
out the states’ militias presented political difficulties not conducive to the decisive 
exercise of military power. A few months later Congress passed permanent militia 
legislation that freed the President from consulting Congress when in session and 
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dispensed with the requirement that a federal judge issue a certification.121 The decision 
to use military force in cases of domestic insurrection would thereafter rest in the 
President alone.  
In 1799, when under the leadership of John Fries Pennsylvanians again staged a 
rebellion against federal tax collectors and surveyors, John Adams acted with much less 
hesitancy than did Washington in pursuing a military response.122 Adams sent out no 
commissions of inquiry, as Washington had done. Whereas the Washington 
administration felt compelled to issue militia requests to the state governors, Adams 
called out the militias directly. And whereas Washington felt constrained to use only 
militia, the Adams administration did not think twice about using regulars even as 
Congress had not expressly authorized it.123  
Conclusion 
Generally the decades after ratification saw the marginalization of militias within 
the constitutional structure of coercion. Military historians have identified the Militia 
Acts themselves as the root cause of the militias’ decline.124 In truth, the problem rested 
in the Constitution itself which attempted in earnest to incorporate the state militias into 
the national military framework, but which also effectuated a centralization of power and 
sovereignty whose essential logic left little room for part-time untrained citizen soldiers 
traditionally beholden to the states. The future of federal military responses to domestic 
disturbances lay in volunteers and regulars employed and equipped at federal expense 
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and subject to federal training and discipline. 125  In this respect, moreover, the 
“Revolution of 1800” did not repudiate so much as advance the Federalists’ original 
vision. Even as the Jeffersonians in Congress reduced and reformed the army early in 
their tenure, Jefferson also established the first national military academy, an institution 
destined to serve as a nursery for the same kind of military establishment that many 
others in his party feared and abhorred.126 In responding to the Burr Conspiracy, the 
Jefferson administration creatively employed the Neutrality Act of 1794 to justify 
employment of regulars against the conspirators.127 In 1807, Congress obviated the need 
for such creativity when it passed legislation giving the President express authority to use 
regulars in all those cases before reserved to the militia.128   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
TAXATION AND THE COERCION OF THE MAGISTRACY 
 
*  *  * 
During the ratification debates Antifederalists advanced the claim that the 
Constitution would create a government that enforced its laws primarily by military 
coercion. “I read it attentively,” said Patrick Henry, “and could see nothing to warrant a 
belief that the civil power can be called for.”1 The Antifederalists most often expressed 
their fear of a military government under the Constitution in the sphere of tax 
enforcement. This, for the Constitution’s opponents, represented the inescapable 
consequence of vesting the federal government with powers of both sword and purse. 
The Constitution itself, to be sure, provided some cause for concern here. We have 
already examined its broad military provisions authorizing the federal government to 
employ military force to “execute the Laws of the Union.” The taxation power seemed 
even more open-ended and, indeed, incorporated the threat of coercion into its very text. 
This capacious grant gave Congress authority not only to lay but, emphatically, “to 
collect” duties, excises, and other internal taxes for the “common defense and general 
Welfare of the United States,” subject only to uniformity and proportionality 
requirements.2  
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The Antifederalists perceived the taxing power as fundamentally coercive.3 From 
their perspective, not only would a distant, unrepresentative government impose the new 
taxes, and not only would it enforce the tax on an unwilling populace by military 
coercion, but the government faced no meaningful constitutional limitations in doing 
these things. With respect to the power’s broad scope, the Federalists did not and, indeed, 
could not dissimulate too much to assuage their opponents. Laying aside the Necessary & 
Proper Clause, no power in Article I had such an unbuttoned, discretionary feel. Hamilton 
linked the power of taxation to the preservation of the federal government itself and as 
such, he wrote, it “ought to exist without limitation.” 4  
As to customs duties, the Constitution apportioned exclusive authority to the 
federal government; Article I Section 10 prohibited the states from taxing imports or 
exports. A “COEQUAL authority” with the states would govern taxes on other articles of 
revenue.5 The Supremacy Clause, however, meant that federal taxes would prevail in 
cases of conflict; the states could not constitutionally check or limit the federal 
government’s own taxing power or collection efforts. The Antifederalist Brutus feared 
the implications of these principles in the context of taxation. Under the Supremacy 
Clause, he wrote, federal taxes, even those operating concurrently with the states, could 
                                                
3 Brutus called the taxing power a “great engine of tyranny and oppression” that “in process of time [will] 
draw all others after it.” Brutus No. 1, Oct. 13, 1787, in Storing, Complete Anti-Federalist, 2:366. For 
Luther Martin’s description of the taxing power in similar terms, see Martin, “The Genuine Information,” 
Nov. 29, 1787, in Farrand, Records, 3:203-205. 
4 The Federalist No. 23, 184 (Alexander Hamilton). 
5 The Federalist No. 34, 226 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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destroy a state’s government “at one stroke” by depriving it of the means by which to 
support itself.6  
Why, in a country founded in the name of liberty against taxation and in a 
document that in many other areas purported to limit and define the powers of 
government, did the framers propose and the people ratify so broad a power to tax and, in 
particular, to collect? Did the Antifederalists’ fears that the Federalists intended to 
establish a tax collection regime enforced by military coercion have a basis in fact? 
Answering these questions requires that we understand the specific historical context in 
which the need for federal taxation arose in 1787, as well as the constructions that the 
Federalists placed on the taxation power during the ratification debates—topics addressed 
respectively in Parts I and II below.   
Yet answering these questions also requires consideration of the taxation regime 
that the Federalists actually established under the Constitution after ratification. 
Historians and constitutional scholars have largely ignored federal tax administration in 
the early national period.7 New scholarship on the federal customs houses in the 1790s 
does something to rectify the oversight.8 These works contend that, far from establishing 
a military taxation regime, the Federalist tax administrators adopted essentially the same 
lax administrative approaches adopted by the separate state customs regimes in the 
1780s, but that, in contrast to the state regimes (yet for reasons never adequately 
                                                
6 Brutus No. 1, Oct. 13, 1787, in Storing, Complete Anti-Federalist, 2:367. 
7 The only work in the twentieth century that gave sustained attention to the topic is White, The Federalists, 
chaps. 27, 34, 36. For a late nineteenth-century work describing the early national statutory framework for 
customs duties and collection, see Goss, History of Tariff Administration.   
8 Rao, National Duties; Rao, “Creation of the American State”; Mashaw, Creating the Administrative 
Constitution; Dalzell, “Taxation with Representation”; Dalzell, “Prudence and the Golden Egg.” 
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explained in this scholarship), those accommodationist policies enabled the federal 
collection regime to thrive in the 1790s. The Federalists, on this view, avoided coercion 
at all costs and in these accommodationist practices lay the key to their successes.  
This chapter argues that neither Patrick Henry nor modern accommodationist 
scholarship correctly describes the administrative history in the 1790s. The Federalists 
did establish a taxation regime in both the ports and the interior backed by the credible 
threat of military sanctions and they did employ military coercion to execute the tax laws 
in the 1790s. They designed a system, however, that channeled confrontations between 
the state and taxpayers into an administrative infrastructure that existed apart from the 
military infrastructure, even as the former proceeded in some measure under the latter’s 
auspices. This involved, first, tax collection in the customhouses and in the interior and, 
second, in cases of conflict, litigation in the federal district courts that Congress 
established primarily for the collectors’ benefit.  
But did the Federalists intend for this non-militaristic administrative infrastructure 
to operate coercively on taxpayers or their property? And, if so, did it in fact operate 
coercively during the 1790s? Accommodationist scholarship suggests no. This chapter 
finds otherwise. To the extent they existed, accommodationist practices in the customs 
houses do not and cannot explain why the federal collectors collected nearly six times 
more duties in the period from 1792 to 1795 than the combined state regimes did in the 
period from 1785 to 1788, or why federal collections continued to soar after 1795. The 
federal regime’s increased geographical coverage, higher tax rates, and rising 
international commercial activity account for the difference to a far greater extent than 
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accommodationist practices do. I will endeavor to show here, however, that ultimately 
one factor and one factor alone made federal customs collection work and enabled it to 
thrive where the state regimes had failed: the credible threat of coercive sanctions.          
I. Fiscal Failure under the Articles of Confederation 
 Like all wars, the American Revolution required money. The Continental 
Congress, however, had to proceed very gingerly in this regard. As Gouverner Morris 
wrote in 1779, “America having never been much taxed . . . and the Contest being on the 
very Question of Taxation, the laying of [][taxes] unless from the last Necessity would 
have been Madness.”9 Drafted in 1777 but not formally ratified until 1781, the Articles of 
Confederation therefore gave Congress only two ways to raise money: bond issuances 
and requisitions on the states. Congress frequently employed the first device in the early 
stages of the war, borrowing substantial sums from both domestic and foreign 
subscribers. It also relied heavily on requisitions. By the requisition mechanism, 
Congress could request just about anything from the states, including soldiers, materiel, 
and money. With monetary requisitions, as with other forms, Congress assigned a quota 
amount to each state based on land values in the state.  
By the late 1770s, the requisition system had begun to suffer due to many states’ 
unwillingness and, in some instances, inability to pay their assigned quotas. The question 
immediately arose: What recourse did Congress have against delinquent states? The 
conclusion increasingly reached: essentially none. As early as 1781 a small nationalist 
faction that included James Madison proposed an amendment to the Articles authorizing 
                                                
9 Quoted in Rakove, Beginnings of National Politics, 305. 
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Congress to employ military or naval force “to compel . . . States to fulfill their federal 
engagements.”10 The amendment met with overwhelming opposition, as did alternatives 
that would have authorized Congress to seize property of delinquent states or impose 
naval blockades on them.11 Opponents saw all these provisions as insults to the newly 
sovereign several states. 
Twice in the 1780s Congress attempted to replace the undependable and 
unenforceable requisition mechanism with a system of federal taxation confined to 
impost duties and twice it failed. Because Congress lacked taxation powers under the 
Articles, it had to ask the states for their approval to amend the document. Despite the 
modesty of the proposals, in both cases Congress failed to secure the unanimous approval 
required for amendment.   
In 1781, Congress asked the states for power to levy a five-percent ad valorem 
duty on all imports and on all lawful prizes for the exclusive purpose of paying off the 
nation’s war debt.12 The proposal circulated to the states remained vague on particulars. 
Even as strong dissenting voices initially arose in Massachusetts, by mid-1782 all but two 
of the state legislatures had approved the proposal in principle. Georgia and Rhode Island 
held out. The latter state saw the emergence of a political majority formed around 
opposition to the impost and, ultimately, its legislature unanimously rejected it. 
Opponents advanced the claim that the impost betrayed the essential principles of the 
American Revolution. In the Providence Gazette, the “Farmer”—soon-to-be elected 
                                                
10 Committee Report, Mar. 12, 1781, in Journals of the Continental Congress, 20:469-470.  
11 See Rakove, Beginnings of National Politics, 290-93. 
12 Report of the Committee of the Whole, as amended, Feb. 3, 1781, in Journals of the Continental 
Congress, 19:112.  
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congressional delegate David Howell—rejected the impost on the same principles that he 
rejected the stamp act: “that no subject shall be called on to pull his purse-strings except 
by the immediate authority of this State, and by officers of our own appointment.” This, 
for another writer calling himself “Candid,” formed the “essence of our political 
freedom.” 13  David Howell characterized the duty as an “entering wedge, others will 
follow—a land tax, a poll tax & an excise.” “Tyranny is to be resisted most easily and 
effectually in its first approaches, and at a distance.”14 
The impost proposal did not specify how the tax would be collected. Having 
passed their own impost laws, a few of the states had begun to set up customs houses in 
major ports. Would the federal government itself assume control over the collection of 
the impost? David Howell assumed the worst—that the Continental Congress would 
employ a “numerous train of Collectors, Comptrollers, Searchers, tide-waiters, Clerks, 
etc. etc.” to collect the tax.15 “[T]he country will so swarm with troops of officers, excise 
men, etc.,” wrote another commentator, “and, like the locusts of Egypt, they will devour 
every green thing.”16 Early in 1783, word had spread about an official plan of continental 
tax collection that confirmed opponents’ greatest fears. One section of the plan 
apparently provided federal collectors with “power . . . to break open houses, shops, etc.” 
and inflicted harsh “punishments . . . on those who opposed them.” According to one 
member of the Massachusetts governor’s council, “we may as well go under Great 
Britain again at once.” “The ordinance,” observed Roxbury minister William Gordon, 
                                                
13 Providence Gazette, Apr. 13, 1782, Dec. 28, 1782.  
14 Jonathon Arnold and David Howell to Governor William Greene, Oct. 15, 1782, in Staples, Rhode Island 
in the Continental Congress, 396. 
15 Ibid.  
16 A Plain Dealer, Providence Gazette, Jan. 26, 1782. 
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“has all the evils in it, that we have been exclaiming so bitterly against.”17 Meanwhile, 
Virginia and South Carolina had repealed their approvals of the impost and before 
Congress even realized it the whole plan had unraveled.18 “Rhode Island’s defiance,” one 
historian concludes, “had successfully brought undercurrents of ideological anxieties over 
the continental impost to the surface.”19  
Nevertheless, in April 1783, over the objections of four New England delegates, 
Congress approved a revised impost plan that responded to some if not all the objections 
to the last.20 The new plan would expire at the end of twenty-five years. Under its terms, 
the states would appoint the collectors but the collectors would thereafter “be amenable 
to and removable by the United States in Congress assembled, alone.” Congress also 
urged the creation of a supplementary fund in each state to help defray national expenses. 
With the New Englanders, Alexander Hamilton withheld his vote from the proposal—but 
for completely different reasons. Hamilton thought it dangerous to vest appointment 
powers in the states, for the states could only be expected to appoint collectors to serve 
their own interests. The appointees’ local biases would produce accommodation and 
restraint rather than energy and administration.  
Over the next two years, most of the states acquiesced to the impost of 1783. 
During the same period, however, a potent opposition converged around the critical 
problem of control over collection. In Virginia, Edmund Pendleton reported to James 
Madison that the House of Delegates, concerned about the federal government gaining 
                                                
17 William Gordon to Horatio Gates, Feb. 26, 1783, in Gordon, “Letters,” 487.  
18 Main, The Antifederalists, 94, 96-98. 
19 Dalzell, “Taxation with Representation,” 17. 
20 Resolution, Apr. 18, 1783, in Journals of the Continental Congress, 24:257-261. 
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“undue influence in the states,” stood firm against “the Intervention of any new 
officer.”21 Virginia and Massachusetts ultimately made their respective assents to the 
revised plan conditional on strict limitations on federal enforcement powers.22 In 1785, 
Rhode Island conditioned its assent on retaining complete control over collection.23 The 
next year New York followed suit.24 
Thus, by 1786 it had become clear that the Continental Congress’s second impost 
proposal would fail. This in itself created a sense a crisis that did not exist before. 
Exacerbating this perception, however, the states had fallen further and further behind on 
their requisition quotas. As early as October 1785, James Madison pressed the Virginia 
assembly to authorize the “use of coercion.” “Perhaps a single frigate under the orders of 
Congress could make it the interest of any one of the Atlantic states to pay its just 
Quota.”25 In August of 1786, Congress apportioned requisitions toward which, for the 
first time, most of the states failed to pay anything whatsoever. Then, Congress’s 
attempts to secure loans to pay for federal troops to respond to Shays’s Rebellion ended 
in failure. With the government starved of money, payment of salaries to federal civil 
officers ceased in early 1787 and the country careened toward defaulting on its 
considerable loans from France, Spain, and Dutch bankers. Calls for fundamental reform 
or even total reconstitution began to attract greater attention by the fall of 1786. Rebellion 
in Massachusetts (in part, a tax rebellion) made vivid the vices of the Confederation. By 
                                                
21 E. Pendleton to James Madison, May 4, 1783, in Madison, Papers, 7:13.   
22 See Mass., Acts and Laws 1782-1783, 541-43 (Oct. 20, 1783, chap. 18); Hening, Virginia Statutes at 
Large, 11:350-52 (Oct. 1783 session: chap. XXXI). 
23 See Main, The Antifederalists, 89.  
24 New York, Laws, 2:320-22 (1786).  
25 Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 3, 1785, in Madison, Writings, 2:180.  
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1787, as we have seen, reform-minded commentators everywhere had come to diagnose 
the problem primarily in terms of the Continental Congress’s want of coercive power. 
II. Constructing Taxation during the Ratification Debates 
  Against this background, in 1787 the Federalists waged an attack on the 
requisition system more dramatic and comprehensive than anything that had preceded it.  
All agreed that the solution to the Confederation’s vices with respect to revenue 
collection lay in vesting the federal government with, in Edmund Pendleton’s words, 
“independent, coercive powers.”26 Yet most also came to harbor reservations about the 
application of coercive power to the states as political entities. “The great and radical vice 
in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation for states 
or governments in their corporate or collective capacities.” Hamilton described this “great 
and radical vice” as the “parent of anarchy.” Why? Because, vis-à-vis the states, “the 
only constitutional remedy is [military] force, and the immediate effect of it, civil war.”27 
The military sanction’s imprecision raised special concerns. “If we should attempt to 
execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force against a delinquent state,” 
Oliver Ellsworth said, “it would involve the good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the 
same calamity.”28  
The solution to the problem of coercion, then, lay not in vesting the federal 
government with coercive power by which to enforce requisitions. It lay in dispensing 
with the flawed requisition mechanism altogether and instead vesting the federal 
                                                
26 Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, Apr. 7, 1787, in Madison, Papers, 17:515-517. 
27 The Federalist No. 16, 152 (A. Hamilton). 
28 Speech at the Connecticut Ratifying Convention, Jan. 7, 1788, in DHRC, 15:275. 
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government with coercive power over the individuals within the states, on whom 
coercion might be peaceably and proportionately exercised. In this regard, Hamilton and 
other Federalists drew a distinction between the “coercion of arms” and the “coercion of 
law.”29 “I am for coercion by law,” Oliver Ellsworth declared at the Connecticut ratifying 
convention.  “No coercion is applicable to [sovereign states], but that of an armed force . . 
. But this legal coercion singles out the guilty individual, and punishes him for breaking 
the laws of the Union.”30 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the Article III judiciary 
would serve as a critical instrumentality of the federal government in this regard. At the 
North Carolina ratifying convention, William R. Davie associated the coercion of law 
with what he called “coercion through the judiciary.”31 In the context of taxation in 
particular, however, the Federalists did not confine their conceptions of peaceable 
coercion to the judicial sanction alone. Congress’s broad power to “lay and collect” taxes 
under Article I, together with a constitutionally mandated unitary executive, 
contemplated much more. It contemplated independent federal control over tax 
collection—what Hamilton called the “COERCION of the magistracy.”32     
While this phrase, “coercion of the magistracy,” plainly denoted a species of 
coercion different from and milder than military force, it still caused uneasiness in more 
than a few Antifederalists, particularly in New York and Rhode Island. The Federalists 
responded in the first instance by redirecting attention from collection and enforcement 
                                                
29 Farrand, Records, 1:284. Madison’s notes use the spelling “coertion,” which I have taken the liberty to 
correct here. See also ibid., 1:296 (Robert Yates’ notes), recording Hamilton’s distinction: “By force, I 
mean the coercion of law and the coercion of arms.”  
30 Speech at the Connecticut Ratifying Convention, Jan. 7, 1788, in DHRC, 15:275. 
31 Elliot, Debates, 4:155. 
32 The Federalist No. 15, 149. 
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mechanisms to the substantive scope of taxation itself. Namely, they asserted that indirect 
taxes alone—import duties and, possibly, excises on luxuries—would ordinarily suffice 
to generate adequate revenue without resort to direct internal taxation.33  
 Focusing on the impost made sense for a few reasons. Since the beginning of the 
1780s a fairly broad consensus existed around the necessity and propriety of uniform 
federal import duties. The fiscal crises of 1786 only strengthened the consensus. 
Resentments toward Britain for terminating many of the trading privileges enjoyed by 
Americans before the war, moreover, had by 1787 provoked loud calls for retaliation and 
protection. A uniformly collected federal impost, the Federalists rightly maintained, 
would discourage interstate discrimination, encourage American manufactures, prevent 
the exportation of specie, and help restore the balance of trade. It would do so, 
furthermore, with minimal state interference in the economy. Only merchants dealing in 
the enumerated articles would pay the tax and merchants as a class could also expect 
special benefits from an effective system of federal customs collection. Nothing 
prevented the merchants from passing some or even all the duties on to domestic 
purchasers. To the extent those purchasers did not perceive the addition, Hamilton 
suggested, the tax had the potential to become virtually insensible to the populace.34  
The only remaining issue involved control over collection. Yet, here again, events 
had turned somewhat in the Federalists’ favor. By 1787 it had become eminently clear 
                                                
33 The First Congress, however, rejected a proposed amendment to the Constitution that would have barred 
direct taxes until the impost proved demonstrably insufficient for “public exigencies” and the states failed 
to comply with special requisitions. Massachusetts, for example, proposed such an amendment in their 
ratification stipulations. Elliot, Debates, 1:322-23. 
34 The Federalist No. 12 and No. 35, 135, 231 (A. Hamilton). See also Rao, “Creation of the American 
State,” 69; Einhorn, American Taxation, 133.   
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that the customs collection regimes recently established in the coastal states had failed to 
answer the purpose. Bitter memories of the events and controversies surrounding British 
customs collection during the imperial struggle contributed to lax enforcement of the 
state customs laws during the Confederation period.35 Infirm and unvigilant collection 
practices crippled all the state regimes for the short time they existed. Gaping regulatory 
holes left most of the coastline vulnerable to undetected importation. The collectors 
rarely employed the state courts to put pressure on offenders and delinquents. Even law-
abiding merchants struggled to keep up with all the different states’ rates and regulations. 
New Jersey collected no duties at all. In this haphazard administrative environment, the 
merchants managed to avoid the state customs collectors with greater success than they 
had avoided Crown tax officials. 36  “The State Governments,” said Fisher Ames, 
“instituted by the people themselves for their particular benefit, have hitherto been unable 
to execute laws of this nature.”37 Massachusetts, with one the biggest ports on the coast, 
shuttered its customs houses in 1784. In New York, which collected the most duties of 
any state, the collector at Penobscot could observe that over the course the 1780s, the 
merchants had “found means to avoid the regulation then prescribed.” The coasting trade 
presented special problems. “Coasters have so long trampled upon the Revenue Laws of 
this State with impunity that they now think they are bound by no Laws.”38 
                                                
35 In essence, the loose administration in the states during the 1780s marked something of a return to the 
pre-revolutionary imperial customs system in the colonies, which London neglected and failed to enforce 
until the 1760s. On the lack of enforcement before the 1760s, see Barrow, Trade and Empire. For 
additional discussion of customs administration in the colonies, see Rabushka, Taxation in Colonial 
America. 
36 See White, The Federalists, 461; see also Goss, History of Tariff Administration, 10-23. 
37 1 Annals of Cong. 299 (May 9, 1789).   
38 Quoted in White, The Federalists, 461. 
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In fact, while reformers sometimes rationalized vesting the federal government 
with power over individuals on the grounds that it would simply give to the federal 
government the same ordinary powers of magistracy that the states possessed, the state 
tax regimes had their own set of problems that the Federalists did not wish to replicate at 
the federal level. Without an effective impost collection, the states relied primarily on 
direct taxes. The Federalists, to the contrary, professed a desire to avoid all direct taxes 
whatsoever and, instead, simply to harness the enormous income potential of the eastern 
seaboard trade that the existence of the different state regimes had obstructed. No less 
problematic, most collectors in the states did not work for the state governments. Rather, 
the people in the localities elected them, creating immediate conflicts of political interest 
that crippled collection efforts. Popular resistance to taxes in the backcountry, increasing 
private debt, and lack of a stable currency exacerbated the collection problem. At the 
same time, the local community’s entire tax burden fell on the designated collector, who 
became personally liable to the county or state treasurer for any and all deficiencies. 
Given the collectors’ considerable personal exposure, in many areas it became impossible 
to find individuals willing to serve.39 For all these reasons, Federal control over the 
collection of duties under the Constitution seemed a far more desirable alternative during 
ratification than it had in previous years.  
In all these ways, the Federalists succeeded in framing the debate about taxation 
primarily in terms of the impost. Article I’s virtually unlimited powers of direct and 
indirect taxation thus seem to have rode in on the back of a much narrower appeal.    
                                                
39 See Carnahan, “Pennsylvania Insurrection of 1794,” 119-120.      
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III. The Collection Acts 
But what did the Federalists do with this virtually unlimited taxation power after 
ratification? At first, they did not depart from the stipulations they made during 
ratification. They prioritized customs collection. Yet here alone, according to the man 
who would soon become the nation’s first treasury secretary, lay enormous revenue 
potential provided that the government put the proper administrative infrastructure in 
place. And why not vanquish the demons associated with the impost failures of the 1780s 
as quickly and decisively as possible?  
With the stated purposes of supporting government, discharging the debt, and 
encouraging American manufactures, the first two pieces of legislation passed by the 
First Congress after its members took their oaths in 1789 established duties on tonnage 
and a long list of imports, some by a specified flat rate, others ad valorem.40 Early 
versions of the impost elicited some significant differences of opinion on the proper 
objects of taxation (molasses, Madeira wines, and spirits attracted considerable debate), 
the rates thereof, and the recommendable degree of discrimination against British 
interests in the West Indies and elsewhere. Congress ultimately passed moderate import 
duties (though considerably higher than the old 5 percent) on virtually all imports and 
tonnage duties that greatly discriminated against foreign ships. Both duties embodied a 
good measure of protection against British interests in particular.   
The First Congress’s real legislative innovations, however, came in the Collection 
Act of 1789, which, in the words of Senator William Maclay, created an “[a]lmost entire 
                                                
40 For customs duties, see Act of July 4, 1789, chap. 2, 1 Stat. 24. For tonnage, see Act of July 20, 1789, 
chap. 3, 1 Stat. 27.  
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new system”41 In the Continental Congress’s waning days, after the impost of 1783 had 
died, a committee had proposed amendments to the Articles of Confederation that would 
have vested complete control over federal customs collection in the state governments.42 
After its first reading, no one seems to have given it any further consideration. 
Apparently, however, this proposal resurfaced early in the First Congress. John Laurance 
from New York City, a Federalist lawyer with close connections to Hamilton, 
successfully denounced it as “very inadequate to the objects of the General Government” 
and took the lead in drafting the bill that became enacted.43  
Drawing inspiration from both British customs administration in the colonies and 
New York’s customs laws, the final legislation divided up the eastern seaboard into fifty-
nine districts, each with designated ports of entry and ports of delivery. It prohibited ships 
carrying goods from abroad from entering at any other place but ports of entry, and 
prohibited ships engaged in coastal trade from entering anywhere but ports of delivery. 
Most important, it established exclusive federal control over collection. Each district 
would receive a superintending federal collector (who could appoint as many deputies as 
needed), surveyor, and, in larger districts, a presiding naval officer.44  
                                                
41 July 22, 1789 entry, Maclay, Journal, 340. 
42  Proposed Amendments, read Aug. 7, 1786, in Journals of the Continental Congress, 31:494-497. 
43 1 Annals of Cong. 367 (May 18, 1789). For reference of the bill to a new committee to include Laurance 
among others, see ibid., 453 (June 13, 1789). William Smith called Laurance the “principal draftman” of 
the bill. Philip Smith to Otho Holland Williams, Aug. 31, 1789, in Williams, Calendar, 189. Hamilton 
strongly supported Laurance in his election to the House. See, e.g., Speech at a Political Meeting, Feb. 27, 
1789, in PAH, 5:276-277; [Hamilton] To Electors of the City and County of New York, [Mar. 3, 1789], in 
ibid., 5:283-286. Laurance and Hamilton had also served as co-counsel for British plaintiffs in a number of 
cases arising out of alleged violations of the Treaty of Peace. See Hamilton, Laurance, Morgan Lewis, and 
Richard Varick to Thomas Mifflin, Dec. 10, 1783, in PAH, 3:378-379. 
44 Act of July 31, 1789, chap. 5, § 1, 1 Stat. 29-35. 
  
 256 
The legislation imposed substantial obligations on merchants over and above 
using exclusive entry points. Within forty-eight hours of arrival, masters of all incoming 
ships not already detected and boarded by officials, had to make a formal entry with the 
collector’s office for the relevant district, to produce a manifest to the collector, and to 
give an oath verifying the accuracy of the same.45 The collector then assessed duties and 
fees. Tonnage duties came due within ten days of entry and, in any case, before outgoing 
clearance.46 Unloading goods required a permit conditioned on payment of duties, giving 
a bond with one or more sureties, or tendering collateral to the collector.47 The act 
prohibited anyone from offloading goods at night or without a permit. Consignees of 
imported goods bore an independent duty to apprise the collector of received goods, 
together with the net prime cost thereof; to produce applicable invoices and bills of 
lading; and to report any delivered goods or values not reflected in the invoices.48 Finally, 
responding to complaints about the state customs laws, the legislation permitted 
merchants to draw back tendered duties on re-exported goods, but stringently regulated 
these transactions to protect against frauds and abuses.49  
 The legislation borrowed substantially from the New York statutes. Yet at least 
one foundational difference would distinguish the new federal collections regime from 
the old state regimes. It flowed from a principle of administrative theory. All the state 
regimes, including New York’s, according to Hamilton, made the security of the revenue 
dependent “essentially on the integrity of the individuals interested to avoid the payment 
                                                
45 Ibid., § 11, 1 Stat. 38-39. 
46 Ibid., § 20, 1 Stat. 42. 
47 Ibid., § 19, 1 Stat. 42. 
48 Ibid., § 13, 1 Stat. 39-40. 
49 Ibid., § 32, 1 Stat. 45-46. 
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of it.” This may have had appeal in the ideological context of the American Revolution. 
Experience had taught, however, that the “impulse of interest” inevitably destroyed 
collection regimes so conceived.50 The Collection Act therefore proceeded on a different 
assumption. The merchants would need tangible inducements to comply.  
The meticulous extent to which the Collection Act affixed sanctions, in the form 
of penalties, property forfeitures, and even imprisonment, to each and every breach of the 
rules, marked a significant departure from the customs laws in the states in this regard. 
No delinquency went unpenalized. Failure to make entry within forty-eight hours 
triggered a $500 penalty for each offense, as did refusal or neglect to make required 
oaths.51 Unloading goods without a permit or at night resulted in a $400 penalty for each 
person even remotely involved in the scheme, forfeiture of all the unloaded goods, and, in 
some cases, forfeiture of the whole vessel with tackle, furniture, and apparel.52 Dishonest 
conduct in transactions with port officials gave rise to penalties and/or forfeitures in 
every case. Two types of fraudulent conduct—landing goods for which a drawback had 
already been collected and making a false oath to a collector—resulted in 
imprisonment.53 Finally, the act required the collector, acting “in the name of the United 
States,” to bring suit for all penalties, forfeitures, and delinquent bonds, together with 
costs, in the applicable federal district court.54 
To police violations, however, customs officials wielded substantial powers of 
search, inspection, property seizure, and detainment whose exercise did not immediately 
                                                
50 Speech on the Public Credit, Dec. 13, 1790, in Hamilton, Works, 3:98-99. 
51 Act of July 31, 1789, chap. 5, § 11, 1 Stat. 39. 
52 Ibid., § 12, 1 Stat. 39. 
53 Ibid., §§ 34-35, 1 Stat. 46-47. 
54 Ibid., § 36, 1 Stat. 47. 
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depend on the courts. The collector, for example, could indefinitely detain ships for 
suspected violations by simply refusing to surrender the vessel’s register (required papers 
for a ship to sale).55 If an importer opted to deposit goods to secure duties but failed to 
pay the duties as promised, the collector could sell the deposited goods at public sale to 
cover the duties and storage costs without a court order.56 The act empowered officials to 
board any incoming ship not already entered for the purpose of acquiring manifests and 
other information.57 When directed by the collector, inspectors could go on board any 
arriving ship to examine declared goods and to monitor the unloading process to ensure 
that the seamen did not unload goods not specified in the manifest.58 Goods removed 
from the wharf without the collector’s sign-off became subject to seizure and forfeiture.  
Where suspicion existed that an invoice did not correctly reflect the actual or 
customary cost of the entered goods, the act mandated that the collector take possession 
of the goods, “at the risk and expense of the owner or consignee thereof,” until two 
“reputable merchants,” mutually chosen by the collector and consignee, determined the 
correct value.59 If officials suspected concealment of dutiable goods, they could board 
and search the ship in question without a warrant. (Where cause to suspect concealment 
of dutiable goods in a land dwelling existed, however, the act required the local justice of 
                                                
55 Section 20 required an incoming ship to deposit its register with the collector at the time of entry, “and 
there remain until outgoing clearance.” Ibid., § 20, 1 Stat. 42. This provision applied to ensure payment of 
tonnage duties, but control of the register would soon become “a means of enforcing compliance with all 
formalities of entry, payment of dues . . . and other requirements imposed upon shipmasters and 
shipowners.” White, The Federalists, 446. See also Act of Mar. 2, 1799, chap. 22, § 63, 1 Stat. 675. 
56 Act of July 31, 1789, chap. 5, § 19, 1 Stat. 42. 
57 Ibid., § 10, 1 Stat. 38. 
58 Ibid., § 15, 1 Stat. 40-41. 
59 Ibid., § 22, 1 Stat. 42. 
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the peace to issue a warrant to the collector to search the dwelling.60) Officials remained 
duty-bound to seize any concealed dutiable goods legally found in either boats or land 
dwellings on the spot, whether inside or outside their respective districts.  
Jurisdiction over ships bound from foreign ports, however, would not suffice to 
prevent all frauds on the revenue. Vessels engaged in the coastal trade—“coasters” in 
contemporaneous parlance—had traditionally played key roles in smuggling schemes. 
Passed a few days after the Collection Act, legislation relating to the coastal trade 
(“Coasting Act”) contained many provisions that helped address this issue and others 
relating to revenue collection.61 For information-gathering purposes, the act established 
registration and enrollment procedures for American vessels, and required outgoing 
clearance for all ships bound to foreign ports subject to fines.62 It required that owners of 
all ships five tons and over obtain an annual license to engage in the coastwise trade 
conditioned on payment of tonnage, an oath not to engage in illicit trade, and giving 
bond, with sufficient security, to secure the oath.63 Licensed coasting vessels carrying 
$200 worth of foreign goods or $400 of ardent spirits, as well as those bound for a district 
in a non-adjoining state carrying American goods only, needed a permit from the 
collector to secure outgoing clearance.64 For this the master had to deliver duplicate 
manifests of the whole cargo, swear to their truth, and give oaths. Unloading cargo from a 
coaster also required a permit, conditioned on similar obligations. Coastwise ships 
                                                
60 Ibid., § 24, 1 Stat. 43. 
61 See Act of Sept. 1, 1789, chap. 11, 1 Stat. 55, amended by Act of Dec. 31, 1792, chap. 1, 1 Stat. 287; Act 
Feb. 18, 1793, chap. 8, 1 Stat. 305.   
62 Act of Sept. 1, 1789, chap. 11, §§ 1, 2, 22, 1 Stat. 55, 60. See also ibid., § 24, 1 Stat. 61. 
63 Ibid., §§ 22, 23, 1 Stat. 61. 
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arriving from a non-adjoining state or carrying foreign goods or ardent spirits faced more 
stringent disclosure and oath requirements.65 Departing without a permit resulted in a 
$400 fine, and any goods not reflected in the ship’s manifest found thereafter became 
subject to seizure and forfeiture.66 Coasters bound for a foreign port had to surrender their 
license, subject to fines.67 Collectors could file suit in the district court for coasting-
related penalties and forfeitures as per the Collection Act.  
 To incentivize collection officials to execute their offices with vigor, the 
Collection and Coasting Acts established a system of official compensation based on 
transaction fees, a percentage of total collections, and bounties. The legislation fixed fee 
rates (in contrast to many of the state laws) and imposed a $200 per-offense penalty on 
officials for demanding more.68 Collectors in high-traffic ports received ½ percent of all 
monies received and paid into the treasury; in all other ports, 1 percent.69 Half of all 
penalties and forfeitures recovered in court went to the relevant port’s collector, surveyor, 
and naval officer (divided evenly). If an outside informer reported the violations, the 
legislation required port officials to give half their recovery to the informer.70 By 
incentivizing ordinary citizens to police revenue violations, the latter provision would, in 
theory, considerably enhance the government’s ability to detect violations. As to the 
collectors, bounty compensation tended to promote a measure of adversarialism between 
                                                
65 Ibid., §§ 27, 28, 1 Stat. 63. 
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the officials and the merchants—the one’s gain being the other’s loss. In the words of one 
historian, bounties thus encouraged “the aggressive exercise of coercive power.”71  
Finally, while the Collection Act required that collectors, surveyors, and naval 
officers give bonds to the United States conditioned on faithfully discharging their duties 
according to law, officials had no personal exposure for uncollected taxes in the manner 
of state tax collectors. Port officials, moreover, received considerable protections in 
claims against them alleging improper seizures, including double their costs if they 
prevailed. Even where the plaintiff prevailed, the judge could still immunize the official 
from liability by determining that reasonable grounds existed for the error.72 
IV. A Progressive Experiment 
The First Congress proceeded on the assumption that the President would appoint 
the designated port officials, but that the Treasury Department would exercise immediate 
superintendence over customs administration. The question remained, however, who to 
appoint to the collector positions. Washington prioritized two attributes—loyalty and 
experience. He also, however, wanted to act quickly. For the most part, he appointed 
revolutionary army officers, many members of the Society of the Cincinnati. He also 
gave some preference to individuals who had served in the state customs regimes, whose 
positions the Constitution had abolished. Reappointing state collectors, moreover, 
promoted continuity in the transition to the federal regime and might foster enough good 
will to enable the fledgling federal government to appropriate the existing state customs 
infrastructures for federal uses. With at least one notable exception, these factors 
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combined to produce appointments of local notables who had supported ratification. A 
few of the appointees did have criticisms of the Collection Act, particularly the 
collector’s commission rate, which seemed low when applied to state receipts during the 
confederation period. All the new collectors, however, committed themselves to 
enforcing the new laws and otherwise securing the revenue with vigor and rectitude.  
Certainly, the collectors hoped that the merchants would voluntarily comply with 
their new obligations under the Collection Act. At the same time, they quickly realized 
that many merchants had “become prejudiced in favour of old pursuits . . . They do not 
forsake their old employments and enter upon new ones with [] confidence.”73 The port 
officials, wrote Joseph Whipple (collector in Portsmouth, New Hampshire), “have the 
greatest difficulties to encounter—having unbeaten paths to explore & to reconcile a 
people accustom’d almost to no law but their will, to strict observance of Revenue Laws, 
which are generally in their nature obnoxious to Such a people.”74  
By all appearances, the new federal collectors charged fairly hard out of the 
blocks to stake out the federal government’s new administrative ground and to show the 
merchants that the many sanctions established in the Collection Act would carry real 
punch under the new system.75 Soon after the new federal customs houses went into 
operation, reports of smuggling busts, property seizures, and a whole host of other 
                                                
73  Benjamin Lincoln (Collector in Boston) to Alexander Hamilton, [Nov.-Dec. 1789], Treasury 
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regulatory violations began to appear. In one early case, the New Jersey district court 
obliged collector John Ross’s suit to fine one Adam Caldwell for assisting in unloading 
cargo on the night of August 29, 1789 in the Delaware River near Elizabeth-town.76 In 
Boston, having obtained word of a nighttime offloading, collector Benjamin Lincoln and 
his inspectors found the merchandise in question “in a barn in the north part of the town 
far distant from the Ship.” Thereupon Lincoln seized the property and the ship, and sued 
in rem in the district court for penalties, which the court awarded on default.77 A few 
weeks later Lincoln and his staff uncovered a devious scheme to disguise fish from Nova 
Scotia as local product. “I considered the detection of this fraud as a matter of 
importance,” Lincoln wrote, “for they were not only evading the duties but they were 
drawing from us a bounty of five Cents upon every quintail.” After intercepting the 
scheme at the wharf, boarding the offending vessel, seizing the fish and the ship, and 
detaining the captain, Lincoln prosecuted all the participants for penalties. In the interim, 
“[t]he Captain was taken and committed.”78            
                                                
76 The American Museum, or Universal Magazine (Philadelphia), vol. 8, Appendix IV, 4 (1790).  
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In the early period, the collectors often sought Hamilton’s opinion on how to 
interpret provisions in the revenue legislation and deferred to the Secretary’s 
interpretations. In a few instances, however, conflicts between Hamilton and the 
collectors arose. Section 31 of the Coasting Act, for example, allowed a fee of sixty cents 
“[f]or every entry of inward cargo directed to be made in conformity with this act, and for 
receiving of and qualifying to every manifest of vessels licensed to trade as aforesaid.”79 
Apparently, certain of the collectors interpreted this provision broadly to permit sixty 
cents for entering the goods, and sixty cents more for receiving the ship’s manifest. 
Hamilton disagreed, adopting the narrower construction on advice from New York 
counsel. “[I]t appears to me an important principle of public policy that allowances to 
officers should not be extended by implication or inference; as discretion on that head, 
must from the nature of the thing be liable to great abuses.”80 The collectors, however, 
pressed their case and some persisted in the practice notwithstanding the treasurer’s 
interpretation. When the Attorney General agreed with the collectors’ interpretation, 
Hamilton let the matter alone.81  
But when it came to securing the revenue and preventing fraud, Hamilton showed 
less flexibility. Thus he instructed the collectors that vessels engaged in foreign trade and 
making deliveries to more than one port, had to pay tonnage dues at each and every entry, 
not just the first. To guard against shipmasters adding items to the manifest certified by 
the collector at the previous port, Hamilton directed that quantities be expressed in words 
                                                
79 Act of Sept. 1, 1789, chap. 11, § 31, 1 Stat. 64. 
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(e.g. “Ten” rather than “10”), that each article in a given class be numbered distinctly, 
and that the previous collector attach a certificate to the manifest itself.82 Finally, in 
December 1789, as the first bonds on West Indian imports came due, Hamilton instructed 
the collectors to put overdue bonds in suit immediately. “On this point, the most exact 
punctuality will be considered as indispensable.” 83  Permitting merchants to delay 
payment in exchange for bonds already represented something of an accommodation. To 
permit them to redeem late without immediate prosecution sent the wrong signal, 
according to Hamilton.  
  Citing Hamilton’s correspondence with the collectors, recent scholarship depicts 
Hamilton as on the defensive against lax enforcement by the collectors who, on this view, 
substantially accommodated the merchants in the 1790s.84  Hamilton’s actual circulars to 
the collectors do not support this proposition. The evidence in the early period rather 
suggests that the collectors hewed fairly close to Hamilton’s instructions and sought to 
protect the revenue against smuggling and other frauds with considerable vigor. The 
collectors did have qualms about certain provisions in the revenue laws, as did Hamilton. 
For the most part, Hamilton agreed with the collectors on these issues. In some instances, 
both Hamilton and the collectors believed that the existing laws erected unjustifiable 
obstructions on trade; in others, they believed that the circumstances warranted greater 
enforcement powers, and greater sanctions for misconduct.  
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On April 22, 1790, Hamilton presented proposed legislative revisions to Congress 
that for the most part reflected concerns he shared with the collectors. On the one hand, 
Hamilton argued for revisions that would have benefited the merchants. For example, he 
advocated abandoning the tax on pickled fish from Nova Scotia, since buyers almost 
always re-exported it, such that the cost of administering the duties and drawbacks far 
exceeded any benefit to the revenue. He also proposed to give ships more time to unload 
than the fifteen-day window established in the Collection Act. Finally, he thought the 
requirement that merchants pay or secure duties on all cargo on the first entry, even 
goods ultimately bound elsewhere, constituted a "serious obstruction[] to trade” because 
it unnecessarily required that goods intended for another port be landed and, in some 
cases, weighed and measured.85  
In other areas, Hamilton argued that Congress should tighten requirements on 
merchants, impose greater sanctions for violations, and confer greater enforcement 
powers. Many of the collectors actively supported him and none opposed Hamilton on 
these issues. Concerned that the 48-hour entry rule permitted ships to proceed elsewhere 
during the window, Hamilton proposed to narrow the window to twelve hours. He 
recommended additional penalties and to increase some of the existing ones. He thought 
it prudent to empower inspectors to stay on board ships carrying imported goods as they 
went from district to district to monitor unloading; and to “secure with proper fastenings” 
all the hatches and other communications with the holds of ships.86 Hamilton considered 
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these invasive measures a benefit to trade since it would relieve merchants of the duty to 
enter and secure duties on imported good intended for other ports. To deter the merchants 
from delaying payment on their bonds, Hamilton proposed a coast-wide credit ban as an 
automatic administrative sanction upon delinquencies.87  
Yet perhaps the most pressing proposed legislative revision in the direction of 
greater enforcement concerned adequate material supplies. No sooner had the Collection 
Act gone into effect than collectors in the major ports began a concerted campaign to 
acquire a supply of official government ships to patrol the coasts for which the first 
Collection Act had failed to provide.88 Until 1791, the collectors had to make due with 
whatever boats they might acquire on their own without apportioned funding. A few 
borrowed small open row or sail boats. In Philadelphia, Sharp Delany employed a “Barge 
with Sails.”89 Yet small boats could only venture so far from the coast and had limited 
speed and maneuverability. Their small size did little to command the respect of the large 
commercial vessels they had to police. All the collectors agreed that only fully decked, 
armed schooners or sloops could answer the purpose.  
As written, the entry rules relied largely on the initiative of the shipmaster to 
come forth and declare upon “arrival” in a port or district; and the Coasting Act exempted 
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licensed vessels under twenty tons from all entry and clearance requirements. The 
collectors believed both provisions had permitted foul play among designing merchants.90  
With  revenue cutters and a supporting fleet of smaller boats, the collectors sought to 
secure the revenue by preemptive administrative action. They wanted official revenue 
cutters on patrol at all times to spot any and all ships (including coasters) approaching the 
coastline in high-risk areas, to confront and board the ships, and to secure manifests prior 
to “arrival.” This would also operate to prevent unidentified incoming vessels from 
entering into inlets and rivers where the merchants had the upper hand. Over the 
merchants’ objections, Hamilton agreed with the collectors and asked Congress to fund 
ten revenue cutters in the first instance, “the utility of which will increase in proportion as 
the public exigencies may require an augmentation of the duties.”91            
The Collection Act of 1790 obliged Hamilton and the collectors on all the 
foregoing enforcement proposals. Among other things, it halved the 48-hour entry 
window and imposed stiff fines for violations, doubled the applicable penalty for failure 
to submit required papers and oaths upon entry, and imposed new penalties in a variety of 
other areas.92 Most important, it provided for the construction of ten revenue cutters as 
per Hamilton’s proposal, and for crews on each with guaranteed compensation. 
Collectors could purchase as many additional open boats as needed for the better 
detection of frauds.93 Under the Collection Act of 1789, inspectors could, at the behest of 
the collector, go on board any ship arriving from a foreign port to examine manifests and 
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supervise unloading; absent a reason to suspect fraud, officials had no search powers and 
even those with access to small open boats could scarcely venture out of port to meet an 
arriving ship. The Collection Act of 1790 gave the new revenue cutter officers (and other 
port officials) the power to go on board any arriving ship (even a coaster) and to intercept 
the ship as far out as twelve miles from the coast. Upon boarding a ship, moreover, 
officials now possessed broad powers to search “the cabin and every other part of the 
ship,” to install locks on the hatches and other portals to the ship’s hold during the 
nighttime hours, to seal any containers found outside the hold, and to remain on board a 
ship going from one district to another.94 
  Hamilton assigned the first ten cutters to Boston (the Massachusetts), New 
London (the Argus), Philadelphia (the General Greene), Portsmouth (the Scammel), New 
York (the Vigilant), Norfolk (the Virginia), Baltimore (the Active), New Bern, NC (the 
Diligence), Charleston (the South Carolina), and Savannah (the Eagle). Each carried light 
but considerable arms—at least ten muskets with bayonets, twenty pistols, one broad axe, 
and two chisels.95 At least three had swivel guns installed on deck.96 All the first ten 
cutter captains commissioned by Washington came recommended by the respective 
collectors, local politicians and, in some cases, merchants. All but one had served at sea 
during the Revolution as naval, marine, or privateering officers.97   
On June 4, 1791, Hamilton disseminated a circular to the new cutter captains, 
underlining key provisions in the Collection Act of 1790 and offering instructions as to 
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how to execute their duties. The cutters’ sole task, according to Hamilton, consisted in 
guarding the revenue from all infractions on the coast, bays and rivers “pre[vi]ous to the 
anchoring of Vessels.” For these purposes, the cutters would need constantly to “ply 
along the Coasts in the neighbourhood of your Station, & to traverse the different parts of 
the Waters which it comprehends.” The officers, Hamilton wrote, must confront, board, 
and demand manifests “indiscriminately” from incoming vessels. Hamilton also laid 
emphasis on Section 15 of the Collection Act of 1790, which authorized the cutter 
officers to “arrest and bring back” any ship hailing from abroad attempting to depart from 
a district within the United States without reporting to the relevant officials.98 Preventing 
such departures “must essentially depend on the Revenue Cutters.” Finally, while 
Hamilton recommended “in the strongest terms . . . activity, vigilance & firmness,” he 
also admonished the officers to “keep in mind that their Countrymen are Freemen & as 
such are impatient of every thing that bears the least mark of a domineering Spirit.” The 
officers should therefore avoid all “haughtiness, rudeness or insult” and “endeavour to 
overcome difficulties . . . by a cool and temperate perseverance in their duty.” Law not 
emotion or impulse governed the relationship. The officers, after all, had the law on their 
side and could “meet with nothing disagreeable in the execution of their duty which [] 
[the law] will not severely reprehend.”99       
Of course, ten cutters, no matter how large and fitted out, could not patrol every 
area of the coast at once. Stationed at strategic spots with telescopes, however, the cutter 
                                                
98 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, chap. 35, § 15, 1 Stat.158. 
99 Hamilton to the Captain of the Revenue Cutters, June 4, 1791, Circular Letters of the Secretary of the 
Treasury (T Series), RG 56, M735, National Archives, Waltham.    
  
 271 
crewman could detect most incoming ships. Every maritime historian who has studied the 
early revenue cutter operations has concluded without hesitation that the first revenue 
cutters reduced smuggling, deterred dishonest conduct, and otherwise greatly contributed  
to the effective enforcement of revenue and other coastal regulations.100  
The merchants now knew that as far as twelve miles out, they could by law be 
detained, their manifests demanded, their ships searched in their entirety, their goods and 
wares seized. Better to just comply, give a bond, and try to pass as much of the duties and 
fees onto purchasers and consignees as possible. A few months after launching the 
Massachusetts, collector Benjamin Lincoln observed that many merchants now paid their 
dues with “cheerfulness & punctuality.”101 Not all did, however, and soon thereafter 
revenue cases spiked on the New England district court dockets—many based on revenue 
and coasting violations first detected by the revenue cutters.102  In addition to smuggling, 
the cutters’ indiscriminate boardings and searches exposed innumerable other infractions 
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such as failure to carry manifests, sailing abroad without surrendering a coastal license, 
and carrying false registration papers.103  
In the coming years, the federal government would call upon the revenue cutters 
to do more than secure revenue. The cutters helped enforce neutrality-related prohibitions 
and the embargo of 1794.104 In the period from 1797 to 1799, the government constructed 
a fleet of revenue cutters substantially larger than the first ten and employed them in the 
quasi-war with France together with other naval vessels. For a few years, the American 
revenue cutters functioned as both warships and domestic police forces. In addition to 
light arms and swivel guns, these larger cutters boasted as many as sixteen canons.105 
V. Explaining the System’s Early Successes 
Judging from the federal government’s revenue receipts, the federal custom 
houses created by the Collection Acts enjoyed great success in the 1790s. From 1792 to 
1795, federal officials in the major ports collected nearly six-hundred percent more than 
their state counterparts had in the period from 1785-1788.106 Throughout the 1790s, 
annual impost revenues steadily increased and by decade’s end had grown nearly 
fourfold.107 Why the impressive growth? A steady increase in the value of imports 
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accounts for some it. Increases in tax rates and a decline in smuggling activities account 
for more. But why, ultimately, did the merchants pay higher duties and engage in less 
smuggling than they had before?  
Some portion of the merchants doubtless voluntarily complied out of a sense of 
duty and patriotism. Many, after all, had signed on to the new Constitution. Two extrinsic 
factors may have further facilitated voluntary compliance: Government bondholders 
stood to benefit directly from a stronger national revenue and favorable economic 
conditions in the 1790s usually allowed the merchants to pass a good portion of their 
customs duties to purchases. Recent historians of early national taxation, however, have 
laid emphasis on another cause. They suggest that the customs system owed its success to 
a governing approach in Congress, in the Treasury Department, and in the customhouses 
that “accommodated, rather than coerced” the merchants.108 By this account, in its early 
stages the fragile federal government ceded substantial regulatory ground to the 
merchants, striking a “grand compromise” whereby “the merchant capitalists paid taxes 
but controlled the means of national regulation.”109 According to one scholar, “it is hardly 
too much to say that in the early years of the republic, the major customs houses were run 
by the local merchants.”110 
To be sure, the early federal government faced a situation in the customhouses 
that required prudence and, in some circumstances, moderation. Customs revenue and 
                                                
108 Rao, “Creation of the American State,” 487.    
109 Ibid., 491.  
110 Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution, 297. The roots of the accommodation thesis lay in 
Dalzell, “Taxation with Representation.” See also Edling,  Revolution in Favor of Government, 210, citing 
Rao and Dalzell and arguing that “the Federalists did not believe in coercing the merchants to pay their 
duties” and that the federal government “lacked the coercive power to force them to do so.”  
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therefore the federal government itself depended on the merchants and on a robust coastal 
and transatlantic trade. No one in the federal government wanted to make war on the 
merchants. No one wanted to tax the merchants out of existence. All desired to facilitate 
free trade, not impede it. All knew that establishing the federal government’s authority 
would by necessity take time and should proceed in increments. With these things said, 
however, the accommodation thesis exaggerates the extent to which the government 
deferred to the merchants and accords undue significance to accommodation in 
explaining the early revenue system’s success. Whatever the merchants’ influence, 
neither Congress nor the Treasury Department or the port officials accommodated them 
as a class in ways that compromised the federal government’s coercive powers.  
First, Congress did not substantially accommodate the merchants. Rather, over 
the course of the 1790s, it imposed greater and greater taxes on the merchants. The early 
revenue legislation, moreover, gave port officials capacious enforcement powers, 
imposed substantial penalties for each and every violation, and contained only token 
protections for the merchants themselves. As we have seen, in response to Hamilton’s 
proposals, Congress acted quickly to pass the Collection Act of 1790, which further 
expanded the enforcement powers of port officials and established more sanctions. 
Indeed, in the sphere of enforcement, one strains to imagine what additional powers of 
administrative coercion Congress might have granted. By 1798, the cutters had mounted 
canons and the next year Congress made it lawful for the cutter crews, after firing a 
warning shot, to “fire at or into” any vessel that attempted to flee inspection.111 To be 
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sure, Congress delayed in amending the Coasting Act 1789 and thereby, for a time, 
permitted designing merchants to exploit a loophole exempting licensed coasters from 
formal entry and clearance requirements.112 No evidence exists, however, that Congress 
delayed for the purpose of accommodating the merchants. In any case, when Congress 
did act, in 1793, it did so vigorously, closing the loophole and confirming that officials’ 
broad search powers extended to coasting vessels, their cargoes, and their papers.113 It is 
true that Congress did not act on Hamilton’s proposal to establish revenue supervisors in 
each state to superintend the collectors and one might argue that this enabled a greater 
degree of localism to influence the collectors than might have otherwise prevailed. Again, 
however, no evidence exists that in failing to establish such supervisors Congress 
intended to accommodate the merchants.   
Second, the Treasury Department did not substantially accommodate the 
merchants. The correspondence between Hamilton and the collectors, and later between 
Oliver Wolcott, Jr. and the collectors, shows that the Treasury Department consistently 
took a firm stance in favor of vigorous enforcement. Accommodationist scholars cite to 
Hamilton’s July 22, 1792 circular to the collectors as evidence for the proposition that, at 
this auspicious moment, Hamilton “abandon[ed] his policy of administrative ‘strictness’” 
and “relented” to “[l]ocal power structures.”114 The circular, however, concerned the 
specific issue, noted above, of how to interpret collector fee provisions in the Coasting 
Act. The collectors advanced a broad interpretation that would have lined their own 
                                                
112 Hamilton had recommended revisions to the Coasting Act in early 1790, at the same time he 
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113 Act of Feb. 18, 1793, chap. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 315.  
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pockets at the expense of the merchants. Hamilton advanced a narrower construction but, 
when Attorney General Randolph disagreed with him, half-heartedly approved some 
discretion to the collectors on the issue until Congress resolved the question, which it did 
only a few months later. Hamilton took pains to emphasize that his comments only 
applied to the specific fee provision in question.115 In any case, Hamilton’s temporary 
concession here in no way accommodated the merchants. Rather it accommodated the 
collectors at the expense of the merchants.  
The Treasury Department, to be sure, countenanced and even recommended the 
exercise of discretion on the part of the collectors in areas where the law permitted it and 
where such discretion did not threaten revenue security. Where economic circumstances 
(particularly liquidity issues) rendered strict compliance with the revenue laws unusually 
burdensome, or where the merchants appealed over the collector’s head, Treasury took 
notice. Rarely, however, did it relent. The few exceptions cited by scholars only prove the 
rule. In the case of Providence collector Jeremiah Olney, whose rigorous, almost 
unthinking enforcement practices caused influential merchants in Providence to galvanize 
against him, Hamilton privately counseled restraint in this “very special” case if it did not 
entail “improper sacrifice or introducing a looseness of practice.”116 At the same time, 
Hamilton had originally authorized Olney to take the administrative action about which 
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the merchants complained, and in the litigation arising out of the matter helped develop 
an interpretation of the Collection Act that would bring the merchants to book.117  
In May 1790, Congress passed legislation authorizing the Secretary to remit or 
mitigate fines where facts certified by the applicable district judge failed to show an 
intent to defraud the revenue.118 During his tenure as Treasury Secretary, Hamilton 
received many such petitions. If Hamilton intended to accommodate the merchants, we 
might expect to find evidence of this in his responses. His responses, however, do not 
reveal a pattern of accommodation, but rather close attention to the factual circumstances 
of each case. He granted some, denied others, and in many instances withheld judgment 
altogether pending further factual findings.119 His successor, Oliver Wolcott, evinced, if 
anything, less magnanimity than Hamilton with respect to such petitions.120 In 1795, 
Wolcott did reverse Virginia collector William Heth’s seizure of the schooner Molly for 
carrying three casks of porter not listed in the vessel’s manifest. The Chesapeake 
merchants must have applauded the reversal. Yet here the revenue laws did not clearly 
authorize Heth’s seizure and, in any case, the remedy—seizure of the entire ship—did not 
fit the infraction. Still, Wolcott commended Heth for his energetic enforcement efforts in 
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the case.121 In all cases, Treasury’s resolution of petitions for remission operated to affirm 
rather than undermine, let alone surrender, the federal government’s authority over the 
petitioning merchants. 
Finally, the port officials did not accommodate the merchants in a way that 
compromised federal authority or otherwise relinquished the means of national regulation 
and coercion. Accommodationist scholarship does not contend that surveyors, inspectors, 
naval officers or cutter crewmen accommodated the merchants. The primary evidence on 
which these scholars rely concerns the collectors’ practices with respect to customs 
bonds. The Collection Acts gave proprietors and consignees the option of paying 
assessed import duties after selling the goods at market by giving a bond in lieu of 
payment, together with either sureties or a deposit of goods as security.122 Once the bonds 
went delinquent, and assuming that any deposited goods sold at public sale did not satisfy 
the balances in full, the act mandated that collectors commence actions “forthwith” for 
recovery of any unpaid amounts.123 Accommodationist scholars emphasize the extent to 
which the collectors let bonds go delinquent without initiating prosecutions. They suggest 
that this represented a significant victory for the merchants, the triumph of 
accommodation over coercion, and a continuance of the lenient Confederation-era 
practices in the state custom houses.  
                                                
121 Wolcott to Heth, Nov. 24, 1797, quoted in Dalzell, “Taxation with Representation,” 276. Like Olney, 
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The evidence that accommodationist scholars cite from the early period, however, 
does not bear out their thesis. They rely, for example, on Hamilton’s report on custom 
house receipts in 1791 with sizeable sums listed under the heading “Bonds 
Uncollected.”124 The report, however, did not specify the portion, if any, of these 
amounts attributable to delinquent bonds not yet put in suit.125 In some of the large ports, 
this portion remained low. During the period covered by the report, Boston experienced 
very few, if any, delinquencies. Collector Benjamin Lincoln submitted returns to 
Hamilton in November 1791 establishing that the merchants in Boston had punctually 
paid their bonds “for more than a year past.”126 As to those bonds that did go delinquent, 
the New England district court records in the 1790s (which accommodationist scholars 
ignore) do not suggest lax enforcement practices. Particularly in Connecticut, the courts’ 
files contain many prosecutions on bonds of which a considerable number proceeded to 
judgment and execution.127 
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To be sure, throughout the 1790s and beyond many importers preferred to give 
bonds, as it allowed them to sell their goods at market and pay duties from the proceeds. 
Some merchants operated on margins so thin that they had no choice but to obtain credit. 
When markets dried up unexpectedly, this often left these merchants without wherewithal 
to pay their bonds.128 Issues surrounding payment by notes from state banks also delayed 
bond cancellation in the early period. As did small infractions, such as post-dated 
checks.129 If certain collectors exercised restraint under these types of circumstances, it 
redounded to the benefit of the revenue and marked less an accommodation to the 
merchants than to economic realities. Whether some delay in putting late bonds into suit 
ran contrary to the Collection Act, moreover, remained open to question, because the 
legislation prescribed no time limit for prosecutions.130  
  Most important, with rare exceptions late bonds did eventually get paid, often 
with interest accruing from the maturation date. When all else failed, the merchants 
simply tendered some or all the goods that they had been unable to sell.131 Indeed, the 
most remarkable feature of bond practices in the customhouses in the 1790s is not the 
collectors’ failure to prosecute late bonds—which happened in only a small minority of 
cases—but the extent to which  merchants ultimately followed through on their bond 
commitments. Why did they do so? To argue that they paid because the collectors 
                                                
128 Evidence from Philadelphia and New York suggests that economic contractions in 1794 caused the 
collectors there to temporarily refrain from prosecuting late bonds on pleas from the merchants. Dalzell, 
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accommodated them by permitting them to pay late can only account for a minority of 
bond transactions. It also begs the question: why did the merchants in such cases pay at 
all? Perhaps a sense of obligation. Certainly the magisterial sanction of a coast-wide 
credit freeze incentivized many delinquent merchants to pay. Even those collectors that 
permitted bonds to go late, moreover, did not cancel the bonds. Interest therefore accrued 
and, until 1799, the courts and collectors exercised discretion in setting the rate. Above 
all, permitting late bond payments did not relinquish the means of federal regulation to 
the merchants, as accommodationist scholars suggest. The bonds always loomed over the 
delinquent merchants’ heads. They stood exposed to prosecution at any time. Behind 
every bond, whether or not late, lay coercive remedies that the merchants wanted to 
avoid.  
The evidence that, at first glance, best fits the accommodationist thesis on 
customs bonds comes from a single port—Charleston, South Carolina.132 By 1797, the 
Treasury Department had acquired evidence that delinquent bonds had become a serious, 
perhaps even systemic problem in Charleston under the collectorship of Isaac Holmes. To 
make matters worse, Holmes had submitted highly misleading account reports to 
Treasury in an effort to hide the problem. Once the problem came to light, however, 
Treasury did not simply let it lie or otherwise indulge the Charleston custom house’s 
leniencies. It took decisive action, appointing a new collector (James Simons) who 
ramped up enforcement efforts. By June 1798, Simons had turned the situation around, 
reporting huge revenue receipts from Charleston. Secretary Wolcott commended Simons 
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for correcting the “devious” habits that Holmes had countenanced and perhaps even 
encouraged.133 When Simons floated the idea of forgiving some of the previous losses, 
Treasury refused the suggestion. Instead, the federal government arrested and 
commenced a slew of high profile prosecutions against prominent Charleston 
merchants—one against Robert Hazlehurst for $59,000 on twenty-three bonds; another 
against Ebenezer Coffin for over $16,000 on two bonds; and four others for amounts 
around $10,000 each. Juries returned verdicts for the government in all these cases and 
the merchants, under threat of foreclosure, seizure and imprisonment, finally paid up.134   
VI. Internal Taxes 
As we have seen, during the ratification the Federalists placed a fairly narrow 
construction on the taxation clause that confined it, for all intents and purposes, to 
indirect taxation in the form of customs duties. In The Federalist, however, Hamilton had 
also broached the possibility of an excise on ardent spirits and, as part of the first 
financial report that he presented to Congress, continued to advocate such an excise. Like 
import duties, excises qualified as “indirect” taxes. Unlike the impost, however, they also 
qualified as “internal”—an ideologically loaded category of impositions against which 
Americans had revolted during the imperial struggle and Revolution. Federal excises in 
the American environment would therefore require care and caution.  
 Congress preferred to table Hamilton’s proposed excise pending resolution of the 
assumption question. Assumption mattered because, among other things, it would 
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substantially increase the federal government’s debt obligations. When Congress did 
approve an assumption bill in August 1790, it also immediately raised customs rates 
across the board.135 By the end of 1790, however, it had become clear to Hamilton that 
interest on the assumed state debts would require additional revenue. An internal tax 
recommended itself for a few reasons. First, with a substantial customs rate increase to go 
into effect at year’s end, it made sense to wait before imposing further burdens on the 
merchants. Second, with the impost in its infancy, Hamilton felt that the government 
would do well in any case to diversify its sources of revenue. Third, assumption produced 
tremendous tax relief in the states. With the burdens of state internal taxation 
significantly lightened, Hamilton expected the beneficiaries to become more receptive (or 
at least less resistant) to a fairly small internal federal tax levied for the purpose of, in 
essence, funding the relief program. Finally, early supporters of internal taxation worried 
about the federal government’s lack of visibility in the interior. Without internal taxation, 
Connecticut Governor Oliver Wolcott Sr. wrote in 1790, many people “would not have 
the least apprehension of the existence of a national government and consequently have 
no regard for it.”136 “A man ought to feel the force of government, to reverence it,” 
declared Hartford Federalist Chauncey Goodrich.137  
Yet, for the moment, Hamilton hesitated to go so far as Wolcott and Goodrich to 
advocate a direct tax. Better to proceed by increments. The government had first to 
attempt an excise. Thus, in his December 13, 1790 Report on the Public Credit Hamilton 
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reiterated his earlier proposal to target the production and consumption of hard alcohol. 
To this end, he advocated a new tax on domestically distilled spirits and to raise customs 
duties on foreign spirits.138 Depicting the excise as a milder and less costly alternative to 
a land tax, Hamilton thought the “expediency” of taxing hard alcohol in particular, which 
many Americans considered a source of extravagance and impoverishment, seemed “too 
obvious to justify.” The only real question concerned the “mode of collection.” Here 
Hamilton rejected the idea that existing collections operations in the ports could 
adequately enforce the new taxes and criticized the state excise regimes for relying too 
much on the “integrity” of the taxpayers rather than, like his own plan, the “vigilance of 
the public officers.”139 
After a hard-fought debate in the House, Hamilton’s liquor excise became law 
over the prostrate bodies of southern and mid-Atlantic Antifederalists. Opponents called 
the tax “odious, unequal, unpopular, and oppressive” and feared the “swarm” of tax 
collectors the legislation would “let loose” throughout the country.140 The legislation 
established duties on imported liquor from twenty to forty cents per gallon depending on 
proof; on spirits distilled in the United States from foreign materials, from eleven to thirty 
cents; and on wholly domestic spirits, from nine to twenty five cents, if in a city, town, or 
village. Country stills would pay an annual duty of sixty cents for each gallon of their 
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capacity.141 Collection of the duties on imported liquor occurred basically by the same 
process applicable to collecting duties on other imports, subject to the same kinds of 
oaths, searches, penalties, and forfeitures. 142  Collecting the duties on domestically 
distilled spirits, however, would require substantially more administration.  
For these purposes, the excise law (like the Collection Act and Judiciary Act) 
divided the nation into multiple districts corresponding to each state; and further divided 
each district into surveys. It provided for the appointment of revenue supervisors in each 
district and for as many inspectors as needed in each survey. Distillers producing 
designated spirits for sale had to post signs indicating as much above the doors of every 
building or apartment used to make or store such spirits, to make formal entry with 
inspectors, and to keep proper inventory paperwork—subject to penalties and/or 
forfeitures. The tax came due biannually upon demand by officials at the proprietor’s 
dwelling place and, in any case, prior to first removal from the distillery. Each removed 
cask required a certificate issued by the inspector “to accompany the same wherever it 
shall be sent” and had to bear required government markings, on pain of forfeiture. 143 
Proprietors forfeited any whiskey “fraudulently deposited, hid, or concealed.”144   
Excises had traditionally drawn objections in the American context for two 
primary reasons: First, in the states they had become associated with summary “distress 
and sale” collection procedures that derogated from the course of the common law, 
including the right to a jury. Second, like their imperial predecessors excise collectors in 
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the states typically had broad discretionary search powers. Before Congress, Hamilton 
contended that neither objection applied to the 1791 excise law. The legislation itself tells 
a different story. Inspectors received virtually unlimited discretion to enter and search 
registered distilleries or warehouses “upon request” for any reason whatsoever and 
without a warrant.145 Searching other places required a warrant. Contrary to Hamilton’s 
gloss, moreover, the legislation did in fact give collectors the option of recovering unpaid 
taxes by levying on goods and selling them at public auction without resort to the 
courts.146 In actions brought by officials for seizures, on the other hand, the act required a 
trial by jury and a finding of probable cause for making the seizure.   
As it happened, the country’s first federal excise encountered little resistance in 
New England and New York since in those regions it fell primarily on large rum 
producers capable of absorbing the cost. Many large producers near the ports also stood 
to gain from the increased customs duties on competing foreign spirits. Despite its 
relaxations for smaller country stills, the act seemed much more oppressive to the 
multitude of small whiskey distillers in the mid-Atlantic and southern backcountries 
many of whom kept stills in or around their homes. After the costs of transporting the 
product to market in the east, these farmers had precious little left to pay the tax. Even 
prior to their collapse in the late 1780s, moreover, the state magistracies extended only so 
far as a geographical matter. Many frontier families had grown accustomed to living 
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without any laws whatsoever. In all cases, internal taxes imposed by a distant government 
raised every red flag of revolutionary ideology.  
Western Pennsylvania had more small stills than any other area in the country and 
therefore resistance to the federal excise grew particularly strong there. The Scotch-Irish 
population in this region (particularly the Fourth Survey) had cultivated a deep hatred for 
excise men in the home country and had accordingly opposed state attempts to collect 
excises in the 1780s with great intensity. By 1787, officials associated with excise 
collection in any form had become “acceptable objects for social aggression” on the 
Pennsylvania frontier.147 Soon after enactment of the whiskey excise, citizens in the 
Fourth Survey proceeded under a charge to treat all tax officials “with contempt and 
absolutely refuse all kind of communication or intercourse.” 148 State sheriffs and judicial 
officials conspired with the rebels against federal collection efforts by refusing to 
cooperate in the execution of federal process.149  
By the fall of 1792, Hamilton had begun to consider the possibility of military 
action.150 Steady collection efforts and a presidential proclamation, however, brought 
most of the delinquent distillers into compliance by 1794. Yet a determined minority 
persevered. The rebellion’s final provocation occurred when federal officials succeeded 
in serving legal process on unregistered distillers in the Fourth Survey, requiring them to 
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travel long distances to Philadelphia for trial in federal court.151 This prompted the attack 
on inspector John Neville’s house that commenced the general outbreak.  
As we have seen, proceeding cautiously under the Militia Acts the Washington 
administration succeeded in putting together an army formidable enough to quell the 
rebellion before any overt military confrontation occurred. Congress thereupon 
appropriated ample funds to indemnify officials and supportive citizens for property 
damage caused by mob.152 “When the officers know that they are to be protected in their 
persons and property—when the posse comitatus are informed that they are to be 
regarded in a like manner—we may expect energy in the execution of the laws.”153  
At this point, the Federalists might have simply let things lie for a time. 
Suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion, however, seemed to give pro-tax Federalists 
greater and not less confidence in their cause. The ever-escalating European wars, 
moreover, presented new exigencies. To finance defense measures that anticipated 
American involvement in the wars, Congress began enacting a number of new excises in 
1794. These included excises on carriages, retailers of wines and foreign spirits, snuff, 
refined sugars, and auction sales—all to be enforced by the same internal revenue 
officials appointed under the first excise act and by essentially the same means. As it 
happened, all the new excises proved fairly uncontroversial except the carriage tax, which 
prominent Virginians challenged in the federal courts as an unapportioned direct tax 
                                                
151 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 463. This prompted an amendment in June 1794 permitting 
excise suits in state courts in extenuating circumstances. Ibid. 
152 Act of Feb. 27, 1795, chap. 33, 1 Stat. 423.  
153 4 Annals of Cong. 996 (Dec. 1794) (Rep. Hartley).  
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under Article I.154 Both federal and state officials looked to the Supreme Court to decide 
the question and, in Hylton v. United States (1796), the Federalists achieved a major 
victory when the Court unanimously affirmed the carriage tax’s constitutionality.155  
Pro-tax confidence rose further. Weeks after the Hylton decision, Congress raised 
the carriage tax, strengthened its enforcement provisions, and established an elaborate 
administrative grievance procedure designed to keep further tax disputes out of the 
courts. 156 The new legislation mandated that inspectors proceed against delinquent 
taxpayers in the first instance by the summary procedure of distress and sale of good and 
chattels. To gear up for war against France, a stamp tax eerily reminiscent of the one that 
had precipitated the imperial struggle in the 1760s followed.157 Finally, in 1798 Congress 
capped the accumulation of federal excises by passing the nation’s first direct tax—a $2 
million assessment on land, houses, and slaves.158 Rather than relying on existing offices 
established under the excise laws, the direct tax legislation established a horde of new 
officials—commissioners, assessors, and collectors—to appraise land and houses, 
enumerate slaves, and otherwise secure payment of the taxes. Here again, the collectors 
received no statutory authority to sue property owners for unpaid taxes in the courts; the 
legislation directed them to proceed only by distress and sale of the taxpayer’s property.  
Nascent Republicans saw the land and house taxes as but one part of a 
monarchical Federalist agenda that included establishing a standing army and suppressing 
political speech. Popular opposition to the new taxes grew strongest in southeastern 
                                                
154 See Marcus, “Introduction [to Hylton v. United States],” in DHSC, 7:359-502. 
155 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
156 Act of May 28, 1796, chap. 37, 1 Stat. 478. 
157 Act of July 6, 1797, chap. 11, 1 Stat. 527. 
158 Act of July 14, 1798, chap. 75, 1 Stat. 597. 
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Pennsylvania where German protestants instinctively rejected as “unconstitutional” any 
tax on something so sacred as their own homes. Although these “church Germans” had 
reliably cast their votes for Federalists in the 1790s, the new taxes and Jeffersonian 
propaganda surrounding the war legislation caused most to realign as demonstrated in the 
1798 congressional elections.  
Not surprisingly, Pennsylvania commissioner Jacob Eyerly found it virtually 
impossible to find individuals willing to serve as local assessors in southeastern 
Pennsylvania. Those that did agree to serve encountered obstruction, intimidation, and 
threats of armed force among the Germans, effectively immobilizing collection efforts.159 
Upon request from tax officials, Pennsylvania circuit court judge Richard Peters issued 
arrest warrants for a number of suspected obstructionists and thereupon the federal 
marshal, with posse, imprisoned eighteen suspects in Bethlehem pending transportation 
to Philadelphia for interrogation. After an armed cadre of nearly one-hundred-fifty men 
compelled the marshal to release the suspects, President Adams called out federal troops. 
Those troops easily overawed the rebels and thereby put an end to the tax uprising 
historians now call Fries’s Rebellion.160   
Conclusion and Summary 
Popular opposition to internal taxation under the Federalist-controlled government 
put wind in the sails of the Jeffersonian ascendancy and ultimately helped pave the way 
to the Federalist Party’s demise. The Revolution of 1800 all but rendered Article I’s 
                                                
159 Testimony of Jacob Eyerly, in Wharton, State Trials, 510-16. 
160 On Fries’s Rebellion, see Newman, Fries’s Rebellion; Davis, The Fries Rebellion.  
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supreme powers of internal taxation a dead letter for many years to come.161 Pro-taxation 
Federalists failed in this regard because their experiments in internal taxation betrayed the 
narrow construction they had placed on the taxing power during the ratification debates. 
And because they used the taxes not to pay down the debt, but to fund a standing military 
establishment, which, in turn, they employed to repress tax resistance movements. All of 
this seemed to bear out Patrick Henry’s dire predictions of a military government under 
the Constitution.  
To focus on the immediate fate of internal taxes, however, obscures the 
Federalists’ considerable administrative accomplishments in the realm of external taxes 
in the customs houses. Even at their peak in 1801, internal taxes accounted for only 8 
percent of total revenue. Virtually all the federal government’s revenue in the decades 
after ratification came from one place: the customs houses. Customs revenue, moreover, 
grew at an almost unbelievable rate from day one.162  
To attribute the early growth of customs revenues to the federal government’s 
accommodation of the merchants, however, tells an incomplete story because it describes 
the system as a whole through the lens of a small minority of cases. The theory is based 
on a contradiction—that the government secured greater customs revenue by excusing 
non-payment. In fact, the government secured greater customs revenue by not excusing 
non-payment. Perhaps some historically significant measure of accommodation as to the 
timing of payments on customs bonds did occur (primarily in South Carolina) but the 
                                                
161 Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America, 24. For the Jeffersonians’ repeal of the Federalists’ internal 
taxes, see Act of Apr. 6, 1802, chap. 19, 2 Stat. 148.   
162 Wallis, “Federal Government Revenue by Source, 1789-1939,” in Carter, Historical Statistics, 5-82  
(Table Ea588-593). 
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government vigorously prosecuted those cases, and even Isaac Holmes’ accommodations 
paled in comparison to the loose enforcement practices that prevailed during the 1780s. 
The period saw the federal government taking and holding much more administrative 
ground in the ports than it ceded. It saw the appointment of federal collectors remarkable 
more for their energy, vigilance, and meticulous attention to the law than for their 
leniencies and relaxations.  
Accommodation does not and cannot account for the early federal revenue 
system’s resounding successes. The credible threat of administrative and judicial 
sanctions made the early American customs system work and enabled it to thrive.  
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CHAPTER 8  
 
COERCION THROUGH THE JUDICIARY 
 
*  *  * 
Tax collection in the early republic carved out for the federal executive 
magistracy a critical administrative role within the constitutional structure of coercion. 
Yet our discussion of tax collection in the last chapter also gestured toward the 
judiciary’s essential function in the logic that underlay the operation of coercion by other 
means within the new system. Where magisterial enforcement efforts failed, and where 
large rebellions did not necessitate military intervention, the federal government’s 
immediate recourse against recalcitrant taxpayers lay in the courts. To recover statutory 
penalties and confirm forfeitures, the collectors had no choice but to seek court orders. 
With respect to enforcing the federal government’s supremacy through coercion by other 
means, all roads led ultimately to that branch which Alexander Hamilton misleadingly 
characterized as the “least dangerous.”1 All roads, that is, led to what William R. Davie 
called “coercion through the judiciary.”2   
                                                
1 The Federalist No. 78, 437 (Alexander Hamilton). For the alternative view, arguably held by a much 
wider swath of Americans and perhaps, in fact, even Hamilton himself, see Maryland Representative 
Michael Stone’s comments in 1 Annals of Cong. 827 (Aug. 1789): “It is well observed, and I concur in the 
opinion, that of all the wheels of Government, the Judicial is the most disagreeable.” For Elbridge Gerry’s 
prediction that the federal judiciary would become a “Star Chamber” and “oppressive,” see his September 
15, 1787 Federal Convention speech in Farrand, Records, 2:635 (Rufus King’s notes), and his Statement to 
the Massachusetts Senate, October 18, 1787, in ibid., 3:128.  
2 July 29, 1788 Speech at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, in Elliot, Debates, 4:155. 
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What did Davie mean by this phrase? We can begin to articulate an answer by 
posing a related question: Why did the framers create a distinct judicial power in the first 
place? What constitutional function did the federal judiciary serve in historical context? 
The dissertation’s final three chapters explore the ways in which the framers and 
Federalists intended the judicial function to address the problem of coercion within the 
constitutional order, and whether it in fact did so in the period after ratification. The 
present chapter commences the analysis in two parts. Part I examines original 
understandings surrounding the Constitution’s judicial provisions and Part II the creation 
and basic structure of the first federal judicial establishment. 
I. Essential Functions: The Enforcement of Supremacy 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress lacked authority to 
establish courts of law except in the narrow category of prize appeals and its forays into 
the latter area proved ineffective and ended in embarrassment. Not until mid-1786, when 
crisis loomed, did a delegate to Congress first broach the possibility of amending the 
Articles to provide for a federal appeals court with some constitutional significance 
beyond cases of capture.3 The proposal met with the sound of crickets. The idea of 
creating an independent federal judicial department on par with the judiciaries in the 
states seems to have found its first expression in the correspondence of Henry Knox and 
James Madison in early 1787.4 The idea, however, of creating an independent federal 
                                                
3 See Proposed Amendments (art. 19), read Aug. 7, 1786, in Journals of the Continental Congress, 31:497. 
4 See Knox to Washington, Jan. 14, 1787, in Washington, Papers, 4:518-23; Madison to Edmund 
Randolph, Apr. 8, 1787, in Madison, Writings, 2:339.  
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judicial department to address the problem of coercion first emerged during the Federal 
Convention.   
At the Federal Convention’s outset, conflicts among the delegates existed on a 
whole host of issues, with representation looming largest in the opening weeks. The 
record reveals, however, that a robust consensus quickly formed in Philadelphia on at 
least one head:  the need to make the federal government “paramount” or “supreme” over 
the states within its sphere.5 To be sure, disagreements arose as to the proper procedural 
requisites for such supremacy to take effect and over just how far the federal sphere 
should extend as a substantive matter. These questions, however, did not strike at 
supremacy’s true essence, which concerned a constitutional relationship.  
Notably, high-profile nationalists had argued in earnest during the 1780s that the 
Continental Congress possessed supremacy so conceived relative to the states. Indeed, 
John Marshall would later go so far as to assert that “[t]he requisitions of Congress under 
the confederation were as constitutionally obligatory as the laws enacted by the present 
Congress.”6 What, then, changed in 1787? Certainly, Article VI gave national supremacy 
                                                
5 The Virginia Plan reflected a robust conception of national supremacy and, as amended, specifically 
employed the term “Supreme” to describe each of the three departments within the proposed national 
government. Randolph Resolution No. 1, as amended (June 13, 1787), in Farrand, Records, 1:228. Yet we 
should not forget that the otherwise backward-looking New Jersey Plan first introduced the idea of a 
separate supremacy clause. See Paterson Resolution No. 6 (June 15, 1787), in ibid., 1:245, proposing that 
all treaties and federal laws “shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts or 
Treaties shall relate to the said States or to their Citizens, and the Judiciary of the several states shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the respective laws of the Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.” 
Nor should we forget that after the New Jersey Plan met its demise, Antifederalist-to-be Luther Martin re-
introduced an independent supremacy clause which, after some revisions, became part of the Constitution. 
Ibid., 2:28-29 (July 17, 1789). Martin later took pains to distinguish the supremacy clause he had 
introduced from the one that ended up in Article VI. See Martin, “The Genuine Information,” Nov. 29, 
1787, in ibid., 3:286-87. Writing as the “Landholder,” Oliver Ellsworth thanked Martin for introducing the 
clause and accused him of flip-flopping during the ratification debates on its propriety. Landholder No. 10, 
Maryland Journal, Feb. 29, 1788, in ibid., 3:273.       
6 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 388 (1821). 
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an overt textual basis lacking in the Articles of Confederation and ratification by the 
people (rather than the state legislatures) would endow the claim to supremacy with 
greater force than it previously had. Most important, however, the concept of supremacy 
itself took on a new meaning in 1787. Even if the Continental Congress possessed 
theoretical supremacy, it wanted effective constitutional means by which to preserve that 
supremacy against encroachments from the states. More than any other vice of the 
Confederation, this required immediate rectification in 1787. The means of self-defense 
thereupon became supremacy’s essential ingredient. Supremacy for the Federalists meant 
enforceable supremacy. The critical question during the Federal Convention revolved not 
around whether but how to make it so.7 
At the outset, no serious dispute existed as to the proposition that the federal 
government must possess adequate militaristic means to enforce its supremacy under 
appropriate circumstances and, notwithstanding the absence of an express force clause, 
the Constitution’s military provisions memorialized this consensus. With respect to non-
militaristic coercion, however, the delegates’ understandings evolved over the course of 
the summer. The congressional negative maintained support well into July. Yet concerns 
over its practicability, sweeping preemptive scope, and potential to instigate overt 
conflicts between the federal and state governments, gradually weakened support for the 
                                                
7 “What is the meaning of [] [the Supremacy Clause], but that as we have given power we will support the 
execution of it? We should act like children to give power and deny the legality of executing it.” James 
Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention, July 29, 1788, in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 
2:899. See also Landholder [O. Ellsworth] No. 5, Connecticut Courant, Dec. 3, 1787, in Ford, Essays, 160, 
arguing that the Constitution and federal law must be the supreme law of the land “or they are nothing.” At 
the Federal Convention, Gouverneur Morris distinguished between a “federal” government and a “national, 
supreme, Govt.,” the former a “mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties, the latter having a 
compleat and compulsive operation.” Farrand, Records, 1:34 (May 30, 1787) (emphasis in original). 
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congressional negative in its original form. The distinction advanced by Hamilton 
between the “coercion of law” and the “coercion of arms” on June 18 may have played a 
significant role in the negative’s ultimate defeat. Before Hamilton’s speech, the 
congressional negative’s partisans argued for the indispensability of the negative on the 
grounds that the only alternative lay in military coercion and therefore civil war.8 After 
the speech this argument disappeared, notwithstanding ample opportunities to assert it.9 
At the same time, delegates who had previously supported the congressional negative 
now turned against it on grounds never before asserted at the Convention: “A law that 
ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary department.”10 On July 17, 
moments after the negative’s skeptics first articulated this argument, the Committee of 
the Whole voted down the congressional negative 7-to-3.  
Whereupon, apparently for the purpose of pounding the final nail in the negative’s 
coffin, the cantankerous Luther Martin from Maryland moved to constitutionalize the 
recently introduced linkage between the enforcement of national supremacy and the 
courts. Specifically, Martin introduced the first iteration of what would become the 
Supremacy Clause, culled right out of the failed New Jersey Plan. The provision bound 
the “Judiciaries of the Several States” to federal legislative acts and treaties—here 
deemed “the supreme law of the respective states”— “any thing in the respective laws of 
                                                
8 Madison had invented the argument. See Farrand, Records, 1:164 (June 8).  
9 The very next day, June 19, in delivering comprehensive critiques of the New Jersey Plan and 
commenting on its lack of a congressional negative, Madison declined to assert the argument. See ibid., 
1:314-22. (On June 16, James Wilson also did not feel the need to assert this argument in criticizing the 
New Jersey Plan. See ibid., 1:252-55.) 
10 Ibid., 2:28 (G. Morris). Roger Sherman made the same point. Ibid., 2:27. 
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the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.”11 During the short debates over the 
New Jersey Plan in mid-June, no one had commented on this provision and, of course, 
the New Jersey Plan as a whole met with a swift and resounding defeat. But on July 17, 
the delegates unanimously passed Martin’s motion to include the New Jersey Plan’s 
supremacy clause in the Constitution. In addition to judicializing the enforcement of 
supremacy, the provision reflected a shift in understandings about the very nature of 
supremacy. By its text, the Virginia Plan had made departments supreme.12 As envisaged 
by Madison and Wilson, the congressional negative made federal authority supreme. The 
supremacy clause approved by the delegates on July 17, however, adopted a different 
approach: it made federal law supreme. Perhaps no other shift in original meanings would 
have greater implications for the structure of the union.      
At the same time, the shift in the locus of federal supremacy’s enforcement to the 
courts brought with it some limitations when measured against the congressional 
negative. First, it meant that the enforcement of federal supremacy would proceed in a 
more reactive manner. The exercise of judicial power required individual litigants first to 
invoke a court’s jurisdiction. No one could have expected the courts to enforce 
supremacy in the absence of a concrete litigation controversy in the way that the 
Congress might have done. Second, litigants usually brought their disputes before a court 
after the defendant had done the harm alleged and therefore, in cases wherein the 
defendant might rely on a repugnant state law to justify the harm, after enactment of the 
law. In all events, the courts lacked power to prevent the passage of such a law in the way 
                                                
11 Farrand, Records, 2:28-29 (emphasis added). 
12 Randolph Resolution No. 1, as amended (June 13, 1787), in ibid., 1:228.  
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that the congressional negative had contemplated. Finally, trial courts included juries and 
juries that took it upon themselves to decide legal questions, as American juries were 
wont to do, might present considerable obstructions to the judicial enforcement of 
supreme law over contrary state acts.  
There remained, moreover, the critical question of which courts would enforce 
supreme federal law within the constitutional order. The supremacy clause that the 
delegates approved on July 17 bound “the Judiciaries of the several States” and the final 
clause in Article VI similarly specified “the Judges in every State.” To the extent either or 
both of these phrases referred exclusively to state judges (and by all appearances they 
did), the specification made sense for at least two reasons. First, the state judges would 
naturally incline to the side of their home state in cases of conflict. Indeed, the possibility 
existed that the state judges might disregard federal law on the grounds that it flowed 
from a foreign sovereign. Second, during the 1780s state judges hesitated to acknowledge 
the Treaty of Peace’s superiority over conflicting state laws.13  
For these same reasons, however, few if any of the delegates felt that a mere 
paper mandate would adequately bind the state judges. The state judges alone could not 
be trusted to enforce national supremacy. The delegates’ commitment to backing federal 
obligations with federal sanctions precluded it. Fortunately, by the time the Convention 
approved the preliminary version of the supremacy clause on July 17 a solution 
recommended itself, for all the delegates had already agreed in principle to establish a 
                                                
13 See, e.g., the New York Mayor Court’s decision in Rutgers v. Waddington (1784), in Hamilton, Law 
Practice, 1:402-19.   
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national Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over the state courts in cases 
implicating federal law or otherwise involving “the national peace and harmony.”14  
Luther Martin himself thought the federal judicial establishment should consist 
solely of a Supreme Court, leaving all other original and appellate jurisdiction to the state 
courts. Memorialized in the New Jersey Plan and supported by a handful of other 
delegates, the proposal presupposed that the Supreme Court would exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over the state high courts. This did not satisfy influential nationalists, 
however, who believed the Constitution should require the creation of inferior federal 
courts in addition to a Supreme Court. The new government could never rise to the task 
before it, Madison had declared in June, without “[a]n effective judiciary establishment 
commensurate to the legislative authority,” including “inferior tribunals . . . dispersed 
throughout the Republic.”15 To move the debates forward, on July 18 the delegates 
agreed to a compromise provision that would have “empowered” rather than required 
Congress to establish inferior federal tribunals.16 Yet ultimately the tide may have flowed 
back in favor of the nationalist position. Later revisions suggested that the delegates 
intended the final provision in Article III to mandate the creation of inferior federal 
                                                
14 See Randolph Resolution No. 9 (May 29, 1789), in Farrand, Records, at 1:21-22; and, as amended (No. 
11; June 13), ibid., 1:230, 232. For the Convention’s unanimous approval of the resolution as amended, see 
ibid., 1:228, 2:37.  
15 Farrand, Records, 1:124 (June 5). Nathaniel Gorham similarly asserted that inferior federal courts “are 
essential to render the authority of the Natl. [] [government] effectual.” Ibid., 2:46 (July 18). 
16 Ibid., 2:45. 
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courts, leaving to Congress discretion to settle the jurisdictional allocation among the 
different courts.17  
Two critical additions to the New Jersey Plan’s supremacy clause followed after 
the initial compromise on inferior courts. First, the Committee of Detail made federal law 
and treaties supreme over not only state “laws” but also state constitutions.18 This 
extended the judicial negative far deeper into the state sovereignties than the 
congressional negative, which had applied only to “laws passed by the several States.”19 
It also reinforced the felt necessity for federal judicial superintendence over the state 
courts, for few delegates could have reasonably expected the state judges to overturn their 
own constitutions in defense of the new federal government.  
Second, on August 23 the convention unanimously approved John Rutledge’s 
motion to include “this Constitution” as part of the supreme law of the land.20 A few days 
later, moreover, the delegates brought the language describing the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts into perfect alignment with the Supremacy Clause’s strengthened mandate, 
extending the judicial power to “all cases, both in law and equity, arising under this 
[C]onstitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties . . .”21 It went without saying 
that the federal judges would operate under a strict obligation to uphold “this 
                                                
17 Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 247. The final provision read: “The judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in . . .  such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.” The Committee of Detail deleted the phrase “when necessary.” Farrand, Records, 2:186.  
18 Farrand, Records, 2:169. 
19 Ibid., 1:228. 
20 Ibid., 2:389.  
21 Ibid., 2:430-31; see also ibid., 2:600. Aligning the provisions also involved deleting the words “passed by 
the legislature” to describe the laws of the United States in the jurisdictional clause. Ibid., 2:431.   
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Constitution.” 22 At this point, then, the immense power and responsibility that fell to the 
federal judiciary as the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution under the new frame of 
government became clear, even if the delegates themselves had little time to dwell on it. 
This included a judicial duty to negative any state law or constitutional provision on 
which a litigant relied that ran contrary to the federal Constitution, federal law, or 
treaties.  
One final move remained, however, to complete the judicialization of supremacy 
within the constitutional order. This consisted in insulating the Article III judges from the 
people, the states, and other departments of the federal government in the course of 
deciding cases properly within their jurisdiction. As explored in Chapters 1 and 2, 
judicial independence presented a puzzle for the revolutionary generation. On the one 
hand, they recognized the need for impartial administration of justice and interpretation 
of the laws. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 described such judicial impartiality 
as nothing less than “essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his 
life, liberty, property, and character.”23 On the other hand, many revolutionary Americans 
could not deem it proper under republican principles for the judges to boast significant 
independence from the people themselves. Thus the same Massachusetts constitution that 
extolled judicial impartiality also made the judges the “substitutes and agents” of the 
people and “all times accountable to them.”24 Accordingly, the Massachusetts state 
legislature could summarily remove the judges by simple address to the governor.25 
                                                
22 Ibid., 2:579. 
23 Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1 (Dec. of Rights), art. XXIX. 
24 Ibid., art. V. The Massachusetts constitution also seemed to limit if not prohibit the power of judicial 
review. It declared that the power of suspending laws or execution of them “ought never to be exercised but 
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In incorporating the Glorious Revolution judicial settlement as a structural matter, 
if without a king, the Massachusetts constitution went far beyond most of the other states 
in the extent of the judges’ independence. The Constitution, however, went further still 
and, indeed, beyond every other precedent in the historical record. It serves as testimony 
to the legal backgrounds of key delegates to the Federal Convention that from day one in 
Philadelphia the convention proceeded on the assumption that all the new federal judges, 
particularly the justices on the Supreme Court, must enjoy tenure for life on good 
behavior with salary guarantees. This drew not a single objection. If opponents of judicial 
independence on the English model existed in America at this time, they had no 
representation at the Federal Convention in 1787.  
Where the English whigs and revolutionary-era constitution makers conceived of 
judicial independence primarily as independence from the executive, however, the critical 
feature of the federal judges’ independence under the Constitution lay in their 
independence from the states. Life tenure with fixed compensation certainly advanced 
this objective. The appointments process, however, held special relevancy in this regard. 
At the Federal Convention, the Virginia Plan (as amended) had vested judicial 
appointments in the Senate. The provision garnered substantial support. After the 
delegates approved equal representation in the Senate, however, a new objection arose. 
Now vesting judicial appointments in the Senate opened up the process to undue state-
specific influence and James Madison rose to assert the point vigorously. As an 
                                                                                                                                            
by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the 
legislature shall expressly provide for.” Ibid., art. XX 
25 Ibid., Part 2, chap. III, art. 1. Cf. 12 & 13 William III, chap. 2, § 3 (1701). 
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alternative, Madison proposed to vest nominating power in the President, “a national 
officer, acting for and equally sympathizing with every part of the U, States,” while 
giving the Senate a veto on the nominees.26 For a time, a majority of delegates refused to 
budge. But ultimately Madison’s quest to insulate the judicial nominating decision from 
state representatives in the Senate prevailed.  
The only way to hold the judges politically accountable once appointed lay in the 
impeachment mechanism. Almost all the discussion on impeachment at the Federal 
Convention revolved around the President. Certainly a very high legal standard applied. 
Only morally culpable conduct, a blatant “error of the heart, and not of the head,” could 
satisfy it.27 For a time, the Committee of Detail considered giving the Supreme Court 
jurisdiction over impeachment trials, which suggested that the high court justices 
themselves remained exempt from impeachment no matter how egregious their 
conduct.28 Ultimately, the impeachment power’s institutional locus moved from the 
Supreme Court to Congress, with the House of Representatives to serve as a grand jury of 
sorts, and the Senate to serve as a trial court. Presumably, at this point the unelected life-
tenured judges became entitled to a full trial in the Senate upon impeachment in the 
House before removal—and this only in cases of gross misconduct. Late in August, John 
Dickinson moved to insert into Article III a provision for summary removal by legislative 
address to the President—the method with origins in the Glorious Revolution settlement 
that whig lawyers in Massachusetts had sought to enshrine in their own constitution. 
                                                
26 Farrand, Records, 2:80-81 (July 21).  
27 J. Iredell at N.C. Ratifying Convention, July 28, 1788, in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 2:882. 
28 Farrand, Records, 2:157 (Committee of Detail draft VII).  
 305 
Gouverneur Morris’s response imported a new procedural dimension into the good 
behavior standard that did not exist in England, let alone the American states.29 Morris 
“thought it a contradiction in terms to say that the judges should hold their offices during 
good behavior, and yet be removable without a trial.” In any case, he continued, “it was 
fundamentally wrong to subject Judges to so arbitrary an authority.”30 Only Connecticut, 
where the state judges stood for annual election, could muster a vote in favor of 
Dickinson’s losing motion.31  
In the end, the Constitution of 1787 rested on a configuration of supremacy, law, 
and independent judicial power with no real peer or precedent in history. Tellingly, it 
employed the key term “supreme” in only two senses: the first to denote the status of the 
Constitution and federal law vis-à-vis the states; the second to describe the country’s high 
judicial tribunal. The foremost Antifederal commentator on the federal judiciary during 
the ratification debates perceived these linkages with acuity and feared their implications. 
Brutus felt sure that the federal government, working through its judicial arm in a “silent 
and imperceptible manner,” would effectuate “an entire subversion of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers of the individual states.”32 At the same time,  Brutus saw 
nothing in the Constitution to prohibit the judges from “mould[ing] the [federal] 
government, into almost any shape they please.”33 In the Court of Exchequer’s history in 
                                                
29 Ibid., 2:428. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 2:429. 
32 Brutus No. 11, Jan. 31, 1788, in Storing, Complete Anti-Federalist, 2:420. 
33 Ibid., 2:422. 
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England the federal judges would find ample precedent for “giv[ing] such an explanation 
to the constitution, as will favour an extension of [][their] jurisdiction.”34  
Although Brutus did believe that the absence of a hereditary monarch rendered 
the argument for a good behavior standard on the English model less convincing in the 
American context, he emphasized that the Constitution had otherwise “departed from 
almost every other principle of [] [English] jurisprudence.” 35  In Britain, judicial 
independence simply meant tenure on good behavior and guarantees against salary 
diminution. The Constitution by contrast made “the judges independent in the fullest 
sense of the word. There is no power above them, to control any of their decisions. . . . In 
short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under 
heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of 
heaven itself.”36  
While they took the Antifederalists to task on other issues touching the judicial 
power during the ratification debates, the Federalists did not stand up to deny Brutus’s 
basic appraisal of the independence accorded the judges under the Constitution. Only 
total independence from the other departments of the federal government, from the states 
and from the people themselves, could render the federal judges able to serve their 
special roles as “faithful guardians of the Constitution.”37 To be sure, Publius insinuated a 
connection between the Supreme Court and the people by equating “the people 
themselves” with the Constitution—a connection that John Marshall would later seize 
                                                
34 Ibid., 2:420. 
35 Brutus No. 15 (cont’d), Mar. 20, 1788, in ibid., 2:438. 
36 Ibid., 2:437-38. 
37 The Federalist No. 78, 442 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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upon to great effect. In fact, however, the Federalists drew an important distinction 
between the two. For, as Publius wrote in the same essay, “[u]ntil the people have, by 
some solemn and authoritative act, anulled and changed the established form, it is 
binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually.”38  
II. Inventing the Federal Courts  
Early in 1789, Samuel Osgood, whom Washington later appointed the first 
Postmaster General, criticized the recently ratified Constitution for vesting Article III’s 
jurisdictional powers in the federal judiciary and not Congress. “It seems as if the 
Convention had a distrust in the Wisdom & Prudence of [Congress].”39 Whatever the 
merits of Osgood’s observations as a constitutional matter, the representatives elected to 
the First Congress seem to have proceeded on a somewhat different assumption: It would 
fall to the national legislature to set the federal judicial machinery in motion. None 
apparently believed, moreover, that the Constitution required Congress to legislate to the 
limits of Article III.  
At the same time, beside the revenue laws no order of legislative business ranked 
higher after ratification than establishing an independent federal judicial department. The 
spring and summer of 1789 thus saw the birth of the first judiciary act (“Judiciary Act of 
1789). Few contemporaneous commentators expressed unqualified satisfaction with the 
legislation in its final form. Many saw it as a sketch, to be amended as experience might 
counsel. As it happened, this legislation, formally styled “An Act to establish the Judicial 
                                                
38 Ibid., 2:440. 
39 Samuel Osgood to [?], Feb. 20, 1789, in DHSC, 4:364-65.  
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Courts of the United States,” created the basic framework for the federal judicial 
establishment that prevails to this day.  
 Prevailing historical interpretations of the Judiciary Act of 1789 emphasize the 
extent to which it accommodated the Antifederalists.40 The Antifederalists, historians tell 
us, admired the act much more than the Federalists did.41 The following analysis of the 
act’s drafting history will suggest that the prevailing accounts exaggerate the extent of the 
opposition’s influence and that the Judiciary Act generally marked a substantial victory 
for pro-judicial Federalists.  
Lawyers in Congress dominated the drafting process and the debates surrounding 
the act, often seeking outside advice and commentary from eminent legal professionals in 
the respective states, particularly Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York.42 A grand 
committee of lawyers in the Senate drew up the basic outlines of the bill. In its formative 
stages Connecticut lawyer Oliver Ellsworth quickly became the bill’s “leading 
projector.”43  Ellsworth had served as a judge on the Connecticut Supreme Judicial Court 
in the 1780s, attended the Federal Convention (and was on the Committee of Detail), and 
would go on to become the third Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Two 
other lawyers on the Senate committee who had also attended the Federal Convention 
exerted considerable secondary influence—Benjamin Austin’s archenemy and future 
                                                
40 The most influential historical accounts of the act are Warren, “New Light”; Goebel, Antecedents and 
Beginnings, 457-508; Marcus, “Judiciary Act of 1789,” in DHSC, 4:22-107; Holt, “To Establish Justice”; 
Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act.  
41 Holt, “To Establish Justice,” 1423, 1517; Warren, “New Light,” 53.  
42 Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 467. 
43 Paine Wingate to Timothy Pickering, Apr. 29, 1789, in DHSC, 4:382. 
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Massachusetts governor, Caleb Strong; and former New Jersey attorney general and 
future associate Supreme Court justice, William Paterson.44  
In his private diary, the lay Senator from Pennsylvania, William Maclay, evinced 
great uneasiness about what he saw as the lawyers’ efforts to transplant English 
jurisprudence into the American system. Maclay criticized the extent to which the Senate 
bill enlarged the power of judges at the expense of juries. The laymen inside and outside 
of Congress, he suggested, struggled to understand the lawyers’ “thorny thicket of law 
forms.” Even so, when the bill came up for debate in the Senate and the House, the 
lawyers banded together in a “hue and cry to run down any person who will venture to 
say one word about it.”45  
The bill ultimately enacted on September 24, 1789 reflected a strong consensus in 
the First Congress around the constitutional necessity of a Supreme Court with binding 
appellate jurisdiction over the state courts, as well as an unwillingness to leave federal 
trial jurisdiction to the state courts.46 Richard Henry Lee’s early proposal to confine 
federal trial jurisdiction to admiralty alone did not receive serious consideration.47 On 
paper, the new federal judiciary looked much more like the British hierarchical model 
than the state judiciaries.48 Juries dominated the state systems. In eleven of the thirteen 
states, the highest judicial court functioned primarily as a second trial court; juries 
                                                
44 The committee also included Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee whose motion to confine the federal 
courts jurisdiction to admiralty jurisdiction met with defeat, but who nevertheless boasted in private 
correspondence that he had succeeded in getting the Senate to rectify the Constitution’s objectionable 
features in this regard. See Holt, “To Establish Justice,” 1484.  
45 Maclay, Journal, 92, 94, 96 (entries from June 28-July 1, 1789). 
46 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
47 Maclay, Journal, 85, 87 (entries on June 22 and 23, 1789). 
48 See Pfander and Birk, “Article III and the Scottish Judiciary”; Pfander, One Supreme Court. 
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decided both trials and “appeals.” Review rarely occurred on questions of law and, to the 
extent it did, the judicatories shared responsibilities with the state legislatures.49 Indeed, 
many considered the state legislature the highest “court” in the state.50 As we shall see, 
the federal judiciary would dramatically depart from the state systems in all these 
respects. The continuing existence of the “sovereign” states and their judicatories within 
the union by itself required a whole new conceptual framework for the federal system.  
The legislation created a three-tiered federal judicial system to consist of thirteen 
district courts, three circuit courts, and an all-important Supreme Court, that would 
enable litigants to bypass the state courts entirely in enumerated matters. The judicial 
districts corresponded to each of the states and the circuits to defined regions—the 
eastern circuit to consist of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York; 
the middle circuit to consist of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia; and 
the southern circuit to consist of South Carolina and Georgia. Six justices would sit on 
the Supreme Court, to hold two sessions annually in the capital. A single judge residing 
in the applicable state would preside over each of the district courts, to convene four 
times a year. Presumably to save costs, the act provided for no separate circuit judges. 
Rather, each circuit court, to convene twice annually, would consist of the applicable 
district judge and any two Supreme Court justices, provided that no district judge could 
vote in an appeal from his own decision.51 The composition of the circuit courts imposed 
                                                
49 Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act, 5-7, 31-43.  
50 This argument was made by counsel (but rejected by the Court) in Olney v. Arnold. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 308 
(1796). 
51 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1 Stat. 73-76. The remote districts of Maine and 
Kentucky did not get a circuit court until later. Any four Supreme Court justices would constitute a 
quorum; any two circuit court judges. 
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substantial travelling burdens on the justices of the Supreme Court about which the 
justices increasingly complained over the course of the 1790s. It also, however, 
minimized the possibility of localistic sentiment slanting judicial decision making.  
The specific jurisdiction accorded the new federal courts under the legislation will 
receive sustained attention below. One jurisdictional feature of the Judiciary Act, 
however, merits emphasis at the outset. The eighteenth-century English judiciary 
consisted of separate court systems with jurisdiction over different types of cases: King’s 
Bench and Common Pleas presided over suits at common law (with juries), Chancery 
over suits in equity (without juries), and admiralty courts decided disputes arising out of 
water transactions (typically without juries). A few of the American colonies and states 
adopted this model in the eighteenth century. The Judiciary Act, by contrast, effectuated a 
complete merger of these jurisdictions. It erected one system of courts each of which had 
jurisdiction to decide cases at common law, in equity, and in admiralty. This, in turn, 
meant that each federal court would possess judicial powers that none of the English 
courts alone possessed.  
The merger of common law and equity raised special difficulties during the 
debates surrounding the Judiciary Act. Although equity jurisdiction had emerged in 
England as a mechanism by which to soften the rigors of the common law, the fact 
remained that equity chancellors possessed far greater discretionary powers than common 
law judges. Respondents in equity could not, moreover, rely on a jury of their peers to 
check the chancellor’s discretion because they had no rights to a jury trial. 
Knowledgeable Americans, particularly the Antifederalists, therefore had reservations 
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about the introduction of chancery procedures into the federal courts. With some 
appreciation of this fact, the Senate committee’s initial bill included a provision 
precluding suits in equity “where remedy may be had at law.”52 But a number of lawyers 
in the Senate opposed the restriction, including William Samuel Johnson from 
Connecticut.53 William Paterson successfully moved to remove it altogether on July 11.54 
A few days later, however, the Senate approved a revised version that gave litigants 
seeking to invoke the federal courts’ equity jurisdiction more leeway, conditioning 
dismissal on a “plain, adequate, and complete remedy . . . at law.”55 The revised 
provision became Section 16 of the Judiciary Act.    
In other instances, the drafters of the initial Senate bill sought quite openly to vest 
federal judges sitting in common law actions with broad chancery powers. One provision, 
for example, established chancery discovery procedures in actions at law. The most 
controversial clause authorized the judges to require defendants to testify as to their 
knowledge of the case and, if they refused, to enter a default judgment against them.56 
When William Maclay likened the procedure to “extorting evidence by torture,” 
Ellsworth moved to subject the plaintiff to the same requirement if the defendant 
requested it.57 Not surprisingly, this did little to assuage the clause’s critics and, in the 
end, the lawyers had no choice but to excise it. Yet in the din occasioned by the 
testimonial clause the remaining portions of the Senate committee’s discovery provision 
                                                
52 Original Senate Bill [Section 16], in DHSC, 4:74. 
53 Maclay, Journal, 95 (July 1, 1789 entry). 
54 Warren, “New Light,” 96. 
55 See Enrolled Act [Section 16], in DHSC, 4:73.  
56 Original Senate Bill [Section 15], in ibid., 4:72. 
57 Maclay, Journal, 93 (June 29, 1789 entry). 
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escaped serious scrutiny and became law, empowering the new federal judges to compel 
production of books and writings from litigants on motion, and to enter a non-suit or 
default in the event of non-compliance.58 
In still other cases, the lawyers’ efforts “to push the power of chancery as far as 
possible” infringed the traditional province of juries.59 Notwithstanding the colonists’ 
opposition to the old vice-admiralty courts sitting without juries in revenue cases, 
everyone in the First Congress accepted that the ancient common law right to a jury trial 
did not apply to proceedings in either equity or admiralty. On the other hand, experiences 
in the decade after Independence made the framers of the Judiciary Act skeptical of local 
jurors’ ability to render impartial verdicts.60 One section in the Senate committee’s initial 
bill, apparently drafted by Caleb Strong, provided that in actions brought for a forfeiture 
on a bond or contract, the judge alone could assess the amount due “according to 
equity.”61 A similar provision existed in the old Massachusetts’ statutes, but confined the 
judge’s power to reducing the plaintiff’s alleged damages.62 Strong’s provision, on the 
other hand, gave the judge wide open discretion. In the federal context, observers might 
very well have feared that British creditors would employ the provision to collect war 
interest on American accounts opened prior to Independence. For this and other reasons, 
the provision came under heavy attack during the Senate debates. “The jury were the 
proper chancellors in such a case,” William MaClay objected, “and I liked them much 
                                                
58 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 82. 
59 Maclay, Journal, 96 (July 1, 1789 entry). 
60 See Holt, “To Establish Justice,” 1427-58. 
61 Original Senate Bill [Section 25], in DHSC, 4:88.  
62 See Acts and Resolves of the Province, 1:356 (Dec. 10, 1698, chap. 22, sec. 1). 
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better than the judges.”63 The final provision permitted the judge to determine the amount 
owing on a forfeited bond “according to equity,” but to appease skeptics added that 
where the parties disputed the judgment amount, a jury could assess damages if either 
party requested it.64    
Save for these somewhat oblique attempts to except certain matters from the 
jury’s purview, no one in the First Congress denied that in suits at common law, 
particularly criminal trials, the immemorial right to trial by jury applied. Significant 
controversy arose, however, on the question of jury composition and selection and, here 
again, the Senate committee angled to vest federally appointed judicial officials with 
considerable discretion to address the problem of local bias. The original Senate bill 
would have permitted drawing the juror pool (or “venire”) from any part of the district 
most favorable to an “impartial Trial.” This would have vested the marshal with 
considerable discretion in selecting the venire.65 Antifederalists in both houses objected 
to the provision in the criminal context. They advocated selection of the venire by 
random sample (or “by lot”) from a list of qualified individuals residing in the 
neighborhood of the crime.66 The final provision embodied a compromise. In capital 
crimes, petit jurors would have to come from “the County” in which the defendant 
allegedly committed the crime. In all other cases, state law would dictate selection of the 
                                                
63 Maclay, Journal, 98 (July 2, 1789 entry).  
64 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 26, 1 Stat. 87. 
65 Original Senate Bill [Section 27], in DHSC, 4:93. 
66 See Journal of the Senate, 40, 41, 77 (July 9, July 13, and Sept. 9, 1789); Goebel, Antecedents and 
Beginnings, 506-507.  
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venire. 67  Since New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia did not require 
selection by lot, this meant that federal court officials in these districts would possess 
some of the same discretion originally proposed by the Senate committee.68  
Over what aspects of common law trials would juries so formed possess 
authority? American juries had traditionally wielded considerable law-determining power 
in the eighteenth-century and revolutionary ideology provided new and compelling 
rationales to justify jural supremacy over judges on questions of fact and law alike.69 By 
its terms, the Judiciary Act departed from state practices in the direction a vesting more 
authority in the federal judges: the act confined the jury’s role to “issues of fact” alone.70 
To the judges it reserved all questions of law. It also vested the judges with  power to 
grant new trials “for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts 
of law”—a reference to the somewhat malleable English common law practices on this 
question that permitted new trials for blatant errors of fact or law.71 Ever deferential to 
juries, state judges prior to ratification never granted new trials for verdicts against the 
law. Under the auspices of the Judiciary Act, however, the federal judges in the coming 
years increasingly began to exercise this authority over juries.72   
During the ratification debates, the Antifederalists contended that Article III 
threatened the finality of jury verdicts by granting appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme 
                                                
67 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 88. “The county was the extent of [] [the Senate’s] yielding 
to the vicinage principal.” Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 507.  
68 Henderson, Courts for a New Nation, 97. The Jeffersonians would later complain about the marshals 
selecting juries of “tories” in sedition cases. Ibid. On July 9, the Senate voted against regulating grand jury 
and non-capital criminal juries at the federal level. Journal of the Senate, 40. 
69 See Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law; Nelson, “Lawfinding Power of Colonial American 
Juries.”  
70 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, §§ 9, 12, 13,1 Stat. 77, 80, 81.  
71 Ibid., § 17, 1 Stat. 83. See also Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:377-91. 
72 See Lettow, “New Trial for Verdict against Law.”  
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Court “both as to Law and Fact.”73 The Judiciary Act somewhat allayed their concerns as 
to questions of fact. Congress here exercised its authority to make exceptions and 
regulations to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction by limiting it to review by “writ of error,” 
a common law writ that encompassed errors of law only. Except in admiralty cases, the 
act similarly limited circuit court review of district court decisions.74 To call this a 
concession to the Antifederalists, however, misses the mark for the writ of error 
comported well with the federal courts’ originally contemplated role as enforcers of 
supreme law within the union. Notwithstanding Article III’s language, no one in 1787 or 
1789 intended for the federal courts to disturb legitimate fact determinations of juries. 
The primary objective lay in wresting control over questions of law from juries, not 
questions of fact.   
Irrespective of the jury’s role in the trial phase of common law actions, however, 
the Judiciary Act vested the federal judges with coercive powers that operated 
independent of juries. First and foremost, it gave the federal judges plenary power “to 
punish by fine or imprisonment, at the[ir] discretion . . . all contempts of authority in any 
cause or hearing before the same.” 75 The statute made no mention of juries in contempt 
proceedings and this squared with eighteenth-century understandings of the contempt 
power: the judges alone would find and punish contempt by summary process. The law 
of contempt had deep roots in the English monarchial tradition and, at its core, 
contradicted republican principles to no less an extent than common law crimes did. 
                                                
73 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  
74 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, §§ 22, 25, 1 Stat. 84, 85. Cf. ibid. § 21, 1 Stat. 83, allowing for “appeal” 
rather that writ of error in circuit court review of district court decrees in admiralty.   
75 Ibid., § 17, 1 Stat. 83.  
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“[T]he law of contempt is not the law of men, it is the law of kings.”76 The medieval 
English courts had first exercised the contempt power as the king’s representatives; they 
punished contempts of the king’s authority. Over time, however, the common law courts 
and Chancery alike converted this kingly prerogative into their own inherent right. In the 
sixteenth century, Star Chamber refashioned contempt of court as a summary proceeding 
and King’s Bench carried on the practice after the former’s demise.77  
Although judges in the American colonies assumed similar powers of contempt, 
rarely did the assemblies attempt to codify the power. The Judiciary Act marked the first 
codification of the contempt power on American shores after the Revolution. Even so, the 
provision did not limit the judges. Rather it empowered them to employ the common law 
and, above all, their own “discretion” to define and punish contempts. Although no 
recorded debate attended the provision during the congressional debates, the lawyers in 
both houses would have been particularly familiar with Blackstone’s recent exposition of 
the offense, which confirmed its summary nature and defined it broadly to include any 
failure by the parties, witnesses, jurors, court officials, or inferior judges to obey the 
court’s dictates or otherwise respect the court’s authority. Yet whereas Blackstone 
described contempt as a power belonging to “superior courts,” the Judiciary Act vested it 
in every judge in the federal judiciary.78  
 
 
                                                
76 Goldfarb, “History of the Contempt Power,” 7.  
77 See ibid., 6-13. See also Fox, History of Contempt of Court.  
78 Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:283. 
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III. Process and Coercion 
Why did the First Congress feel it necessary to grant such broad contempt powers 
to the federal judges? To preserve and protect the very means of judicial compulsion, 
which is to say, process. Of what specifically would such process consist? Except for a 
passing reference to habeas corpus, the Constitution said nothing explicit in this regard. 
The Judiciary Act said a little more. As we have seen, on motion the courts could compel 
the production of books and writings from the parties on pain of non-suit or default. 
Elsewhere the act made reference to attachment of goods and real estate by original 
process.79 Laying aside the supervisory writ powers vested in the Supreme Court alone 
(discussed in Chapter 10), the legislation empowered the federal courts to issue two other 
writs—venire facias (compelling appearance of jurors or witnesses), and scire facias 
(compelling a person to come before the court and show cause).80 Finally, Section 14 
included an expansive catch-all clause, giving the courts authority to issue “all other writs 
. . . which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and 
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”81  
What “other writs” did Section 14 contemplate? A number of writs employed by 
the English and American state courts fell within the provision’s ambit, including, among 
others, capias ad respondendum (seizure of a defendant’s body to secure a first 
appearance in court), capias ad satisfaciendum (seizure of the same to secure payment of 
a judgment), fieri facias (levy on goods and chattels to satisfy a judgment), and elegit 
                                                
79 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 79-80; see also ibid., §§ 22, 23, 24, 25, 1 Stat. 84-86. 
80 Ibid., §§ 29, 14, 1 Stat. 88, 81 
81 Ibid., § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.  
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(seizure of personalty or realty to compel payment of judgment). In equity and admiralty, 
subpoenas and arrest warrants respectively served the purpose of compelling 
appearances. And, of course, in their capacity as equity chancellors the federal judges 
would possess power to grant writs of injunction to compel a defendant to take or not 
take certain actions on a prospective basis—the quintessential remedy in equity.  
Some controversy attended the topic of original criminal process during the 
debates on the Judiciary Act. One clause in the Senate committee’s original bill would 
have authorized each federal judge to issue arrest warrants “upon his own knowledge” for 
“any Offence against the laws of the United States.”82 The “gentlemen of bar,” wrote 
Maclay, “insisted that this was agreeable to the laws of England.” Others in the Senate, 
however, bristled at this “gun-powder plot” against “the liberty of the citizen.”83 The 
provision thereafter died a quiet death. The final provision authorized both federal judges 
and state magistrates to arrest and imprison those accused of a “crime or offense against 
the United States” in accordance with the applicable state procedures. In most states, this 
required either an information from a prosecutor or witness recognizances on oath. 
Irrespective of state procedures, the provision also bound the judges to release non-
capital suspects on bail. 84 
The Judiciary Act, however, left many questions of process, particularly civil 
process, unanswered. Happily the lawyers that framed the act did not mean for it to 
constitute the last word on these matters. No sooner had the Senate sent the judiciary bill 
                                                
82 Original Senate Bill [Section 33], in DHSC, 4:103. 
83 Maclay, Journal, 99, 100, 101 (entries for July 3 and 7, 1789). 
84 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91.  
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to the House than the same lawyers responsible for drafting the bill began work on 
companion legislation addressing the issue of process in the federal courts (the “Process 
Bill”).  
Here again, Ellsworth, Strong, and Paterson dominated the drafting process. As 
reported to the House, the Process Bill contemplated uniform procedures to apply 
throughout the federal court system in a number of areas, including the commencement 
of civil actions, civil bail, and default procedures. With respect to original civil process, 
the bill purported to vest the federal judges with greater coercive writ authority over 
defendants than many state judges possessed and, indeed, greater than that which the 
English judges possessed. The New England states employed a scheme of issuing writs in 
succession, each succeeding writ more coercive than the last: the judges first issued a 
summons to appear; if the defendant failed to comply, the court could authorize an 
attachment of his goods or chattels; only when an attachment failed to secure an 
appearance did state law permit the coercion of bodily arrest.85 Blackstone described a 
similar process in the English courts.86 By contrast, the Senate’s Process Bill would have 
granted the federal courts authority to arrest civil defendants by capias in the first 
instance without resort to either summons or attachment.87  
                                                
85  For Massachusetts, see Mass., Acts and Laws 1784-1785, 86-97 (Oct. 30, 1784, chap. 38); for 
Connecticut, see Conn., Acts and Laws 1784, 84-86 (Feb. 1784 session [?]). Except as to style, the 1784 
Massachusetts forms tracked the forms originally enacted in 1701. See Acts and Resolves of the Province, 
1:459-61 (June 3, 1701, chap. 2). See also Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 511-12, 518, discussing 
New England state process laws.  
86 Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:280-82. 
87 Original Senate Bill [Section 2], in DHSC, 4:115-16. Presumably defendants able to post bail could 
obtain a release. An additional provision would have established a small amount-in-controversy 
requirement in non-tort cases when the United States sued, before the capias could issue. See Original 
Senate Bill [Section 5], in ibid.,116-17.  
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For reasons that the record does not substantially reveal, the Senate’s Process Bill 
did not survive the House. Perhaps, having conceded so much in the Judiciary Act, 
skeptics of federal judicial power obstructed the bill simply for retaliatory purposes. On 
the same day the House received the bill, moreover, it also received notice that the Senate 
had taken action on the House’s proposed amendments to the Constitution, revealing 
substantial disagreements between the two chambers. In any case, passed five days after 
the Judiciary Act, the final process legislation (“Process Act”) did not achieve the federal 
uniformity originally contemplated. It simply provided that “in suits at common law” the 
federal district and circuit courts would use the same “forms of writs and executions” 
(except as to “style”) and “modes of process” as used by the high courts in the respective 
states. In equity and admiralty cases, process would issue according to universal equity 
and admiralty practices rather than state-specific usages.88   
The Process Act itself said nothing about the style of process. On this one issue, 
some recorded commentary does exist that helps explain the elision. The Senate Bill had 
specified that federal process “shall be in the name of the President of the United States 
of America.”89 This would have capitalized on the respect virtually every American 
accorded President Washington and, more significant, served as notice to all recipients of 
process that the coercion of arms ultimately backed coercion through the judiciary within 
the constitutional order. By analogy the provision drew on colonial judicial practices 
                                                
88 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, chap. 21, §§ 1, 2, 1 Stat. 93-94. The original act made “civil law” the benchmark 
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1792, chap. 32, § 2, 1 Stat. 276.  
89 Original Senate Bill [Section 1], in DHSC, 4:115.  
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wherein process issued in the name of the king. After Independence, however, the states 
determined that their own judicial processes would run in the name of the 
Commonwealth or, alternatively, the People.90 Opponents of the Senate Bill’s provision 
would accuse the drafters of bringing in a “Monarchy by Sidewind.”91 Representative 
Stone objected on the grounds that the provision implied that “the sovereign authority 
was vested in the Executive,” when in fact “the United States were sovereign.”92 The 
Senate lawyers at first held their ground, but then proposed to eliminate any reference to 
the style of process, to which the House agreed.93 As the lawyers must have recognized, 
however, this simply passed the baton to the judges. The Supreme Court easily resolved 
the matter at the beginning of its February 1790 term: as per the original Senate Bill, 
federal judicial process would issue in the name of the President of the United States.94   
The few historians who have treated the Process Act of 1789 have variously 
called it “almost anarchic,” a product of “professional provincialism,” and a victory for 
“advocates of state interests” and other anti-consolidationists.95  It hardly qualified as 
anarchic. If anything, it made life easier for existing lawyers who could use their current 
knowledge of state processes to navigate the federal judiciary and, in this sense, eased the 
transition to the new system. In common law cases, processual incorporation meant that 
the relatively severe process and execution rules that applied in states such as New York 
                                                
90 See Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 515.  
91 See Senator Grayson’s comments, quoted in Adams, Notes of Debates in the Senate, July 15, 1789, in 
Adams, Diary, 3:218. William Maclay deemed it part of the “old System of giving the President as far as 
possible every appendage of royalty.” Maclay, Journal, 167 (entry for Sept. 26, 1789). 
92 1 Annals of Cong. 916 (Sept. 25, 1789).  
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95 Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 540, 511; Marcus, “The Process Acts,” in DHSC, 4:108. 
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and South Carolina would apply equally in federal courts sitting in those states.96 In at 
least one respect, moreover, the Process Act vested coercive writ power in the federal 
courts that did not depend on state law. Specifically, the act provided that in those states 
that authorized execution of a judgment by writ of capias satisfaceindum (seizure of the 
body), the federal judges could proceed with the capias even if state process first required 
resort to levying on goods or real property (fieri facias or elegit). By this measure, at the 
execution stage all the federal courts possessed measurably greater coercive power over 
judgment debtors than did the state courts in, for example, New England.97  
The next few years saw episodic attempts to revise the Process Act. None 
succeeded until 1792. The 1792 amendments effectuated a momentous change. They did 
so, however, in a devious way. Like the original act, the 1792 act incorporated applicable 
state processes (except as to execution)—subject, however, to a proviso with the potential 
to swallow up the primary provision. The proviso enlarged the courts’ own rule-making 
authority to include making “such alterations and additions” to state rules (or applicable 
equity or admiralty procedures), as the federal judges “shall in their discretion deem 
expedient.” The act, moreover, vested the Supreme Court with authority to make such 
alterations for the lower federal courts. 98 Accordingly, at its next term the Supreme Court 
adopted “the practice of the Courts of Kings Bench and of Chancery in England,” 
reserving the right to make any “alterations” it deemed “necessary.”99    
                                                
96 Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 511-12, 532-33.     
97 Ibid., 532.  
98 Act of May 8, 1792, chap. 32, § 2, 1 Stat. 276. 
99 Supreme Court Minutes, Aug. 8, 1792, in DHSC, 1:203.  
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Yet one final and quite indispensable element remained in the system of judicial 
coercion established in the Judiciary and Process Acts. The courts needed administrative 
personnel to carry the judicial process into effect, to execute the courts’ writs. To this 
end, the Judiciary Act created a U.S. Marshal’s office in each district to act as the 
judiciary’s enforcement arm. In England and in the states, sheriffs served the same basic 
function for the courts; their responsibilities, however, extended well beyond the judicial 
sphere. The English used the term “marshal” to refer to three types of officials. First, it 
referred to a high officer of state sent out to superintend the counties. Similar royal 
officials called marshals had appeared in the seventeenth-century American colonies.100 
Second—and here the judicial dimension emerges—it denoted the prison-keeper for 
King’s Bench. 101  Finally, the term marshal described the official responsible for 
executing the commands of admiralty courts, including the colonial vice-admiralty 
courts. By all appearances the framers of the Judiciary Act had the greatest familiarity 
with the third usage.102 
 Appointed by the President, the American marshals would serve renewable four-
year terms.103 They could appoint as many deputies as they chose in the execution of their 
respective offices. District and circuit judges, and not the President, had authority to 
remove the deputies “at pleasure.”104 To the marshals fell the responsibility of executing 
all “lawful precepts” directed to him by the federal courts, including seizures, 
                                                
100 Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 17.  
101 Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:285. 
102 See Ubbelohde, Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution, 10.  
103 See Senate Executive Journal, 1: 29-30 (Sept. 24, 1789); Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 
87. 
104 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 87.  
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attachments, and arrests. In performing their duties, moreover, the marshals and their 
deputies could “command all necessary assistance” from the community, including 
calling out a posse comitatus.105 Like the state sheriffs and federal tax collectors, the 
marshals’ compensation would consist of fees. In many cases, this put a bounty on the 
person and property of parties and witnesses. For this reason among others, during the 
ratification debates Patrick Henry called the sheriffs in Virginia “unfeeling bloodsuckers” 
and felt certain that the new “federal sherriff[s]” would commit even more “horrid and 
barbarous ravages on our people.”106 At least the sheriffs stood for annual election. 
Presumably Henry and others like him looked with great suspicion on the unelected 
marshals, all obedient Federalists, appointed under the Judiciary Act.107    
Conclusion and Summary  
Supremacy for the Federalists meant enforceable supremacy. The critical question 
during the Federal Convention revolved not around whether but how to render it so. 
When resurrected by Luther Martin and approved by the Federal Convention on July 17, 
1787, the New Jersey Plan’s supremacy clause contemplated a fundamental 
transformation in the nature of the American union by making supremacy a legal norm 
and by vesting its ultimate enforcement in the courts. Although the framers did not 
distrust the state courts as much as the state legislatures, they remained unwilling to rely 
on the state courts to uphold the Constitution and federal law against contrary state laws. 
Accordingly, Article III established a Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over the 
                                                
105 Ibid.; see also Act of May 2, 1792, chap. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 265.  
106 Elliot, Debates, 3:57-58. 
107 For a useful discussion of the first marshal appointments, see Henderson, Courts for a New Nation, 33-
34. 
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state high courts and authorized the creation of inferior federal courts with broad original 
jurisdiction in matters touching federal concerns. Judges more independent than any in 
history would staff these courts.  
It fell to the First Congress, however, to create the first federal judicial 
establishment. The Federalist lawyers who drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789 sought to 
alter the prevailing balance of power between judges and juries in favor of the former, to 
import English jurisprudence unalloyed into the American system, and to vest the federal 
judges with discretionary powers on par with English equity chancellors. While laymen 
in Congress opposed to the English heritage and suspicious of professional legal 
discretion did force a few concessions, the Judiciary Act generally represented a 
substantial victory for the likes of Oliver Ellsworth and other Federalist lawyers.  
The means of judicial compulsion, however, lay in the legal process, a topic that 
the Judiciary Act covered only in fragments. The Federalist lawyers’ first attempts to 
legislate uniform federal processes met with defeat. With the Process Acts of 1789 and 
1792, however, the lawyers succeeded in vesting federal judges with writ powers more 
coercive and discretionary than those possessed by state judges. The federal judges also 
received summary contempt authority to protect the integrity of those processes from 
contumacious parties, witnesses, and jurors. 
A critical question remained. Of its own force the Constitution mandated the 
creation of a Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over certain cases. Yet it remained 
for Congress to delineate the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—which is to say, the categories of cases within which 
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the federal courts could employ the tools of judicial coercion. To this important question 
we now turn.   
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CHAPTER 9 
 
HISTORICIZING FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION 
*   *   * 
Prevailing historical interpretations of the Judiciary Act of 1789 assert that it 
marked a victory for the Antifederalists insofar as the act left “federal question 
jurisdiction”—a modern phrase unknown to the Federalists of 1787 denoting jurisdiction 
over all cases “arising under” the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties 
of the United States—to the state courts.1 It is true that the act did not include an “arising 
under” federal question provision applicable to the lower courts phrased in the manner of 
current law. 2  We should pause, however, before deeming this a victory for the 
Antifederalists. For at the time, no one in Congress—not even dyed-in-the-wool 
Federalist lawyers—ever proposed to incorporate such a provision into the original 
Judiciary Act.3 To ask why the First Congress did not include a provision that the 
members themselves never seriously considered frames the analysis in anachronistic 
terms.  
To properly assess the Federalists’ jurisdictional achievements as a historical 
matter, we must step into the shoes of the eighteenth-century actors. What federal 
                                                
1 Holt, “To Establish Justice,” 1423; Marcus and Wexler, “Judiciary Act of 1789,” 16.  
2 The current statute is at 28 U.S. Code § 1331: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” The short-lived Judiciary 
Act of 1801 gave the circuit courts jurisdiction phrased in similar terms. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, chap. 4, § 
11, 2 Stat. 89.  
3 One pseudonymous letter published in North Carolina and cited by Charles Warren suggested that an 
early draft of the legislation gave the circuit courts open-ended federal question jurisdiction. See Warren, 
“New Light,” 61. The direct evidence surrounding the bills, debates, and amendments does not comport 
with this hearsay evidence.  
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questions mattered to the Federalists and why? Did the Judiciary Act provide the federal 
courts with jurisdiction over those questions?  
This chapter contends that four jurisdictional categories encompassing federal 
questions mattered most to the Federalists: (i) prize cases; (ii) revenue enforcement; (iii) 
private contract impediments; and (iv) federal crimes. The Judiciary Act of 1789 vested 
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts with enforceable jurisdiction in all these 
areas. Early Federalist lawyers and judges, in turn, employed these jurisdictional 
categories to carve out an indispensible role for the federal courts within the 
constitutional order that responded to the problem of coercion faced by the framers in 
every area of major concern.  
I. Public Admiralty: Prize Cases 
Modern constitutional lawyers do not associate admiralty litigation with important 
federal questions, let alone view it as a jurisdictional category within which the federal 
courts must assert supremacy over the states. But the eighteenth-century Federalists did.4 
Prize litigation in the Revolutionary and Confederation periods forms the critical if oft-
overlooked context for the creation of the first federal judicial establishment.  
Early in the American Revolution the Continental Congress began commissioning 
American privateers to capture ships that supported the British cause. With the twin goals 
of encouraging privateering and regulating its abuses, Congress early recognized the need 
for official determinations in accordance with the law of nations as to whether captured 
ships constituted legal prizes. Admiralty courts had traditionally served this function and, 
                                                
4 See Casto, “Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction.” 
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in 1775, Congress asked each of the states to establish its own admiralty tribunals for 
prize cases. To distinguish the American courts from the loathed British vice-admiralty 
courts, Congress instructed the states to use juries in these matters.5  
No sooner had the states set up these tribunals and started hearing cases than 
Congress began receiving petitions seeking to revise the state decrees. First by committee 
then by establishment of the Court of Appeal in Cases of Capture, Congress thereafter 
endeavored to assert appellate jurisdiction over the state admiralty courts.6 The adventure 
did not go well. A number of states passed laws forbidding admiralty appeals to 
Congress. In notable cases in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, the state legislatures, 
courts, and executive officials refused to recognize the Court’s decrees overturning 
locally slanted jury verdicts in prize trials. These underappreciated cases exposed the 
imbecility of the Articles government to no less a degree than the government’s inability 
to secure an adequate revenue under the requisition system. With no power to execute its 
decrees, the Court of Appeal could do nothing in the face of state defiance and Congress 
hesitated to get involved. At ratification, these controversial prize cases remained 
unresolved and still very contentious.7 
The Judiciary Act solved the problems associated with prize litigation in the 
Confederation period in three ways. First, it created a federal judicial establishment that 
completely supplanted the state admiralty regimes. The federal courts received exclusive 
jurisdiction over admiralty cases, leaving nothing to the state courts. Historians often 
                                                
5 Journals of the Continental Congress, 3:371-75 (Nov. 25, 1775). 
6 Article IX of the Articles of Confederation gave Congress clear authority to do so.  
7 See generally Bourguignon, First Federal Court.  
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emphasize the extent to which the Judiciary Act hemmed in the Article III judicial power. 
Rather than stopping short of the Constitution, however, the act’s provision for exclusive 
admiralty jurisdiction went beyond the Constitution, for nothing in the text of Article III 
or elsewhere authorized this result. Second, as we have seen, in a move that re-aligned 
the new federal system with the old imperial vice-admiralty courts, the Judiciary Act 
excised jury trial requirements in public admiralty cases. Finally and perhaps most 
importantly, the Judiciary Act provided the federal courts with an administrative arm—
the office of the U.S. Marshall—charged with executing the federal courts’ writs and 
decrees.8  
Commenced during the Revolution and concluded in the new federal courts in 
1795, the prize litigation styled Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrator nicely demonstrates 
the differences between the new system and the old one on the question of federal 
judicial power in admiralty. 9 The case is worth considering in detail here. In 1775, as 
hostilities worsened between Britain and the colonies, the owner of the brigantine 
Lusanna (Elisha Doane of Massachusetts) had unwisely carried cargo to London and, to 
secure safe passage back to the states, masqueraded as a loyalist to British authorities, 
obtained a British register, and agreed to carry a cargo to Gibraltar. Owned by John 
Penhallow and other New Hampshire merchants, the American privateer McClary 
captured the Lusanna en route and filed a libel in the recently established New 
Hampshire admiralty court to declare the ship lawful prize. The jurymen—all from 
                                                
8 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
9 The documents produced in the case through the mid-1780s are collected in “The Revolutionary War 
Prize Cases: Records of the Court of Appeal in Cases of Capture, 1776-1787” [hereinafter “Prize Cases”], 
Case No. 30, M162, Roll 3, National Archives, Waltham.  
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Portsmouth, home of Penhallow and the other libelants—found for the New 
Hampshirites. Citing state law, the court forbade Doane an appeal to Congress. So Doane 
appealed to the New Hampshire Superior Court, where another jury deemed the Lusanna 
lawful prize. Thereupon, the state sheriff sold the Lusanna and her cargo, distributing the 
proceeds to the libelants.10  
Forbidden a federal appeal by state law, Doane petitioned Congress, which 
referred the case to the Committee on Appeals over New Hampshire’s objection.11 
Sparring on the question of jurisdiction ensued before the Committee, resulting in a 
number of continuances. In the interim, the states ratified the Articles of Confederation 
and Congress established the Court of Appeal in Cases of Capture. On September 17, 
1783, the Court of Appeal, having reexamined both the facts and law in the case, 
purported to reverse the New Hampshire high court, ordering that the property be 
restored.12  
The Court, however, lacked both power and personnel to enforce its decree. The 
McClary parties refused to comply and instead petitioned the New Hampshire legislature 
to send a remonstrance to Congress (which it did) and enlisted the assistance of the New 
Hampshire attorney general to lobby Congress for a reversal of the Court of Appeal’s 
decree (which it narrowly declined to do). Meanwhile, with Doane now deceased, his 
administrators filed a common law action in Massachusetts to enforce the Court of 
Appeal’s decree. The Suffolk Court of Common Pleas found for the New Hampshirites 
                                                
10 Proceedings of the New Hampshire maritime court, Dec. 1777 and Sept. 1778 terms, in “Prize Cases,” 
Case No. 30, M162, Roll 3.  
11 The Committee on Appeals was the predecessor of the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture (est. 1780).  
12 Proceedings of Court of Appeal, Sept.1783; Counsel’s Notes, Sept. 13, 1783; Minutes of the Court of 
Appeal, Sept. 11, 1783, in “Prize Cases,” Case No. 30, M162, Roll 3.     
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and, on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts halted the case by refusing 
to admit the Court of Appeal’s decree into evidence on the grounds that the Court of 
Appeal lacked authority to overturn the New Hampshire high court. 13  Doane’s 
administrators did not give up. Soon they had obtained a writ of attachment in 
Pennsylvania state court against a ship docked in Philadelphia belonging to one of the 
McClary parties. The Philadelphia court, however, granted a motion in June of 1786 to 
quash the writ on the ground that as a common law court it had no jurisdiction over prize 
cases.14 
Up to this point, the whole affair showed up the utter impotence of the Court of 
Appeals in Cases of Capture. The new federal courts established by the Constitution and 
the Judiciary Act, however, opened up new possibilities for Doane’s administrators. In 
1792, the administrators exhibited a libel against the McClary parties in the New 
Hampshire federal court, requesting that the court grant process to arrest the defendants 
and compel them to show cause as to why they had failed to comply with the Court of 
Appeal’s decree. The court granted process and, upon hearing the case in 1794, affirmed 
without hesitation the Court of Appeals’ authority to overturn the New Hampshire high 
court by virtue of Congress’s war power, awarding substantial damages.15 The McClary 
parties appealed both to the New Hampshire legislature (which in turn petitioned 
                                                
13 See Marcus, “Pennhallow v. Doane’s Administrators,” in DHSC, 6:389-91. 
14  Doane’s Administrators v. Pennhallow, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 218 (1787) (Court of Common Pleas, 
Philadelphia County). 
15 Proceedings of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire [Oct. 24-Nov. 1, 1793, 
Oct. 24 or 25, 1794], in DHSC, 6:399, 404.   
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Congress) and the Supreme Court.16 Congress refused to get involved in what it now 
considered a purely judicial matter and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, 
though it reapportioned the damages.17 In May of 1795, the Court issued a special 
mandate to the lower court to execute the decree. Thereupon the lower court issued 
monitions to the defendants to pay else face imprisonment. When the defendants did not 
comply, the court issued arrest warrants (the admiralty equivalent of a capias writ) which 
the federal marshal proceeded to execute.18 This apparently proved too much for the 
McClary parties to bear and, nearly thirteen years after the old Court of Appeals had 
issued its decree, they finally relented, thus concluding the case.       
Other prize cases involving state resistance to the Court of Appeals in Cases of 
Capture ended up in the federal courts after ratification and, in all of them, the petitioners  
succeeded in enforcing the Court of Appeals’ decrees where they previously could not.19 
The European wars, moreover, produced many prize-related controversies in the new 
federal courts. In Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, the Supreme Court prohibited France from 
establishing consular courts on American soil to adjudicate these matters and held that 
the federal courts possessed jurisdiction to hear suits for restitution arising out of French 
captures that implicated neutral rights.20 This opened the floodgates to prize litigation 
                                                
16 See Remonstrance of the New Hampshire Legislature, January 16, 1795, in DHSC, 6:415-17; Writ of 
Error, Oct. 25, 1794, in ibid., 6:404-405; Citation & Return of Service, Dec. 30, 31, 1794, in ibid., 6:412-
14. 
17 Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795). For a narrative of the case’s progress in 
the federal courts, see John Hale, “A Statement of the Cause of the M’Clary Owners, and Doane & Doane’s 
Administrators [Sept. 1795],” in DHSC, 6:497-504. 
18 Proceedings of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire [Oct. 24-26, 1795], in 
DHSC, 6:505-506. 
19 See Bourguignon, First Federal Court. For a discussion of Houston v. The Sloop Active, which the 
Supreme Court finally resolved in United States v. Peters, see Chapter 10, Section I.  
20 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794). 
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between French and British litigants in the district courts and, by 1796, prize cases 
dominated the Supreme Court’s docket.21 Thereafter the Supreme Court made procedural 
rulings that narrowed its appellate function in such cases.22 Prize litigation, however, 
continued to crowd the lower courts’ dockets into the late 1790s and saw a dramatic spike 
during the War of 1812. After 1815, the United States ceased using privateers and, ever 
since, this important category of jurisdiction under the first Judiciary Act has remained 
lost to the eighteenth century.23     
II. Revenue Enforcement 
As  we saw in Chapter 7, no factor better illuminated the fundamental flaws of the 
Articles of Confederation than the Continental Congress’s inability to raise a revenue 
sufficient to make required payments on the sizable national war debt. Establishing an 
effective tax collection system therefore ranked high, if not highest, on the framers’ list of 
priorities. The Constitution conferred upon Congress wide-open authority for these 
purposes. Enacted nearly two months before the Judiciary Act, moreover, the first 
Collection Act made it eminently clear that the new federal courts would play an 
indispensible role in the enforcement of the revenue laws.24 Just as the first Impost Act 
required the Collection Act, so, too, the Collection Act required the Judiciary Act. The 
Federalists often drew the connection between tax enforcement and judicial coercion 
during the Federal Convention and ratification debates. On March 4, 1789, as the United 
States Congress began its first day of business, the to-be federal tax collector at 
                                                
21 Marcus, “Introduction [to Cases, 1796-1797],” in DHSC, 7:3.  
22 See Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). 
23 See Casto, “Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction,” 151-53.  
24 Act of July 31, 1789, chap. 5, § 1, 1 Stat. 29-35. 
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Biddeford, Maine, Jeremiah Hill, reiterated the point in a letter to George Thatcher, the 
newly elected representative for the district of Maine in Congress. “[A]s there must be a 
Chain of Revenue Officers from one End of the United States to the other in order to 
secure Government, protect the fair & honest Trader, and detect the Smugler,” wrote Hill, 
“so, it appears to me, there must be a line of Inferior Courts in the same Manner to 
protect those Officers, command Obedience to the federal Laws and ordinances & to 
punish Offenders.” Some in Congress would doubtless object to the collectors and courts, 
Hill continued. “ [B]ut what will it signify to make Laws except there is Somebody to put 
them in force & Something to punish violators of them.”25   
All members of the First Congress who accepted the need for inferior federal 
courts also believed that those courts should have jurisdiction over revenue cases. 
Without controversy during the legislative debates, the Judiciary Act accomplished this 
result in Section 9, which vested the district courts with exclusive original jurisdiction 
over “all seizures” made on water or land under the federal impost laws, and “all suits for 
penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States.” It also gave the 
district courts jurisdiction concurrent with the states over suits at common law for $100 
or more commenced by the United States.26 Litigants could file appeals in the circuit 
courts and, in large cases, to the Supreme Court.  
Revenue cases completely dominated the district courts’ dockets in the early 
1790s. No other category of cases even compares.27 The Judiciary Act left open a number 
                                                
25 Jeremiah Hill to George Thatcher, Mar. 4, 1789, in DHSC, 4:365-66. 
26 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77.  
27 See USDC Mass., Maine, Ct., RI, Case Files; New Hampshire Final Record Book, 1790-95, RG21, 
National Archives, Waltham. See also Henderson, Courts for a New Nation, 55-56.  
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of procedural issues that the judges and litigants would have to address in the context of 
these concrete controversies. The act left open, for example, whether suits for penalties 
and forfeitures should proceed as civil or criminal matters. Presumably the collectors 
lacked authority to file criminal actions. They could always, however, pass a given case 
to the district attorney and often did so in the coming years. Most of the district attorneys 
preferred to deal with customs cases as civil matters, but did not always disclose this fact 
to the defendants. One effective strategy employed by the district attorneys involved 
threatening criminal charges for the purpose of forcing a quick confession to a civil 
charge, including payment of a fine. This worked particularly well for Abraham Ogden in 
New Jersey.28        
The Judiciary Act also left open whether juries would or should participate in 
revenue matters. The English judges excepted revenue prosecutions from jury trial 
requirements.29 The American colonists had strongly objected to this practice in the vice-
admiralty courts. Traditionally, actions for seizures of ships and cargoes for revenue 
violations sounded in admiralty and ran against the property (in rem) rather than the 
person who owned the property (in personam). Early cases in the federal district courts 
under the Judiciary Act confirmed this understanding among the collectors and district 
attorneys. As it happened, more often than not no one came forward to contest such 
seizures in the first instance. Typically, after continuing the case one or two terms to give 
owners further opportunities to appear, the judge would issue a writ of execution, 
                                                
28 See Lender, This Honorable Court, 51, 266 n.23, recording fifty-six such cases for February and May 
terms of 1795. 
29 Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:281.  
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instructing the marshal to sell the property at public auction and return the proceeds to the 
court; the judge would then tax costs for court officials (and, if applicable, the district 
attorney), and then apportion the remaining money equally to the collector and the United 
States as per the Collection Act.30  
If, on the other hand, someone did come forward to contest the seizure, a trial 
would ensue. Here again, the Judiciary Act did not require a jury trial. The interested 
party, however, often demanded one anyway. Early federal courts in Georgia and South 
Carolina denied such requests. In New Jersey and Virginia, however, the courts did 
permit juries.31  
Actions for penalties and forfeitures generally proceeded in personam against 
individuals. As with in rem suits, such cases often went unanswered in the early years 
and the judges followed the same basic procedures outlined above in entering and 
executing default judgments. If in a given case, however, the collector had not seized 
sufficient property to satisfy the judgment, the marshal’s task became considerably more 
difficult, requiring execution of a capias, fieri facias, and/or elegit.32 
When the defendant did appear in an in personam action, the jury question again 
arose. For its part, the Massachusetts district court permitted juries to sit in such cases 
                                                
30 For examples in Massachusetts, see, at the March 1790 term, Hiller v. One Chest of Tea, etc., Lincoln v. 
One Bag of Coffee, Lincoln v. 16 Boxes of Lemons, Lincoln v. 1 Chest of Tea, 3 Horses, and 1 Wagon; at 
the June 1790 term, U.S. v. 1 Hogshead of Molasses, etc., United States v. Ship Neptune, Lincoln v. 
McNeil, Cross v. Marquand; at the September 1790 term, U.S. v. Sprague, Lincoln v. Six Saddles, Lincoln 
v. Schooner Bee, Lincoln v. Smith, Lincoln v. McNeil, U.S. v. Burleigh, U.S. v. Hopkins; in the Dec. 1790 
term, U.S. v. 4 Bags of Coffee; at the March 1791 term, U.S. v. Schooner Nancy, Lincoln v. One Barrel of 
Sugar, Lincoln v. 4 Bags of Coffee; and at the Dec. 1791 term, Hiller v. Sundry Goods —all in USDC 
Mass. Case Files, RG21, National Archives, Waltham. See also Henderson, Courts for a New Nation, 55; 
Lender, This Honorable Court, 34.  
31 Henderson, Courts for a New Nation, 55-56. 
32 Ibid., 61.  
 339 
and, in least one instance, a Salem jury blatantly nullified the revenue laws. Through a 
tip, Boston collector Benjamin Lincoln determined that one Samuel Davis, owner of a 
vessel coming from the Bahamas, had surreptitiously landed cotton on one of the 
Elizabeth Islands near Cape Cod. Thereafter, Davis entered at Boston and, when the 
surveyor asked him about the cotton, Davis denied that he had landed it. Lincoln brought 
an in personam suit against Davis and his mate for the stiff $1000 fine authorized under 
the Second Collection Act. The court issued arrest warrants and, once executed, the 
marshal released Davis on bail; the mate sat in jail until trial.33 
In early September 1791, the cases came on for trial in Salem. Lincoln established 
the defendants’ culpability to the satisfaction of the judge and jury. The defendants could 
not prove otherwise. Still, the jury failed to agree to a verdict because, Lincoln believed, 
“the penalty . . . was too high.” The case caused Hamilton “great uneasiness.” Lincoln 
and Hamilton agreed to channel cases into the district court’s Suffolk terms, which they 
expected might draw less biased jurors, and perhaps to avoid Salem altogether in future 
trials. In the meantime, the district attorney Christopher Gore filed a complaint against 
Davis in the next circuit court for false swearing. Davis pled guilty and paid a fine.34    
Over and above the contingency of juries in revenue cases, the continuing 
existence of the state courts presented one final difficulty for the federal tax collectors. 
The Judiciary Act did not prevent individuals from filing private suits for damages in the 
state courts against the federal collectors. The collectors could, of course, plead the 
                                                
33 Lincoln to Hamilton, July 29, 1791, Treasury Correspondence, RG56, M178, Roll 11, National Archives, 
Waltham. 
34 Lincoln to Hamilton, Sept. 9, 1791, in ibid.; Hamilton to Lincoln, Oct. 7, 1791, ibid. For the case files 
themselves, see U.S. v. Samuel Davis and U.S. v. Job Davis, USDC Mass., Case Files, Mar. 1792 term, 
RG21, National Archives, Waltham.  
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revenue laws in defense, but could not always rely on the state judges and juries to 
vindicate them. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act protected the collectors in such cases by 
permitting appeals to the Supreme Court from state high court decisions denying a 
federal claim or defense.35 The early Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction under this 
critical provision for the first time in a revenue-related matter.  
In 1792, the conscientious Federalist collector at Providence, Jeremiah Olney, 
suspended the prominent merchant Welcome Arnold’s credit under Section 41 of the 
Collection Act for letting a bond go delinquent. Soon thereafter, Olney concluded that 
Arnold had attempted to circumvent the credit suspension by loading cargo into another 
merchant’s vessel and thereupon denied credit (and therefore a landing permit) to the 
second merchant until Arnold paid his bond. The subject cargo sat idle on the vessel for 
weeks. Both merchants sued Olney in Rhode Island state court for resulting losses.  
Olney pled Section 41 in a demurrer. The Rhode Island Court of Common Pleas 
sustained the demurrer, but on appeal the Superior Court of Judicature reversed. A jury 
thereafter found for the merchants and Olney appealed to the Supreme Court for a writ of 
error under Section 25. The Supreme Court reversed the Rhode Island high court on the 
legal question, in effect quashing the jury verdict below and sustaining Olney’s original 
demurrer.36 “Public policy, national purposes, and the regular operations of government,” 
                                                
35 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85-87. 
36 Olney v. Arnold, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 308 (1796). For the most detailed discussion of the case available, see 
Maeva Marcus, “Olney v. Arnold; Olney v. Dexter,” in DHSC, 7:565-77. For documents relating to the 
case, see ibid., 7:577-624. For an article on Olney’s relations with the merchants, see Dalzell, “Prudence 
and the Golden Egg.” Congress later codified the Olney rule against collusive transfers. Act of Mar. 2, 
1799, chap. 22, §62, 1 Stat. 675.  
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the Court later declared, “require that the revenue system should be faithfully observed, 
and strictly executed.”37     
III. Contract Impediments     
The evidence makes it unmistakably clear that the multitude of debtor-relief laws 
passed by the state legislatures in the decade after Independence greatly disturbed the 
Federalists and that they meant for the Constitution to help eradicate these perceived 
vices. The economic interpretation asserts that the Federalists’ concerns about state-level 
contract impediments belied strong sympathies with the creditor class vis-à-vis debtors 
and, relatedly, that the Constitution marked a victory for the emerging capitalistic ethos 
in America.38 To be sure, the emerging commitment to the sanctity of contracts in 1787 
suggested a departure from the communitarianism of colonial yore. The argument that 
class bias explains the Federalists’ opposition to contract impediments, however, finds 
little direct support in the record. An ideological motivation, on the other hand, finds 
ample support. The promises memorialized in private contracts formed the essential 
bonds holding American society together. Permitting individuals to break their promises 
with impunity could only lead to the disintegration of society and, ultimately, anarchy. 
The Federalists’ bias in favor of law and order—and, correlatively, their fear of 
anarchy—better explains their opposition to contract impediments than does class bias.39  
 The Federalists’ fear of anarchy associated with contract impediments, moreover, 
extended beyond domestic disorder. It included international anarchy, which is to say, 
                                                
37 Priestman v. United States, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 28, 34 (1800). 
38 See Beard, An Economic Interpretation; Holton, Unruly Americans.  
39 See, e.g., Report on the Public Credit, Dec. 13, 1790, in Hamilton, Works, 3:100; see also Madison, 
Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money (1786), in Madison, Papers, 9:158-59, noting that paper money 
and other legislative contract impediments destroyed “confidence between man and man.”  
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war. The American Revolution, of course, served as the Federalists’ primary point of 
reference in this regard. The Americans had fought the war with esprit de corps and later, 
with Independence secured, could look back on the “glorious cause” through rose-colored 
lenses. Victory emboldened many Americans and resentments lingered, particularly 
below the Mason-Dixon line. Still, few if any Americans in 1787 wanted to provoke 
another war with Britain. For their part, the Federalists believed it imperative to the 
nation-building process to keep the country out of war for a considerable period. To 
avoid another war and the anarchy that it entailed, however, required some sacrifices 
among which adherence to the terms of the peace with Britain as set out in the Treaty of 
Peace (signed September 3, 1783) ranked highest. Among other things, those terms 
required that Americans follow through on their pre-war contractual obligations to British 
merchants: Article IV of the Treaty provided that “creditors on either side, shall meet 
with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona 
fide debts heretofore contracted.”40 
During the Revolution, nine state legislatures had enacted provisions that either 
sequestered British debts or obstructed collection efforts. In 1777, for example, the 
Virginia legislature purported to discharge liability to British creditors for amounts paid 
into the state loan office.41 Another act passed in 1782 prevented British creditors from 
                                                
40 Definite Treaty of Peace Between the United States of American and his Britannic Majesty, in 8 Stat. 80 
(Sept. 3, 1783), art. IV [hereinafter Treaty of Peace]. 
41 “An act for sequestering British Property, enabling those indebted to British subjects to pay off such 
debts, and directing the proceedings in suits where such subjects are parties,” in Hening, Statutes at Large 
of Virginia, 9:377-80 (Oct. 1777 session: chap. IX).  
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recovering in the state courts.42 The Treaty of Peace did not put an end to these contract 
impediments, in large part because Congress lacked the means to enforce its provisions. 
Many Americans greeted Article IV in particular with shock and horror, deeming it an 
undeserved windfall for the vanquished enemy. Not only did the state legislatures permit 
wartime legislation that violated Article IV to continue in force. Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, for example, passed new acts allowing courts to deduct wartime interest on 
British debts.43 Pennsylvania passed an installment act.44 The courts in Georgia and the 
Carolinas closed their doors to British creditors.45    
That the British refused to evacuate the Northwest frontier as required by Article 
VII of the Treaty, however, only stiffened the states’ resistance. In December 1785, the 
United States registered a formal complaint with the British Secretary of State about the 
troops’ continued presence in the Northwest.46 In response, Britain defended its failure to 
withdraw on the grounds that various extant state laws constituted lawful impediments to 
collection of British debts and therefore violated Article IV.47 Thereupon Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs John Jay investigated the British counter-complaint and found it had 
substantial merit.  
                                                
42 “An act to repeal so much of a former act as suspends the issuing of executions upon certain judgments 
until December, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three,” in Hening, Statutes at Large, 11:76 (May 
1782 session: chap. XLIV, sec. 2). The act would have permitted recovery of debts assigned to an 
American before May 1, 1777.  
43 Conn., Acts and Laws 1784, 283-84 (May 1784 session); Mass., Acts and Laws 1784-1785, 155-57 (Mar. 
11, 1785, chap. 57 [1784]).  
44 Penn., Laws 1782-1785, 412-415 (Dec. 23, 1783, chap. 169); see also Holt, “To Establish Justice,” 1441.  
45 Holt, “To Establish Justice,” 1442. New York also enacted legislation that conflicted with the Treaty. See 
N.Y., Laws, 2:41 (Mar. 17, 1783, chap. XXXI). In the well-known New York case of Rutgers v. 
Waddington (1784), in which Alexander Hamilton represented a British litigant, the New York Mayor’s 
Court avoided the question of whether the Treaty itself nullified repugnant state laws. Hamilton’s notes, 
briefs, and the court’s opinion in the case are reprinted in Hamilton, Law Practice, 1:282-419.       
46 See Adams, “A Memorial,” Nov. 30, 1785, in Secret Journals, 4:186-187.  
47 Letter from Britannick Majesty’s Secretary of State to Adams, Feb. 28, 1786, in ibid., 4:187-202.  
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In his subsequent report to Congress in the fall of 1786, as Shays’s Rebellion 
convulsed Massachusetts, Jay identified two essential misconceptions surrounding the 
Treaty: first, the state governments believed they could legislate around Article IV at 
will; and, second, both Congress and the states proceeded on the assumption that the 
Treaty itself did not and could not repeal the offensive state laws—only the state 
legislatures could do so. Jay’s report argued vigorously to the contrary. Congress 
possessed the exclusive right to make war and peace. Once “constitutionally made, 
ratified and published by Congress,” therefore, the treaty became “superadded to the laws 
of the land” and binding on “every member of the nation,” without “intervention, consent 
or fiat of state legislatures.”48 Neither Congress nor the States, moreover, could act 
unilaterally to alter the plain meaning of Article IV without involving the country in 
“Anarchy and confusion at home, and in disputes which would probably terminate in 
hostilities and War with [ Britain].”49 
In April 1787, Congress transmitted Jay’s report to the states together with a 
number of resolutions and recommendations.50 First and foremost, Congress resolved that 
state laws repugnant to Article IV “ought to be forthwith repealed” by the state 
legislatures. It further “recommended” that the state legislatures effect such repeals in 
general terms without enumerating specific acts; and that the legislatures instruct the state 
courts to decide cases involving Article IV according to the treaty’s “true intent and 
meaning . . . anything in the said Acts or parts of Acts to the contrary thereof in any wise 
                                                
48 Report of the Office for Foreign Affairs, Oct. 13, 1786, in ibid., 185, 204. 
49 Letter to the States, read April 9, 1787, in Journals of the Continental Congress, 32:180.   
50 Ibid., 32:177-84; see also Congress’s March 1787 resolutions, in ibid., 32:124-25.  
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notwithstanding.”51 As it happened, the northern states substantially complied with the 
recommendation. The southern states, however, continued to balk. For its part, Virginia 
refused to comply until the British had evacuated all western posts and paid for slaves 
taken during the war.52      
 Wanting power to enforce its directives, the Continental Congress could do 
nothing in the face of southern intransigence. Framed soon after the states received 
Congress’s resolutions, however, the new Constitution purported to change that. The 
Constitution addressed the problem of contract impediments in four ways. First, the 
Contracts Clause expressly prohibited the states from impairing contract obligations. 
Second, Article I Section 10 prohibited the states from emitting paper money and from 
making anything other than gold and silver legal tender for payment of debts. Third, 
Article VI made both the Constitution and the Treaty of Peace itself the supreme law of 
the land notwithstanding contrary state laws or constitutions. Finally, Article III assigned 
to the federal judiciary the power to enforce the Supremacy Clause.53      
                                                
51 Letter to the States [Apr. 1787], in ibid., 32:181-83. 
52 Henderson, Courts for a New Nation, 74. 
53 The Federalists looked specifically to the new federal courts to solve the enforcement problem with 
respect to the internal obligations imposed by the Treaty. At the Federal Convention, Edmund Randolph 
noted the “difficulty in establishing the judiciary.” “[T]he object, however, at present is to establish this 
principle, to wit, the security of foreigners where treaties are in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of 
the states and the citizens thereof.” Farrand, Records, 1:238 (Yates’ notes, June 13, 1787). At the North 
Carolina ratifying convention, William R. Davie argued that without a federal judiciary the federal 
government’s laws “will . . . be ineffectual, but particularly with respect to treaties. We have seen with 
what little ceremony the states violated the peace with Great Britain. Congress had no power to enforce its 
observance. The same cause will produce the same effect . . . Those ends can only be accomplished by a 
general paramount judiciary.” Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 2:896 (emphasis added). In The 
Federalist essays, John Jay wrote that “[u]nder the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as 
well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner,—
whereas, adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four 
confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent 
courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and 
interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such 
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The Judiciary Act, in turn, gave the new federal courts jurisdiction to enforce 
federal supremacy with regard to contract impediments in three provisions. First, the 
circuit courts received jurisdiction to decide disputes between citizens of different states, 
subject to a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement. This covered interstate Contracts 
Clause claims, leaving jurisdiction to the state courts to decide, in the first instance, 
Contracts Clause claims asserted by their own citizens. Second, the act vested the circuit 
courts with jurisdiction to decide cases brought by aliens, subject to the same amount-in-
controversy requirement. This covered contracts claims between British creditors and 
American debtors wherein Article IV of the Treaty of Peace might arise. Finally, as to 
those cases not captured by the two foregoing provisions—diversity or alienage cases 
involving amounts less than $500, or contract claims between citizens of the same state—
Section 25, as we have seen, provided for appeals to the Supreme Court from state high 
court decisions denying federal claims.54  
 Having long since given up on the state courts for purposes of enforcing the 
Treaty, British creditors found rays of hope in the Judiciary Act. The major British 
trading houses felt no compunction about hiring American lawyers to pursue their claims 
with vigor in the new federal courts. In the ensuing decade, virtually all the federal 
litigation involving contract impediments came into the circuit courts under alienage 
jurisdiction and virtually all the cases involved Article IV of the Treaty. These cases, 
furthermore, occasioned the earliest instances of the federal courts exercising judicial 
                                                                                                                                            
questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national 
government, cannot be too much commended.” The Federalist No. 3, 95 (John Jay).    
54 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77; ibid., § 25, 1 Stat. 85-86. 
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review to strike down state laws—long before John Marshall.  During its spring term in 
1791, the Connecticut circuit court set aside a state statute authorizing the deduction of 
war interest on debts owed to British merchants.55 The next year, in another case brought 
by British creditors, the Rhode Island circuit court invalidated an act passed by the state 
legislature purporting to stay collection of the defendant’s debts for three years.56     
Most of the relevant litigation, however, occurred in the south, particularly 
Virginia, where passions ran highest on the British debt question. On the eve of the 
Revolution, the tidewater planters had branded the British merchants to whom they owed 
vast sums agents of a degenerate society. The planters convinced themselves that 
American political independence from Britain entailed economic independence for 
individual debtors.57 At ratification, southerners owed nearly eighty-five percent of the 
total American debts claimed by the British. Virginia alone could lay claim to almost half 
of the aggregate amount.58  
In some districts, it took upwards of two years for the circuit courts to accumulate 
respectable dockets.59 Not so in Virginia. Over one-hundred British debt cases showed up 
on the Virginia circuit court’s docket in its first term and within a year that number had 
doubled. Due to favorable rates of exchange, accumulated interest, and penal sums owing 
                                                
55 Elliot v. Sage, Deblois v. Hawley, Case Files, USCC Ct., Apr. 1791 term, National Archives, Waltham. 
Described in Connecticut Gazette, May 12, 1791, 2.  
56 Champion & Dickson v. Casey, Case Files, USCC RI, June 1792 term, National Archives, Waltham. See 
also Boston Columbian Centinel, June 20, 1792; Providence Gazette & County Journal, June 16, 1792. 
57 See Breen, Tobacco Culture.  
58 Based on figures in Bemis, Jay’s Treaty, 140.  
59 See, e.g., USCC RI, Minute Book, 1790-1795, RG21, National Archives, Waltham. 
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on forfeited bonds, the amount-in-controversy requirement for alienage cases proved easy 
to satisfy on even small debts.60 
The complaints filed in the British debt litigation fell into three categories: bond 
defaults; actions based on open accounts; and protests of bills of exchange. Bond defaults 
predominated and the leading case, Ware v. Hylton, did not vary too far from the norm 
other than being first to wind its way through the busy Virginia circuit court to reach a 
final judgment. The plaintiff, John Tyndale Ware, was the administrator for one of the 
larger British trading houses in Virginia, Jones & Farrell of Bristol, England. The firm 
had at least twenty other cases pending on the Virginia circuit court’s docket. The 
defendant, Richmond merchant Daniel Hylton, seized on every opportunity to delay 
answering the case. (Hylton would go on to serve as the defendant in the carriage tax 
case, Hylton v. United States.) The plaintiff’s declaration sought £2,976.11.6 on a penal 
bond dated July 7, 1774 (twice the amount actually owed on the bond), together with 
£500 in damages. On April 26, 1780, Hylton had allegedly deposited a substantial portion 
of the claimed amount—$3,111—in the state loan office as per the sequestration law.61  
Hylton’s lawyers asserted five pleas in response to the plaintiff’s declaration. 
Most other Virginian debtors asserted the same pleas. First, they asserted the general plea 
of payment. This standard plea insured that the case would go to a jury should the other 
defenses fail. The remaining pleas asserted special defenses determinable on demurrer 
prior to trial. The second plea alleged that defendant’s payment into the loan office under 
the sequestration law of 1777 extinguished that portion of the debt. The third plea 
                                                
60 Hobson, “Recovery of British Debts,” 182. 
61 Marcus, “Ware v. Hylton,” in DHSC, 7:208. 
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asserted that two other war statutes excused them from payment—a 1782 act barring 
recovery for British debts unless assigned before May 1777, and a 1777 act concerning 
the escheat and forfeiture of British property. The fourth plea—one that consumed 
considerable attention during oral argument—asserted that British violations of the 
Treaty exempted the defendant from complying with Article IV. Finally, and in a similar 
vein, the Virginians asserted that the dissolution of the royal government on July 4, 1777 
annulled all public and private debts to the British.62   
Interested parties on both sides of the Atlantic put their ears to the ground in 
anticipation of the decision in Ware. The best and brightest of the Virginia bar arrayed 
themselves on both sides of the cause, with Patrick Henry and John Marshall representing 
Hylton. The special pleas interposed by the Virginians endowed the case with great 
significance. By the time the Supreme Court accepted Ware for review in 1796, Justice 
James Iredell reportedly called it “the greatest Cause which ever came before a Judicial 
Court in the World.”63   
If the Virginians sought to delay final determination of the issues raised in the 
British debt cases, they generally succeeded in achieving this result. By 1792, in most 
districts the two-judge quorum had become the norm in the circuit court sessions. The 
judges in Ware, however, granted a number of continuances to ensure that a full three-
judge panel, with two Supreme Court justices, would decide the important issues raised 
                                                
62 In their circuit court opinions in Ware, discussed below, John Jay and James Iredell addressed each of the 
special pleas in turn.  
63 Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer, Feb. 7, 1795, in DHSC, 7:319. 
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in the case.64 All knew that the case would effectively determine the outcome in hundreds 
of others. When the case finally came on for trial in the spring term of 1793, oral 
argument on the special pleas stretched on for seven days in late May before a circuit 
panel consisting of Chief Justice John Jay, associate justice James Iredell, and district 
judge Cyrus Griffin. The Virginia circuit court’s much-anticipated decision came a few 
days later on June 7.65  
All the judges overruled the third, fourth, and fifth pleas. Only Jay and Iredell 
delivered opinions. The judges held that the question regarding British violations of the 
Treaty fell outside the judicial ken. The current Constitution and federal government 
recognized the Treaty as binding. The judiciary was bound to take cognizance of its 
provisions as the law of the land. The justices also agreed that any annulment of British 
debts by virtue of the royal government’s dissolution could by the law of nations extend 
no further than the war itself. The peace revived the British claims. For similar reasons, 
the justices held inapplicable the 1782 act barring recovery for British debts unless 
assigned prior to 1777.66 Finally, Chief Justice Jay held that the 1779 escheat act must 
have been pleaded by mistake since it clearly exempted contract debts.    
There remained, however, the plea for the sequestration act’s application to the 
case and here the judges differed. Iredell, to be sure, had a conflict of interest. A similar 
                                                
64 See John Hamilton to Lord Grenville, Apr. 4, 1793, in DHSC, 7:233; George Hammond to Lord 
Grenville, May 17, 1793, in ibid., 7:234.  
65 Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion of the circuit court opinions in Ware relies on James 
Iredell’s notes of his own remarks on June 7, 1793, which can be found in the Pierce Butler Papers at the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania and reprinted in DHSC, 7:26-92; and on John Jay’s opinion on the same 
date as reprinted in ibid., 7:292-311. Jay’s opinion is also reprinted in 13 F. Cases 1059 (C.C.D.V. [1793]) 
(No. 7507), though under the wrong case name.    
66 Justice Iredell held that the Treaty of Peace repealed the act, but that the repeal did not become effective 
until ratification of the Constitution.  
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law existed in North Carolina and Iredell served as an executor for a defendant-debtor 
seeking the law’s protection in pending North Carolina circuit court litigation.67 Perhaps, 
then, it should come as no surprise that Iredell held for the defendant on this issue in 
Ware. Since district judge Griffin concurred in this decision, it decided the issue. Iredell 
did not deny that the Treaty of Peace legally bound the states. Rather, he argued that 
Article 4’s terms did not apply to the particular facts of the case because the defendant 
had already paid his money into the loan office at the time the Treaty went into effect. 
Therefore plaintiff did not qualify as a “creditor” within Article 4’s contemplation. In 
practical effect, this interpretation would have barred all British creditors from recovering 
monies paid into the state loan office since few if any payments occurred after 1782.68 
Iredell admitted that his opinion contradicted the unanimous congressional resolutions 
transmitted to the states in 1787.69  
Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Jay vigorously dissented. After carefully showing 
that by its very terms the sequestration could not protect the defendant, Jay essentially 
recapitulated the analysis set forth in his 1786 report to the Continental Congress. To the 
extent the sequestration act extinguished debts to British merchants, he held, the Treaty 
nullified it. By virtue of language used in other Virginian laws, Jay further held, plaintiff 
still qualified as a “creditor” within the meaning of Article 4 irrespective of when 
defendant made payments into the loan office. With this said, however, Jay emphasized 
                                                
67 James Iredell to John Jay, Jan. 21, 1794, in DHSC, 2:441. 
68 Evans, “Private Indebtedness and the Revolution in Virginia,” 356. 
69 William Tilghman’s Notes on the Justices’ Opinions, Mar. 7, 1796, in DHSC, 7:347 
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that the defendant could rightly petition the state legislature for relief. Iredell and Griffin, 
one the other hand, would have placed that onus on the plaintiff. 
The Chief Justice’s spirited dissent on the sequestration act question gave the 
plaintiff hope that an appeal to the Supreme Court might yield a reversal. First, however, 
the case would have to go to a jury to resolve the general plea of payment. A portentous 
conflict arose here on the controversial question of war interest. Iredell and Griffin 
declined to give an instruction to the jury on this score. Jay, on the other hand, instructed 
the jury that the Treaty of Peace required it to award interest accrued during the war.70 
The jury failed to reach a decision, whereupon the judges dismissed one of the jurors and 
ordered a new trial. At the next term, a verdict did come in. The jury awarded damages 
corresponding to a portion of the claimed debt which defendant had not paid into the loan 
office—or $596. It also awarded interest accruing from 1782, but hung on the question of 
war interest.71   
Defendants chose not to appeal the circuit court’s rulings on the three special 
pleas not involving the sequestration law and thereby relinquished them. Plaintiff, 
however, appealed to the Supreme Court and, and after three continuances, the case came 
on for oral argument at the February 1796 term.72 By this time Jay had resigned from the 
Court and the Senate had not yet confirmed another Chief Justice. Keen to bring the 
British debt question to a final resolution, a quorum consisting of the newly 
commissioned Samuel Chase, James Wilson, William Cushing, William Paterson, and 
                                                
70 Phineas Bond to Lord Grenville, June 25, 1793, in DHSC, 7:312-13. 
71 Marcus, “Ware v. Hylton,” in ibid., 7:214-15; Hobson, “Recovery of British Debts,” 192.  
72 See Writ of Error, June 6, 1794, Assignment of Error, and Citation, in DHSC, 7:314-16.  
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James Iredell let the hearing go forward. Iredell declined to vote. The question at bar 
turned on the sequestration act alone.  
On March 7, 1796, the justices delivered their opinions. Justice Chase spoke first 
and all the other participating justices essentially concurred in his opinion.73 To some 
extent, Chase’s opinion tracked Jay’s circuit court ruling. Article 4 of the Treaty of Peace 
rendered the sequestration act null and void, and the efficacy of the Treaty’s prohibition 
on contract impediments did not depend on the approval of the state legislatures. In his 
own reasoning, however, Chase laid special emphasis on an aspect of the case that Jay 
had not—the elephant in the room: the Supremacy Clause. If any doubts existed prior to 
ratification as to whether a state legislature could stand in the Treaty’s way, Chase held, 
“they must be entirely removed by the 6th article of the Constitution.” Chase underlined 
the Supremacy Clause’s retroactive application with respect to treaties. The Treaty “is to 
be considered in the same light as if the Constitution had been established before the 
making of the treaty of 1783.” At the moment of ratification, then, state laws impairing 
British contract rights became “totally annihilate[d]” and “prostrated before the treaty.”74 
As the supreme law of the land, the Treaty operated directly on the repugnant state laws 
and on the individuals seeking their protection. Chase emphasized the federal judiciary’s 
special constitutional role in enforcing the supremacy of Article 4 over the states: “Courts 
must adjudge the laws creating the impediments void.”75  
                                                
73 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).  
74 Ibid., 236-237, 242.  
75 Tilghman’s Notes on the Justices’ Opinions, in DHSC, 7:344. 
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Although Iredell did not vote in the Supreme Court’s decision, he reiterated the 
basis for his circuit court ruling at length.76 Justice William Cushing registered the 
decisive response. Article 4, Cushing declared, voided the sequestration law “ab initio,” 
with the result that its provisions never possessed the force of law and therefore nothing 
the defendant did under its auspices could ever boast legal validity.77  The ab initio 
fiction extended the bounds of judicial power over state legislation in matters involving 
the Treaty to points that ordinary federal legislation did not reach. In fiction if not fact, it 
recalled the way in which the failed congressional veto would have worked had it not met 
defeat in Philadelphia.  
The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the circuit court on the sequestration act 
issue and remanded the case to the circuit court to ascertain additional damages in 
conformity with the Court’s decision. The circuit court impanelled another jury for this 
purpose and, at the May 1797 term, the jury returned a verdict for $5,418 plus costs. The 
defendant, however, failed to comply with a bond he had sworn out to satisfy the 
judgment. Whereupon the circuit court awarded a default judgment for an additional 
amount to the plaintiff. The marshal’s office thereafter hounded the defendant with 
attachments and threats of imprisonment and, in 1798, Hylton finally satisfied the 
judgment.78      
                                                
76 Iredell recused himself from voting but interposed a longwinded reiteration of his circuit court opinion 
anyway. 
77 Ware, 3 U.S. at 281: “the plain and obvious meaning of it, goes to nullify, ab initio, all laws, or the 
impediments of any law, as far as they might have been designed to impair, or impede, the creditor's right, 
or remedy, against his original debtor.”  
78 See Marcus, “Ware v. Hylton,” in DHSC, 7:222. 
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Although British creditors had good reason to applaud the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ware, in truth the 1793 circuit court rulings in Ware had cleared the way for 
most British creditors to secure recoveries in the Virginia circuit court. By all 
appearances, they experienced considerable success. Many debtors settled out of court. 
Those that charged onward could only buy time. By 1795, the Virginia circuit court had 
rendered approximately 500 judgments in favor of British creditors and, after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ware, additional favorable judgments came pouring 
throughout the south at increasing rates.79  
British creditors, however, continued to face some obstacles in circuit court 
litigation. First, juries in Virginia and elsewhere more often than not deducted war 
interest from their verdicts—this notwithstanding the federal judges’ instructions to the 
contrary. In 1792, none other than Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson had offered an 
elaborate defense of this practice in which southern jurors doubtless took solace.80 
Second, in cases based on unliquidated book accounts, plaintiffs in Virginia faced a 
statute of limitations that, when strictly enforced, barred many actions involving Scottish 
factors. Not until 1806 did the Supreme Court resolve this issue in favor of the factors.81 
Third, the Virginia circuit court enforced difficult rules for proving up debt in book 
account cases. In the past, the Virginia state courts had accepted submission of plaintiff’s 
                                                
79 See Henderson, Courts for a New Nation, 77. Weeks after the Ware decision, the North Carolina circuit 
court, with now-Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth and district judge Stitgreaves presiding, struck down a 
North Carolina law substantially identical to the Virginia sequestration law. Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F. Cas. 
336 (1796).   
80 Jefferson to George Hammond, May 29, 1792, in American State Papers: Foreign Relations 1:201, 213-
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interest.” Hobson, “Recovery of British Debts,” 194.   
81 See Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 456 (1806) (holding that five-year limitations period did not 
preclude suit for debts contracted less than five years before the Revolution).   
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account book together with an oath as satisfactory proof. Yet a two-year limitation period 
applied. This meant that plaintiffs in the 1790s had to resort to ordinary common law 
rules, such as proving delivery of the goods or authenticating the handwriting of 
bookkeepers, which proved difficult to satisfy so long after the fact.82  
Finally, many judgment creditors found it difficult to collect on their judgments. 
Deadbeats accounted for some of the difficulty. More often, however, plaintiffs obtained 
large judgments only to find that the defendants lacked sufficient attachable assets to 
satisfy them. As a result, countless defendants stood exposed to arrest and imprisonment. 
In 1792, however, Congress began enacting relief statutes that obligated judgment 
creditors to support imprisoned insolvent debtors.83 In any case, imprisonment of their 
debtors did little if anything to help creditors actually satisfy the underlying money 
judgments. They wanted their money, not the debtor himself.  
For these reasons among others, the British sought and received additional 
creditor protections in the negotiations that led to the controversial Jay Treaty. Article 6 
of the Treaty provided that “in all [] Cases where full Compensation for [] losses and 
damages cannot, for whatever reason, be actually obtained had and received by the said 
Creditors in the ordinary course of Justice, The United States will make full and complete 
Compensation for the same to the said Creditors.”84 A five-member commission would 
determine the compensation in each case. As it happened, only two Americans sat on the 
commission and they promptly walked out after the British laid down rules that would 
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have included war interest in the compensation awards. By a Convention dated January 8, 
1802, both sides agreed to annul Article 6 in lieu of which the Americans agreed to pay 
Britain three annual lump sums of £600,000 sterling.85 Those creditors not made whole 
by these payments would have to continue to try their hands in the federal circuit courts 
under alienage jurisdiction. As ever, debt litigation in the circuit courts took time. But 
with the judges in their corner, the creditors could expect favorable dispositions at the 
end of the line. 
IV. Criminal Jurisdiction: Offenses against the Sovereignty  
The conventional historical account says that the Federalists intended to leave 
most criminal jurisdiction to the states and granted only the bare minimum to the federal 
government. For this reason, key modern works on the constitutional founding essentially 
pass over federal criminal jurisdiction in silence.86 The following discussion will suggest 
that the conventional account too narrowly construes the relevant constitutional 
provisions and uncritically swallows the lines some Federalists pursued for the purpose of 
mollifying their adversaries. It is true that that the states would retain essentially all the 
criminal jurisdiction they possessed before the Constitution. And it is true that the 
Judiciary Act did nothing to impinge on the states’ criminal jurisdiction. The Constitution 
and the Judiciary Act, however, did create another layer of criminal jurisdiction 
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specifically linked to the new federal authority whose historical significance scholars 
have largely overlooked.  
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government possessed no 
criminal jurisdiction whatsoever for the reason that it possessed no domestic sovereignty 
whatsoever. Congress’s inability to punish the Shaysites for attacking the federal armory 
in Springfield exposed this fundamental weakness. Criminal jurisdiction came in as an 
attribute of the newly established federal sovereignty under the Constitution and as a 
product of the shift in the object of federal power from states to individuals. Its originally 
conceived constitutional function lay primarily in protecting the government itself and, in 
particular, its outward administrative processes. “[E]very government,” Hamilton wrote, 
“ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation.”87 The most important 
category of crimes for the Federalists therefore involved what we shall call offenses 
against the sovereignty.  
Sections 9 and 11 of the Judiciary Act gave the district and circuit courts 
exclusive “cognizance of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the 
United States.” What did this mean in historical context? At the time the Judiciary Act 
passed, Congress had enacted no criminal legislation beyond certain offenses enumerated 
in the first Collection Act. Certainly the drafters of the Judiciary Act meant for the 
language in Sections 9 and 11 to serve as a placeholder for the crimes and offenses 
Congress might provide for in the future. The drafters of the Judiciary Act knew that 
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work had begun on a crimes bill in Congress and could have expected its enactment 
within a year.  
The question, however, of what the language of Sections 9 and 11 could have 
referred to at the time of its enactment is worth pursuing here. Might it have referred to 
crimes established in the Constitution? Article I of the Constitution authorized Congress 
to “define and punish” water crimes and counterfeiting. The federal government also 
received exclusive criminal jurisdiction over federal properties, facilities and “other 
needful buildings,” the subtext being the Shaysites’ armed attacks on government 
buildings in Massachusetts.88 Congress could also proceed to establish all the criminal 
jurisdiction necessary and proper to carry out its own enumerated powers and all other 
powers vested in the federal government or any department or officer thereof. By their 
terms, however, all these provisions merely empowered Congress to act in these areas. 
Arguably, therefore, the phrase “crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of 
the United States” in the Judiciary Act did not contemplate crimes referred to in Article I 
Section 8 because Congress had not yet exercised its power to define those offenses at the 
time the Judiciary Act became law.   
Article I Section 8, however, did not exhaust the criminal jurisdiction created by 
the Constitution. The true heart of the federal government’s criminal jurisdiction under 
the Constitution lay in Article III’s Treason Clause. The Treason Clause differed from the 
offenses denoted in Article I Section 8 in one essential respect: It established a crime 
whose judicial enforceability in the union did not depend upon any legislative enactment. 
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The early federal judges understood this well and instructed grand juries on treason prior 
to passage of legislation specifying the crime.89 At the time of their enactment, Sections 9 
and 11’s provision for criminal jurisdiction in the district and circuit courts therefore 
referred, if to nothing else, then to the constitutionally mandated crime of treason. 
Of what did treason consist? The records from the Federal Convention suggest 
that the Constitution’s definition of treason emerged as an intended alternative to 
controversial judge-made English doctrines—i.e., “constructive” treason— widening the 
crime’s scope and to the severity of punishments associated with it in the English 
tradition.90 Thus Article III purported to confine the crime to “levying War” against the 
“United States” (or aiding its enemies) and, absent a confession in open court, required 
the testimony of two witnesses to “the same overt Act” to support a conviction.91 
Members of the Committee of Detail culled the definition from the Statute 25 Edward III, 
but also rejected additional conduct defined by the English statute as treasonous—
specifically, the controversial prohibition on “compassing or imagining” the king’s 
death.92  
But if any Federalists had convinced themselves that the Constitution’s treason 
provisions properly circumscribed the crime so as to render it consistent with republican 
principles, certain Antifederalists did not agree. “By the principles of the American 
revolution,” Luther Martin roared, “arbitrary power may and ought to be resisted, even 
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by arms if necessary.” Yet if a state ever attempted to so resist federal power, Martin 
reckoned, “the State and every of its citizens who act under its authority are guilty of a 
direct act of treason.”93 The Treason Clause’s superficially precise language, moreover, 
belied many ambiguities with which the judges, marshals, and government lawyers 
moving within the court system to work. By its terms, no mens rea requirement 
apparently applied. The Constitution defined neither “levying war” (the activity) nor “the 
United States” (the object). Nor would Congress ever hazard to do so. Finally, while the 
clause required an “overt Act,” it failed to specify whose overt act it required.   
Commentary surrounding the Treason Clause during the Federal Convention 
occasioned some of the only instances in 1787 of the framers referring to the federal 
government as a “sovereign”—a term hitherto reserved to the states and, less frequently, 
to the people under the several state constitutions.94 These early references to federal 
“sovereignty” made sense in this context since the crime of treason presupposed the 
existence of a sovereign government to make war against. The most fundamental 
difference between treason in England and treason under the United States Constitution, 
lay less in the latter’s restricted scope than in the substitution of a specific personal 
sovereign (the king) with an abstract sovereign (the United States). The crime of treason 
against the federal state, or “the United States,” had the potential to extend further than in 
England because the American “sovereign” could, both in theory and practice, 
encompass much more than a personal monarch could.95 The very abstractness of the 
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strange new sovereign insinuated in the Treason Clause meant that any offense against it 
became ipso facto “constructive.”96 Finally, the Treason Clause did nothing to prohibit 
the federal government from defining and punishing all kinds of other offenses against 
the federal sovereignty.97   
The first congresses focused almost exclusively on codifying offenses against the 
sovereignty. The Collection Acts imposed heavy fines on anyone who forcibly resisted or 
obstructed customs officials in the execution of their duties. On its face, the broad 
language used to describe the lower federal courts’ criminal jurisdiction in Sections 9 and 
11 of the Judiciary Act—“all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the 
United States”—also seemed to subsume offenses against the sovereignty. 98  The 
Judiciary Act also codified for the judges broad common law powers to summarily 
punish any and all contempts of the judicial authority—a significant provision to which 
we shall return below.   
The first legislation defining federal crimes, the Crimes Act of 1790, established 
many additional offenses within this critical sphere of criminal jurisdiction. Historians 
have described the Crimes Act as “narrowly restrictive.” 99  In fact, the legislation 
established federal crimes in every area expressly provided for in the Constitution, 
including piracy, counterfeiting, and treason—all made punishable by death only. 100 
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Rather than endeavoring to put a finer point on the Treason Clause, the legislation simply 
reproduced its amorphous language verbatim.101 Yet the legislation also defined crimes 
found nowhere in the Constitution, though arguably within the contemplation of the 
Necessary & Proper Clause. These included accessories to and misprisions of piracy and 
treason.102 As well, from its Article I Section 8 jurisdiction over federal properties 
Congress inferred powers to punish any murder, manslaughter, mayhem, or larceny 
committed thereon. Finally, the Crimes Act defined and established punishments for a 
slew of offenses touching the legal process in particular, namely rescue of a person 
convicted of a capital crime (punishable by death); stealing or falsifying federal court 
records or processes (punishable by 7 years in prison, or $5,000 fine and 39 stripes); 
perjury (3 years, $800 fine, and 1 hour in pillory); bribery of a judge (imprisonment and 
fine at judge’s discretion); obstruction of the judicial process (1 year and $300); and 
rescue of a person before trial (1 year and $500).103      
Other than revenue-related prosecutions, the federal courts’ criminal dockets 
remained slim from 1790 to 1793. Prosecutions for water crimes predominated during the 
early period and here the new federal courts showed no leniency in meting out 
punishments for those convicted of such crimes.104 The Neutrality Act of 1794 also 
occasioned a few high-profile prosecutions in the circuit courts. The Whiskey Rebellion 
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in Pennsylvania, however, gave rise to the first major cases involving offenses against the 
federal sovereignty in the United States. 
 Although Washington’s army encountered no real opposition among the western 
insurgents in 1794, it did take twenty prisoners back to Philadelphia for prosecution in 
the Pennsylvania circuit court. A grand jury in Philadelphia thereafter returned thirteen 
misdemeanor indictments under the Crimes Act and excise act, and twenty-five 
indictments for treason. Fifteen of the twenty-five treason defendants, however, had fled 
the country.105 For the April 1795 term, the government moved forward with five of the 
remaining treason indictments. Associate justice William Paterson and district judge 
Richard Peters attended this term. In one case, United States v. Porter, the jury returned a 
verdict of not guilty, having determined that the government had arrested the wrong 
person. In two others, United States v. Stewart and United States v. Wright, the judges 
granted a motion to postpone trial until the other trials had concluded, but refused to grant 
bail to the prisoners.106  
The two remaining cases—United States v. Vigol and United States v. Mitchell—
went forward and resulted in convictions. In Vigol, the indictment alleged that the 
defendant, “one of the most active insurgents in the Western counties,” had accompanied 
an armed band of men that attacked the houses of two excise officers and, under threat of 
imprisonment, compelled both officers to swear never again to enforce the excise laws; 
the group seized the first officer’s official papers and burned the second’s house 
(including his papers). After oral argument, counsel agreed to submit the case to the jury 
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on the question of whether two witnesses had witnessed an overt act of treason. Justice 
Paterson charged the jury. Like so many of the jury charges in the early federal courts, 
Paterson’s instructions here made the judge’s own views unmistakably clear: the 
defendant had committed treason and, while counsel had raised the question of proof, all 
the evidence in the case ran only “one way.” As to the defendant’s suggestion of duress, 
Paterson stated that it could apply only where the other insurgents had threatened the 
defendant’s “very life.” Anything less and “it would be in the power of every crafty 
leader of tumults and rebellions to indemnify his followers by uttering previous 
menaces.”107               
The allegations in United States v. Mitchell gave counsel and the court occasion to 
address the scope of the Treason Clause in greater detail. The indictment alleged that the 
defendant had attended a meeting of armed insurgents at Couche’s Fort; that from thence 
he accompanied the group to General Neville’s house where he helped set the house 
afire; and that he also attended a meeting of insurgents at Braddock’s Field where he 
refused to sign a submission to the government and induced others to do the same.108  
At trial, the defendant’s counsel—Tilghman and Thomas—emphasized that only 
one witness could positively attest to the defendant’s presence at Neville’s house and, as 
to the meeting at Couche’s fort, none of the testimony proved that the meeting took place 
for a treasonous purpose. More importantly, defense counsel argued that, even if 
defendant had participated in all the alleged acts for the purpose of preventing Neville 
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from enforcing the excise laws, he still would not have committed treason. Counsel 
distinguished between compelling Congress to repeal a law (which probably did 
constitute treason) and resisting execution of the law (which did not); and similarly 
between levying war on the government and compelling one officer, or even all the 
officers in a particular district, to resign. Counsel adduced the Crimes Act’s prohibition 
on obstructing process (a misdemeanor) as evidence that Congress did not intend to make 
resistance to particular tax officials a capital crime. Finally, counsel argued that merely 
conspiring to commit treason could not, without some further overt act by the defendant, 
support a conviction for treason.109  
Citing English authorities, the prosecution—district attorney William Rawle and 
Attorney General William Bradford—maintained that raising a body of armed men to 
compel repeal of a law or prevent its execution constituted treason, plain and simple. If 
the defendant had, alone or with a few others, obstructed an officer to avoid payment of 
their own taxes only, the prosecution conceded that might amount to a misdemeanor 
alone. Yet if “there is general rising of a whole county, to prevent the officer from 
discharging his duty in relation to the public at large, the offence is unquestionably high 
treason.”110 The prosecution advanced an aggressive interpretation of what qualified  as 
an “overt act” of treason under the Constitution. It mattered not whether Mitchell had 
participated in the burning of Neville’s house or even accompanied the other insurgents 
who did so. Attorney General Bradford pressed the claim that one could “levy” war on 
the United States without actually “making” war on the United States. Defendant’s overt 
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treasonous act occurred when he attended the meeting at Couche’s Fort, with arms—to 
which four witnesses attested. This alone levied war on the United States by an “overt 
act” and therefore constituted treason.111 
Justice Paterson’s charge to the jury sided squarely with the prosecution. “If its 
object was to suppress the excise offices and to prevent the execution of an act of 
Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence in legal estimation is high treason; it is 
an usurpation of the authority of government.”112 As to whether the defendant was 
present at Neville’s house, Paterson reminded the jury that a second witness had stated he 
had seen the defendant marching thereto and a third expressed a vague recollection of 
having seen the defendant there. The jury, Paterson suggested, might reasonably find on 
these facts that two witnesses witnessed the defendant’s presence at Neville’s house. In 
the end, however, Paterson agreed with the prosecution that conspiracy to commit treason 
is an overt act of treason and Paterson so instructed the jury: whether or not the defendant 
went to Neville’s house “the prisoner must be pronounced guilty. The consequences [i.e., 
death] are not to weigh with the jury . . .”113   
The jury did precisely what Paterson instructed them to do in both Vigol and 
Mitchell. The court thereafter sentenced both defendants to the mandatory punishment: 
death by hanging. 
Additional treason prosecutions occurred five years later in connection with 
Fries’s Rebellion. Beginning in 1798, yeomen of German descent living in three 
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southeastern counties organized protests against the house tax and succeeded in 
preventing its collection. After the federal marshal had arrested a number of suspects, an 
armed body of 140 men, led by one John Fries, intimidated the marshal into releasing the 
prisoners on March 7, 1799. The federal military response ensued and, soon thereafter, a 
federal grand jury in Philadelphia indicted ninety-two individuals associated with the 
rebellion—thirteen for treason, and the rest for various misdemeanors. As to the 
misdemeanors, a few indictments alleged violations of the Crimes Act’s prohibitions on 
rescues and obstructing process. Yet 1798’s Sedition Act—about which the Fries’s rebels 
had also loudly complained—served as the federal prosecutors’ most effective tool in this 
regard. Scholars typically restrict their examinations of prosecutions under the Sedition 
Act to those under its second section, which criminalized seditious words and writings. In 
the Fries affair alone, however, the act’s first section (which criminalized combinations 
or conspiracies formed to oppose the government or its laws, on pain of heavy fines and 
up to five years imprisonment) produced many more convictions—twenty-six to be exact, 
compared to the eleven convictions secured by the government under the act’s seditious 
libel provision.114   
The treason indictments produced three convictions, together with obligatory 
sentences of death by hanging.115 The trial of John Fries in Philadelphia is illustrative. 
Preliminary questions at this trial arose concerning the place of the trial and the 
composition of the petit jury. Section 29 of the Judiciary Act required that trials for 
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capital crimes occur in the county where the defendant allegedly committed the crime or, 
if that proved too unworkable, that the marshal at least select a venire from that county. 
The Pennsylvania circuit court in United States v. Fries had done neither: it scheduled 
trial in Philadelphia and, after jury selection, it became apparent that only two jurors 
resided in the county (Northampton) where the rescue had occurred.116 At the eleventh 
hour, defense counsel William Lewis and Alexander Dallas moved for a venue change to 
Northampton. District judge Richard Peters and justice James Iredell promptly denied the 
motion. Fairness to the prosecution and juror impartiality trumped Section 29. “If nearly 
one whole county has been in a state of insurrection,” Iredell queried rhetorically, “can it 
be said that a fair trial can be had there?”117  
 Fries’s counsel did all they could to convince the court to throw out the doctrine 
of constructive treason established in Vigol and Mitchell. Although counsel advanced 
some of the same contentions made by the defendants in the earlier cases—only seeking 
to “put an end” to the government altogether or, at least, “tak[ing] possession” of the 
executive or legislature to compel an action rose to the level of levying war; combining to 
defeat a single law did not—they adduced and distinguished English cases to support 
these claims. The treason trial of Lord George Gordon for marching a crowd of forty-
thousand to Westminster to “surround, intimidate and coerce” Parliament into repealing 
the Papists Act of 1778 had ended in acquittal. A fortiori, argued counsel, Fries’ 
comparatively small stunt in Northampton, which involved no actual violence, could not 
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amount to treason. Counsel distinguished what they deemed the only English precedent 
holding that rescuing prisoners constituted treason on the grounds that the decision came 
down during the “disgraceful days of Henry VIII” and Parliament later repealed the 
statute on which the decision rested.118 Finally, the defense paraded before the jury a 
number of obnoxious cases from the medieval period—one in which the court found that 
simply imagining harm to the king constituted treason, another in which the court found 
that an innkeeper’s boast that he would make his son “heir to the crown” did—to show 
that the doctrine of constructive treason inexorably led to tyranny.119  
Fries’s lawyers, however, placed most emphasis on existing federal legislation—
the Crimes Act and Sedition Act—which made rescues and combinations to oppose laws 
misdemeanors punishable by fines and imprisonment only. Fries, the lawyers conceded, 
did probably commit these lesser crimes. The government here, however, averred high 
treason alone. Since Congress had determined by statute that the conduct in question did 
not rise to the level of treason, counsel urged, the government’s treason case could not 
proceed. 
With Vigol, Mitchell, and the weight of modern English authority on their side, 
the prosecution stood on much firmer legal ground. And, once again, the judges (Peters 
and Iredell) supported the government in their charges to the jury. The decisions in Vigol 
and Mitchell remained “in full force” and nothing in the defense’s presentations altered 
that. “[O]pposition by force to one law,” Iredell stated, “ is of the same nature as 
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opposition to all the laws; the offence is levying war against the government.” Peters 
found counsel’s discussion of cases from the “gloomy, dark, and tyrannical days of 
British history” laughable, since even the English judges now rejected those 
monstrosities. The court must remain cautious about those abuses, “but not so much 
alarmed . . . as to restrain from the proper and necessary use of interpretation.” Finally—
and here both Peters and Iredell became particularly adamant—Congress could not by 
legislative enactment alter the definition of treason found in the Constitution and, no less 
significant, only the judges could interpret that definition. The rescues and combinations 
described in the Crimes Act and Sedition Act respectively fell outside the definition of 
treason only when committed for private purposes. To the extent committed with 
treasonable intent—i.e., to prevent a public law’s general operation or compel its 
repeal—they constituted an overt act of levying war under Vigol and Mitchell.120  
  Alas, however, the jury composition question came back to haunt the 
prosecution. Five days after the primarily urban jury found Fries guilty of high treason, 
defense counsel moved for a new trial on the grounds that one of the jurors had displayed 
a clear bias against Fries prior to trial. Iredell granted the motion, and Peters went along 
with some reluctance. A second trial occurred in April of 1800, this time with Peters and 
justice Samuel Chase presiding. At the outset, Chase made it clear to defense counsel—
again Dallas and Lewis—that he would not tolerate them attempting to upend legal 
principles set down by the court in Vigol, Mitchell, and in Fries’s first trial. Whereupon 
counsel withdrew from the case and Fries, hoping to generate sympathy that might result 
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in a presidential pardon, declined to have new counsel appointed for him. At the 
conclusion of the second trial, the jury once again found Fries guilty of treason. Separate 
juries had also found his two lieutenants in the rescue guilty of the same crime.121  
All the individuals convicted for treason in both the Whiskey Rebellion and 
Fries’s Rebellion ultimately received presidential pardons which spared them their lives. 
After several Pennsylvanians had informed him that Vigol and Mitchell had essentially 
gone insane, Washington pardoned them on July 10, 1795—a month after the court had 
sentenced them to be hanged. No one in the administration opposed Washington on this 
score. Five years later, however, the question of pardoning the Fries defendants generated 
significant differences of opinion in the Adams cabinet. At first the cabinet advised 
against any mercy under the circumstances. Adams seemed to lean the other way from 
the outset, reckoning that Fries and his men had committed only misdemeanors. After the 
convictions and death sentences came in, Adams inquired with his advisors whether a 
single execution might suffice as an example. Attorney General Charles Lee and 
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert responded that executing Fries, the leader, 
would indeed suffice for purposes of deterrence. Treasury Secretary Wolcott, however, 
remained convinced that all three treason defendants should suffer death.122 Adams’s 
ultimate decision to go against his cabinet’s wishes and pardon all the defendants greatly 
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exacerbated growing schisms within the Federalist party and contributed the party’s 
demise.123  
  Four additional points with respect to the treason pardons in the 1790s deserve 
mention here. First, all presupposed criminal guilt in fact and law, and did nothing to 
revise the courts’ judgments and sentences. No harsher punishment existed than death. 
Time and again, however, the judges emphasized to the juries in the treason cases that 
sympathy should not influence their deliberations: “the attribute of mercy is placed by 
our Constitution in other hands.”124 Second, all the defendants suffered the coercion of 
bodily confinement for significant periods prior to the pardons. In the case of the Fries  
convicts, Adams waited to issue pardons until hours before their scheduled executions 
and he refused to pardon defendants convicted of misdemeanors.125 In all, these acts of 
executive mercy in the early republic, particularly after full-blown public trials and 
incarceration, reinforced rather than undermined the federal government’s jurisdiction to 
punish offenses against its sovereignty—and reinforced the credible threat of judicial 
coercion for treasonous acts.126 
Unenumerated Crimes 
In United States v. Hudson & Goodwin (1812), the Marshall Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice William Johnson (a Jefferson appointee), held that the federal courts 
lacked power to adjudicate crimes without specific statutory (or direct constitutional) 
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authorization. The five-paragraph opinion cited neither the Constitution itself nor the 
Judiciary Act or any other legal authority. “Public opinion,” according to the Court, had 
“long since settled” the question.127 
The Hudson & Goodwin Court’s terse, matter-of-fact reasoning belied the nearly 
fifteen years of political struggle that preceded it. When seen in its proper historical 
context, the holding hardly constituted a foregone conclusion. Indeed, had the Marshall 
Court known about the drafting history of Article III and the Judiciary Act, the Court 
probably would have decided Hudson & Goodwin differently. At the Federal Convention, 
the Committee of Detail’s initial draft of Article III gave the federal courts jurisdiction 
over “laws passed by the legislature of the United States.” On August 27, John Rutledge 
moved to delete the phrase “passed by the legislature,” which the convention 
unanimously approved.128  
More compelling evidence of original intent comes from the Judiciary Act’s 
drafting history.  The initial Senate bill gave the lower federal courts jurisdiction over “all 
crimes & offenses that shall be cognizable under the Authority of the United States & 
defined by the laws of the same.” The Senate later deleted the phrase “& defined by the 
laws of the same” without recorded controversy.129 Likewise, the original Senate bill’s 
provision for criminal apprehensions gave judges and state magistrates authority to arrest 
individuals suspected of engaging in a “crime or offense against the laws of the United 
                                                
127 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
128 Farrand, Records, 2:423-24, 431. Similarly, the Committee of Detail’s draft of the Supremacy Clause 
made “Acts of the [National] Legislature” supreme. The final version made “Laws of the United States 
which shall be made” supreme. Ibid., 2:183, 663. 
129 Original Senate Bill [Sections 10 and 11], in DHSC, 4:54, 60; cf. Engrossed Senate Bill [Sections 9 and 
11], in ibid., 4:56, 59.   
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States.” The Senate later deleted “the laws of,” giving judges authority to order the arrests 
of individuals suspected of a “crime or offense against the United States.”130    
This evidence makes the conclusion nearly inescapable that the drafters of the 
Judiciary Act intended to vest the lower federal courts with jurisdiction over non-
statutory crimes. Why? Some scholars have argued that it served as a mere stop-gap 
measure, to govern until passage of a comprehensive criminal bill for which Congress 
had already assigned a committee, but can cite to no positive evidence to support the 
claim.131 The real answer is fourfold. First, the drafters embraced a theory of government 
that laid great emphasis on self-preservation. The logic here proved hard to dispute. The 
people, Oliver Ellsworth later declared to a South Carolina grand jury, organized the 
government “to exist.” It therefore followed that conduct “clearly destructive” of the 
government or its powers “must be criminal,” whether or not Congress had spoken.132 
Second, experiences during the Confederation period suggested that the American 
environment’s democratic excesses presented unique threats to the federal government’s 
existence. 133  Third, the Federalists recognized that Congress could probably never 
specifically describe each and every way in which individuals or combinations thereof 
might conspire to destroy the government or its powers. And, finally, there existed an 
inherited body of case decisions—the common law of England—on which the federal 
judges could rely in defining otherwise unenumerated offenses against the sovereignty. 
                                                
130 Original Senate Bill [Section 31], in DHSC, 4:103; cf. Enrolled Act [Section 33], ibid., 4:102  
131 See Holt, “To Establish Justice,” 1505. 
132 Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina, May 15, 1799, in Claypoole’s American 
Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), May 31, 1799.  
133 See Henry Knox to Washington, Mar. 19, 1787, in Washington, Papers, 5:95-98. 
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The principles reflected in these decisions qualified, in Ellsworth’s words, as “known 
law.”134     
It would take some time, however, before the Federalists actually articulated these 
points with respect to common law jurisdiction in particular. The early period after 
passage of the Judiciary Act saw federal prosecutors and judges incorporating the 
unwritten law of nations into their indictments, arguments, and jury charges.135 The 
outbreak of the European wars  and the arrival of Citizen Genet occasioned the first 
prosecutions for violations of the law of nations. In the leading case, the Washington 
administration sought a conviction against one Gideon Henfield for aiding and abetting a 
French privateer.  Ignoring a forceful jury charge urging conviction, the jury acquitted 
Henfield.136 Whether it did so because Congress had not yet criminalized the offense 
remains unknown. In any case, district attorneys in other states continued to seek criminal 
convictions for privateering activities by American citizens through 1793 and into 
1794.137 Early in 1794, the Supreme Court all but held that the Constitution had 
incorporated the law of nations into the laws of the United States whether or not 
Congress had legislated on the question.138 Any remaining controversy fizzled out when 
Congress passed the Neutrality Act in June of 1794, which attached specific punishments 
                                                
134 Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina, May 15, 1799, in Claypoole’s American 
Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), May 31, 1799. 
135 See John Jay’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York, Apr. 12, 
1790, in DHSC, 2:25-30. Here, at least, Article I gave Congress power to define and punish “Offenses 
against the Law of Nations.” The first Crimes Act prohibited violations of specified immunities accorded 
foreign ministers under the law of the nations. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, chap. 9, §§ 25-28, 1 Stat. 117-18. 
136 United States v. Henfield, 11 Fed. Cas. 1099 (USCC Pa. 1793). For the indictment, arguments of 
counsel, petit jury charge, and verdict, see Wharton, State Trials, 66-88.  
137 See. e.g., United States v. Greer, USCC Ct., Case Files, Sept. 1793 term; United States v. Ingraham, 
United States v. Hall, and United States v. Gregory, USCC Ct., Cases Files, Apr. 1794 term, RG21, 
National Archives, Waltham, MA.  
138 Glass v. The Sloop Betsy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794). 
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to all the activities sponsored by Genet that breached the nation’s declared neutrality in 
the ongoing wars.139  
The first attempt by the federal courts to punish an unenumerated crime purely 
within the domestic realm came in United States v. Worrall (1798), once again in the 
busy Pennsylvania circuit court. 140  Chase and Peters presided. The defendant had 
attempted to bribe the Commissioner of Revenue, Tench Coxe. The Crimes Act punished 
bribery of a judge, but no act of Congress made bribery of the Commissioner of Revenue 
a crime. The prosecutor and judges nevertheless urged the jury to convict and it did so. 
Whereupon defense counsel moved to arrest judgment on the grounds that no statute 
prohibited the conduct in question. The district attorney, William Rawle, argued that the 
offense arose “under the laws of the United States” because Congress created the 
Commissioner of Revenue. Although Congress had not specified a punishment for the 
conduct in question, Rawle pressed, the court could do so “upon the principles of 
common law punishment.”141  
No federal judge in the period before 1800 ever denied the existence of a general 
common law jurisdiction in the federal courts. Except Samuel Chase in the Worrall trial. 
Chase here seemed inclined to grant defense counsel’s motion. Chase had no doubt that it 
lay within Congress’s power to criminalize bribery of a revenue official. Since it had not 
exercised that power, however, neither could the court. Judge Peters, on the other hand, 
agreed with Rawle:  
                                                
139 Act of June 5, 1794, chap. 51, 1 Stat. 381.  
140 28 F. Cas. 774 (USCC Pa. 1798).  
141 Ibid., 778. 
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The power to punish misdemeanors is originally and strictly a common law 
power; of which I think the United States are constitutionally possessed. It 
might have been exercised by Congress in the form of a legislative act; but it 
may also, in my opinion, be enforced in the course of a judicial proceeding. 
Whenever an offence aims at the subversion of any Federal institution, or at the 
corruption of its public officers, it is an offense against the well-being of the 
United States; from its very nature it is cognizable under their authority; and, 
consequently, it is within the jurisdiction of this court, by virtue of the 11th 
section of the judicial act.142 
Peters’ view ultimately prevailed in Worrall, for the Court denied the motion for arrest, 
pronounced judgment, and sentenced the defendant to prison time and to pay fines.   
 Over the next few years, every federal prosecutor and federal judge to voice an 
opinion on the issue agreed with Peters that the federal courts possessed common law 
jurisdiction to punish for acts destructive to the existence of the federal government.143 
During the same period, however, the Jeffersonians arrayed themselves in opposition to 
the idea. The opposing positions crystalized in the debates surrounding section 2 of the 
Sedition Act, which made seditious libel, broadly defined, a criminal misdemeanor. The 
offense of seditious libel came directly from the English common law. Star Chamber first 
defined it in 1605.144 Indeed, prior to passage of the Sedition Act the federal government 
pursued a number of a common law seditious libel prosecutions against republican 
                                                
142 Ibid., 779-80.  
143 See Marcus, “Spring and Fall Circuits, 1799,” in DHSC, 3:322. 
144 The Case de Libellis Famosis (1605), in Coke, Reports, 5:125a.  
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editors.145 Republican opponents of section 2 argued that nothing in Article I conferred 
power on Congress to criminalize seditious libel and, in any case, the prohibition violated 
the First Amendment’s free press guarantees. The Federalists advanced four arguments in 
response. 
First, because every government possessed inherent power to preserve its own 
existence, Congress could criminalize libels which endangered the federal government’s 
existence. For textual support, the Federalists cited to the Necessary & Proper Clause.  
Second, the Federalists argued that the Constitution conferred common law jurisdiction 
on the federal courts over offenses against the sovereignty, including sedition. Third, 
citing Blackstone, the Federalists argued that the First Amendment’s press guarantees 
applied only to prior restraints on publication. Finally, the Federalists proudly cited to 
section 3 of the act, which made the truth of the writing or speech in question a complete 
defense. Traditionally, the common law did not admit the truth defense. Thusly, 
proponents could rightly argue that the act corrected the common law’s unrepublican 
rigors. Making truth a defense, the argument went, encouraged the free exchange of 
ideas; punishing falsehoods prevented the liberty of the press from degenerating into 
license.146 The act, moreover, gave the jury the “right to determine both the law and the 
fact, under the direction of the court.”147    
To meet these latter claims, the Republicans needed more than merely a civil 
liberties argument. They needed a structural one. Issued in January of 1800, the report of 
                                                
145 See Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 200-02, 204-20, 385-90.  
146 For the speech of Massachusetts lawyer and congressman Harrison Gray Otis making all these points, 
see 8 Annals of Cong. 2145-2157 (July 1798). 
147 Act of July 14, 1798, chap. 74, § 3, 1 Stat. 597. 
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the Virginia legislature, written by James Madison, reflected the fully matured 
Jeffersonian response. The argument rested on the premise that the Constitution created a 
government of strictly defined powers. A series of reductios ad absurdum followed. If the 
Constitution vested Congress with power to legislate on any matter covered by the 
common law, it would extend the legislative authority to virtually every subject of 
legislation, thus emancipating it from all limitations. If, on the other hand, the 
Constitution permitted the federal judiciary to punish crimes not specified in legislation 
and not otherwise within the legislative authority, the unelected judges would possess the 
same unbounded legislative power. Under either construction, moreover, the federal 
government could annihilate the residual state sovereignties guaranteed in the Tenth 
Amendment. In sum, to hold that the federal government possessed general common law 
powers would “sap the foundation of the Constitution as a system of limited and specified 
powers.”148  
Despite calls from defense counsel to do so, no federal judge ever declared 
section 2 of the Sedition Act unconstitutional and, on its own terms, the act expired the 
day before Thomas Jefferson took his presidential oath in 1801. Still, the Jeffersonian 
political victory in 1800 gave the Republicans the upper hand in the court of public 
opinion on the common law crimes question. But, with the Federalists now on the 
defensive, could the Jeffersonians hold true to their principles when it came to seditious 
libels on their own? This brings us back round to United States v. Hudson & Goodwin.  
                                                
148 Va. General Assembly, Report of 1799-1800, 217. 
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Appointed by Jefferson in 1806 to the position of federal district judge in 
Connecticut, Pierpont Edwards promptly instructed the circuit court grand jury (carefully 
selected by a Republican marshal) to search the newspapers for libels on the President or 
other federal officers. A number of indictments followed, one against Federalist editors, 
Hudson and Goodwin, for accusing the President and Congress of secretly voting 
$2,000,000 as present to Bonaparte for leave to make a treaty with Spain.149 The circuit 
court judges divided on the question of whether the court had common law jurisdiction 
over the libels. On appeal to the Supreme Court, lawyers for both sides declined to give 
argument on this politically sensitive question. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the 
Supreme Court quashed the indictment, holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction 
over crimes not specifically defined by a federal statute. The lower courts, Justice 
Johnson held, “possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates 
them.” Since, according to Johnson, no extant federal statute conferred jurisdiction over 
seditious libels, the court lacked jurisdiction.150 
Although Justice Johnson described this reasoning as “simple” and “obvious,” the 
foregoing discussion at least shows that the Federalists did not agree. Indeed, they 
regarded the opposing position as no less simple and obvious. What the Court did not 
hold, moreover, deserves special emphasis here. The Court did not hold that Congress 
lacked constitutional power to punish seditious libels. Nor did it hold that the 
Constitution prevented Congress from otherwise legislating to the full extent of the 
                                                
149 The Hudson & Goodwin matter appears in the circuit court’s docket book, but not in the case files held 
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common law of England. Finally, the Court did not hold that the federal judiciary lacked 
power to punish non-enumerated offenses against the sovereignty. Somewhat defensive 
in tone, the last paragraph of Justice Johnson’s short opinion reserved significant ground 
in this regard:           
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice from 
the nature of their institution. . . To fine for contempt, imprison for 
contumacy, enforce the observance of order, &c., are powers which cannot be 
dispensed with in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all 
others, and so far our courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived 
from statute. . .151  
The Court’s caveat is significant in three respects. First, it affirmed the doctrine of 
“inherent” contempt power. It made no difference that the Judiciary Act vested the 
federal courts with contempt powers. By “the nature of their institution” rather than any 
particular statutory provision, the courts possessed powers to fine and imprison for 
contempts of their authority. Second, the Court’s reservation of inherent contempt power 
in the context of Hudson & Goodwin reflected the justices’ acknowledgement that 
contempt of court fell within the same family of common law offenses against the 
sovereignty that seditious libel did—with the difference (passed over in the Hudson & 
Goodwin opinion) that the courts could mete out punishments for contempt by summary 
(juryless) proceedings. Finally, the courts’ common law contempt powers extended at 
                                                
151 Ibid., 34.  
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this time to out-of-court publications. They extended, that is to say, to seditious libels on 
the judiciary itself.   
Why did the Court feel compelled to include this dicta? Remarkably, despite the 
controversies over common law crimes and the Sedition Act the federal courts’ broad 
common law contempt powers had so far escaped serious Jeffersonian scrutiny. Even as 
debates on the Sedition Act consumed Congress and the public, the federal courts quietly 
began punishing the libels of Republican editors as contempts of court without serious 
controversy. In 1799, the circuit court of Pennsylvania indicted a newspaper editor for 
contempt after the editor published a criticism of the Fries treason trial. The “ably 
defended” editor did not contest jurisdiction, but rather claimed innocence.152 In 1801, 
the same court found Aurora editor William Duane in contempt for publishing 
inflammatory remarks about the court’s rulings in a pending private libel case. The court 
sentenced Duane to thirty days in prison and to pay the costs of prosecution.153  
Rumblings at the state level, however, portended future problems. After 
Federalist-leaning judges on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court imprisoned a merchant in 
1802 for out-of-court publications on a concluded case, critical commentary on the 
court’s contempt powers ensued in the press and in the state legislature. When 
impeachments efforts failed, the legislature passed an act in 1809 that prohibited the state 
judges from punishing libelous publications by summary contempt proceedings. Soon 
New York would follow.154 
                                                
152 United States v. Meyer, 26 F. Cas. 1242 (CCD Pa. 1799). The case is described in Wharton, Precedents, 
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153 United States v. Duane, 25 F. Cas. 920, 922 (CCD Pa. 1801). 
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Such state-level agitation may very well have prompted the Marshall Court to 
reserve ground for the federal courts in Hudson & Goodwin. Whatever the motive, 
however, the upshot of the Court’s caveat rang clear: The federal judiciary’s inherent 
common law power to punish unenumerated offenses against its sovereignty, including 
seditious libels, had survived the “Revolution of 1800” undiminished.      
Conclusion and Summary 
These four categories of jurisdiction enabled the federal courts to adequately 
address the coercion problem in every area of major concern in 1787. First, the Judiciary 
Act brought public admiralty litigation into the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts 
and, in so doing, destroyed the state admiralty jurisdiction. Prize litigation—including 
controversial cases left over from the Confederation period in which the Court of Appeals 
in Cases of Capture had ineffectually asserted jurisdiction over the state admiralty 
courts—fell into this category of exclusive jurisdiction. In 1795, in the representative (if 
underappreciated) case of Pennhallow v. Doane’s Administrator the Supreme Court 
enforced the old Court of Appeals’ reversal of a New Hampshire jury verdict where the 
Court of Appeals could not, and thereby established the federal judiciary’s enforceable 
supremacy over the state high courts and trial juries in admiralty matters under the 
Constitution. Charged under the Judiciary Act with executing the court’s writs and 
precepts, the U.S. Marshal’s office greatly facilitated the result.    
Second, the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over revenue collection 
prosecutions addressed the all-pervasive problem of securing the revenue by giving 
federal collectors and government lawyers a dependable judicial forum in which to 
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enforce the payment of duties, fees, penalties, forfeitures, and customs bonds. The 
judicial function in the sphere of tax collection once again proved Patrick Henry’s fear of 
a military government ill-founded. For it provided a second peaceable mode of redress 
for the government to pursue when magisterial enforcement efforts failed. Revenue cases 
dominated the district court dockets in the early republic. Although the government 
prevailed in most of these cases (often by default), occasionally juries intervened to 
defeat or moderate the Collection Act’s rigors. Port officials haled into the state courts for 
alleged official misconduct could appeal unfavorable judgments to a hospitable Supreme 
Court under Section 25. Within this framework, the federal courts contributed to revenue 
security in the early republic as much if not more than the port officials did.  
Third, alienage jurisdiction enabled the new federal courts to perform a 
indispensable function associated with the federal judicial power from the moment of its 
inception: enforcing the Treaty of Peace against recalcitrant American debtors. The 
significance of the British debt question at the framing and ratification of the Constitution 
renders it indisputable that the framers of the Judiciary Act intended to empower the 
federal courts to strike down state laws under the Supremacy Clause. The framers well 
expected this category of jurisdiction to occasion the first instances of judicial review 
under the Constitution. And it did in fact. Alienage jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act 
opened the floodgates to thousands of British creditors seeking to recover on their pre-
war accounts, but hitherto impeded by state confiscation and sequestration acts passed 
during the war and by hostile state judges and juries. Southerners (particularly 
Virginians) owed most this debt. Although the Virginians succeeded in delaying a final 
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judicial determination of the British debt question for a couple years, after Ware the vast 
majority of British creditors obtained satisfactory judgments and executions against 
American debtors in the federal courts in Virginia and elsewhere.  
Finally, the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over federal crimes served the 
critical purpose of enabling the federal government to preserve its existence by punishing 
offenses against its sovereignty. Treason served as the paradigm offense here and in high-
profile trials surrounding the Whiskey and Fries’s Rebellions the federal judges 
expansively construed the crime to include participation in a conspiracy without any 
further overt act. They also denied Congress the power to redefine as misdemeanors acts 
that otherwise satisfied the constitutional definition of high treason as interpreted by the 
judges. The prerogative of sovereign self-preservation presupposed by the crime of 
treason, moreover, insinuated a whole family of other offenses against the sovereignty 
into the constitutional order. In the Crimes Act and later the Sedition Act, Congress laid 
primary emphasis on crimes within this family. Later in the 1790s, common law crimes 
came in under the same theory. Although the Supreme Court subsequently abnegated 
jurisdiction over crimes not specified by Congress, neither the Supreme Court nor any 
other has ever held, as the Jeffersonians once did, that Congress itself lacks power to 
confer common law criminal jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the courts’ 
broad contempt powers, interpretive discretion over the crime of treason, and the 
jurisdiction established by the first Crimes Act, sufficed to capture the offenses against 
the sovereignty that mattered most to the Federalists in and after 1789. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
THE COERCION OF STATES  
 
*   *   * 
Because judicial coercion traditionally applied to individuals, advocacy in favor 
of it during and after ratification harmonized with the Federalists’ overarching and oft-
expressed aspiration to expand the federal government’s coercive power beyond the 
states to the individuals comprising the union. As we have seen, expressions of this 
aspiration often came paired with arguments that the alternative model adopted under the 
Articles of Confederation—governing the states in their sovereign capacities—remained 
fundamentally flawed because, in cases of disobedience, it required the federal 
government to wage war to enforce its authority. The modern Supreme Court and some 
scholars rely on such expressions to argue that the framers meant to preclude the federal 
government from exercising coercion over the states as political entities.1  
This account, however, fails to take seriously the immense threat to domestic 
tranquility and the establishment of justice that the states as political entities posed in 
1787, a threat far greater than individuals acting independent of the states could pose, and 
a threat that a mere redirection of coercive power to individuals did not by itself address. 
Given the problem’s magnitude, it makes little sense and finds little support in the record 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Clark, “Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union.” For the Supreme Court’s main 
cases in this area, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997), and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
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to conclude that the framers dealt with it simply by, in essence, ignoring it. It bears 
emphasis that nothing in the Constitution of 1787 prohibited the federal government from 
acting on the states as political entities and, in addition to the Supremacy Clause, a 
number of provisions—including the military clauses, congressional power over state 
election procedures, and the Article I Section 10 prohibitions—seemed expressly to 
contemplate it.2 Smuggled into the new constitutional order via the Supremacy Clause, 
moreover, the Treaty of Peace, like Article I Section 10, purported directly to bind the 
state legislatures.   
With all this said, the defeat of nationalists’ efforts in Philadelphia to give 
Congress a discretionary legislative veto over state laws and therefore direct political 
power over the states does suggest an original understanding that Congress’s own role in 
superintending the states would remain very limited. But would coercion through the 
judiciary constitutionally extend to the states as political entities? Outside Eleventh 
Amendment scholarship, constitutional historians and Supreme Court cases focused on 
the question of federal coercion of the states consider primarily legislative power in this 
connection, not judicial coercion.3 Even within the Eleventh Amendment literature, 
neither the Supreme Court nor constitutional scholars have placed the question of state 
suability within the larger problem of coercion that the framers confronted in and after 
1787.4  
                                                
2 Except for the slave importation clause, Article I, Section 9’s enumeration of powers forbidden to 
Congress included no real limitations on the federal government’s power to govern the states. See U.S. 
Const. art I, sec. 9. 
3 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
4 See, e.g., Clark, “Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union”; Fletcher, “Historical Interpretation 
of the Eleventh Amendment.” 
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This chapter argues that controlling the states via judicial coercion, as distinct 
from legislative power, lay at the Constitution’s heart and that early efforts to implement 
such control extended beyond subjecting the states to civil suits in federal court. The 
Federalists envisaged the Article III judiciary exercising the coercion of law over the 
states in three registers: (i) judicial power over state courts, (ii) Article III trial 
jurisdiction over the states, and, most significant, (iii) judicial review of state law.   
I. Judicial Power over State Courts 
By its text, the Supremacy Clause bound all state courts to the Constitution, 
treaties, and duly enacted federal legislation notwithstanding contrary state laws or 
constitutions.5 Article I also vested Congress with the power to reconstitute extant state 
courts as inferior federal tribunals by giving them jurisdiction to adjudicate federal 
claims, which the Judiciary Act proceeded to do.6 Questions regarding state judges’ 
independence, however, coupled with the specter of inconsistent judgments and 
interpretations, meant that reformers remained unwilling to rely on the state judiciary 
alone to enforce national supremacy in the courts. Quite separate from the substantive 
allocation of jurisdiction among the lower federal and state courts, the Supremacy 
Clause’s logic required a sanction on the state judges and local juries. Responsibility for 
administering this sanction fell to the Article III judiciary, primarily the Supreme Court.  
The lower federal courts would receive some measure of coercive authority over 
the state courts, including the power to halt state proceedings on removal to the circuit 
                                                
5  See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
6  Pfander, “Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority,” 198. 
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courts.7 Some Federalists also believed that appeals on writs of error should lie from the 
state courts to the lower federal courts.8 The anti-injunction clause in the Judiciary Act of 
1793 forbidding federal judges from issuing “writs of injunction” to stay proceedings in 
state courts only confirmed that the judicial power established in the Constitution 
authorized federal injunctive relief against the state courts in the first instance. 9 
Notwithstanding the modern Supreme Court’s fairly broad constructions of the anti-
injunction rule, the rule originally (and understandably) confined itself to single circuit-
riding justices.10 The legislation, in any event, did nothing to limit the federal courts 
sitting in equity from issuing injunctive relief on motion rather than writ in matters over 
which they had acquired jurisdiction prior to the state court in question.11 The federal 
judiciary’s authority prospectively to enjoin individual state officials from enforcing 
unconstitutional state laws, moreover, rendered the anti-injunction rule beside the point in 
many constitutional cases.12 
The key action, however, would take place in the Supreme Court. Article III 
mandated that a single supreme tribunal sit atop a judicial hierarchy that made all other 
courts in the union, including state courts, “inferior” and thereby in some measure subject 
                                                
7 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 79-80.  
8 In matters of national concern, Hamilton wrote, an appeal from the state courts would “naturally lie to that 
tribunal [the Supreme Court] which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice and 
the rules of national decisions.” The Federalist No. 82, 460 (Alexander Hamilton). Arguably the lower 
federal courts received authority to commandeer state magistrates for purposes of initiating the criminal 
process. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91.    
9 Act of Mar. 2, 1793, chap. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335.  
10 Mayton, “Ersatz Federalism,” 332-38.  
11 Pfander, “Anti-Injunction Act,” 8.  
12 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 
150-52 (1908). See also Section III below.    
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to the high court’s superintending authority.13 To some extent, the English and Scottish 
judicial systems, as well as the state judiciaries in Maryland and Virginia, provided 
models here—with the critical difference, however, that the Supreme Court’s superiority 
extended to courts that existed within pre-existing purportedly “sovereign” state 
judiciaries. The Privy Council’s jurisdiction over the provincial courts may make for a 
somewhat better historical comparison in hindsight. 14  The Federalists themselves, 
however, did not emphasize the point. For them, by all appearances, Article III’s unitary 
hierarchical judicial structure established on a continental scale for general judicial 
purposes represented something quite new in American history.  
This does not mean we should cover our eyes to prevailing eighteenth-century 
Anglo-American judicial understandings in fleshing out the original meanings of Article 
III as a structural matter. Certain features of the eighteenth-century English judicial 
system suggest one analytical framework that, in the absence of countervailing evidence, 
may help clarify how the Federalists understood the role, function, and hierarchical 
structure of the new national judicial establishment. In particular, the superior-inferior 
relationship established in the Constitution between, on the one hand, the Supreme Court 
and, on the other, the inferior federal courts and the state courts arguably brought with it a 
whole corpus of coercive writ machinery and usages at the disposal of English superior 
courts in the eighteenth century.  
                                                
13 See generally Pfander, One Supreme Court. 
14 Or so suggests Mary Bilder at the end of her study of eighteenth-century Privy Council appeals from 
Rhode Island. See Bilder, Transatlantic Constitution, chap. 9. Wilfred Ritz rejects the analogy to Privy 
Council appeals on the grounds that the Privy Council was an executive body that reviewed not only cases 
but legislation and that no prerequisite of exhausting colonial appeals applied. Ritz, Rewriting the History 
of the Judiciary Act, 35.   
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Interpreted in this context, the Supreme Court’s constitutional authority over the 
state courts had two analytically distinct components—one supervisory, one appellate. 
The first corresponded to the family of prerogative writs with which King Bench had 
traditionally enacted and enforced its supremacy over judicial inferiors in the English 
legal system, including mandamus (compelling lower courts or officials to take legally 
required action), certiorari (correcting non-jurisdictional errors), habeas corpus 
(production of the petitioner’s body to test the legality of an imprisonment), and 
prohibition (preventing a lower court from hearing matters not within its jurisdiction); 
and perhaps to entertain collateral attacks on state court proceedings.15  
Separate from the Court’s supervisory power over the states, the Constitution also 
gave it broad federal question appellate jurisdiction over the states as to both law and 
fact, “with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”16 
As it happened, in the decades after ratification the Supreme Court would concede to 
Congress substantial authority to determine, revise, and even abolish the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. The framers, however, believed that Article III’s structural 
requirements of federal supremacy and state court inferiority limited Congress’s 
constitutional authority to make exceptions and regulations concerning the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 17  Whatever the precise scope of the exceptions and 
                                                
15 Pfander, “Federal Supremacy,” 213-14.  
16 U.S. Const. art III, sec. 2, cl. 2.  
17 See Pfander, “Federal Supremacy,” 199-200. 
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regulations clause, it did not contemplate legislative discretion to diminish the Supreme 
Court’s essential superintending function over the states under the Supremacy Clause.18  
The Judiciary Act codified the distinction between the Supreme Court’s 
supervisory power and appellate jurisdiction, and purported moderately to regulate both. 
The Act granted the Court fairly limited appellate jurisdiction over the circuit courts, but 
fairly broad federal question appellate jurisdiction over the state high courts on 
constitutional questions. Without any distinction between criminal and civil cases, 
Section 25 authorized the Supreme Court to reverse state high court judgments denying 
federal claims or rights and most importantly, rather than remanding for a decision in 
accordance therewith (as per circuit court appeals), to “proceed to a final decision of the 
same, and award execution.”19 Although the writ of error device implied that Section 25 
appeals would encompass errors of law only, moreover, it bears emphasis that the statute 
itself did not prohibit the Court from deciding questions of fact and, in the first significant 
case under Section 25, the Court quashed a Rhode Island jury verdict.20 Finally, in 
contrast to the modern Supreme Court’s discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, Section 25 
established mandatory or “as-of-right” appellate jurisdiction. If the case satisfied the 
statutory criteria, the appellant had an absolute right to a decision in the Supreme Court 
and, correlatively, the Supreme Court had a judicial duty to render a decision.  
                                                
18 “[A]s the delegates to the Constitutional Convention made their peace on issue after issue,” writes 
Lawrence Sager, “the Supreme Court’s superintendence of state compliance with national law emerged as 
the fulcrum of the national government” and, while debates occurred over whether the Supreme Court’s 
appellate oversight would constitute a sufficient restraint on the states, the necessity of such oversight 
remained undisputed. Sager, “Constitutional Limitations,” 51. Nothing in Article I alters this conclusion.  
19 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 86. 
20 Olney v. Arnold, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 308 (1796). The provision dealing with appeals from the circuit courts 
expressly prohibited reversals for errors of fact, where section 25 did not. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 
22, 1 Stat. 85  
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Yet, distinct from its appellate grants, the Judiciary Act of 1789 also gave the 
Court mandamus authority over courts and officials “appointed . . . under the authority of 
the United States.”21 It also vested the Court with power to issue writs of prohibition to 
the district courts in admiralty or maritime cases and writs of habeas corpus.22 Some 
additional supervisory authority, moreover, inhered in the judicial power itself and, 
accordingly, the act permitted the federal courts to employ the “principles and usages of 
law” with respect to their writ authorities and to issue such writs as “necessary for the 
exercise of their respective jurisdictions.”23 At least two federal cases in the 1790s 
confirmed that the Court’s supervisory writ authority applied regardless of whether the 
Court had statutory jurisdiction, appellate or original, on other grounds. One granted a 
petition to bar lower court proceedings in admiralty by writ of prohibition, the other 
adjudicated an application for a writ of mandamus to the district court—in neither case 
did an as-of-right statutory appeal otherwise lie.24  
Then came the devious, politically shrewd, and slightly Jeffersonian John 
Marshall, who in Marbury v. Madison held the Judiciary Act’s grant of mandamus 
authority to the Court unconstitutional insofar as it purported to authorize the Court to 
issue the writ as an original matter to Secretary of State Madison because, according to 
Marshall, the case did not otherwise fall within the original jurisdiction laid out for the 
Court in Article III (i.e., litigation involving states or affecting ambassadors, public 
                                                
21 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 81. 
22 Ibid., §§ 13, 14, 1 Stat. 81.  
23 Ibid., §§ 13, 14, 1 Stat. 81, 82. 
24 See United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 129 (1795) (granting petition to bar proceedings in 
admiralty by writ of prohibition); United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 47 (1795) (hearing 
application for a writ of mandamus to the district court despite no other jurisdictional grounds).  
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ministers or consuls), which Marshall regarded as an exclusive and delimiting grant.25 On 
this view, any mandamus authority the Court enjoyed as an original matter depended on a 
constitutional finding of jurisdiction on other grounds.  
Marbury did not speak to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution 
and neither did the case implicate the Court’s superintending function over lower courts, 
for the case involved no decision or proceeding in an inferior court. On the mandamus 
question in particular, the Marbury opinion represents as much an act of misdirection as a 
legitimate interpretation of either the Constitution or the Judiciary Act. Marshall needed a 
way to essentially recuse the Court from the politically charged dispute at bar, while also 
affirming a respectable role for the Court within the American constitutional order. 
Brilliantly, in partially nullifying mandamus authority under the Judiciary Act and 
thereby abnegating the Court’s own authority over the case at hand, Marshall elaborated 
an awesome power of judicial control over legislation to which even the Jeffersonians, 
having prevailed in the case, felt constrained to object.  
Alas, however, only a few years later Marshall revised the Court’s position on its 
prerogative writ authority in the direction of broadening it. In Ex Parte Bollman, the 
petitioners (two of the Burr conspirators) sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme 
Court to test their confinements by order of the district court in a case alleging treason.26 
Marshall easily held that Section 14 of the Judiciary Act, together with other structural 
considerations, conferred freestanding power on the Court to issue habeas corpus ad 
                                                
25 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
26 Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). For the complicated narrative 
leading to the petition, see Freedman, “Just Because John Marshall Said It,” 558-61.  
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subjiciendum irrespective of whether other statutory grounds for jurisdiction existed.27 
On the constitutional question, Marshall acknowledged that Marbury prevented the 
exercise of original jurisdiction since the Bollman matter did not fall within Article III’s 
narrow grant of original jurisdiction to the Court. The Chief Justice concluded, however, 
that the Bollman petition fell within the Court’s constitutional appellate jurisdiction based 
on the definition set out in Marbury because it asked the Court to revise a decision of an 
“inferior court.”28  Therefore, Marshall held, the Court had both constitutional and 
statutory authority to issue the writ.  
Justice Johnson’s dissent correctly observed that the Judiciary Act conferred on 
the Court neither original nor appellate jurisdiction over treason cases and his opinion 
otherwise viewed the habeas power as an instance of original jurisdiction strictly 
ancillary to other grants of original criminal jurisdiction of which the Court had none.29 
Marshall’s broad definition of the Court’s constitutional appellate jurisdiction, however, 
won the day and Bollman basically removed any peril posed by Marbury to the Court’s 
supervisory power over inferior tribunals.30 Later in Ex Parte Crane, Marshall confirmed 
that the Bollman analysis applied equally to writs of mandamus.31 
None of these cases, however, involved petitions from state prisoners or officials 
and therefore none directly touched upon the question of whether the Constitution 
                                                
27 Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch), at 95-101. 
28 Ibid., 100-01.  
29 Ibid., 101-05 (J. Johnson dissenting).  
30 Pfander, “Jurisdiction-Stripping,” 1487.  
31 Ex Parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190 (1831) (upholding power to issue mandamus to compel a federal 
judge in New York to sign a bill of exceptions that would have facilitated subsequent appellate review via 
writ of error). See also Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (rejecting argument that mandamus only 
available where Court otherwise has a statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction). 
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empowered the Court to supervise state courts through prerogative writs in the absence of 
other statutory jurisdiction. In Bollman dicta, Marshall stated that Section 14 of the 
Judiciary Act withheld federal habeas relief from state prisoners—a fair reading of the 
statute’s language. 32  Scholars, however, have convincingly argued that Marshall 
misinterpreted Section 14 and that, in any event, the Court then and now could proceed 
on its common law powers alone in superintending state criminal matters through habeas 
corpus. 33  If any doubt existed on the question of constitutional power, moreover, 
Congress helped resolve it when, in 1867 legislation that forms the basis for current law, 
it specifically empowered federal courts to entertain habeas petitions from state 
prisoners.34 As to supervisory writs generally, the All Writs Act of 1948 gave the federal 
courts power to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law” and, without regard to the 
separate-spheres language that appeared episodically in nineteenth-century decisions, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to constitutionally authorize the Court to issue 
mandamus writs to state courts and judges under appropriate circumstances.35     
II. Trial Jurisdiction over the States 
Article III expressly granted the federal courts jurisdiction over the states in suits 
between states, between a state and a foreign nation or citizen, and in state-citizen 
                                                
32 Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch), at 99. 
33 See Freedman, “Just Because John Marshall Said It,” 574-99; Paschal, “Constitution and Habeas 
Corpus,” 649. 
34Act of Feb. 5, 1867, chap. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86. The act passed prior to ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The current statute is at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255. 
35 See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U.S. 493, 497 (1978) (granting petitioner leave to file petition 
seeking writ of mandamus to compel state judge in New Mexico to give effect to Court's decree). For a 
discussion of the nineteenth-century cases, see Pfander, “Federal Supremacy,” 231.  
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diversity cases. These provisions did not differentiate between claims against a state and 
claims by a state. Furthermore, presumably the United States itself could sue states in 
federal court and nothing in Article III immunized the states from suits by individuals in 
federal question and admiralty cases. Article III also contained an express grant of 
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court “[i]n all cases . . . in which a State shall be 
Party.” 36  
Some controversy arose during the ratification debates over whether state-citizen 
diversity jurisdiction under Article III would permit individuals to hale the states as such 
into federal court in ordinary contract cases. Protective of state sovereignty, the 
Antifederalists believed Article’s III’s language admitted this construction and expressed 
great alarm at the possibility that British creditors might invoke this jurisdiction to sue the 
state legislatures for recovery of monies paid into state confiscation funds. The period 
from 1787 to 1789 saw numerous attempts by the Constitution’s opponents to introduce 
an express jurisdictional prohibition on all cases prosecuted by individuals against the 
states. All these attempts failed.37 Eager to ratify the Constitution, a few Federalists 
placed a construction on Article III’s equivocal language that incorporated traditional 
doctrines of sovereign immunity to bar ordinary contract claims against the states.38 Yet 
                                                
36 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
37 See Fletcher, “Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,” 1047-54. 
38 See The Federalist No. 81, 455 (Alexander Hamilton), arguing that non-consenting states should not 
have to appear in suits by individuals for recovery of debt because of the “nature of sovereignty”; James 
Madison at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, in DHRC, 10:1414, arguing “[i]t is not in the power of 
individuals to call any state into court); John Marshall at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, in ibid., 
10:1433, arguing that “[i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a 
court.” Elsewhere, however, Madison seemed to assume the federal courts would exercise jurisdiction over 
the states. See Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1797, in Madison, Writings, 5:27, referring to appeals 
“ag[ainst] a state” by individuals and suggesting that federal courts could enter “Judicial decree[s]” against 
 399 
Edmund Randolph, who served on the Committee of Detail that drafted Article III, 
confirmed the constitutional propriety of federal jurisdiction over the states in these 
matters.39 
To be clear, the post-ratification controversy over state suability in the federal 
courts turned less on whether federal law or the Constitution applied to the states, but on 
whether the federal judicial process applied to the states. This raised the question of how 
such process might apply to collective political entities in the first instance. Opponents of 
suability emphasized the practical problems.40 Certainly a federal marshal could not 
arrest the state itself. A state had no body to seize. Nor did arresting one of the state’s 
high officials recommend itself.  
In terms of original process, however, none of this presented insurmountable 
difficulties for plaintiffs’ lawyers in litigation against the states in the federal courts in the 
1790s. With the federal judges’ blessing, the lawyers simply dispensed with the capias 
writ and proceeded instead by summons served on the defendant-state’s governor and 
attorney general, or in equity cases by subpoena of the same.41 In some instances in the 
1790s, the state attorneys general appeared on behalf of the summoned state and some 
                                                                                                                                            
states. Mary Bilder’s recent conclusions regarding Madison’s commitments during the Federal Convention 
tend to confirm this. See Bilder. Madison’s Hand.   
39 Edmund Randolph at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, in DHRC, 10:1453, noting that “any doubt 
respecting the construction that a state may be plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away by the words 
where a state shall be a party.” For Randolph’s participation on the Committee of Detail whose members 
originally drafted Article III, see Ewald, “Committee of Detail.” 
40 [James Sullivan], Observations upon the Government of the United States of America, July 7, 1791, in 
DHSC, 5:21-31.  
41 See Marcus and Wexler, “Suits Against States,” 73, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82. The Supreme Court codified these 
practices in cases against states in Moultrie v. Georgia in 1796. See Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 
12, 1796, in DHSC, 1:282; see also ibid., 5:508 (discussing same).    
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declined in the beginning to assert jurisdictional objections.42 In other instances, the 
officials in question simply refused to obey such commands to appear.43 The Supreme 
Court held early that in cases where a representative for the state failed to appear, the 
Court could issue an order to show cause and, if ignored still, enter default judgment 
against the state on plaintiff’s motion.44 A default almost occurred in Oswald v. New York 
wherein initially New York refused to send a representative to appear in response to a 
summons. But fearing a judgment against it, the New York legislature thereafter 
instructed its attorney general to enter an appearance and defend the suit. At trial in the 
Supreme Court, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff notwithstanding the state 
attorney’s exertions. 45  
The claim that enforcing a judicial decree against a state would necessitate 
military coercion, however, seemed more a fear-stoking rhetorical flourish than a 
legitimate constitutional concern. No one, after all, raised this objection with respect to 
jurisdiction over cases between states or between the United States and a state.46 To be 
sure, no case prosecuted by an individual against a state ever proceeded to final execution 
on a judgment prior to enactment of the Eleventh Amendment. Even with an army of 
deputies and cooperative posses, Federal marshals could not without serious difficulty 
have levied upon a state treasury guarded by state militia. Yet pro-suability commentators 
                                                
42 This occurred in the first case to appear on the Supreme Court’s docket, Van Straphorst v. Maryland. See 
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791). See also Marcus, “Van Straphorst v. Maryland,” in DHSC, 5:16-17. 
43 This occurred, for example, in Hollingsworth v. Virginia (1798) (see 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378); and in Oswald 
v. New York (1792) (see 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401). For discussion and documents related to these cases, see 
DHSC, 5:274-351, and ibid., 5:57-126. 
44 See Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 12, 1796, in DHSC, 1:282 
45 Marcus and Wexler, “Suits Against States,” 78. 
46 See U.S. Const. art III, sec. 2, cls. 1, 2. 
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in the early 1790s thought it “highly improbable” that a state would resist the Supreme 
Court’s decrees in the first instance.47 The state legislatures had little choice but to direct 
compliance, one wrote, for to disobey the Supreme Court would violate the states’ oaths 
to support the Constitution. “[T]hey would never dare the consequences.”48 Early judicial 
experiences tended to bear out this prediction. In Oswald, for example, New York simply 
paid on demand the damages assessed at trial without any recorded constitutional 
objection.49 Maryland also paid contract damages in connection with Van Staphorst v. 
Maryland in 1791.50  
If any doubt remained on this question in 1793, the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. 
Georgia decisively resolved it against state immunity. In a 4-to-1 seriatim decision, the 
Court declared it the law of the land that Article III state-citizen diversity applied to suits 
against states within the structure of the American constitutional union.51 All of the 
justices on the Chisholm court had stumped for ratification, and one, James Wilson, 
served with Randolph on the committee that conceived and originally drafted Article 
III.52  
Chisholm excited considerable political controversy and ratification of the 
Eleventh Amendment shortly thereafter effectively reversed the case’s jurisdictional 
                                                
47 [James Sullivan], An Inquiry into the Constitutional Authority of the Supreme Federal Court over the 
States, Apr. 12, 1792, in DHSC, 5:36, 51.  
48 Ibid., 52. In the unlikely case that a state and its citizens continued to resist, this writer argued, Congress 
could easily pass legislation to sequester state revenues, sell vacant public lands in the state, or perhaps 
even levy a tax on the citizens of the subject state to satisfy a judgment, violations of which would subject 
individuals (including state officials) to federal criminal prosecutions. Ibid., 53.  
49 Marcus and Wexler, “Suits Against States,” 78. 
50 Ibid., 75. 
51 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2. Dall.) 419 (1793). 
52 For Wilson’s important role on the Committee of Detail, see Ewald, “Committee of Detail.” 
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holding.53 The Amendment’s prohibition, however, confined itself to the precise scenario 
presented in Chisholm—private actions by an out-of-state citizen (or foreigner) brought 
directly against “one of the United States.”54 It left federal question and admiralty 
jurisdiction intact for both in-state and out-of-state plaintiffs in litigation against the states 
as such.55 The modern Supreme Court rejects the proposition that federal question or 
admiralty jurisdiction ever existed for these purposes and, notwithstanding its 
unambiguous text, interprets the Eleventh Amendment as a complete bar to any 
individual suing a state in federal court.56 Recent scholarship attempts to reconcile this 
view with original understandings, arguing that leading framers stood opposed to 
“coercive” power over the states and thus understood Article III to confer neither status-
based nor subject matter-based jurisdiction in cased prosecuted by individuals against the 
states.57 An opposing line in the literature, and a corresponding dissenting minority on the 
modern Court, goes to the other extreme in suggesting that the Constitution completely 
divested the states of those attributes traditionally associated with sovereignty. On this 
basis, scholars contend that Article III granted jurisdiction over suits prosecuted by 
individuals against states on a number of independent grounds.58    
Neither approach correctly interprets the original understandings of Article III 
because neither attends to the central conceptual distinctions drawn by leading Federalists 
                                                
53 U.S. Const. amdt XI (stripping jurisdiction for “any suit in law or equity” commenced against a state by 
an out-of-state citizen).  
54 Ibid.; see also Fletcher, “Historical Interpretation,” 1060-63. 
55 See Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 382-83, 392 (1821); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 849, 857-58 (1824).  
56 The seminal case is Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Recent cases trumpeting state sovereign 
protections under the Eleventh Amendment include Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).  
57 Clark, “Eleventh Amendment,” 1871. 
58 See Fletcher, “Historical Interpretation.”  
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between military coercion and coercion by other means, between the coercion of politics 
and the coercion of law, and between legislative power and judicial coercion. The 
argument made in the former line that James Madison arrived at the Convention favoring 
coercive power over the states and left opposed to it puts the matter far too crudely.59 
Instead, Madison and many others arrived at the Convention convinced of the need for 
coercive power over the states conceived primarily in militaristic terms. Over the course 
of the debates, inherited biases against standing armies caused delegates to disfavor 
military coercion for these purposes and to embrace in its place alternatively conceived 
forms of governmental coercion vis-à-vis the states—first the coercion of politics as 
embodied in the failed congressional veto over legislation, then the coercion of law 
accomplished through the instrumentality of the federal courts.  
Both the spirit and text of the Constitution contradict the modern Court’s 
suggestion that the Federalists intended for the states to retain some essential, inalienable 
kernel of sovereign prerogative immune from federal judicial coercion. The coercion of 
law required that the federal government possess legal supremacy within its jurisdiction, 
which in turn necessitated a subject matter-based transferal of sovereignty from both 
individuals and states to the federal government. Hamilton suggested with some veracity 
in The Federalist No. 20 that the coercion of law could not properly apply to sovereigns 
in their sovereign capacities because it would lead to war.60 Yet as to subject matter not 
within those capacities (i.e., those delegated, either exclusively or concurrently, to the 
federal government), federal judicial coercion applied to the states under the Supremacy 
                                                
59 See Clark, “Eleventh Amendment,” 1853. 
60 See The Federalist No. 20, 172 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Clause in cases otherwise within Article III’s ambit. The Constitution made English 
judicial traditions of sovereign immunity inapplicable to the states within the American 
union in those spheres within which the Constitution had alienated state sovereignty. 
III. Judicial Review of State Law 
Quite independent of whether Article III granted jurisdiction over the states in 
suits by individuals, however, the Supremacy Clause gave the federal judiciary coercive 
legal power over the states in one additional way: the power to declare state laws or 
constitutions contrary to the Constitution, federal law, or treaties null and void.  
The Federalists conceived of judicial review specifically as a sanction vis-à-vis 
the states, a peaceable but coercive enforcement mechanism that would preserve the 
supremacy of federal law without resort to military force. In 1913, Charles Beard 
observed that the judicial check on popular legislation represented the new system’s 
“keystone” and, indeed, “the most unique contribution to the science of government 
which has been made by American political genius.”61 Yet Beard anachronistically 
focused on the Court invalidating acts of Congress, on which the Federalists did not place 
emphasis and for which nothing in the circumstances that prompted the new Constitution 
called.62 Judicial review’s original purpose under the federal Constitution lay not in 
enforcing constitutional limits on federal power, let alone protecting sovereign states 
                                                
61 See Beard, An Economic Interpretation, 163, 162. 
62 The Supremacy Clause did not unequivocally render the federal Constitution supreme over federal 
legislation or treaties, only over state law and constitutions. U.S. Const. art. VI, sec. 2. That the framers 
declined to create a council of revision, moreover, suggests a limited role, if any, for the federal courts in 
reviewing the constitutionality of federal legislation. See Kramer, The People Themselves, 77, observing 
that the council of revision’s defeat “left uncertain what role, if any, judicial review was expected to play 
when it came to federal legislation” and that, according to the Federal Convention delegates, the executive 
veto along with federalism, bicameralism, and an enlightened legislative elite, would “best [] prevent the 
enactment of unwise and unconstitutional federal legislative measures.” 
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from federal overreach, which became a less important consideration once equal 
representation in the Senate had been instituted.63 The question arose in the context of 
federalism not separation of powers and portended the exercise of federal power not the 
restraint of it. The Federalists contemplated the judicial negative, like the legislative 
negative it replaced, applying specifically to state law and actions taken thereunder, for 
the purpose of enforcing the legal supremacy of the Constitution, federal law, and 
treaties.64  
This did not require the exercise of process on the states directly. With judicial 
review, the federal courts could bring the coercion of law to bear on the states through 
individuals. Although strictly speaking the courts’ jurisdiction in such cases extended 
only to the individual litigants at bar, their legal pronouncements purported to extend 
further. In declaring state laws void in cases between individuals the federal courts 
exercised judicial power (though not jurisdiction per se) over the sovereign state 
legislatures. And since state governors proceeded under a charge to enforce state laws, 
these judicial declarations also implicated state executive officials.   
                                                
63 “When they adopted it in late August,” writes Alison LaCroix, “the delegates intended the Supremacy 
Clause [and thus judicial review] to do what Madison intended the negative to do,” viz., check the state 
legislatures. LaCroix, Ideological Origins, 162. See also James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 
1787, in Madison, Writings, 5:26-27, noting that the theory adopted by the Convention held “that the 
Judicial authority, under the new system, will keep the states within their proper limits and supply the place 
of a negative on their laws”; William R. Davie at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 29, 1788, 
in Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution, 2:892-93, arguing that the states could violate the Constitution “with 
impunity, if there were no power in the general government to correct and counteract such [state] laws. 
This great object can only be safely and completely obtained by the instrumentality of the Federal 
Judiciary”; The Federalist No. 80, 445 (Alexander Hamilton), discussing judicial power and emphasizing 
its purpose of “enforcing” the Constitution’s “restrictions on the authority of the State legislatures.”  
64 In Madison’s famous essay listing the “vices” of government under the Articles, the top three related to 
want of federal power over the states, and number seven placed special emphasis on the lack of “coercion” 
in the government. Madison, Writings, 2:361-63. 
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In the decade after ratification no significant confrontations between the federal 
courts and the state governments occurred in judicial review cases. The period saw New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia quietly submitting to the federal courts’ 
assertions of judicial power over their respective sovereignties. The real tests of the 
federal courts’ mettle in this regard would come after the Revolution of 1800 when the 
doctrine of states’ rights gained an appeal and credibility in American politics and 
constitutionalism that it did not possess in the 1790s.  
 With the ascendance of states’ rights came attacks on the constitutionality of 
Section 25 jurisdiction never before made. As noted, Section 25 provided the Supreme 
Court with an important coercive enforcement tool not available in intra-federal appeals. 
Namely, rather than simply deciding the legal question presented and then remanding to 
the state court for further proceedings, the Court could proceed to a final determination 
and award execution directly. In the first Section 25 case, Olney v. Arnold, the Court did 
proceed to a final determination but declined to award execution. Instead, it issued a 
special mandate to the Rhode Island Superior Court of Judicature to execute the Court’s 
judgment. Happily the Rhode Island high court did not resist. Twenty years later in 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, however, the Virginia Court of Appeals refused on states’ 
rights principles to comply with a Section 25 mandate requiring execution of the 
Supreme Court’s writ of error reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision ejecting a British 
landholder in contravention of the Jay Treaty.65 In response, the Supreme Court bypassed 
the state high court entirely, issuing process directly to the Virginia trial court in which 
                                                
65 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).  
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the plaintiff had instituted the action.66 As it happened, the state trial court complied. If it 
had not, however, the Court might have proceeded to issue federal execution through a 
U.S. marshal consistent with Section 25.   
The federal courts had at their disposal still other tools with which to enforce their 
nullifications of state laws in the age of states’ rights. If state officials refused to comply 
with or obstructed execution of a federal court’s writs, the court could initiate contempt 
proceedings against the officials. The judges could also charge the grand jury to indict 
and, with a federal prosecutor’s assistance, commence criminal proceedings against the 
officials for obstruction of process or even treason. Circumstances obliged the courts to 
pursue these options (among others) in the epic showdown between the state of 
Pennsylvania and the federal judiciary in 1809.  
The conflict in Pennsylvania arose out of a complex prize dispute left over from 
the Confederation period, the procedural narrative of which roughly tracked Pennhallow 
v. Doane’s Administrator. In the early days of the Revolution, a British shipmaster 
carried Gideon Olmsted and others (citizens of Connecticut) to Jamaica as prisoners. To 
get home, the Olmsted party joined the crew on the sloop Active, bound to New York and 
carrying cargo for the British army’s use. No sooner had the Olmsted party seized the 
Active and confined the captain than the Convention, an armed brig fitted out at 
Pennsylvania’s expense, captured the Active, brought her to port in Philadelphia, and 
presented a libel in the state admiralty court. The jury awarded the Olmsted party one-
                                                
66 Warren, Supreme Court in United States History, 450. 
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fourth of the proceeds, and three-fourths to the other claimants, most of which would 
ultimately go to state of Pennsylvania.67  
Olmsted appealed to the Standing Committee on Appeals (the predecessor to the 
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, est. May 1780). On December 15, 1778, having re-
examined the facts, the Standing Committee reversed the state court’s decree, awarding 
all the proceeds to the Olmsted party and ordering the Pennsylvania admiralty court to 
issue process to carry the decree into execution.68 The state admiralty judge, George 
Ross, however, refused to comply on the grounds that the Committee lacked jurisdiction 
to overturn the jury’s factual determination. 69  Whereupon Olmsted petitioned the 
Committee for an injunction to prevent the state admiralty marshal from delivering the 
proceeds from the Active’s sale to Judge Ross. The Committee issued the injunction, but 
the marshal ignored it. With its authority in question, and fearing the disruption to the 
public peace that might follow, the Committee declined to pursue contempt proceedings 
and excused itself from the case “until the authority of this Court be so settled as to give 
full efficacy to their decrees and process.”70              
The case slumbered for a few years. In the early 1790s, Olmsted attempted to 
obtain relief in the Pennsylvania state courts. In 1792, however, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court declared the Standing Committee’s reversal in 1778 void for want of 
                                                
67 Verdict of the Jury, Nov. 24, 1778, Houston v. the Sloop Active, in “Revolutionary War Prize Cases,” 
Case No. 39, M162, Roll 4, National Archives, Waltham.   
68 Decree of the Committee on Appeals, Dec. 15, 1778, in ibid. 
69 Order of the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty, Dec. 28, 1778, in ibid. The 1778 state law creating the 
admiralty court provided that jury verdicts “shall establish the facts without re-examination or appeal.” 
Penn., Statutes at Large, 9:277 (Sept. 9, 1778).  
70 Report of the Committee of Appeals to Congress, Jan. 19, 1779, in Revolutionary War Prize Cases,”  
Case No. 39, M162, Roll 4, National Archives, Waltham.   
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jurisdiction.71 A few years later, Judge Ross delivered the earmarked money (now in the 
form of bonds) to the Pennsylvania state treasurer. Upon the treasurer’s passing, the 
executrices of his estate came into possession of the bonds. In 1802, Olmsted, now in his 
eighties and presumably aware of the Pennhallow decision, sued in Pennsylvania district 
court  to enforce the Standing Committee’s 1778 decree against the executrices. In 
January of 1803, district judge Richard Peters held in favor of Olmsted, decreeing that the 
executrices pay over all the disputed monies, with interest.72 The Pennsylvania legislature 
responded by passing a law that required the governor to protect the executrices from any 
and all federal process issued out of the federal courts.73 Olmsted hesitated to take further 
action. So, too, did judge Peters: “I deemed it best to avoid embroiling the government of 
the United States and that of Pennsylvania (if the latter government should choose so to 
do) on a question which has rested on my single opinion.”74  
Olmsted, however, soon appealed to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus 
to compel Peters to act. In United States v. Peters (1809), the Marshall Court affirmed the 
Standing Committee’s jurisdiction to “revise and correct” the decrees of the state 
admiralty courts as per the Pennhallow case. The Court further declared the 1803 
Pennsylvania law unconstitutional: “If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, 
annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired 
under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation 
is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals.” 
                                                
71 Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160 (1792).  
72 Olmsted v. The Active, 18 Fed. Cas. 680 (1803).  
73 Penn., Statutes at Large, 17:472 (Apr. 2, 1803).  
74 Return to Mandamus, July 18, 1808, in Peters, Whole Proceedings, 84.   
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Finally, the Court rejected the executrices’ Eleventh Amendment defense. Olmsted had 
not sued the state. The Court would not permit the “mere suggestion of title in a State to 
property in possession of an individual” to “arrest the proceedings” in a case otherwise 
properly within its jurisdiction. With “great attention” and “serious concern,” the Court 
thus awarded a mandamus and, by all appearances, judge Peters welcomed the 
command.75 
An intense albeit short-lived rebellion on the part of the state ensued. Upon 
hearing of the Peters decision, the Governor of Pennsylvania—the newly elected Simon 
Snyder, a Republican—announced his intention to call out the militia to enforce the 1803 
legislation and the legislature promptly appropriated $18,000 for this purpose. 76 
Meanwhile, in compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandamus judge Peters issued a 
writ of arrest against the executrices on March 24, 1809.77 Armed militiamen under the 
command of General Michael Bright, however, forcibly prevented the federal marshal 
(John Smith) from executing the writ. Apparently, observers in Pennsylvania thought that 
Smith, then in his sixties, would simply relent. To the contrary, the marshal declared his 
intention to return with a posse of two-thousand men and began making the 
arrangements. 78  At this point, the Pennsylvania legislature began to have second 
thoughts. The prospect that federal armed forces might get involved became real. In an 
attempt to preempt this, Governor Snyder wrote a letter to President Madison outlining 
the state’s position and asking for assistance. Madison’s reply dashed any hopes that 
                                                
75 United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809). 
76 Message of the Governor to the Legislature, Feb. 27, 1809, in Peters, Whole Proceedings, 93.  
77 Writ of Arrest, Mar. 24, 1809, in Lloyd, Whole Trial of Bright, 6.  
78 Testimony of John Smith, in ibid., 35-36.  
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Snyder might have entertained: “The Executive is not only unauthorized to prevent 
execution of a decree sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, but is 
expressly enjoined, by statute, to carry into effect any such decree, where opposition may 
be made to it.”79 
On April 15, 1809, the state legislature decided temporarily to remove the 
militiamen from the executrices’ residences, and thereafter Smith took the women into 
custody. After the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the executrices’ application for 
a writ of habeas corpus, the executrices satisfied the district court’s decree and Gideon 
Olmsted finally received his due.80 
This, however, did not end the enforcement proceedings. The case implicated not 
only the interests of Olmsted and Pennsylvania, but also those of the national 
government. The district court found General Michael Bright and his subordinates in 
contempt and, soon thereafter, a grand jury for the Pennsylvania circuit court returned an 
indictment against them for contempt of court and obstruction of process.81 In his charge 
to the petit jury, justice Bushrod Washington did not mince his words: the defendants’ 
conduct could not go unpunished. Bright’s lawyers had contended that where a state 
government authorized interference with federal process, only “negotiation” between the 
two sovereigns could settle the matter. The federal government’s sphere of constitutional 
authority, justice Washington rejoined, was not negotiable. The Supremacy Clause 
                                                
79 Madison to Snyder, Apr. 13, 1809, in 21 Annals of Cong. 2269. Meanwhile, Federalist editors in had 
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80 Ibid., 383-84. 
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required punishment not diplomacy. Washington characterized criminal judicial 
proceedings as the only peaceable alternative to military force under the circumstances. 
“[I]f the accused can plead the orders of the governor as a justification of their conduct, 
and if the sufficiency of such a plea is established, the civil authority is done away with, 
its means are inadequate to its end, and [military] force must be resorted to. . . The 
doctrine appears to us monstrous.” After a full trial, the jury found the defendants guilty 
and Washington sentenced them to fines and prison time.82 
The Court’s Eleventh Amendment holding in Peters bears reiteration here as it 
will become relevant below: So long as the plaintiff did not name the state as such as a 
party of record and the court otherwise possessed power to award the relief sought as 
between the individual litigants, the court could, indeed had to hear and pronounce 
judgment in the cause. In Peters itself, application of this principle came very close to 
permitting Olmsted to sue the state treasurer and to levy on the Pennsylvania state 
treasury to satisfy his claims. The companion criminal action against General Bright and 
his men left no doubt that the federal courts’ jurisdiction over individuals extended to 
state executive officials acting in their official capacity notwithstanding the Eleventh 
Amendment. This principle, together with the federal courts’ dual character as courts of 
common law and of chancery, would in the coming years facilitate the development of 
another powerful enforcement tool in constitutional cases: the injunction.   
Litigation surrounding the second Bank of the United States (chartered in 1816) 
occasioned this development. Handed down amid national economic turmoil for which 
                                                
82 See United States v. Bright, 27 F. Cas. 1232 (Apr. 1809). President Madison later pardoned the 
defendants.  
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many Americans blamed the Bank, the Supreme Court’s decision in  McCulloch v. 
Maryland (1819) made two essential holdings: First, the Necessary & Proper Clause gave 
Congress power to incorporate the Bank. Second, state laws imposing a tax on the Bank 
or any of its branches violated the Constitution.83 The Northern and Mid-Atlantic states 
generally accepted the holding as binding. From the southern and western states, 
however, flowed vigorous denunciations of the McCulloch decision. Nowhere did the 
criticism became so violent as in Ohio where objections to the Bank rested not only on 
constitutional grounds but economic grounds, and where anti-bank partisans had recently 
risen to power in the state legislature. Ohioans blamed the Bank’s policies for the post-
war credit bubble and for the commercial failures that had crippled the state’s economy.84 
In March of 1819, a month before the McCulloch decision, the state legislature imposed a 
whopping $50,000 annual tax on each of the Bank’s two branches in Ohio and gave the 
auditor broad authority to employ collectors to enter the banking houses and seize money 
or goods if the bank officials refused to pay.85 When the Court handed down its decision 
in McCulloch, the Ohio state government resolved to ignore it, to enforce the tax anyway, 
and deal with the consequences when and if they came.  
    The Ohio statute required the state auditor, Ralph Osborn, to collect the first 
annual tax on September 15, 1819. When Bank officials received word that Osborn 
planned to collect, they presented a bill in chancery to the federal circuit court in Ohio 
asking for a preliminary injunction against Osborn to prevent his collecting the tax. Prior 
                                                
83 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
84 See Gannon, “Political Economy of Nullification”; Bogart, “Taxation and the Second Bank.”  
85 Ohio, Acts, 18:179-87 (Feb. 8, 1819). 
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to the McCulloch decision Bank lawyers secured a similar preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of a Kentucky tax law pending the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McCulloch.86 Government lawyers and creditors alike seemed to have seized on the 
device amid the general lawlessness that accompanied the War of 1812. Henry Clay later 
told the Supreme Court that “[t]he jurisdiction of a Court of equity as to injunctions, has 
been always considered a most useful one, and, of late years, they have been dispensed 
with much more liberal hand than formerly.”87 On the one hand, the device found its 
origins in an English bill in equity as old as chancery itself: the anti-suit injunction, by 
which a potential defendant at law seeks in equity to enjoin a potential plaintiff from 
prosecuting the case. 88  Indeed, in McCulloch, rather than pursuing summary 
administrative collection procedures, the state of Maryland sued the Bank to recover 
taxes as damages in a debt action, to which the Bank pled constitutional defenses. Thus 
Clay could later describe the injunction against the Ohio auditor Ralph Osborn as 
“essentially a defensive proceeding.” “The state is the actor, and the Bank is a defendant. 
In form it may not be so, but the substance is to be regarded.”89 On the other hand, to 
employ the anti-suit injunction against state officials acting in their official capacity so as 
to compel those officials to refrain from enforcing state laws deemed unconstitutional and 
                                                
86 Western Monitor (Lexington, Ky.), Mar. 6, 1819, noting a February 26, 1819 injunction issued against 
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void by the courts of a different government, represented an altogether new kind of 
application.  
On September 18, 1819, Judge Byrd of the Ohio circuit court granted the 
injunction against Osborn. On the advice of government lawyers, however, Osborn 
ignored it and issued a warrant to one John Harper (a deputy collector) for collection of 
the tax. Thereafter Harper and two assistants entered the Bank branch at Chillicothe and 
forcibly seized the taxes due from Ohio’s two branches of the Bank, or $100,000, 
$19,830 in specie.90 The next day, Judge Byrd issued a second injunction directing 
Osborn to return the monies. By this time, however, Harper had delivered the money to 
the state treasurer in Columbus and taken for himself a $2000 fee. The treasurer, in turn, 
deposited the money in a local bank. A few days later, Judge Byrd issued a third 
injunction prohibiting Osborn, Curry, and the local bank from making any further 
disposition of the monies.91 Chief Justice John Marshall issued the same order on 
November 23, 1819.92 
Meanwhile, Bank officials had instituted a trespass action against Harper and one 
of his assistants, and sued out capias writs on both men, which the marshal successfully 
executed. Not surprisingly neither defendant could post bail—set at twice the amount 
collected—and so remained in jail for months. Both eventually secured release and, when 
                                                
90 See Reports of Abraham Claypool (Bank cashier), Sept. 17-25, 1819, in American State Papers: Finance 
4:903-6. 
91 Journal of the House, 1819-1820 (Ohio), 61. For an account of the events in the case up to this point, see 
Auditor’s Report, ibid. at 38-44.  
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the bank lawyers determined that the defendants lacked sufficient assets to pay the 
substantial damages, dropped the case.93    
The proceeding in equity, however, proceeded apace. In January 1820, the Ohio 
circuit court initiated contempt proceedings against Osborn and Harper, ordering them to 
show cause as to why an attachment should not issue for contempt of the court’s 
September 18, 1819 injunction. Soon thereafter, Bank lawyers filed an amended bill 
adding Curry, and the current state treasurer (Samuel Sullivan) as defendants, and now 
asking not only for a restitution order but for a permanent injunction against any and all 
future collection of the tax in Ohio. The omnibus hearing came on before the circuit court 
in September 1821 wherein the court declined to punish Osborn or Harper for contempt, 
but granted the restitution order against Sullivan (including interest on the specie), 
enjoined Harper to return his $2,000 fee, and issued a permanent injunction against any 
future collection of the tax in Ohio.94  
The court also held Sullivan (the current custodian of the earmarked monies) in 
contempt for failing to appear. Upon receiving the court’s restitution order, Sullivan 
refused to comply on the grounds that state law required a warrant from the auditor to 
remove any monies. The circuit court again held Sullivan in contempt, imprisoned him, 
and issued a writ of sequestration against his property. Pursuant to this writ, federal 
agents seized Sullivan’s keys to the vault holding the money. Whereupon the marshal and 
his deputies entered the vault, seized the money, and turned it over to the court. The 
                                                
93 See McMaster, History, 4: 499-500.  
94 Bogart, “Taxation and the Second Bank,” 425; Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 743-45 (1824). 
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court, in turn, deposited the money in the Bank’s Chillicothe branch.95 From the circuit 
court’s various injunctions and orders, the state officials appealed to the Supreme Court.   
Meanwhile, Osborn drafted and turned over to the Ohio legislature a lurid report 
of the circuit court proceedings. The legislature thereafter published a number of states’ 
rights resolutions in protest to the proceedings, including an Eleventh Amendment 
objection and another that would have prevented the Supreme Court from determining 
“the political rights of the separate States . . . in cases contrived between individuals, and 
where they are, not one of them, parties direct.”96 Soon thereafter, the legislature 
proposed a settlement with the Bank, conditioned on the Bank’s agreement to withdraw 
its suit and pay a lesser tax. When the Bank refused to do either, the legislature declared 
it an outlaw.97      
The Bank remained outlawed under state law when oral argument came on in the 
Supreme Court late in 1823. The redoubtable Henry Clay (with Daniel Webster as co-
counsel) argued for the Bank and the anti-bank Ohio politician Charles Hammond 
represented the state officials. Hammond argued that the state had a right to tax the bank 
just as it did any other private corporation. Citing McCulloch, Clay declined to dignify 
the contention with a counterargument. In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the 
Court wasted little time in declaring the Ohio tax null and void under McCulloch. 
Hammond pressed two additional jurisdictional objections: First, he argued that, in effect, 
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the Bank had filed suit against the state of Ohio, which the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibited. “[T]he relief prayed, is against the acts of the Legislature; the State is the sole 
party in interest.”98 Second, he argued that neither Article III nor a federal statute gave 
the Court jurisdiction over the matter. On the Eleventh Amendment question, the Court 
overruled the objection based on the Peters principle. As to jurisdiction, the Court 
adopted a broad reading of Article III’s “arising under . . . the Laws of the United States” 
provision (a single federal “ingredient” in the case sufficed) and held that language in the 
Bank’s charter authorizing it to “sue and be sued” in the circuit courts provided statutory 
jurisdiction.99  
The critical issue for our purposes, however, and one that consumed substantial 
attention during the oral argument, revolved around the proper remedy in the case. 
Hammond argued that the Bank had an adequate remedy at law against Osborn: a 
trespass action for damages. As to the circuit court’s perpetual injunction, Hammond 
cited various English authorities for the proposition that “some act must be done, moving 
toward the commission of a wrong” before the court could so enjoin a defendant in 
equity.100 In response, Clay urged that the case did not amount to a “solitary remediable 
trespass,” but rather “is one of annual, of repeated, vexatious occurrence, for which an 
injunction is the appropriate remedy.”101  
Justice Marshall affirmed the propriety of the circuit court’s injunctions under the 
circumstances. First, Marshall cited case law involving stocks and negotiable securities 
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for the proposition that “a court [of chancery] will always interpose, to prevent the 
transfer of a specific article which, if transferred, will be lost to the owner.” Second, 
Marshall asserted that to treat the case as a mere trespass “disregard[ed] entirely its true 
character and substantial merits.” Osborn did not engage in a private act. He acted as a 
public official. The law of Ohio required him to collect the tax on an annual basis ad 
infinitum. Since the tax exceeded the Bank’s annual dividends in Ohio, moreover, it 
would essentially destroy the Ohio branches. All this constituted a serious affront to 
federal authority itself and, for this wrong, no adequate remedy existed at law.102  
But assuming, as Hammond did, that an adequate damages remedy did exist 
against Osborn, and therefore that Osborn bore “responsib[ility] for his own act, to the 
full extent of the injury,” then “why should not the preventive power of the court also be 
applied to him?” Hammond had attempted to put the Court in a whipsaw, arguing that the 
Court could not issue injunctive relief in the case without making the state a party, but 
also that the Eleventh Amendment prevented the Court from making the state a party. 
Marshall, on the other hand, suggested that, as interpreted by Hammond, the Eleventh 
Amendment supported injunctions against the individual state officials. “[I]f the party 
before the court would be responsible for the whole injury, why may he not be restrained 
from its commission if no other party can be brought before the court?”103  
All the judges and lawyers in the case agreed that enjoining Sullivan and Osborn 
as individuals in effect enjoined the state of Ohio from imposing the tax on the Bank and 
                                                
102 C.J. Marshall’s Opinion, in ibid., 845, 840. The circuit court “interpose[d] its writ of injunction to 
protect the Bank not from the casual trespass of an individual who might not perform the act he threatened, 
but from the total destruction of its franchise, of its chartered privileges, so far as respected the State of 
Ohio.” Ibid., 840. 
103 Ibid., 843. 
 420 
in effect repealed the repugnant legislation. Hammond believed that under the Eleventh 
Amendment this precluded jurisdiction. Marshall, on the other hand, seemed to hold that 
it recommended jurisdiction against individual state officials: The state’s unconstitutional 
tax wronged the federal government and this wrong required a remedy that could reach 
the future wrong contemplated and compelled by state law. The Eleventh Amendment 
prevented the court from requiring the legislature to repeal the law. Therefore, the Bank 
should be able to apply to a federal chancery court to permanently enjoin state executive 
officials from enforcing it.         
The Court thus upheld the permanent injunction against Osborn, the restraining 
and restitution orders against Sullivan, and the order requiring Harper to return his fee. It 
declined, however, to award interest on the specie portion, “it being the opinion of this 
Court that, while the parties were restrained by the authority of the circuit court from 
using [the money], they ought not to be charged with interest.” Satisfying the interest 
demand would have also required treasury authorization—a can of worms that the Court 
understandably did not want to open.104  
By this time, economic conditions had improved and the state legislature had 
turned its attention to other issues. The two years that had elapsed between the circuit 
court proceedings and the Supreme Court’s decision afforded ample time for passions to 
diffuse. Execution of the circuit court’s writ of sequestration in 1820, moreover, had 
already essentially restored the status quo. Laying aside the interest claim and Harper’s 
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relatively small fee, only the legal question of right remained. To the Court’s 
determination of this question in 1824 all the defendants quietly submitted.  
That neither the defendants nor the state government actively resisted the 
Supreme Court’s final decision in Osborn, however, should not obscure the case’s 
historical and constitutional significance: the federal judiciary had succeeded in 
coercively, though peaceably, enforcing the supremacy of the controversial decision in 
McCulloch v. Maryland against a recalcitrant state government. It did so by employing an 
old judicial remedy, coeval with the birth of chancery, in new ways predicated on the 
narrow construction of the Eleventh Amendment earlier established in Peters. Most 
constitutional scholars consider federal injunctions against state enforcement officials the 
peculiar invention of Ex Parte Young (1908) and, as such, a novel twentieth-century 
cause of action derived from the Fourteenth Amendment.105 The foregoing discussion 
shows that its roots in the American context lay earlier, in United States v. Peters and 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, wherein influential members of the constitutional 
generation (Marshall, John Sergeant, and Alexander Dallas) and their direct descendants 
(Clay and Webster) forged judicial innovations in the sphere of coercing the states that 
put flesh on the bones of the Federalists’ original vision.      
Conclusion and Summary 
Empowering the federal government to reach individuals in the same way that the 
state governments reached individuals marked a fundamental transformation in the union 
                                                
105 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In the sole dissent in Young, Justice Harlan declared that the 
principle endorsed by the Court would “work a radical change in our governmental system” that would 
enable even inferior federal courts “to supervise and control the official action of the States as if they were 
‘dependencies’ or provinces.” Ibid., 175.  
 
 422 
effectuated by the Constitution. During the ratification debates, the Federalists 
rationalized this move by arguing that the alternative adopted during the Confederation 
period—governing the sovereign states as such—presented prohibitive enforcement 
problems; namely, the likelihood of civil war. On the other hand, the Federalists also 
recognized that the states as collective entities presented distinct threats to the 
reconstituted union that required a federal constitutional response involving some 
measure of coercion. The Constitution dealt with these competing considerations in a 
number of ways. As we saw in Chapter 6, it provided for the establishment of a standing 
military unlimited in size and did nothing to prohibit the employment of federal military 
force against the states in the last resort to “execute the Laws of the Union.” At the same 
time, however, republican biases against standing armies counseled strongly against the 
use of military force for these purposes. This idea of legislating for the states, moreover, 
seems to have died with the congressional negative in Philadelphia.  
The Constitution and framers of the Judiciary Act, however, established other 
means by which to govern the states: coercion through the judiciary. The Federalists 
envisaged the federal judiciary exercising coercive authority over the states in three ways. 
Coercion came in, first, by virtue of superior judicial power over state courts. Under the 
Constitution and Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court would exercise direct authority over 
the states in two modes: (i) Section 25 appellate jurisdiction over the state high courts 
(including power to compel state trial courts to award execution on pain of contempt or 
even to award execution itself); and (ii) the supervisory prerogative writ authority 
associated with King’s Bench in eighteenth-century England.  
 423 
Article III also gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits between states and in 
state-citizen diversity cases. According to the modern Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
original understandings, ratification of the Eleventh Amendment eliminated the latter 
category of jurisdiction. Yet the Constitution provided another, potentially more powerful 
mechanism of judicial control over the states in cases between individuals: the power to 
nullify state laws running contrary to the Constitution, federal law, or treaties. That the 
first instances of these judicial declarations upheld the interests of Britons under a treaty 
that, according to detractors, did not constitutionally bind Americans, rendered such 
judicial exertions doubly obnoxious to resistant southerners.  
When, after the turn of the nineteenth century, the state governments began 
actively to resist the courts’ nullifications of their laws, the federal judges and 
government lawyers fashioned new coercive remedies out of inherited materials in 
judicial proceedings against individual state officials. In Peters, this involved contempt 
proceedings and criminal prosecutions against Pennsylvania military officials. In Osborn, 
it involved chancery injunctions against Ohio tax collectors. The anti-suit constitutional 
injunction established in Osborn created a considerable source of de facto coercive power 
over the states that, over time, has significantly enhanced the federal courts’ 
superintending role within the constitutional order notwithstanding the Eleventh 
Amendment.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1800? 
 
*  *  * 
In 1819, Thomas Jefferson recalled in a letter to Spencer Roane that the decisive 
Republican victory in 1800 “was as real a revolution in the principles of our government 
as that of 1776 was in its form.”1 Historians have long referred to the election as the so-
called “Revolution of 1800.”2 It seems hard to deny that insofar as the election marked 
history’s first peaceable transition of power from one party coalition to another within a 
political culture that otherwise feared and loathed the idea of a political party, a real 
innovation had occurred.  
But did the Revolution of 1800 usher in attitudes toward federal coercion that 
fundamentally differed from those embraced by the Federalists described herein? 
Certainly Jefferson scaled back the provisional military establishment. He also, however, 
ratified and reinforced the basic paradigm for standing military forces created by his 
Federalist predecessors. Although the third President bungled enforcement of the 
embargo by relying too extensively on the state governors, he seems to have gravitated 
toward a military remedy with greater determination than his High Federalist 
predecessors. By persuading Congress to give him express authority to employ regulars, 
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as opposed to the militia alone, in domestic disturbances, Jefferson also overturned the 
presumption in favor of militia vis-à-vis internal threats embodied in the Militia Acts.  
Acting on this precedent, subsequent presidents ordinarily chose regulars over 
militia in planning and executing military responses to domestic disturbances. In the 
period prior to the Civil War, the uses of federal military forces in domestic matters 
nearly always involved the federal government’s independent enforcement of federal law 
and authority against combinations too powerful for the judicial process to contain, rather 
than requests from the state governments under the Guarantee Clause. Enforcement of the 
embargo laws, the nullification crisis, Indian removal, Bleeding Kansas, and the 1857 
Utah expedition against the Mormons represent the most salient examples of centralized 
military mobilization against internal threats in the period prior to the Civil War.3  
 In the sphere of magisterial coercion, the Jeffersonians did succeed in repealing 
the Federalists’ internal taxes. In virtually every other respect, however, the period after 
1800 saw an acceleration of administrative trends begun in 1789, not a reversal or 
substantial alteration. Passed at the apex of High Federalism, the Collection Act of 
1799—an elaborate 80-page statute that included strengthened enforcement provisions, 
and fifty-six different forms, schedules, and bond forms—survived the Revolution of 
1800 untouched.4 Together with the earlier Collection Acts, the act of 1799 formed the 
foundation for American customs administration straight to the end of nineteenth 
century.5 Revenue enforcement became more coercive not less as federal import taxation 
                                                
3 See generally Coakley, Role of Federal Military Forces. 
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rose steadily and the Jacksonians centralized federal administrative authority in the 
ports.6  
*   *   * 
But to what extent, if at all, did the Jeffersonian takeover in 1800 mark a 
revolution against the system of judicial coercion established by the Federalists?7 The 
repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, which would have significantly enlarged the 
jurisdiction and personnel of the federal judiciary while easing circuit riding burdens, 
must stand as a significant Jeffersonian legislative victory with obvious implications in 
this area.8 To depict either the repeal of the 1801 or the 1802 act as a major innovation or 
sea change in federal judicial culture, however, seems wrong, for the Jeffersonians’ 
exertions essentially restored the status quo as embodied in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  
The controversies surrounding Samuel Chase’s partisan conduct on the federal 
bench may bear a little more fruit here. Influential recent scholarship depicts the Chase 
impeachment as one of the first decipherable constitutional “constructions” of the Article 
III judicial power to occur under the Constitution in the early national period.9 During 
these debates, radical Jeffersonians denounced judicial independence and denied that the 
Constitution required it.10 The more moderate Jeffersonian construction and the one that 
seems to have prevailed, required a neutral disposition in the federal judges, defined as 
                                                
6  See Rao, “Customhouses, Coercion, and Consent,” 7-14. Apparently, Rao will expand on these 
developments in his forthcoming National Duties.  
7 For the key work suggesting significant legal-constitutional implications associated with the Jeffersonian 
ascendancy with which the following discussion takes some exception, see Ellis, Jeffersonian Crisis.    
8 Act of Mar. 8, 1802, chap. 8, 2 Stat. 132. 
9 See Whittington, Constitutional Construction, 20-71.  
10 In his diary, John Quincy Adams noted Representative Giles’ “utmost contempt [for] the idea of an 
independent judiciary.” Diary Entry, Dec. 21, 1804, in Adams, Memoirs, 322. For Jeffersonian commentary 
to the same effect, see also 11 Annals of Cong. 582 (Rep. Giles, Feb. 1802); ibid., 11:708-09 (Rep. Macon, 
Feb. 1802); ibid., 11:661 (Rep. Randolph, Feb. 1802); ibid, 11:178-79 (Sen. Breckinridge, Feb. 1802).   
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independence from political coalitions and particularly the executive, and sought to 
enforce these standards through an expanded impeachment power that, in theory, reached 
any and all partisanship displayed on the bench.11  
In the controversial sedition trial of United States v. Callender (1800), Chase had 
expressly prohibited the jury from finding the Sedition Act unconstitutional.12 In response 
to the House’s impeachment articles, Chase asserted that the judges had an obligation “to 
guard the jury against erroneous impressions respecting the laws of the land” and that 
juries “have no dispensing power” over the law. 13  In response, the Jeffersonians 
contended that, at least in criminal trials, juries stood as “the sole judges . . . both of the 
law and the fact.”14 On this view, while the judges might endeavor to explain legal 
principles to jurors in the abstract, they could not constitutionally declare to the jury how 
to apply the law to the facts of the case. Following the Chase controversy, one scholar 
concludes, federal judges “effectively surrendered the power to advise the jury on the 
proper application of the law to the evidence.”15  
Without question, judicial neutrality emerged from the Chase experience as a 
more potent constitutional value, even as Chase ultimately prevailed in his impeachment 
trial. At the same time, however, calls for replacing the Constitution’s impeachment 
procedures with removal by address, a faster and more responsive mechanism for holding 
                                                
11 See Whittington, Constitutional Construction, 65-71. 
12 See Chase’s comments to counsel, United States v. Callender (USCC Va., 1800), in Wharton, State 
Trials, 709. The case is also reprinted at 25 F. Cas. 239.  
13 Chase Testimony, Feb. 4, 1805, in Smith and Lloyd, Trial of Chase, 1:34, 35. 
14 Speech of Mr. Randolph, Feb. 9, 1805, in ibid., 1:111.  
15 Whittington, Constitutional Construction, 56. 
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the judges accountable, met decisive defeat in the Jeffersonian-dominated House.16 The 
controversy, moreover, revolved around trial conduct and not the appellate function, and 
even here Samuel Chase represented the extreme rather than the norm among federal 
judges. It seems, in fact, that the Jeffersonians simply ratified the vision of judicial 
independence originally envisioned by the Federalists in 1787.  
When the dust settled, most of the federal judges had no trouble distancing 
themselves from Chase.17 The judges would refrain from declaring preferred outcomes in 
jury trials and would otherwise foster an environment of open adversarialism between 
litigants. In exchange, however, the Jeffersonians generally stepped aside as the judges 
(many tenured Federalists) and professional lawyers conspired, with varying degrees of 
success, to confine the jury’s role within the constitutional order to fact-finding alone 
and, through fact stipulations and reserved points of law, to exclude juries entirely from 
the legal process.18          
Taken together the constitutional constructions arising out of the Chase 
impeachment efforts represent less an innovation within American legal culture than a 
reconfiguration of variables unleashed by revolutions past. Moderate Jeffersonians 
adverse to Chase drew on cultural transformations with respect to judicial independence 
and popular accountability that began in the 1770s and 1780s.19 The attack on Chase, 
moreover, marked only one manifestation of a broader movement for law reform at both 
the federal and state levels that convulsed the nation at Jefferson’s ascendance and which 
                                                
16 See Ellis, Jeffersonian Crisis, 106-07. 
17 Most had already fallen out with him over the common law crimes issue.  
18 On the marginalization of juries, see Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law; Millon, “Juries, 
Judges, and Democracy,”148. 
19 See Chapters 1 and 2.  
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fell squarely within the dissenting tradition established by the Austinities in the 1780s.20 
Radical Jeffersonian reformers continued to reject as unrepublican a professional lawyer 
class, the common law, and the legal process, promoting instead a regime of self-
administered arbitration without law, lawyers, or judges. 21  Now a seasoned state 
politician, Austin himself published some important essays during this period wherein he 
argued that the federal judiciary had already “become too complex for the comprehension 
of the citizens” giving “scope to a particular profession” whose members made it their 
chief aim to put the people and their property “under the control of that baneful, 
unqualified instrument generally denominated Common-Law.” 22  If not promptly 
dismantled—and here Austin directed his statements directly to President Jefferson—this 
“extensive machine” would “reduce the people to the most abject state of servitude” by 
generating lawyers “in tenfold proportion to other professions.”23 
Comparable dissenting voices appeared in republican newspapers outside of 
Massachusetts during Jefferson’s presidency—in particular William Duane’s 
Philadelphia paper Aurora—and in jurist Hugh Henry Brackenridge’s popular satirical 
                                                
20 See Chapter 3 and 4.  
21 Ellis, Jeffersonian Crisis (Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania); Reid, Legitimating the Law 
(New Hampshire); Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 230-251 (Virginia); Rowe, “Jesse Higgins” (Delaware); 
Sawyer, “Distrust of the Legal Establishment” (Maryland). See generally Chroust, Rise of the Legal 
Profession, vol. 2. Massachusetts yeoman William Manning’s unpublished manuscript “The Key of 
Libberty” (1798) provides powerful evidence that the spirit of ’86 continued to possess Bay State farmers 
in the 1790s. For the manuscript’s text, see Morison and Manning, “Manning’s The Key of Libberty.” An 
avid reader of the Independent Chronicle in the 1780s and 1790s, Manning’s disquisition empathized with 
the Shaysites, criticized lawyers, bemoaned the monopoly on knowledge wielded by “the few,” and 
proposed to create a “Society of Laborers” to combat the pernicious influence of the aristocratic Society of 
the Cincinnati, which he linked to the Federalist party. Ibid., 212, 221, 223-34, 227, 230, 242, 248.  
22 Old-South, “Reflections on the President’s Message,” Indep. Chron., Dec. 24, 1801, 2. 
23 Ibid. 
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commentary.24 In the last political pamphlet he wrote, published in the Aurora in 1805, 
Thomas Paine argued in favor of arbitration over courts and lodged a nativistic attack on 
the English common law that recalled Austin’s earlier invectives. The “tyrannical” 
Norman-imposed common law, Paine wrote, served only to “waste time, embarrass 
causes and perplex juries,” its Latin and French jargon calculated “to mystify, by not 
being generally understood, and therefore [to] serve the basic purpose of what is called 
law, whose business is to perplex.”25 
But Delawarian Jesse Higgins’s widely disseminated 1805 pamphlet, Samson 
Against the Philistines, also serially published in the Aurora, stands as the radical 
Jeffersonians’ key literary achievement in the area of law reform in the Austinian 
tradition.26 The tract denounced the legal profession—whom Higgins deemed a “national 
aristocracy”—courts, legislators and the common law, all of which Higgins believed only 
                                                
24 See, e.g., Aurora General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 9, 1805, 2; ibid., Jan. 31, 1805, 1; ibid., Jan. 30, 
1805, 1. See also Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry, Part II. “Down with all law,” one of Brackenridge’s 
backcountry antilegalists cried, “and give us a free government, ‘That every man may do that which is right 
in his own eyes.’” Ibid., 386. Brackenridge participated in a literary critique of the law within a post-
Revolutionary tradition masterfully explored by Robert Ferguson. See Ferguson, Law and Letters. The 
preeminent Pennsylvania attorney, Horace Binney reported that Brackenridge, who served on the 
Pennsylvania high court, in fact “despised the law, because he was utterly ignorant of it, and affected to 
value himself solely upon his genius and taste for literature, both of which were less valued by everyone 
else.” “Talk of your Cokes and Littletons,” Brackenridge apparently stated to Binney one day in open court, 
“I had rather have one spark of the ethereal fire of Milton than all of the learning of all the Cokes and 
Littletons that ever lived.” Binney, The Life of Horace Binney, 40. Reform sentiment in Pennsylvania after 
reached a fever pitch midway through Jefferson’s presidency over the case of merchant Thomas Passmore. 
Passmore’s insurer adversaries appealed his favorable arbitration award to the state supreme court, 
whereupon Passmore publicly maligned the insurers. The latter incident led to a contempt order against 
Passmore, as well as fines and prison time. This resulted in legislative attempts to impeach the Passmore 
judges (including Brackenridge); these attempts ultimately failed but sparked significant public debates 
regarding reform of the legal system, with Duane’s Aurora playing a leading role. See Ellis, Jeffersonian 
Crisis, 166-67; see also Pasley, Tyranny of Printers, 299-304. 
25 Paine, “Constitutional Reform,” Aug. 1805, in Paine, Complete Writings, 2:1003-04.  
26 Higgins, Sampson Against the Philistines. 
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obstructed “free enquiry” into the true principles of justice.27 Instantiating a trend among 
the Jeffersonians, Higgins reached back to pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon customs for 
guidance, finding in the early feudal system a “liberty and equality partaking in 
republicanism.”28 In a chapter entitled “Origin of Trial by Jury,” Higgins made the 
historical claim that law per se did not exist among the Saxons, only honest judgment by 
one’s equals. At the moment of decision, therefore, no authority obtained in Saxon 
justice. The “rude unlettered men” of northern Europe, the pamphlet emphasized, 
“submitted to no superior to judge them.”29 Cherished rights to property and personal 
security, Higgins urged, did not ultimately rest on the exertions of learned lawyers or on 
legal precedent. For such rights originally flowed from the “uniformity of decisions of 
men acting as referees without judges or lawyers,” men who could “neither read nor 
write.”30 True justice required neither lawyers nor law but “equality,” “character,” and 
“honesty.” 31  Openly self-schooled in the law, Higgins contended that by reading 
Blackstone and Wilson every American could and should become his own lawyer. This 
particular reform, of course, spelled the gradual extinction of lawyers as such.  
Jeffersonian Constitutional Jurisprudence 
If Jeffersonian lawyers could not bring themselves to go quite so far as Higgins in 
the latter regard, in the realm of constitutional jurisprudence they advanced theories no 
less radical and herein we do find significant innovations in American legal culture 
                                                
27 Ibid., 67, 24. 
28 Ibid., 5.  
29 Ibid., 6. 
30 Ibid., 26. 
31 Ibid., iv, 6, 37. 
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associated with the Revolution of 1800. No legal literary production from the period 
better encapsulates Jeffersonian political theory translated into a constitutional 
jurisprudence than St. George Tucker’s edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England published in 1803.32 A steadfast Jeffersonian who served both as a 
judge on the Virginia Supreme Court of Errors and Professor of Law at William and 
Mary, Tucker included in these five volumes not only extensive footnotes to the 
Commentaries themselves, but also fully eight hundred pages of appendices with detailed 
essays authored by Tucker on a broad range of legal and constitutional topics. In his own 
commentaries, Tucker carried forward an American jurisprudential tradition begun by 
James Wilson concerned primarily with rejecting Blackstone’s applicability on American 
shores. Why did Blackstone not apply in America? The American Revolution and the 
state constitutions it produced, rather than the Federal Convention, carried the pivotal 
causal force here in sending the American constitutional order on a course away from the 
Blackstonian paradigm in Tucker’s view.33 In Virginia in particular, reforms in the law of 
inheritance vis-à-vis the English model, for Tucker, found obvious origins in the 
egalitarian spirit of ’76.34         
Yet Tucker believed that the most dramatic constitutional changes caused by the 
Revolution lay in what the state constitutions embodied in fact and which James Wilson 
invented as a principle of general jurisprudence: sovereignty rested in the people 
themselves. The Revolution, Tucker declared, had “formed a new epoch in the history of 
                                                
32 Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries.   
33 Editor’s Preface, ibid., 1:iv-v.  
34 Ibid., 1:x-xi.  
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civil institutions, by reducing to practice, what before, had been supposed to exist [only] 
in the visionary speculations of writers.”35 The Constitution expressed this principle, 
though not in the Preamble on which Wilson had placed so much emphasis. Tucker rather 
found popular sovereignty in the rights invoked in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.36 
Accordingly, where Wilson conceived sovereignty as a property belonging to the people 
on a national scale, Tucker conceived it resting separately in the people of the several 
states. Virginia possessed a sovereign people, separate from the sovereign people in New 
York, and from the sovereign people of Pennsylvania and so forth. On the other hand, 
Tucker, like Wilson, retained Blackstone’s awesome if somewhat unsettling definition of 
sovereignty. Tucker made a strict distinction, however, between “the indefinite and 
unlimited power of the people” and the “definite” powers of the state and federal 
governments. 37  Precisely because sovereignty rested in the people, America’s new 
sovereigns needed mechanisms by which to monitor and check their provisional agents 
that only written constitutions, deemed supreme law and strictly construed in favor of 
preexisting rights, could provide.38     
Yet when it came to interpreting the powers delegated to the federal government 
under the United States Constitution, Tucker’s analysis began not with the collective 
national people or with individuals. It began with the states as political entities and with 
the presumption that, with respect to the Federal government, each of the states retained 
all the independent “sovereignty” (derived from their respective peoples) that they had 
                                                
35 Editor’s Appendix, Note A, in Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 1:4.  
36 See “View of the Constitution of the United States,” Editor’s Appendix, Note D, in ibid., 1:143, 154; “Of 
the Several Forms of Government,” Editor’s Appendix, Note B, in ibid., 1:14. 
37 Editor’s Appendix, Note A, in ibid., 1:5. 
38 “View of the Constitution of the United States,” Editor’s Appendix, Note D, in ibid., 1:155.  
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first acquired at the moment of Independence.39 Both the Articles of Confederation and 
the Constitution formed “compact[s]” between the sovereign states by which the states 
provisionally granted to the federal government, by plain written specification, 
designated powers, reserving all others to the states and their respective peoples through 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.40 No such delegation, however, compromised the 
states’ essential independence or “sovereignty” within the union. At the same time, any 
power specified in the Constitution that the states did not possess and therefore could not 
alienate must perforce have flowed from the people. Tucker therefore recognized that the 
government created by the Constitution had both a federal character insofar as it derived 
from the states; and a national character insofar as it derived from the people.41 The 
“federal compact” encompassed purely federal concerns defined as relating either to the 
union’s relationship to foreign nations or to the relationship between the states; while the 
national compact staked out a narrow residual zone that should not in any case encroach 
upon the states’ internal affairs. In cases of conflict to the potential detriment of states’ 
rights under the federal compact, however, Tucker’s writings leave the conclusion 
inescapable that he believed the terms of the federal compact should prevail over the 
national one in favor of the states notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause.   
Over what exactly did the states retain “sovereignty,” according to Tucker? 
Everything, with narrowly construed exceptions. The states possessed “uncontrolled 
                                                
39 Ibid, 1:150. 
40 Ibid., 1:141 (defining a “federal compact”).  
41 He quoted at length James Madison’s tortuous analysis of the federal government’s hybrid character in 
The Federalist No. 39. Ibid., 1:146. 
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jurisdiction over all cases of [internal] municipal law.”42 Tucker adopted the presumption 
that both in 1781 (adoption of the Articles) and at ratification the states, as independent 
sovereigns, did not voluntarily concede any of this jurisdiction to the federal government. 
Therefore any federal power construed in a way that might “derogate[] from the 
antecedent rights and jurisdiction of the state making the concession” required the 
strictest construction.43 On this view, the Necessary and Proper Clause became simply a 
clarification of those principles of limited government already presupposed by the 
Constitution’s enumerated powers, written constitutions, and popular sovereignty.44 In 
adjudging the Fifth Congress’s provision for a volunteer corps under the President’s 
exclusive authority unconstitutional under the militia clauses alone, Tucker’s strict 
construction of the Constitution’s military provisions essentially interpreted out of the 
document Congress’s power “[t]o raise and support Armies” and to prescribe uniform 
militia discipline, to say nothing of the President’s status as commander-in-chief of “the 
Army” in possession of “executive power.”45 When Tucker’s construction of a given 
enumerated power did not suffice to protect the states, Tucker stood ready to proclaim it a 
voidable violation of the federal compact, even if “constitutional” in the strict sense. 
Tucker, for example, considered Article II, as written, voidable insofar as it failed to 
provide specific internal textual limitations on executive power in the way that Articles I 
and III did.46 He also declared the Bankruptcy Clause unconstitutional on the grounds 
                                                
42 “View of the Constitution of the United States,” Editor’s Appendix, Note D, in Tucker, Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, 1:152.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 1:286-88. 
45 Ibid., 1:273-74.  
46 Ibid., 1:348. 
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that it required uniform laws among the states in an area otherwise “municipal” and not 
“federal.”47  
It followed from Tucker’s expansive conception of state-controlled “municipal 
law,” moreover, that each of the several states retained exclusive and independent 
jurisdiction over the entire English legal inheritance, including English statutes and the 
common law. Tucker’s sixty-page essay on this topic contended vigorously that the states 
remained the only proper repositories for the common law and that no federal common 
law of the type asserted by certain Federalist judges could ever exist in the United States 
consistent with the sovereign rights of states.48 Although it borrowed greatly from the 
Virginia Report of 1799, this essay must stand as one of the key literary achievements in 
a Jeffersonian jurisprudential cause that enjoyed relative success in the short-term insofar 
as the United States Supreme Court would soon ratify Tucker’s understanding in federal 
criminal matters.49  
In St. George Tucker’s commentaries, then, we pass from a jurisprudence of 
power to a jurisprudence of right, and from a constitutionalism concerned with coercion 
to one concerned with protection. In his episodic appeals to history, Tucker could not 
help but gesture toward the coercion problem in 1787 and acknowledge that the 
Constitution provided a solution: “The mild tone of requisition was exchanged for the 
                                                
47 Ibid., 1:177. Tucker believed that Congress’s exclusive right of legislation over seats of government 
constituted “a power, probably, more extensive than it was in the contemplation of the framers of the 
constitution to grant.” Ibid., 1:276  In the only Marshall Court opinion in which Marshall himself dissented, 
the Supreme Court later interpreted the Bankruptcy Clause to permit some state legislation in the area of 
insolvency protection. See Ogden v. Sanders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213 (1827).   
48 “Of the Unwritten, or Common Law of England; and It's Introduction into, and Authority within the 
United American States,” Editor’s Appendix, Note E, in Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 1:378-449. 
49 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).   
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active operations of power . . .”50 Yet the outstanding enforcement problem studied in 
Tucker’s constitutional jurisprudence concerned not how to enforce federal law and 
authority against the states and individuals, but how to enforce the rights of states against 
federal law and authority.  
Did Tucker’s states’ rights constitutionalism lead him to believe that a minority of 
states acting outside constitutional processes possessed power to nullify a federal law so 
as to relieve themselves and their peoples from adhering to it? Alternatively, could a state 
constitutionally secede from the union? Historians have devoted considerable attention to 
these questions in the context of inquiring whether the early Jeffersonians shared the 
understandings of southern nullifiers and secessionists in period leading up to the Civil 
War.51 While Tucker conceded that “the states possess no constitutional negative upon 
the proceedings of Congress” in the way that the President did, he held that the states 
unquestionably had a right to constitutional revolution in the event that, for whatever 
reason, they came to perceive the federal compact as too oppressive.52 When the federal 
government abused its power, moreover, Tucker thought each state obligated to “arrest[] 
the progress of the evil” so as to protect the “rights” and “liberties” of their respective 
peoples. Still, Tucker, and for that matter most of his prominent Virginia brethren at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, remained a bit too close to the constitutional realities of 
1787 to publically endorse state nullification powers with respect to specific federal laws. 
                                                
50 “View of the Constitution of the United States,” Editor’s Appendix, Note D, in Tucker, Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, 1:150. 
51 For one illuminating discussion of scholarly claims in this area, see Elkins and McKitrick, Age of 
Federalism, 719-21. 
52 Editor’s Appendix, Notes D and B, in Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 1:314, 12. In support of the 
latter proposition, Tucker cited Scottish ethical philosopher Thomas Hutchinson. Editor’s Appendix, Note 
B, in ibid., 1:12 note. 
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But with regard to secession, Tucker did not equivocate: The federal compact theory 
presupposed a retained power in each state to “withdraw[] itself from the confederation 
without the consent of the rest” at any time, for any reason. Neither the Articles nor the 
Constitution had “diminished” this right.53  
Gazing backward from the Civil War, the foregoing language would have seemed 
portentous. In its own time, Tucker’s states’ rights constitutional jurisprudence did not 
represent views shared by the community at large outside Virginia. Not a single 
additional state signed on to the oft-discussed Virginia or Kentucky Resolutions and 
nothing in the Jeffersonian victory in 1800 immediately altered the general consensus 
against asserted state nullification and secession rights. 54  Nor did states’ rights 
constitutionalism generally have much of an influence on the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in the early national period. To the contrary, by all appearances John 
Marshall’s ascendance to the Chief Justice position commenced a long period during 
which, by any honest historian’s reading, a far more nationalistic orientation with clear 
Hamiltonian origins animated the Court’s decisions. With this said, however, the 
Marshall Court could have never achieved so much in the age of Jefferson had its 
jurisprudence not accommodated the Revolution of 1800 to some extent. 
Marshallian Constitutional Jurisprudence 
How did it do so? For one, as we have suggested, in response to the Chase 
controversy and the constitutional constructions of judicial power that it produced, the 
Court withdrew the judicial office from partisan politics and sought in the first instance to 
                                                
53 “Of the Several Forms of Government,” Editor’s Appendix, Note B, in ibid., 1:74-75. 
54 This helps explain why the Harford Convention failed. 
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avoid direct partisan controversy and, in the next, to rest its pronouncements on shared 
constitutional values that transcended temporary political majorities.55 Most importantly, 
however, and more obviously favorable to the Jeffersonians in 1800, the Court conceded 
the federal judiciary’s near-complete jurisdictional dependence on Congress. The 
doctrine of jurisdictional dependence, to be sure, had earlier roots—in the Judiciary Act 
itself, in Justice Iredell’s opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, and in the Ellsworth majority’s 
position in Wiscart v. Dauchy. 56  The Marshall Court, however, presided over its 
extension into new areas. In countenancing the Jeffersonians’ repeal of the Judiciary Act 
of 1801, for example, Stuart v. Laird (1803) upheld Congress’s power to abolish inferior 
federal courts and associated judicial offices notwithstanding constitutional life tenure 
and salary guarantees.57 In United States v. More (1805), the Court denied itself the 
authority to hear criminal appeals from the circuit courts on the grounds that Congress’s 
grant of jurisdiction in some cases eliminated it in all others.58 Finally, the Jeffersonians 
could claim at least a partial victory in the Court’s decision in United States v. Hudson & 
Goodwin, which substantially constitutionalized Jeffersonian understandings in the 
limited sphere of common law crimes.59 
In exchange for such concessions, however, the Jeffersonians in Congress stood 
aside as the Court carved out for itself a central position within the constitutional order 
                                                
55 This roughly tracks the argument in Nelson, “Eighteenth-Century Background.” 
56 For Iredell’s dissenting opinion in Chisholm, see 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
See also Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). 
57 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). St. George Tucker thought this principle contradicted 
judicial independence because it allowed Congress, in effect, to fire judges at will. See “View of the 
Constitution of the United States,” Editor’s Appendix, Note D, in Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
1:360-61. In his capacity as a state judge, Tucker held that the Virginia legislature could not abolish courts 
provided for in the Virginia constitution. See Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va.  (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 86, 92-93 (1793). 
58 United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805).  
59 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
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that advanced the original Federalist vision and denied key premises underlying Tucker’s 
constitutionalism. The Court’s withdrawal from partisan politics and embrace of shared 
constitutional values, while not without Jeffersonian influence, actually operated against 
Jeffersonians committed to states’ rights; for, as a juridical matter, those shared 
constitutional values found expression primarily in the Constitution itself and Marshall 
adopted a nationalist reading on the Constitution. Sometimes the Court’s abnegations of 
jurisdiction, moreover, provided optical cover for significant arrogations of judicial 
power. Marbury v. Madison stands as the clearest case in point. There the Court 
succeeded in declaring for itself a supreme power of judicial review and a privileged 
status as interpreter of the Constitution in the final resort. It did so, however, by declining 
to exercise any judicial power whatsoever over the case at bar.60  
Marbury itself involved the separation of powers and the Court ultimately 
invalidated mandamus provisions of the Judiciary Act. As such, the decision remains 
unrepresentative insofar as the Marshall Court would never again invalidate an act of 
Congress. The pivotal early cases, of course, concerned not the relationships among the 
different departments of the federal government, but the relationship between the federal 
government and the states. And here, time and again, the Marshall Court ruled against the 
states and in favor of the federal government’s independence and legal supremacy within 
its sphere. These cases gave Marshall ample occasion to strengthen the Court’s role in the 
                                                
60 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
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preservation and defense of federal power vis-à-vis the states in justiciable cases or 
controversies.61  
In part, this endeavor involved defending judicial ground already take by the Jay 
and Ellsworth Courts. To be sure, the Marshall Court never hesitated to strike down state 
laws inconsistent with treaties, Congress’s authority, or Article I, Section 10.62 Equally 
significant, against considerable challenges registered by the Virginians, the Court 
effectively preserved its constitutional supremacy over the state high courts in cases 
where state law encroached upon federal authority and established the critical principle 
that the Constitution prohibited state authorities from interfering with the federal judicial 
process.63 Finally, as we saw in the last chapter, in the Eleventh Amendment’s wake 
perhaps the Court’s most enduring achievement in the area of superintending the states 
lay in its reservation of prospective injunctive powers over individual officials charged 
with enforcing unconstitutional state laws.64 
                                                
61 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 387-88 (1821) (“No government ought to be so defective 
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other dangers than those which occur every day. Courts of justice are the means most usually employed, 
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62 As to treaties, see Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816); as to federal law, see 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 
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Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), and Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 
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63 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).  
64 See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 739 (holding that Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits against “officers 
and agents of the State, who are intrusted with the execution of [] [state] laws”) (syllabus). In 1908, the 
Supreme Court later confirmed the availability of prospective injunctive jurisdiction over state enforcement 
officials charged with enforcing laws deemed unconstitutional. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150-52 
(1908) (citing nineteenth-century cases). In the sole dissent, Justice Harlan declared that the principle 
endorsed by the Court would “work a radical change in our governmental system” that would enable even 
inferior federal courts “to supervise and control the official action of the States as if they were 
‘dependencies’ or provinces.” Ibid., 175. After the decision in Ex Parte Young, Congress mandated that 
only three-judge district courts could issue injunctive relief in cases challenging the constitutionality of 
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In all these ways, the Court shored up judicial power within the constitutional 
order notwithstanding Jeffersonian constitutionalism. Jeffersonian strict construction as 
expressed in the jurisprudence of St. George Tucker found no place in the Marshallian 
legal vision because the Court rejected the federal compact theory on which Tucker based 
his rule of construction. The states did not create the Constitution as Tucker and the 
Jeffersonians had felt so confident in asserting. Rather, as Justice Story put it in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee (1812), “The Constitution of the United States was ordained and 
established . . . emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declares, by ‘the people 
of the United States.’”65 The Marshallians thus refused to concede any federal character 
in the act of ratification. The states had no rights vis-à-vis federal power, broadly 
construed, because all power under the Constitution flowed from the people themselves 
whom the Marshallians, unlike Tucker, deemed separable from and supreme to the 
states.66  
That in the above quote Justice Story put a certain operative phrase in quotation 
marks, however, has significance here that distinguishes Marshallian appeals to the 
people. For the Marshallians, in short, the act of ratification transformed the people 
themselves from a live quantity to a purely textual quantity within the constitutional 
order. The people’s legal existence thereafter fell strictly within the four corners of the 
Constitution to remain a stationary object for judicial inspection and interpretation. The 
Constitution, on this view, made it the judicial department’s special duty to represent the 
                                                                                                                                            
state laws, from whose decisions litigants could appeal directly to the Supreme Court.  See Act of June 18, 
1910, chap. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557. The current statute is at 28 U.S.C. § 2284.  
65 Martin, 14 U.S. at 324. 
66 See generally Barber, Fallacies of States’ Rights. 
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people so constituted against the states when necessary to resolve constitutional 
questions otherwise within the court’s jurisdiction.67  
In none of this did the Court proceed unopposed.68 The state governments resisted 
the Marshall Court’s advances at almost every turn. 69  While in the early period, 
moreover, Marshall could at least rely on an executive department willing to back up the 
Court’s decrees vis-à-vis the states with a credible threat of military coercion, that 
support nearly ran dry from the moment of Andrew Jackson’s inauguration. When 
Jackson famously flouted the Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia,70 he in effect 
gave presidential approval to Georgia’s defiant denial of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction 
over the states notwithstanding statute and precedent.71 The rights of states to interpret 
the Constitution for themselves based on the federal compact theory would find new 
expression and secure new discursive footholds in antebellum constitutional politics in 
the Missouri crisis, the Webster-Hayne debates, and then in the nullification controversy 
wherein states’ rights advocates pushed their case so far as to cross even Jackson’s 
threshold of tolerance. Finally. Marshall’s Jacksonian successor to the Chief Justice 
position, Roger Taney, would take judicial cognizance of states’ rights within the union 
to an extent that John Marshall would never have tolerated.    
                                                
67 Hamilton writing as Publius had earlier insinuated this result. See The Federalist No. 78, 436-42 (A. 
Hamilton).  
68 For controversies sparked by the Marshall Court’s decisions within the legal community in post-
Revolutionary Virginia, see Miller, Juries and Judges Versus the Law. 
69 President Madison prepared to mobilize federal forces to execute the Court’s judgment in United States 
v. Peters (1809) after the Governor of Pennsylvania called out the state militia to prevent it. See Nelson, 
“Eighteenth-Century Background,” 955; see also Chapter 10, Section III. Kentucky responded with 
comparable defiance to the Court’s decision in Green v. Biddle (1821). See Jessup, Reaction and 
Accommodation, 217-28; see also Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1 (1821).   
70 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1932).  
71 See Friedman, “History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,” 395. 
  444 
From Revolution to Civil War 
If the Jacksonians preferred Taney to Marshall, however, the whole spirit of 
Jacksonian democracy disfavored government by unelected independent judges in the 
first instance. Here the Jacksonians could identify with the more radical Jeffersonians 
before them, but substantially departed from the moderate Jeffersonians many of whom 
exited the Chase controversy with a redoubled commitment to judicial independence. 
Notwithstanding the Marshall Court’s achievements, The Democratic Review could assert 
in 1838 that “the judiciary system of the system of the United States is based on false 
principles” stemming from “the entire omission, in its organization, of the element of 
responsibility to public opinion.”72  State legislatures and constitutional conventions 
created elective judiciaries. 73  The legal profession, too, experienced a period of 
significant democratization in the age of Jackson.74 The old bar associations dissolved, 
barriers to entry fell away in many states, and the profession divided between the 
democratic codifiers and the common law’s conservative defenders.75  
Where earlier codifiers such as William Sampson had adopted the Napoleonic 
Code as their model and proposed to memorialize in a “judicial code” immutable 
universal principles of natural justice,76 the Jacksonians’ enthusiasm for democracy and 
faith in the common man produced a conceptual identification of law with popular will 
that defined the thinking of influential law reformers during this period. “All American 
                                                
72 “The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Judges and Jurisdiction,” in U.S. Mag. & Democratic Rev. 
1, no. 4 (Jan. 1838):144-45.  
73 On which see Shugerman, The People’s Courts; Friedman, History of American Law, 111, 323.   
74 See Bloomfield, “William Sampson and the Codifiers,” 249. 
75 Ibid., 250; see also Cook, American Codification Movement.   
76 Sampson, Discourse , 37. 
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law,” the fiery Bay State codifier Robert Rantoul declared, “must be statute law,” for 
only “[s]tatutes enacted by the legislature, speak the public voice.”77 Jacksonian codifiers 
therefore carried forward the egalitarian legal ideal earlier propounded by Benjamin 
Austin and Jesse Higgins.78  
The most profound critiques of the established legal order during this period, 
however, came from outside the legal profession and indeed outside legal or legislative 
institutions altogether, where the Jacksonian zeitgeist generated probably the most 
subversive, self-conscious attack on law itself ever to appear in American history. The 
individualistic spirit of the age sent many Americans looking for new realms of 
individual liberty beyond law’s reach. Over a century before F.A. Hayek’s writings, 
Jacksonians had begun to envision a spontaneous, self-regulating social order bereft of 
law as their governing normative paradigm. The first edition of The Democratic Review 
declared that law stood opposed to democracy and championed instead the “principle of 
FREEDOM” which would by itself produce “the best possible general result of order and 
happiness from the chaos of characters, ideas, notions and interests—human society.”79 
The “disorganizing, anarchical spirit” that filled the air in the 1830s led to considerable 
popular rioting and convention activity in numerous states.80 Apparently without any 
                                                
77 Rantoul, Memoirs, 281, 280. 
78 The rhetoric of anti-aristocracy pervaded Rantoul’s writings. See ibid., passim. It is conspicuously absent 
from Sampson’s. See Sampson, Discourse, passim. 
79 “Introduction,” U. S. Mag. & Democratic Rev. 1, no. 1 (Oct. 1837): 6. 
80 Evening Journal (Boston), Aug. 7, 1835, 2. On Jacksonian rioting, see Grimsted, “Rioting in Its 
Jacksonian Setting.” New York proved a hotbed for convention activity, particularly among the Loco-
Focos. In his call for a constitutional convention in 1837, John M. Hunt envisioned a “NEW 
CONSTITUTION, based not upon compromise, not upon any narrow views of temporary expediency, but 
upon the broad and eternal basis of RIGHT. We wish Law to become a mere echo of Conscience.” Byrdsall, 
History of the Loco-Foco, 150 (emphasis added). On New York Democrats’ movement for a new 
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sense of threatening the social order, radical Jacksonians revolted against virtually every 
form of legal or institutional restraint imposed upon them from without.81 While publicly 
critical of such popular subversions of the legal order, Jackson himself personified the 
subordination of law to individual character—an “anarchic hero” who without 
compunction thrust ahead with his decisions unaffected by popular support for a national 
bank, the Supreme Court’s judgment in favor of the Cherokees, or virtually any other 
legal norm or dictate inconsistent with his instincts.82 
The decline of Calvinism and the rise of perfectionism within antebellum culture 
seemed to render law’s traditional justifications—human vice and depravity—entirely 
anachronistic and inapplicable. The southern Jacksonian politician, ex-lawyer, and writer 
P.W. Grayson articulated one penetrating and influential critique of the law that reflected 
these perfectionist currents. Circulating widely within the emergent labor organizations in 
the seaport cities, Grayson’s Vice Unmasked (1830) contended that the “MACHINERY 
OF LAW” degraded man’s true “moral essence”—that is, his natural inclination to make 
                                                                                                                                            
constitution in the 1840s against the background of the Anti-Rent War, see Wilentz, Rise of American 
Democracy, 591-93. On the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island (1841-42), see Fritz, American Sovereigns, 
246-75; Dennison, Dorr War. Jacksonians fully supported Thomas Dorr and his followers’ effort to set up a 
revolutionary government to secure expanded suffrage. See “Rhode Island—Its Rightful Governor and 
Unrighteous Government,” U.S. Mag. & Democratic Rev. 15, no. 74 (Aug. 1844): 122. According to 
Lawrence Kohl, Jacksonians asserted “a kind of ‘domesticated’ right of revolution, a natural right to act 
outside the law which might be exercised in an orderly way within society.” Kohl, Politics of 
Individualism, 173-74. 
81 See Kohl, Politics of Individualism, 163. 
82 Grimsted, “Rioting,” 367. In diametric contrast to Europe, wrote one articulate defender of Jacksonian 
vigilantism, “in America the individual is all and society nothing . . . all aspects of the law are subordinated 
to individual right, which is the basis and essence of the republic.” Quoted in ibid., 366. Such views, 
however, met with significant Whig opposition. Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune, for example, declared 
in 1843 that “the essence of freedom consists in the supremacy of abstract law over personal will.” New 
York Tribune, Nov. 25, 1843. For an insightful discussion of the conflicts as well as the convergences 
between Jacksonian Democrats and the Whigs as to the place of law in a democratic society, see Kohl, 
Politics of Individualism, 145-85. 
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the “good of others” the natural object of his own “self-love.”83 Law severed man’s 
existential connection to others by cordoning off his property and rights, subordinating 
him to rules and then instigating quarrels about the application of those rules. Laws that 
“lashed” individuals into “the practice of the plain principles of right” made humans into 
mere machines and alienated man from his true moral self.84 In the instant of its coercive 
operation, law thus denied man the capacity to rule himself.85 Grayson’s solution? “The 
repeal of all law.” Only then could humans truly rule themselves. Only then could 
humans truly be themselves.86 
Grayson’s secularized antinomianism anticipated Emerson and the 
Transcendentalists whose widely read writings provided additional philosophical 
grounding for Jacksonian antilegalism. “The tendencies of the times,” Emerson wrote, 
“favor the idea of self-government, and leave the individual, for all code, to the rewards 
and penalties of his own constitution.”87 These anti-institutional intellectual orientations 
continued to find public expression well into the 1840s. In 1846, the editors of The 
Democratic Review confidently predicted that law and lawyers would soon wither away 
forever in America. An article entitled “Prospects of the Legal Profession in America” 
                                                
83 Grayson, Vice Unmasked. The Workingman’s Advocate reviewed the book, calling it the “production of 
an amiable and talented mind” and endorsing its conclusions. “Review,” Workingman’s Advocate 1, no. 19 
(Mar. 6, 1830): 19. Much of the antilegalism in the Jacksonian period came out of the Working Men’s 
movement. See Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology, 99-179; see also Wilentz, Chants Democratic, finding 
in the antebellum labor movement in the 1820s and 30s an artisan-based consciousness flowing from a 
shared commitment to republican principles of virtue, equality, and independence). 
84 Grayson, Vice Unmasked, 29. 
85 Ibid., 20, 15, 21, 28, 29. 
86 Ibid., 159. “That which must be done,” Grayson revealingly wrote, “is to . . . bid [Americans to] no 
longer worship the cold prescriptions of policy, for the warm principles of justice—to free his soul from 
the fetters of authority—to remit and exalt him to himself—to let him seek, by the light of his conscience 
alone, in the joyous, genial climate of his own free spirit, for all the rules of his conduct.” Ibid., 168. 
87 “Politics,” in Emerson, Works, 1:178. 
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depicted legal institutions as obsolescent in a progressive democratic society committed 
to individual freedom.88 The democratic faith’s commitment to enlarging “the power of 
individuals” and thereby leaving “every man, as far as possible, to his own discretion,” 
had since Jefferson’s presidency substantially narrowed the government’s ability legally 
to interfere in the individual’s pursuits, the article observed.89 The inverse relationship 
between the individual and the law, and the whole “tendency” of American society 
toward the former’s ultimate supremacy, meant that over time the “sources of 
litigation”—which could only “spring from a violation, alleged or real, of some existing 
law”—would simply dry up.90  
As to the fate of lawyers in America, the editors wrote that the “individualization 
of our people” had resulted in “an overthrow of the ancient dignities and eminence of the 
legal profession,” whose members had therefore degenerated into mere “clerks.”91 In a 
society where “[e]veryman’s love of his own rights makes him respect the rights of 
others” and where “the people are denied no important rights,” the lawyer could never 
again boast a distinguished position.92 Indeed, “the great mass of [the lawyer’s] pure law 
learning might be erased from his mind without materially impairing his interest as a 
companion, or his usefulness and value as a citizen.”93  
The Review’s unqualified faith that the sequence of events it envisioned—
including the extinction of all law and lawyers—would soon enough come to fruition is 
                                                
88 “Prospects of the Legal Profession in America,” U.S. Mag. & Democratic Rev. 18, no. 91 (Jan. 1846): 
26. 
89 Ibid., 27, 28. 
90 Ibid., 27. 
91 Ibid.   
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 29. 
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quite remarkable. The editors equated the emergence of the self-reliant individual to 
replace legal institutions with the emergence of “Truth” itself, a manifest destiny. This 
irresistible cultural tendency drawing Americans away from a society governed by law 
and lawyers, the editors concluded, would “never quiet until it has vindicated its entire 
and absolute supremacy.”94  
Soon enough, of course, the slavery question would eclipse every other issue in 
American law, politics, and constitutionalism. Beginning in the late 1840s, Southern 
slave interests commandeered American constitutional politics and St. George Tucker’s 
states’ rights constitutionalism rose again in a blaze of glory in defense of an institution 
that Tucker himself abhorred. Yet to reduce the debates over slavery to Jeffersonian 
states’ rights versus Marshallian nationalism obscures the deeper post-Revolutionary 
context within which the debates occurred. “Prior to the Southern Rebellion,” Orestes 
Brownson wrote in 1865, “nearly every American asserted . . . ‘the sacred right of 
insurrection’ or revolution, and sympathized with insurrectionists, rebels and 
revolutionists . . . . [T]reason was regarded as a virtue, and traitors were honored, feasted 
and eulogized as patriots.” Until the Civil War, Brownson suggested, the “political 
tradition” spawned by the American Revolution had prevented Americans from truly 
                                                
94 Ibid., 28. In an article on the women’s movement, Putnam’s Magazine concluded that it was “too late” 
for women to retrieve “dignity” by recourse to the “learned professions”: “Democracy has so shattered the 
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American Literature, Science, and Art 1, no. 3 (Mar. 1853): 279. For other writings in The Democratic 
Review criticizing legal institutions in the 1840s, see “The Abuses of Law Courts,” U.S. Mag. & 
Democratic Rev. 21, no. 112 (Oct. 1847): 305-312; and “Law Reform,” U.S. Mag. & Democratic Rev. 21, 
no. 114 (Dec. 1847): 477-487. 
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recognizing “a power, force or will that governs distinct from that which is governed.”95 
The slavery debates provided a powerful outlet for these legally subversive impulses that 
Brownson linked to the American Revolution’s cardinal principle: “Individuals create 
civil society and may uncreate it whenever they judge it advisable.”96  
This principle, from Brownson’s view, had torn the nation asunder. Had not 
abolitionists and slave masters alike cited to the American Revolution in support of their 
cause? And had not each side, on this ground, threatened secession? Had not each 
asserted nullification powers resting in mere parts of the union? With the Declaration of 
Independence never far from reach, anti-slavery thinkers in the North leveraged the age’s 
antinomian faith in the supreme authority of the individual conscience into a 
thoroughgoing moral attack on the peculiar institution and on any law, lawyer, or 
politician that even implicitly tolerated or supported it. Whether articulated by St. George 
Tucker or John C. Calhoun, moreover, the federal compact theory meant that vis-à-vis the 
states the federal government lacked the very component that the framers deemed most 
essential to cure the Articles of Confederation’s defects: legitimate coercive power. 
 And yet it stands as a testament to John Marshall’s  legacy that, as the 1850s 
proceeded, notwithstanding the cross-currents of post-Revolutionary antilegalism that 
convulsed American legal culture, increasing numbers of Americans began to look to the 
nation’s high court to finally settle the slavery question.97 Delaware Senator John 
                                                
95 Brownson, American Republic, 48, 20. 
96 Ibid., 47. 
97 See “Appellate Jurisdiction of the Federal, over the State Courts,” 150-52; Speech of Sen. Stephen A. 
Douglas, July 2, 1856, in Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 797; Speech of Sen. Albert G. Brown, July 2, 
1856, in ibid., 801; Speech of Abraham Lincoln, July 23, 1856, Galena, Illinois, in Lincoln, Collected 
Works, 2:355.  
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Clayton’s 1848 proposal to take the slavery question out of matters “merely political” and 
to “refer the whole matter to the Judiciary,” inaugurated a nine-year public debate on this 
option’s propriety in which many participants began to view the Court through primarily 
partisan lenses, turning to the Court to uphold their side in the controversy.98 The Court 
had learned well from the early national judicial controversies that the judges should not 
as a prudential matter entangle themselves in partisan politics. When in Dred Scott, 
however, Justice Taney for all intents and purposes aligned the Court with the southern 
section’s constitutional position, the political firestorm that ensued all but guaranteed that 
the conflict would never see a peaceable resolution in the judicial department.99 Even if, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, the Court’s supremacy within the constitutional order 
escaped serious controversy in Dred Scott’s immediate aftermath, the coercion of law had 
nevertheless failed at its taproot—public acquiescence.100 With the political process at an 
impasse, this left only one option for the national government within the constitutional 
structure of coercion when shots rang out at Fort Sumter.  
 
 
                                                
98 For Senator Clayton’s proposal to this effect, see Cong. Globe, 30th Congress, 1st Sess. 988 (1848). For a 
useful discussion of these deabtes, see Friedman, “History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,” 413-15.   
99 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U,S, (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
100 See Friedman, “History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,” 426-31.   
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